JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, M. - This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree dated May 18, 1971 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Faizabad Division. Faizabad in Appeal No. 253 Gonda from the order dated March 3, 1970 passed by the judicial Officer, Gonda in case No. 1073 under section 229-B/209, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 , Samad and Hafeez had filed a suit seeking declaration of their Sirdari rights in plot No. 64 (area 2.53 acres ) rights in Ghani and the ejectment of the defendant-appellants Kariya Shakru and Gallar from an area of 1.69 acres out of his plot numbered as 64-M. The defendant-appellants contested the suit by pleading firstly that the land in suit the came from Bhadai, ancestor of both the parties and thus both the parties were joint Sirdars, and secondly that if they were not held to be co-sirdars then they claimed Sirdari rights by virtue of a private partition which was more than twenty years old and by the operation of law under section 210, U.P.Z.A AND L.R. Act. They also claimed that the land in dispute was not identifiable on the shot and therefore, the suit was not maintainable. Both the court below have, however, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff-respondents. 4. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the finding of the lower appellate court on the point of identifiability of the land on the spot is based on no evidence, and that the question should have ben decided as a preliminary issue either with the help of sending a Commissioner on the spot or by means of local inspection. The learned counsel for the appellants has in this connection referred to Ram Narain v. Raja Ram 1975 R.D. 102, in which a learned Member has discussed the question of identifiability of land in some detail and has observed as follows: "All the ruling regarding presumption of identifiability cited by the learned counsel for the appellants refer to revenue paying land i.e. plot numbers or their subdivisions worked out according to para A-57 of The Land Records Manual. In the instant case, however, we are seized of a suit concerning sub-divisions Ka and Kha of plot No. 254/4. In the instant case, however, we are seized of a suit concerning sub-divisions Ka and Kha of plot No. 254/4. A sub-division cannot be numbered as 'Ka' or 'Kha' by the Lekhpal under A-37 of the Land Records Manual. If such a sub-division exists, then it must be given fractional number. The use of the words 'Ka' and 'Kha' shows that these are theoretical sub-divisions not considered by the Lethpal during the partal while making entries in the map under para A-57. Further, the case law cited by the learned counsel for the appellants on presumption of identifiability refers in each case to map-whether it be a settlement map, or a current it be a settlement map, or a current map prepared by the Lekhpal or a map specially prepared and accepted by the court. Obviously, the Khasra is merely an index and cannot show the location of the plots and it is only a map which would show the location. Therefore, the argument regarding presumption of identifiability falls to the ground. "In the absence of any proper sub-divisions of the land recognised and noted by the Lekhpal under Para A-57 of the Land Records Manual, the mere admission that the land could be pointed out would not be sufficient. The court cannot pass a decree ejecting the respondent while describing the land from ejectment has been ordered as the one pointed out by the plaintiff and the defendants. It would be a faulty decree. When the learned Additional Commissioner, therefore, stressed the absence of the map he was within his rights to do so and rejected the plead that the land was identifiable in the absence of evidence." 5. It may be noted that in the above case the trial court had held the land in dispute to be identifiable but the Additional Commissioner held the land in identifiable. In the present case, however, both the courts be low have held that the land in dispute was identifiable. Thus, this case is to be distinguished from the case cited above. 6. As regards the legal position it may be briefly discussed. It is certainly an established principle that the land form which ejectment is sought must be identified on the spot and if it is not identifiable the suit for ejectment is liable to be dismissed. Thus, this case is to be distinguished from the case cited above. 6. As regards the legal position it may be briefly discussed. It is certainly an established principle that the land form which ejectment is sought must be identified on the spot and if it is not identifiable the suit for ejectment is liable to be dismissed. The Criteria of identifiability of land are following: (1) A separate plot number and if the plot is sub-divided, a separate sub-division number assigned to the land recorded in the village records. (2) the location of the plot or the sub-division, as the case may be, shown distinctly in the village map. (3) Identification of the plot on the spot by reference to exact boundaries in all the directions. (4) Precise area of the plot. We may now apply the above criteria to the present suit. We find that the plaintiff-respondents did not file any extract from the Khasra or any map to show the land form which the defendant-appellants were sought to be ejected had a separate plot or sub-division number or that it was demarcated, in the village map. The trial court also did not make a spot inspection or appoint a Commissioner for spot inspection when the plea or non-identifiability of land was taken in the written statement. The plaint-respondents had, however, given a sketch map of the spot prepared by themselves in the plaint and had also shown its boundaries and area in the plaint. The particulars, however, are not enough to determine the question of identifiability since they are not corroborated by any extract from the village records or from the village map. The trial court thus committed a material irregularity in not making a spot inspection or appointing a commissioner for a local inspection to determine the identifiability of land. As it is it would neither be fair for this court to say that the land in dispute is identifiable or to say that the land is not identifiable and that the suit was not maintainable. The only correct things would be to remand the case trial court for determining the identifiable of the land though a spot inspection or by appointment of commissioner for the spot inspection. 