JUDGMENT Yashoda Nandan, J.: - This appeal by the workmen of the respondent company No. 1' is directed against the judgment of a learned single Judge, allowing the writ petition at the instance of the respondent company and quashing an award of the Labour Court, Lucknow, which has been impleaded as respondent No. 3. The material facts giving rise to this appeal are that the appellants, who were employed as Time Keepers pressed a demand for being upgraded to Grade 'B' of the clerical staff of the respondent company and being accorded the scale of Rs. 100-250. Their demand not being acceptable to the management, their claim was sponsored by respondent No. 2 Hind Mazdoor Sabha. The conciliation proceedings proved futile and consequently the State Government referred to the Labour Court under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, the following dispute for adjudication : "Kya Sevayojko Dwara Parist Me Uliakhit Shramiko Ko Likhit Sreni (B) Tatha Vetan Kram Rupiya 100-250 Diya Jana Uchit Tatha Vaidhanik Hai Yadi Nahi, To Sambandhit Shramik Kis Tithi Se Kis Labh Chati Purti Ke Adhi-Kari Hai Evam Kis Vivran Ke Sath ?" 2. Written statements were exchanged between the parties and on a consideration of the pleadings and the evidence led the Labour Court gave an award to the effect that the workmen mentioned in the order of reference be placed in Grade 'B' of the clerical-staff of the Company concerned and be accorded the wage scale of Rs. 100-250 with effect from 1st of August 1970. It further awarded that for the period commencing 1st of August 1970, the workmen shall be paid the resultant difference in their wages. An amount of Rs. 150/- was also awarded to the appellants workmen as costs. Aggrieved by the award which was enforced by the State Government by means of a notification dated 11th of October. 1971, the respondent company filed a writ petition challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It was prayed that a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus be issued directing the respondents to the writ petition not to enforce the award of the Labour Court dated 21st February 1972. 1971, the respondent company filed a writ petition challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It was prayed that a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus be issued directing the respondents to the writ petition not to enforce the award of the Labour Court dated 21st February 1972. The learned Single Judge, who heard the petition took the view that the dispute raised by the workmen and referred to the Labour Court for adjudication amounted to one for promotion and relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Brooke Bond India (P.) Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1966 SC 668 held that promotion being a management function it was not open to the Labour Court to give the award it did. The writ petition was consequently allowed and the impugned order quashed. No costs were awarded to the successful Company. 3. In this appeal before us Sri K. P. Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for the appellants workmen, contended that in its true nature the dispute referred for adjudication to the Labour Court was not one in which the workmen claimed promotion and the learned single Judge had erred in relying on the decision of the Supreme Court mentioned above and in quashing the award. Sri M. K Katju learned counsel appearing for the respondent company on the other hand strongly contended that in substance the workmen claimed promotion and in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court on which the reliance was placed by him during the course of arguments, the learned single Judge was right in the view taken by him and in quashing the award. 4. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and having examined the material on record we are of the opinion that the contention raised by counsel for the appellants must prevail. 5. The admitted facts are that the clerical staff of the respondent company was placed in three grades as a consequence of Adjudication Case No. 35 of 1966. The pay scale of the clerical staff of Grade 'A' was Rs. 150-300; that of the clerical staff in Grade 'B' of Rs. 100-250 and of those in Grade 'C' was Rs. 75-150. The time Department of the respondent company consisted at all relevant times of one Head Time Keeper and three Time Keepers. The pay scale of the clerical staff of Grade 'A' was Rs. 150-300; that of the clerical staff in Grade 'B' of Rs. 100-250 and of those in Grade 'C' was Rs. 75-150. The time Department of the respondent company consisted at all relevant times of one Head Time Keeper and three Time Keepers. Since the award in Adjudication Case No. 35 of 1966, the Head Time Keeper was allocated to Grade 'B' of the clerical staff and thus was placed in the time scale of Rs. 100-250. The three appellants, who were the only time keepers employed by the company were allocated to Grade 'C' of Clerical Staff and were placed in the wage scale of Rs. 75-150. On the 1st of August, 1970 the post of Head Time Keeper was upgraded to Grade 'A' and he was placed in the wage scale of that category. Till 1st of August 1970 the difference in the pay scale of Head Time Keeper and the appellants Time Keepers was only of one Grade. After 1st of August 1970 when the post of Head