Judgment :- 1. A common question of some importance is raised is these cases This question is one which frequently arises in revision petitions under S.103 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and therefore it has been referred to a Division Bench by one of us sitting single. It has been contended by some of the parties to these petitions that the Taluk Land Board which has the duty of determining the land to be surrendered as excess land under S.85 (5) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 is obliged to accept the plea that land is held by a tenant who is entitled to purchase the land and as such, such land is liable to be excluded from the scope of ceiling and surrender provisions whenever such a plea is raised. It is their case that it is not open to the Land Board or the Taluk Land Board to assess the sustainability of this plea and consequently there is no discretion in these authorities to reject the plea for exclusion of such lands. 2. Chapter III of the Act concerns the scheme relating to ceiling limit of land and the surrender of excess land envisaged by the Act. S.81 of the Act provides for exempting certain lands from the provisions of Chapter III. The ceiling area of land to be held by a person is specified in S.82. S.83 of the Act prohibits owning or holding or possessing under a mortgage of lands in the aggregate in excess of the ceiling area with effect from the notified date. The date notified is 111970. S.85 (1) obliges any person owning or holding land in excess of the ceiling area notified under S.83 to surrender such land. There is a proviso to this section which excludes certain lands from being taken into account in calculating the excess land to be surrendered under S.85 (1). The said section with the proviso, leaving out the Explanation which may not be necessary for the purpose of this case, runs "85. There is a proviso to this section which excludes certain lands from being taken into account in calculating the excess land to be surrendered under S.85 (1). The said section with the proviso, leaving out the Explanation which may not be necessary for the purpose of this case, runs "85. Surrender of excess land: (1) Where a person owns or holds land in excess of the ceiling area on the date notified under S.83, such excess land shall be surrendered as hereinafter provided: Provided that where any person bona fide believes that the ownership or possession of any land owned or held by such person or, where such person is a member of a family, by the members of such family, is liable to be purchased by the cultivating tenant or kudikidappukaran or to be resumed by the land owner or the intermediary under the provisions of this Act, the extent of the land so liable to be purchased or to be resumed shall not be taken into account in calculating the extent of the land to be surrendered under this sub-section." The obligation to file a statement before the Land Board by any person owning or holding land in excess of the ceiling area is imposed by sub-section (2) of S.85. Sub-section 3A imposes similar obligation to file statement to the Land Board in certain other cases. Sub-section (5) of S.85 provides for the decision by the Taluk Land Board on matters which they are called upon to decide for the purpose of the surrender provisions of the Act. Sub-section 3A imposes similar obligation to file statement to the Land Board in certain other cases. Sub-section (5) of S.85 provides for the decision by the Taluk Land Board on matters which they are called upon to decide for the purpose of the surrender provisions of the Act. It may be relevant to extract sub-section (5) of S.85 of the Act here: "(5) On receipt of the statement under sub-section (2) or sub-section 3A the Land Board shall transfer the statement to such Taluk Land Boards as may be decided by the Land Board in accordance with such principles as may be prescribed and such Taluk Land Board shall a. cause the particulars mentioned in the statement to be verified; b. ascertain whether the person to whom the statement relates owns or holds any other lands; and c. by order, determine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered." Sub-section (6) provides that in determining the identity of the land to be surrendered the choice indicated by the person who files the statement under subsection (2) or (3A) of S.85 shall be accepted by the Land Board subject to certain exceptions, one of them being that the Land Board has reason to believe that the person whose land is indicated to be surrendered has no good title to the land. Sub-section (9) of S.85 confers power on the Land Board to reopen the determination to the extent of proceeding afresh under sub-section (5) or (7) of S.85 in cases where the Land Board is satisfied that the extent of lands surrendered by or assumed from a person under S.86 is less than the extent of lands which he was liable to surrender under the provisions of the Act or that the lauds surrendered by, or assumed from, a person were not lawfully owned or held by him. There is limitation on this power. It is that this shall not be exercised after the expiry of three years from the date on which the order sought to be set aside has become final. Rules have been framed in exercise of the powers conferred under S 12. of the Act providing for the procedure in regard to the determination of the ceiling area and the lands to be surrendered. These are the Kerala Land Reforms (Ceiling) Rules. Rules have been framed in exercise of the powers conferred under S 12. of the Act providing for the procedure in regard to the determination of the ceiling area and the lands to be surrendered. These are the Kerala Land Reforms (Ceiling) Rules. Detailed provision as to the statements to be filed by the parties, verification to be caused to be made, draft statement to be prepared by the Land Board thereafter specifying the lands permitted to be retained and those to be surrendered calling for objections arc made in the rules. R.13 provides for enquiry to determine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered. R.13 runs as follows: "13. Enquiry to determine extent and identity, (i) On the date fixed for hearing of the objections and for determination of the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered, or on any other day to which the proceedings may be adjourned, the Taluk Land Board, may, after considering the objections, if any, and the oral and documentary evidence let in and after hearing