JUDGMENT P.C. Saxena, Member. - Three separate suits had been filed against the Gaon Sabha and the State of U.p, under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. In all these case the state filed written statement challenging the claims and the District Government Counsel (Revenue) appeared as its counsel in each. The subsequent history of the cases is interesting. 2. No Pairvi was done by the State after filing of the written statement. So far as the Gaon Sabha was concerned the summons had been served on the Pradhan by affixation in the presence of two witnesses and was, therefore, legally sufficient. The cases were decreed ex-parte against both state and the Goan Sabha on March 17, 1960. 3. The State alone filed restoration application against the ex parte decrees and these were allowed on June 28, 1960 on payment of costs by a certain date fixed by the Court. Several adjournment were allowed by the court for payment. When this was not made the restoration application were a month later and were dismissed. The state went up in litigation upto the Board of Revenue which on October 30, 1963 upheld the orders of the trial court. 4. It was now that the Gaon Sabha thought fit to enter the picture. Restoration applications were filed in all the cases requesting that the ex parte decrees dated March 17, 1960 be set aside on the ground that the Gaon Sabha had no knowledge of the proceeding. The trial court recorded evidence and came to the conclusion that the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha had been doing Pairvi all along in the restoration cases filed by the State and was present on all the dates fixed by the courts. The service of summons had been adequate and it also found to the effect that the District Government Counsel (R), who had conducted the case of State had also been the counsel for the Gaon Sabha and ,therefore knowledge of that body must be presumed. The restoration application were dismissed. 5. In appeal the learned Additional commissioner has taken a different view. The restoration application were dismissed. 5. In appeal the learned Additional commissioner has taken a different view. It has been conceded that the District Government Counsel (R) is a recognised agent of the Gaon Sabha but it was held that since the D.G.C. appeared in the case as counsel for the State Government and not as counsel for the Gaon Sabha form which he had received no instruction knowledge of the Gaon Sabha could not be presumed. The appeals were allowed. 6. In arguments before me learned counsel for the respondent cited a ruling reported in 1970 R.D. 353 of the Board of Revenue where it was held that the District Government Counsel though an authorised counsel for the state as well as the Gaon Sabha was representing the State only and not the Gaon Sabha and hence has appearance in the case could not be treated to be on behalf of that body. 7. With all respect, I find myself unable to accept the view expressed in the above ruling. It is a recognised principle of judicial procedure as practised in all the courts of U.P. that a counsel for a party fully represents his client. The only exception to this principle would be where a specific allegation is made and proved of professional misconduct on the part of a lawyer in the manner of his handling of the interest of his client. It has been specifically admitted in the present case that the District Government Counsel was the standing counsel of the Gaon Sabha. There has also not been the slightest whisper of a suggestion that there had been any deliberate breach of trust on his part in the safeguarding of the interest of his client. The only view that can, therefore, be taken by a court is that the Gaon Sabha chose not to per-sue its interest in the cases through the deliberate silence of its counsel on its behalf. Knowledge by the Gaon Sabha must be legally presumed throughout the process of litigation in view of the physical presence of its standing counsel in court though ostensibly on behalf of the state alone. 8. Knowledge by the Gaon Sabha must be legally presumed throughout the process of litigation in view of the physical presence of its standing counsel in court though ostensibly on behalf of the state alone. 8. The above legal presumption is quite apart from the merits of the revision application before me which clearly show that the Gaon sabha had been adequately served with the summons and also chose to break it long silence in the matter only after the State had lost the litigation upto the Board of Revenue. It is further noticed that a compromise application were subsequently filed in this court fully conceding the case of the applicants and were sent to the trial court for verification but were received back because one of the revisionist had died. 9. The above facts would show that the over 15 years the present revisionist have been dragged to one court after another by the State and the Gaon Sabha on frivolous legal and factual claims which have no substance whatsoever. The applications in revision are allowed and special costs awarded to each revisionist amounting to Rs. 1,000/- in each case. 10. This order will govern Revision Nos. 67-68 of 1966-67/Ballia and No. 200 of 1966-67/Ballia.