Time Keeper was upgraded to category 'A' the difference in their wage scales escalated to two degrees. The workmen claimed that there had been no alteration in the comparative responsibilities and duties of the Head Time Keeper and the Time Keepers and consequently the increase in the difference between their wage scales was unjustified. The workmen in their written statement asserted that in the report of various Wage Boards constituted for different industries, it had been invariably held that only one degree of difference between the wage scales of Head Time Keepers and Time Keepers was called for. In the written statement filed on behalf of the management it was stated that the claimants had been getting the benefit of Grade 'C' and they were non-graduates and had no special performance to merit promotion. It was asserted that promotion from a lower grade to higher grade is purely discretionary with the management. It was prayed by the management that the Labour Court be pleased to hold that the reference by the Government was bad and mala fide and it be further pleased to hold that the workmen were not entitled to any relief. It was asserted that promotion from a lower grade to higher grade is purely discretionary with the management. It was prayed by the management that the Labour Court be pleased to hold that the reference by the Government was bad and mala fide and it be further pleased to hold that the workmen were not entitled to any relief. The assertion by the management that the dispute raised by the workmen amounted to a claim for promotion was disputed by the workmen by means of a rejoinder written statement. They stated that the dispute referred was not concerned with the promotion motion of the workmen but involved their categorisation to a higher grade taking into account their skill and responsibilities. It was further stated that for the clerical staff of Grade 'B', graduation was not a requisite qualification. In their rejoinder written statement it was not disputed by the management that for allocation to Grade 'B' holding of a bachelor's degree was not a required qualification. The management stated that in fact the post of Head Time Keeper had been upgraded and there was no case of general increment which could be claimed by the workmen. It was further stated that it was only the desire of the management to upgrade the post of Head Time Keeper and place more responsibility on him. The material issue before the Labour Court on the pleadings exchanged was as to whether the workmen claim amounted to one for promotion. The Labour Court took the view that it was essential for a just and satisfactory wage structure that the differential in pay scales and grades of different categories of workmen be based on rational grounds. The Labour Court took the view that if the differential in the wage scale of different categories of workmen was illogical and with out any just basis, dis-satisfaction among workmen was bound to grow as a consequence. The Labour Court held that since the award in Adjudication Case No. 35 of 1966, the difference in the wage scales between Head Time Keeper and the Time Keepers had been of only one degree. It was held that no evidence had been led to show that since 1st of August 1970 there had been any alteration in the comparative duties and responsibilities of the Head Time Keeper and the Time Keepers. It was held that no evidence had been led to show that since 1st of August 1970 there had been any alteration in the comparative duties and responsibilities of the Head Time Keeper and the Time Keepers. The Labour Court observed that the only evidence led by the Management was to the effect that the post of Head Time Keeper carried more responsibility than that of Time Keepers. It was held that even in 1966 the post of Head Time Keeper carried greater responsibility but there was nothing to show that any additional responsibility or the requirement of greater qualification was the cause of the higher wage scale accorded to the Head Time Keeper since the 1st of August 1970. In this view of the matter the Labour Court concluded that in fairness, the Management should have maintained the differential in degree between the wage scale of the Head Time Keeper and the Time Keepers. The disputes between the parties according to the Labour Court was only one of upgrading and not one involving promotion. 6. We are in complete agreement with the reasoning of the Labour Court and the conclusion arrived at by it. Un-disputably the workmen concerned did not lay claim to any post other than the one already held by them. In substance their claim was that since there had been no change in their comparative duties and responsibilities, there was no justification for the management to increase further the differential between the pay scales of the Head Time Keeper and that of themselves. In essence the workmen merely asserted that since the Head Time Keeper's responsibilities and qualifications had remained constant and yet his wage scale had been improved, in fairness their wage scale should also be enhanced. They merely asserted their right to a better wage scale in view of the undisputed circumstances. It must be borne in mind that the Time Department of the respondent company consisted only of the three appellants holding the post of Time Keepers and they claimed to be placed in a higher category carrying a better pay scale. It is worthy of note that according to the management itself the Head Time Keeper had not been promoted but his post had merely been upgraded. The Time Keepers similarly desired upgrading to a higher category. 