such of the persons who appear and, where necessary, after such further verification and ascertainment or investigation as it may deem fit and proper, by order, determine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered: Provided that where the Taluk Land Board intends to rely on the particulars obtained by any such further verification, ascertainment or investigation, no such order shall be passed without giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to such of those parties whose interests are likely to be affected if such particulars are relied upon. (2) Where, for the determination of the extent of land to be surrendered, it becomes necessary to decide the question as to whether any extent of land is exempted under subsection (1) of S.81 or not, the Taluk Land Board may decide such question, provided that no such decision shall be made without giving the person interested in the land a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (3) The Taluk Land Board shall, after passing the order determining the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered, cause to prepare an extract of such order in Form No. 5, and such extract shall form part of the order. (3) The Taluk Land Board shall, after passing the order determining the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered, cause to prepare an extract of such order in Form No. 5, and such extract shall form part of the order. (4) Where there has been any modification in the extent or identity or both of the lands to be surrendered by any subsequent order of the Taluk Land Board or by an order in revision by the High Court, the Taluk Land Board shall cause necessary changes to be made in the extract referred to in sub-rule (3) or cause a revised extract to be prepared." 11 is evident from these provisions hat the determination of the question of the ceiling area that could be retained by a person, the determination of the extent of land that can be held by a person and further the determination of the question as to the land to which exemption applies are powers vested in the Taluk Land Board. S.85(5)(c) envisages the determination by the Taluk Land Board of the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered. Sub-clause (b) of sub-section (5) of S.85 confers power to ascertain whether a person to whom the statement relate owns or holds any other lands. Though normally choice of the land to be surrendered is with the person who files the statement, the Taluk Land Board is permitted to examine whether such person has title to the land which he proposes to surrender in order to avoid the situation where surrender is of land to which the declarant has no title or has only detective title. These indicate the ambit of the powers of the Land. Board and the Taluk Land Boards (referred to as Boards hereafter) The determination of the extent of land to be surrendered necessarily calls for determination of the extent of land owned or held by a person. It would be possible to determine this only if the Boards have power to ascertain the facts relating to the owning and holding of property by the declarants and make a judicial determination of the question of extent of lands held by them on the notified dates. The determination of the extent of land to be surrendered would, therefore, call for determination of the title of the declarant to the lands owned or held by him. The determination of the extent of land to be surrendered would, therefore, call for determination of the title of the declarant to the lands owned or held by him. If, according to a declarant, a property is not owned by him and if the owning of that property would increase the extent of land that will have to be surrendered the question whether he owns such land calls for determination. In other words any dispute on the question whether the declarant owns or holds land will necessarily have to be decided by the Boards if it has to determine the extent of land the declarant has to surrender, for, without such decision it would not be possible to fix such extent. The identity of land to be surrendered would also call for determination of the title of the declarant to the properties offered to be surrendered. 3. A person who owns property held under a lease has an obligation to treat such property as property held by him for the purpose of ceiling provisions subject to the proviso to sub-section (1) of S.85. That is because it is not every property held by a tenant that vests in the State as on 111970. S.72 of the Act envisages vesting of landlord's right in Government on a date notified by the Government in this behalf in the Gazette. Such date was notified as on 1-11970. The provision in the section operates to vest all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders of karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under S.13 and in respect of which certificates of purchase under sub-section (2) of S.59 have not been issued, free from all encumbrances. There is a proviso to the said section which excludes the operation of the section on holdings or part of holdings in respect of which applications for resumption under the provisions of the Act are pending on such date. It is only parties entitled to fixity of tenure under S.13 that will come within the scope of S.72. We are referring to this only to indicate that mere existence of a lease may not justify the assumption that the land covered by the lease would have vested in the Government. 4. It is only parties entitled to fixity of tenure under S.13 that will come within the scope of S.72. We are referring to this only to indicate that mere existence of a lease may not justify the assumption that the land covered by the lease would have vested in the Government. 