7. The only correct things would be to remand the case trial court for determining the identifiable of the land though a spot inspection or by appointment of commissioner for the spot inspection. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants has also assailed the judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner one the ground that he has misread and misinterpreted the statement of witnesses and that he has erred in law in brushing aside the statements of defence witnesses without assigning. According to the learned counsel, since the plaintiff-respondents did not produce even a single independent witness, the witnesses examined by the defendants must have been believed. In this connection he has referred to Rafi Bux v. Smt. Harmeedan 1973 R.D. 29, in which a learned Member has observed as follows; "The practice of ignoring relevant oral evidence in the face of documentary evidence is not at all warranted in law. There are only conditions as laid down in Chapter 6 of the Indian Evidence Act in which documentary evidence excludes oral evidence. Except such cases as are mentioned in Chapter 6 of the Indian Evidence Act relevant oral evidence must be considered along with documentary evidence; for there may be facts not reflected by documents." The principle enunciated above is a sound one. A court is required to consider both oral and documentary evidence judicially and not to brush aside oral evidence in a summary fashion. Thus the plaintiff-respondents had examined only one witness Abdul Hafeez who is one of the plaintiffs himself, whereas the defendant-appellants had examined three witness, Karia, D.W. 1, who is one of the defendants-appellants and two independent witnesses Mata Bux, D.W. 2 and Ram Lakhan, D.W. 5. The Additional Commissioner has erroneously stated that D.W. 2 does not know the land at all. The witness has clearly said that he knows the land in dispute and has in the course of his statement given enough particulars about this land including its area and location. Thus, the learned Additional Commissioner has erred in law in omitting to consider the evidence of this witness merely on a wrong assumption that he does not know the land in dispute. The learned Additional Commissioner has also similarly erred in law in not considering the evidence of Ram Lakhan Singh, D.W. 3 on a wrong assumption that this witness does not know who is in possession of the land in dispute. The learned Additional Commissioner has also similarly erred in law in not considering the evidence of Ram Lakhan Singh, D.W. 3 on a wrong assumption that this witness does not know who is in possession of the land in dispute. A perusal of the record shows that this witness has clearly stated that the land in dispute is about 12 bighas in area, that Callar, Shakru, Samed and Kariya are in possession of portions of this plot and portions of each person is about three Bighas. The witness has only stated that he does not know how much area Kariya was cultivating in addition to the land in dispute. This statement is, however, immaterial for the purpose of the present case. The trial court has also committed the same error in appraising the oral evidence and thus the trial court's findings are also based on misreading of the evidence and on omission to consider entire material evidence judicially. 8. Both the courts below have laid stress on the fact that consolidation has taken place in the village and that has adjudication of the rights has become final. However, none of the courts below has bothered to consider what the precise adjudication of title was done by the consolidation authorities. The plaintiff-respondents did not file a copy of the order of the consolidation authorities. They did file an extract form the Khatauni Chakbandi Bandobast 1370 Fasli in the trial court but received the extract back on November 27, 1971 and did not bother to file it again in this Court. Thus, it is not possible for this Court to hold what exactly the adjudication of title as done by the consolidation authorities is. The learned counsel for the appellants has also referred to Yogendra Vikram Singh v. Krishna Kumar Singh 1976 A.W.C. 585 in which Trivedi, J., has held as follows: "In my judgment the bar of Section 49 does not operate as under section 27 (2) it is open to the respondent to show that the entries in the record of rights prepared in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 27 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act showing Smt. Umrai as Bhumidhar was not true. Section 27(2) was substituted by U.P. Act 12 of 1965 and is in these terms "All entries in the record of rights prepared in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be presumed to be true unless the contrary is proved." It is clear form this provision that although normally a presumption of correctness of the entries in the record of rights prepared in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 27 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act attaches to such entries, but it is a rebuttable presumption." I would certainly uphold the principle that in view of section 27 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act the presumption of correctness of the entries in the record of rights prepared by the consolidation authorities is rebuttable. In others words, the entry in the consolidation Khatauni does not act as a bar under section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 9. In the result of the above discussion, the judgments of the courts below cannot be sustained in law. I hereby allow the appeal, set aside the orders of the courts below, and remand the case to the trial court for fresh decision in accordance with law. The trial court shall also make a spot inspection of appoint a Commissioner for determining the identifiability of the land, and direct the parties concerned to file copies of the judgments of the consideration authorities, if any, regarding land in dispute to consider the question whether Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act was applicable.