7. It is worthy of note that according to the management itself the Head Time Keeper had not been promoted but his post had merely been upgraded. The Time Keepers similarly desired upgrading to a higher category. 7. Since the learned Judge relied on a decision of the Supreme Court and before us learned counsel for the management brought to our notice two others of the same Court, we feel called up to express our opinion on the question as to when promotion has to be considered all managerial function ousting the jurisdiction of Labour Courts from arrogating to themselves such functions. It must be kept in mind that the Supreme Court in all the three decisions cited before us has merely held that promotion is 'normally' a managerial function and has not declared that promotion is invariably all managerial function. Instances are conceivable where under the rules or Standing Orders applicable or the conventions prevailing promotions to certain jobs might have seniority alone as the criterion. In cases of this type the management has no discretion and there is no element of choice involved. Promotions in such cases cannot be characterised as a managerial function. In the large majority of cases however, promotion to higher posts results not only in better wage scales for the promoted workmen but usually if not invariably necessitates a process of selection from out of those eligible because the higher post would carry greater responsibilities and call for keener capabilities. Promotions of this character would necessitate a consideration of the comparative suitability of the eligible workmen. Such a selective process would require a consideration not 'only of the past performance of those eligible but necessitate the making of a comparative estimate of their skill, some times of a technical nature their personality, capacity to discharge the heavier responsibilities and similar other factors. Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunal are hardly fitted or equipped technically or otherwise to take upon themselves the task of making such selections. The entrepreneur on the other hand is best qualified to discharge this function. If the choice of the management is not mala fide and no element of victimisation has entered into it, there would be no scope in such cases for interference merely because those not selected are dissatisfied and discontented. The entrepreneur on the other hand is best qualified to discharge this function. If the choice of the management is not mala fide and no element of victimisation has entered into it, there would be no scope in such cases for interference merely because those not selected are dissatisfied and discontented. Even if the Labour Court or Tribunal concerned comes to the conclusion that the promotion is the outcome of victimisation of those overlooked 't cannot itself embark on making a selection for promotion, for the simple reason that it is not equipped by training and otherwise to undertake the task. It has in such cases merely jurisdiction to set aside the promotion which led to the dispute and to order the management to make a fresh selection confining itself to relevant considerations. It must be borne in mind that though the immediate objective of all labour legislation's is maintenance of industrial peace that is not an end in itself. The ultimate purpose of all labour legislation is the socio-economic well-being of the community as such. A dissatisfied labour force endangers the economic stability of the nation. On the other hand if those not suited to discharge the functions of a higher post are promoted by Labour Courts or Industrial Tribunals which do not possess the requisite background qualifying them to undertake the task of making selections, industrial progress is bound to be jeopardised to the detriment of national economy. That is why in the decisions to be adverted to by us presently the Supreme Court has merely held that promotion is 'normally' a managerial function and has not considered it to be a management discretion in every case. 8. The views expressed by us do not, in any fashion, run counter to the decisions of the Supreme Court relied on by learned counsel for the respondent Company, one of which has been cited by the learned single Judge. The facts giving rise to the decision in Brooke Bond India Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1966 SC 668 were that the appellant concern had promoted Manerikar and Dhume, two of its employees from Grade 'A' to Grade 'B' on the 1st of April 1959. As a result of these promotions Manerikar superseded one employee while Dhume superseded six employees. A dispute was raised by the affected workmen on account of their supersession. As a result of these promotions Manerikar superseded one employee while Dhume superseded six employees. A dispute was raised by the affected workmen on account of their supersession. This was based on an earlier award with reference to the appellant concerned by the National Tribunal which provided as follows : "All things being equal seniority shall count for promotion. If the senior person has been overlooked in the question of promotion, he is at liberty to ask the concern for the reason why he has been overlooked in which case the concern shall give him the reasons provided that it does not expose the concern or the officer giving reasons, to any civil or criminal proceedings." 