( 1 ) THIS appeal is by the appellant in MA. 19/73 on the file of the Civil judge at Haveri. He is aggrieved by an order made in Mis. Case 6/74, whereby his application for re-admission of the appeal was refused. ( 2 ) IT has arisen in this way: The appellant filed an original suit for specific performance in the Court of the Munsiff at Ranebennur. In the course of the said suit, he had obtained an order of temporary injunction which later on came to be vacated. Aggrieved by the dissolution of the injunction, he preferred Misc. App. l9/73 before the Civil Judge at Haveri. When the said appeal was pending the original suit came to be dismissed for default. He had also applied for restoration of the suit pursuant to the provisions of Or. 9 CPC. Before his suit could be recorded, the appeal came to be dismissed on the ground that it had become infructuous, aa no suit could be said to be pending on the day when the appeal was called on for hearing. Subsequently, the suit came to be restored by the learned Munsiff on 6-12-1973. In view of the said restoration, the appellant applied for re-admission or revival of the appeal (Misc. App. 19/73) specifically referring to Or. 41, R. 19 read with S. 151 CPC. ( 3 ) THE learned Civil Judge came to the conclusion, in my opinion, rightly, that Rule 19 of Or. 41 CPC was inapplicable to a case of this kind. He however, did not deal with the matter under the provisions of S. 151, cpc, presumably because no argument seems to have been addressed before him on the basis of it. He further came to the conclusion that the said application for re-admission of the appeal had been filed beyond 30 days from the date of restoration of the suit by the learned Munsiff, and therefore was liable to be dismissed in the absence of any reasonable explanation furnished for the delay involved. Hence this appeal. ( 4 ) IT is true that Rule 19 of Or. 41 CPC would be clearly inapplicable to the present case, as had been held by the learned Civil Judge. The learned civil Judge has no doubt observed that it was open to the appellant to approach the learned Munsiff again under Or. Hence this appeal. ( 4 ) IT is true that Rule 19 of Or. 41 CPC would be clearly inapplicable to the present case, as had been held by the learned Civil Judge. The learned civil Judge has no doubt observed that it was open to the appellant to approach the learned Munsiff again under Or. 39 CPC and obtain a fresh order of injunction, which if vacated, subsequently, and then a fresh appeal could be presented by the appellant. In observing thus, the learned civil Judge has over-looked the principle of law governing the matter. In the case of Shivaraya v. Sharnappa, (1867) 1 Myslj. 414, this Court has ruled, inter alia, that if a suit which had been dismissed for default was subsequently restored all the ancillary orders made before such dismissal would stand restored unless there was some direction to the contrary. The effect of this decision on the facts of the instant case is that when the suit stood restored, the earlier order of dissolution of injunction also stood restored. It does not follow from this that the appellant should have presented a fresh appeal against such order of dissolution of injunction when he could legitimately invoke the provisions of S. 151 CPC to have his earlier appeal (Misc. App. 19/73) re-admitted or revived. ( 5 ) IT seems to me that a situation of this kind has not been provided for in any of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In such a situation s. 151 CPC is clearly attracted. Indeed, recourse to that power is warranted on the facts and circumstances of this case and the appeal ought to be re-admitted for further hearing. ( 6 ) IN regard to the question of limitation, the learned Civil Judge has concluded that time for applying for re-admission of the appeal had commenced from the date of restoration of the suit by the learned Munsiff. It seems to be that the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation act is applicable only to such cases where a party to a lis is entitled to apply under any of the provisions of the Code and not to a case where the inherent power of the Court under S. 151 CPC is invoked. It seems to be that the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation act is applicable only to such cases where a party to a lis is entitled to apply under any of the provisions of the Code and not to a case where the inherent power of the Court under S. 151 CPC is invoked. This apart, I fail to see the rationale in inisting that he should have filed this application within 30 daya of the restoration of the suit. It is to be remembered that the appeal had already been lodged in the Court of Appeal and had been dismissed. All that he need do was to apply for re-admission of the same pursuant to the provisions of S. 151 CPC in the circumstances aforesaid. It is further to be remembered that he would not be applying for re-admission of the appeal pursuant to any of the rules under Or. 41 CPC when it would have been necessary for him to comply with the provisions of the limitation Act governing such matters. I am therefore clearly of the view that this conclusion of the learned Civil Judge cannot be sustained. ( 7 ) BUT it is argued by Sri R. H. Chandangowdar, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, that once the application is construed as properly falling under S. 151 CPC, the present appeal would not be maintainable. It seems to me he is clearly right in this submission. But accepting this contention would only mean that this appeal has to be dealt with as a revision petition preferred under S. 115 CPC in regard to which all that was required by the appellant to do was to make an appropriate application. This it seems to me is an exercise in futility. I do not therefore consider it necessary to reject this appeal on the ground urged by Sri Chandangowdar. ( 8 ) IN the result, this appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The order made by the learned Civil Judge, Haveri, in Misc. Case 6/74 is hereby set aside. Consequently, he is directed to restore the appeal (Misc. App. 19/73) and dispose of it in accordance with law. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .