JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - Respondent No. 3 Srimati Maharani Devi Tirkha, is the owner of two premises, the tenants whereof are the petitioner Radhey Shyam Sharma and one Shanker Lal respectively. The landlord filed two applications under section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1917, against the two tenants. Originally, the applications were rejected by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer but, on revision, the Commissioner reminded the cases for a fresh decision. While these cases were pending, the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting. Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, came into force. The two applications were then converted into applications for release under section 21 of this Act. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application against the petitioner but dismissed the application against Shanker Lal. The petition thereupon preferred an appeal to the District Judge. The landlord also filed an appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority rejecting her application against Shanker Lal. The two appeals were transferred to two different Additional District Judges for disposal. The petitioner made an application to the VI Additional District Judge, Meerut, before whom his appeal was pending to grant time to enable him to move the District Judge to consolidate the two appeals and to transfer them to the same court. The VI Additional District Judge refused this prayer and heard the appeal. By his order dated May 24, 1975, he dismissed the petitioner's appeal. The petitioner has now challenged the orders of the Prescribed Authority and of the Additional District Judge in this petition. 2. The first point urged by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the VI Additional District Judge should have permitted the petitioner to move the District Judge to consolidate the two appeals and to transfer them to the same court. Probably, that would have been the better course but, In my opinion, there was no legal obligation on the VI Additional District Judge to grant the petitioner time to enable him to get the two appeals consolidated. In any case, so far as the petitioner's appeal was concerned, it had to be decided on its own facts and merits. The learned counsel contends that the needs of the two tenants should also have been compared and the release order should have been passed only against the tenant whose need was the least. In any case, so far as the petitioner's appeal was concerned, it had to be decided on its own facts and merits. The learned counsel contends that the needs of the two tenants should also have been compared and the release order should have been passed only against the tenant whose need was the least. I do net see how this could be done in the appeal of the petitioner when the other tenant, Shankar Lal was no party to it. The scope of the appeal filed by the landlord against Shankar Lal was totally different. Whether the landlord's appeal against Shankar Lal was dismissed or allowed, it would make no difference to the case of the petitioner, consolidation could not have helped the petitioner. In any case, it cannot be urged that the VI Additional District Judge acted without jurisdiction in not giving the petitioner any opportunity to get the two appeals consolidated. 3. It was next contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Prescribed Authority as well as the Additional District Judge had taken into account a report made by the Rent Control Inspector on June 23, 1972, which they were not entitled to do as the inspection and the report were made ex parte without any notice to the petitioner. Learned counsel has drawn my attention to Annexure V of the Writ Petition which is an objection filed by the petitioner to this report before the Prescribed Authority. One of the objections raised to this report was that it was ex parte and liable to be set aside. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I do not think that the orders of the Prescribed Authority and of the Additional District Judge are Vitiated on account of reference to this report even if it was made ex parte. It appears that there was also an earlier report of the Rent Control Inspector. Both the reports were In connection with the assertion of the landlord that the rented premises. In which she was living, was dilapidated and not sufficient for her needs. The first report indicated that the accommodation, in which the landlord was living, was a two storeyed one that the first storey was dilapidated and that the landlord was living with her family on the ground floor. In which she was living, was dilapidated and not sufficient for her needs. The first report indicated that the accommodation, in which the landlord was living, was a two storeyed one that the first storey was dilapidated and that the landlord was living with her family on the ground floor. The second report substantially confirmed the first report but it is urged that it further stated that the entire premises, in which the landlord was living was dilapidated. Having carefully perused the two orders, it appears to me that both the authorities have come to the conclusion that the first floor of the accommodation, in which the landlord was residing, was dilapidated and that she was living on the ground floor only together with her whole family. Both the authorities have further found that the ground floor accommodation was not sufficient to meet the needs of the landlord and that her need for the dispute accommodation was genuine. Both the authorities have placed reliance upon the affidavits filed by the parties and, though both of them have referred to the second report of the Rent Control Inspector, there does not appear to be any reliance placed on it as no finding has been recorded that the entire premises was dilapidated. The finding is only that the first floor was dilapidated and this finding is supported by the first report of the Rent Control Inspector as well as by the affidavits filed in the case. in my opinion, the reference to the second report in the two orders does not vitiate house orders. I may add that, though it is stated in the writ petition that the question about the validity of the second report on the ground that it was ex parte was raised at the hearing of the appeal before the VI Additional District Judge, no such question appears to have been specifically raised in the grounds of appeal. I am not satisfied that any such question was actually urged before the VI Additional District Judge. The second contention of learned counsel for the petitioner fails. 4. The last contention of learned counsel is that, after the order of the Additional District Judge, the landlord, on June 10, 1975, accepted rent from the petitioner and, therefore, this amounted to a waiver of termination of the tenancy. The second contention of learned counsel for the petitioner fails. 4. The last contention of learned counsel is that, after the order of the Additional District Judge, the landlord, on June 10, 1975, accepted rent from the petitioner and, therefore, this amounted to a waiver of termination of the tenancy. Sub-section (6) of section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, provides that, on the expiration of a period of 30 days from an order of eviction under this section, the tenancy of the tenant shall stand determined. The tenancy is thus determined by a provision of law consequent upon an order for release under section 21 and not by the Act of the parties. The legal consequence of the order passed under section 21 cannot be arrested or nullified by the Act of parties. Of course, even after the passing of an order under section 21 and after the expiry of one month, thereafter, the parties may enter into a fresh tenancy and may agree not to execute the order for release under section 21. But that is not the case. Mere acceptance of rent in these circumstances may not amount to creation of a fresh tenancy. It may be mentioned that, in the counter affidavit, it is asserted that the amount has been accepted by way of damages for use and occupation and not as rent. In any case, in my opinion, this is not a question which can be examined in this writ petition as it has no repercussion on the question whether the need of the landlord is genuine and greater than that of the tenant. If a fresh tenancy his come into existence, the tenant can take such action as is open to him. The alleged acceptance of rent will, in no case, vitiate the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the VI Additional District Judge. Since these orders do not suffer from any error of jurisdiction or from any manifest error of law, they cannot be quashed by a writ of certiorari. 5. The writ petition is without merits and is hereby dismissed with costs. The stay order is vacated.