9. When the supersession became known the management was asked to give the reason and it gave the same and said that in making promotions it took into consideration the merit, personality and suitability of the employees. Dissatisfied with their supersession, the workmen raised a dispute which was referred to the Industrial Tribunal by the Government of Mysore in these terms : "Whether the promotion of Sriyuths P. D. Dhume and Y. S. Manerikar, superseding Sriyuths G. N. Kamat, B. V. Kulkarni, H. C. Deshpande, G. R. Balgi and D. N. Naik is justified If not, to what relief are the workmen entitled ?" 10. The case of the workmen before the Industrial Tribunal was that the action of the management was not bona fide, was taken to victimise the superseded employees on account of their trade union activities and that the reasons given for superseding the senior employees were vague and of a general character. The case of the appellant on the other hand was that seniority alone could not be criterion for making promotion and that other factors like merit, personality, etc. had to be taken into consideration. The appellant asserted that all these facts had been taken into consideration when the two promotions ins question were made. It was also stated that promotions were made after considering the qualities and abilities of the employees concerned. The appellant further denied either that there were any mala fides in the matter of these promotions or that the action was taken with a view to victimise those who had been superseded. 11. It was also stated that promotions were made after considering the qualities and abilities of the employees concerned. The appellant further denied either that there were any mala fides in the matter of these promotions or that the action was taken with a view to victimise those who had been superseded. 11. The tribunal recognised that normally the question of promotion was a management function and had to be left mainly to the discretion of the management which has to make a choice from among the employees for promotion. It, however, was of the view that in a pro' per case the workmen had a right to demand relief when just claims of the senior employees were overlooked by the management. The Industrial Tribunal therefore, first considered the question as to whether it was a case in which the workmen had the right particularly in view of the earlier adjudication in this very concern to demand that the two promotions made should be scrutinised by the Industrial Tribunal. It came to the conclusion that the action of the management was mala fide mainly because it took eleven weeks to reply to the query of the workmen asking for reasons for their supersession. It was of the view that the evasive replies and in ordinate delay showed that the two promotions were mala fide. The tribunal appeared to be of the view that the six employees were superseded on the consideration that they were more or less active members of the union and because of their trade union activities, though there was no specific finding to that effect. Thereafter the tribunal went into the merits of the case and considered the record of the six employees which were produced before it and came to the conclusion on that five of them were as good as those who had been promoted. The Tribunal finally ordered that these five employees should be promoted from Grade 'A' to Grade 'B' with effect from the date on which the other two persons were promoted. It further ordered that these persons be given their due place with respect to their seniority. It also ordered that they were entitled to increments which they would have got if they were promoted along with the two persons namely, Manerikar and Dhume. 12. It further ordered that these persons be given their due place with respect to their seniority. It also ordered that they were entitled to increments which they would have got if they were promoted along with the two persons namely, Manerikar and Dhume. 12. In the appeal before the Supreme Court the appellants attacked the correctness of the award on two main grounds. In the first place it was urged that on the face of it the award could not be sustained for there were only two promotions by the management and the tribunal, had ordered the management to promote five more persons. It was urged before the Supreme Court that the Tribunal could not do this even if it found that the promotions were not justified. It was contended that in any case there was no occasion to promote seven persons from the date from which these two promotions had been made, for on that date there were only two promotions to be made and what in effect the tribunal had done was to make seven promotions on that date. Secondly it was urged that the Tribunal's findings that there were mala fides and victimisation were based on no evidence. It was further urged that even if the tribunal found that there was case for interference with the promotions made, the tribunal should have set aside the promotion of Dhume, for Manerikar in any case was entitled to promotion being No. 2 in the seniority list and should have directed the appellant to promote another person in place of Dhume after considering all relevant factors. 13. The contentions raised on behalf of the appellant found favour with the Supreme Court. It was in this back-ground that the Supreme Court held that : "Generally speaking promotion is a management function; but it may be recognised that there may be occasions when a tribunal may have to interfere with promotions made by the management where it is felt that persons superseded have been so superseded on account of mala fides or victimisation. Even so after a finding of mala fides or victimisation, it is not the function of a tribunal to consider the merits of various employees, itself and then decide whom to promote or whom not to promote. Even so after a finding of mala fides or victimisation, it is not the function of a tribunal to consider the merits of various employees, itself and then decide whom to promote or whom not to promote. If any industrial tribunal finds that promotions have been made which are unjustified on the ground of mala fides or of victimisation, the proper course for it to take is to set aside the promotions and ask the management to consider the cases of superseded employees and decide for it self whom to promote, except of course the person whose promotion has been set aside by the tribunal." 14. The Supreme Court reversed the finding of the Industrial Tribunal that the workmen superseded had not been promoted on account of victimisation and as a consequence of their trade union activities. Having found that the findings of the Tribunal, that the relative merits were not fairly considered, that the promotions were mala fide and that there was victimisation, were based on no evidence and must therefore, be set aside, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no reason for the Tribunal to interfere with the promotions made by the management. A close study of this decision of the Supreme Court clearly shows that the workmen had laid a claim to a promotion post merely on the basis that they were senior to those who had been promoted and that their claims had been overlooked because of victimisation practised on them by the management. In the background of the fact that the post under consideration involved promotion on the basis of a comparative estimate of the merits of the candidates, the Supreme Court held that promotion was a management function because it necessitated the making of a choice from among the employees eligible. 15. Similar was the situation in the decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 354 of 1961, Brooke Bond (India) (P.) Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1963) 1 Lab LJ 256 (SC). The relevant facts leading up to the decision were that in November 1959 the appellant Company promoted two clerks Sankara Narayanan and Natarajan from Grade 'A' to Grade 'B' one Mr. Mani who was senior to both the promoted workmen, was not promoted. Dissatisfied with the supersession of Mani an Industrial dispute was raised and referred to an industrial Tribunal. The relevant facts leading up to the decision were that in November 1959 the appellant Company promoted two clerks Sankara Narayanan and Natarajan from Grade 'A' to Grade 'B' one Mr. Mani who was senior to both the promoted workmen, was not promoted. Dissatisfied with the supersession of Mani an Industrial dispute was raised and referred to an industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the appellant company was not just field in refusing to promote Mr. Mani and it accordingly directed the appellant to promote him to Grade 'B' with effect from 1st of April, 1959. From the decision of the Supreme Court it appears that the Tribunal had based its award substantially on the view that the failure to promote Mr. Mani was in violation of the direction issued by the National Industrial Tribunal in its award pronounced in 1959, relevant part of which has been quoted while discussing the decision of the Supreme Court referred to in an earlier part of the judgment. The Tribunal had held that from the records it appeared that Mr. Mani was not worse than the two persons who had been promoted and in a sense was their equal. The Tribunal further observed that the appellant had failed to give reasons for refusing to promote Mr. Mani as required by the award of the National Industrial Tribunal of the year 1959. 16. In the appeal before the Supreme Court it was urged that in making the award the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction. It was also urged that on the merits the award was unsustainable. The Supreme Court observed that : "there can be no doubt that promotions to which industrial employees are entitled normally would be treated as the function of the management, and so even the National Industrial Tribunal which dealt with this issue recognised that it must be left to the discretion of the management to select persons for promotion. On the other hand, labour also wants that the claims of employees who are eligible for promotion should be duly considered and so, the formula evolved by the National Industrial Tribunal requires that at a given time, if more than one person are eligible for promotion seniority should be taken into account and should prevail unless the eligible persons are not equal in merit. 16. 16. It is true that though promotion would normally be a part of the management function, if it appears that in promoting one employee in preference to another, the management has been actuated by malicious considerations or that the failure to promote one eligible person amounts to an unfair labour practice, that would be a different matter. But in the absence of mala fides, normally it must be left to the discretion of the management to select which of the employees should be promoted at a given time subject of course to the formula to which we have just referred." 17. The Supreme Court went on to observe that: "the tribunal seems to have taken the view that since Mr. Mani was working as an 'A' grade clerk and the two persons were also working as 'A' grade clerks, it followed that Mr. Mani was equal to the other two in all respects. In our opinion, this view is clearly erroneous. If this view were to be accepted as true, there would be no scope for determining the rival claims of persons claiming promotion on merits. In this company, there are three grades. grade 'A' which is the lowest grade 'B' which is higher than 'A', and grade 'C' which is the highest. It is common ground that in November 1959 all the three persons were working in grade 'A'. But surely, merely from the fact that the three persons were working in grade 'A', it does not follow that their merits were exactly the same and equal. The tribunal seems to have assumed that since Mani was working in grade 'A' he must be deemed to be equal to Sankara Narayanan and Natarajan. That, in our opinion, is the basic fallacy on which the award proceeds." 18. The Supreme Court held that the tribunal was in error in holding that the appellant was to blame for not giving reasons to Mr. Mani. The Supreme Court proceeded to observe that it was unfortunate that the Tribunal had failed to consider the evidence led before it on the merits of Mr. Mani's standing with the appellant. On a consideration of the evidence on record the Supreme Court held that in view of the admission made by Mr. Mani himself his work had not been satisfactory. Mani's standing with the appellant. On a consideration of the evidence on record the Supreme Court held that in view of the admission made by Mr. Mani himself his work had not been satisfactory. In consequence of the findings recorded by it the Supreme Court set aside the award of the Tribunal and upheld the supersession of Mani. From the facts as emerge from an analysis of this judgment it is evident that when the Supreme Court held that promotion to a higher post was normally a management function, it was concerned with a situation where the promotion involved a process of selection and an estimate of the comparative merits of those eligible to the promotion post. In our view the Supreme Court has emphasised in both the decisions cited above that promotion is "normally" a management function because cases might arise where promotion may be due to a workman as of right by reason of seniority without the involvement of any element of selection at all. 19. The third decision of the Supreme Court on which Sri Katju placed considerable reliance is that rendered in Civil Appeal No. 2325 of 1968 reported in 1974 Serv LJ 588 : (1974 Lab IC 128) (Sc). The facts of the case might be usefully noticed for a proper appreciation of the decision. One P. P. Jude was employed as Incharge of the Animal Feeding Stuff Department in the factory at Ghaziabad of the Hindusthan Lever Ltd. Ghaziabad. On 10th of April 1967 he was transferred as Incharge to the Engineering Store section. There were four grades of technical employees in the factory. The grades were called as Grade T-1; Grade T-2; Grade T-3 & Grade T-4, When P. P. Jude was working as Incharge of the Animal Feeding Stuff Department, he was in Grade T-3. He was claiming to be placed in Grade T-4, a higher grade. So there were two disputes in regard to him employment. The first with regard to his transfer from the Animal Feeding stuff Department to the Engineering Store Section and the second about his being given Grade T-4. These disputes were referred by the State Government for adjudication to Labour Court, Meerut. 20. The Labour Court framed five issues. One of them being; "whether P. P. Jude, was not placed in Grade T-4 because of his trade union activities ? These disputes were referred by the State Government for adjudication to Labour Court, Meerut. 20. The Labour Court framed five issues. One of them being; "whether P. P. Jude, was not placed in Grade T-4 because of his trade union activities ? The Labour Court found that there was no evidence to show that Jude had been victimised for his trade union activities. On merits the Labour Court seems to have taken the view that the work performed by the Incharge of Animal Feeding Stuff Department was one of the nature which was performed by an employee in Grade T-4. It took the view that as P. P. Jude was Incharge of the said Department, his case was really one of fitment in, and not promotion to Grade T-4. Accordingly the Labour Court held that his transfer from the department to the Engineering Store Section was not legal and unjustified and that he was entitled to be posted as the Incharge of his former department. It further held that he was entitled to be fitted in Grade T-4 with effect from December 30, 1967 the date of the reference of the dispute for adjudication. Labour Court gave its award in favour of the workmen. 21. Counsel for the appellant before the Supreme Court made five submissions. The only contention considered by it was as to whether the Labour Court had acted in excess of its jurisdiction in promoting P. P. Jude to Grade T-4 despite its finding that the workmen had failed to prove mala fide or victimisation on the part of the management. Delivering judgment on behalf of the Court S. N. Dwivedi, J. observed that : "It is true that if the case is one of fitment of P. P. Jude in Grade T-4, the award cannot be successfully attacked by the appellant. If, on the other hand, evidence on record shows that P. P. Jude has in effect been promoted to Grade T-4 the award will be defective and will have to be set aside." 22. The Supreme Court observed that the answer to the above mentioned question would turn on the view whether the work of the Incharge of Animal Feeding Stuff Department was of the nature of the work performed by an employee of Grade T-4. The Supreme Court found that there were six stores in the factory. They were Vanaspati Store. The Supreme Court observed that the answer to the above mentioned question would turn on the view whether the work of the Incharge of Animal Feeding Stuff Department was of the nature of the work performed by an employee of Grade T-4. The Supreme Court found that there were six stores in the factory. They were Vanaspati Store. Dehydrated Vegetable Store, Animal Feeding Stuff Department, two Oil Receiving Sections and Engineering Store. It was found that the Incharge employees of Engineering Store, Oil Receiving Section and Dehydrated Vegetable Store were in Grade T-4, but the employees incharge of the other stores were not entitled to be in Grade T-4. According to the statement of R. D. Rehna, personnel Manager of the appellant, there was no T-4 job in A. F. S. Department. Since the statement of R. D Rehna had remained unchallenged in the cross-examination and no evidence had been produced to the contrary on behalf of the workmen, the Supreme Court accepted the statement of Rehna to the effect that there was no T-4 job in the A. F. S. Department, The Supreme Court further found that the workmen had produced no evidence to prove that P. P. Jude was performing the work of an employee in Grade T-4. The Supreme Court consequently held that the Labour Court was manifestly wrong in its view that it was a case of fitment in Grade T-4, and not of promotion to that grade. In this background it was held that : "In our view, it is really a case of promotion from Grade T-3 to Grade T-4, and promotion is ordinarily a management function. In the absence of the finding of mala fide or victimisation of P. P. Jude for trade Union activities or any unfair labour practice, Labour could not arrogate to itself the promotional function of the management." In view of this finding the Labour Court's award directing the appellant to place P. P. Jude in Grade T-4 was held to be bad and was set aside. Since the Standing Orders of the employer concern provided that transfer of an employee from one department to another is at the discretion of the Manager provided that the terms and conditions of the employee were not adversely affected, the Labour Courts order directing the transfer of Jude to Animal Feeding Stuff Department was also found to be unjustified. Since the Standing Orders of the employer concern provided that transfer of an employee from one department to another is at the discretion of the Manager provided that the terms and conditions of the employee were not adversely affected, the Labour Courts order directing the transfer of Jude to Animal Feeding Stuff Department was also found to be unjustified. It is noteworthy that according to the finding of the Supreme Court there was no T-4 grade post in the Department in which Jude was employed. The dispute raised by Jude and referred for adjudication to the Labour Court consequently involved creation of a higher post and appointment of Jude to that post. This was manifestly a dispute involving promotion of Jude to a non-existent post. If a higher post had to be created it was for the management to appoint a person to that higher post on a consideration of the relative merits of those eligible for that post. It was in this sense that it was held that "normally" promotion was a management function and the Labour Court could not arrogate to itself that function. In view of our conclusion that the dispute referred to the Labour Court in the instant case was not in respect of any claim to promotion by the appellants neither the decision relied upon by the learned single Judge nor the other two decisions of the Supreme Court cited before us by learned counsel for the respondent company have any application to the facts of the case. With due reference to the learned single Judge, who decided the writ petition, we hold that the Labour Court acted within its jurisdiction in giving the award impugned in the writ petition. 23. For the reasons given, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and dismiss the writ petition. The appellant workmen will be entitled to their costs of this appeal as well as of the writ petition from the respondent company.