4. Proviso to S.85(1) calls for construction in this case Counsel for the petitioners in these cases contend that when once it is pleaded that a declarant is holding lands outstanding with tenants or that the lands which belonged to the declarant are held by tenants, without anything more being shown, the Taluk Land Board or the Land Board, as the case may be, is precluded from going into the question whether that is a true statement of fact. The plea is that the Board is precluded from adjudicating on the merits whether the said land is also to be included as land owned or held by the declarant, but on the other hand the Board is obliged to exclude the said land in the final determination of the extent of land to be surrendered. This plea is sought to be supported on the basis that the question of determination of the existence of a tenancy is entirely within the jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal functioning under the provisions of the Act and that being the case the Land Board and the Taluk Land Boards cannot assume such jurisdiction. In case such jurisdiction is assumed and in the event there happens to be adjudication by the Land Tribunal also on this question, there is likely to be conflict of findings and it would not be warranted by the scheme of the Act which envisages determination of the question of tenancy as within the sole jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It is therefore said that the Taluk Land Board should have resisted from adjudicating on the merits on the question as to whether the land pleaded to be in the possession of tenants were available as land owned or held by the declarants. The plea by the declarants should have been taken to be sufficient to entitle such declarants to claim exclusion of such lands in determining the extent of land owned or held by them. It is this plea which requires examination in these cases. 5. We may refer to S.85(i) proviso. The plea by the declarants should have been taken to be sufficient to entitle such declarants to claim exclusion of such lands in determining the extent of land owned or held by them. It is this plea which requires examination in these cases. 5. We may refer to S.85(i) proviso. To us, this proviso specifically makes the provision as to the circumstances under which lands are not to be taken into account in calculating the extent of the land to be surrendered under sub-section (1) of S.85. There should be bonafide belief in the person of the fact that the ownership or possession of any land owned or held by such person or where such person is a member of a family, by the members of such family, is liable to be purchased by the cultivating tenant or kudikidappukaran. We are leaving out the latter part of the proviso for the present as it may not be necessary for our purpose. 6. The belief of the person which justifies leaving out certain extent of land from that to be surrendered must be bonafide belief. Secondly the belief must be that the lands which are so left out are liable to be purchased by the cultivating tenant or kudikidappukars. S.72 B of the Act provides for the purchase by a cultivating tenant of the right, title and interest of landowners and intermediaries It is useful to extract sub-section (1) of S.72B, for, the proviso to that sub-section is relevant. That runs 72B. Cultivating tenants' right to assignment. S.72 B of the Act provides for the purchase by a cultivating tenant of the right, title and interest of landowners and intermediaries It is useful to extract sub-section (1) of S.72B, for, the proviso to that sub-section is relevant. That runs 72B. Cultivating tenants' right to assignment. (1) The cultivating tenant of any holding or part of a holding, the right, title and interest in respect of which have vested in the Government under S.72, shall be entitled to assignment of such right, title and interest: Provided that (a) no cultivating tenant shall be entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of any holding or part of a holding under this Section for he, or if he is a member of a family, such family, owns an extent of land not less than the ceiling area; (b) where the cultivating tenant or, if he is a member of a family, such family, does not own any land or owns an extent of land which is less than the ceiling area, he shall be entitled to the assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of only such extent of land as will, together with the land, if any, owned by him or his family, as the case may be, be equal to the ceiling area." The proviso shows that it is not every cultivating tenant that is entitled to purchase. The mere fact that a property is with a cultivating tenant does not lead to the assumption that the land is liable to be purchased by him. That calls for further examination of the question whether he or a member of a family owns an extent of land not less than the ceiling area. It may be that in several cases lessees may own or possess lands in excess of the ceiling area or it may be that the family to which they belong may own such excess land. It may be that the leasehold itself is of an extent larger than the ceiling area in which case the entire extent cannot be purchased by the cultivating tenant. It may be that the cultivating tenant owns or holds other land not in excess of the ceiling area but which together with the leasehold may be in excess of the ceiling area. It may be that the cultivating tenant owns or holds other land not in excess of the ceiling area but which together with the leasehold may be in excess of the ceiling area. In all these cases the cultivating tenant may not be entitled to purchase the land to the extent such land would be in excess of the ceiling area of himself or of his family as the case may be. Every tenant is not a cultivating tenant. That term is defined in S.2 (8) of the Act to mean a tenant who is in actual possession of, and is entitled to cultivate the land comprised in his holding. The proviso to S.72B indicates that though the right, title and interest in respect of land might have vested in the Government under S.72 it does not necessarily follow that in all cases such land is liable to be purchased by the cultivating tenant. Therefore for the purpose of the proviso to S.85 (1) it is not sufficient to show that the land is vested in the Government. The provision in S.72B (1) must be satisfied and in that context the proviso to that sub-section is of significance.. Hence the question to be decided for the purpose of S.85 (1) in the light of the proviso is not whether a particular tenancy pleaded is true or not. That is not the question with which the Taluk Land Board is directly concerned. The determination called for is of the question whether the person who has to file the statement bonafide believes that the land sought to be excluded by him from the ceiling provisions is liable to be purchased by a cultivating tenant. In determining this question incidentally the truth or otherwise of the lease set up by the person may arise for consideration. The fact that it incidentally so arises does not mean that this is the question which is to be decided by the Boards. The question which is to be decided is what is indicated in the proviso. Hence it cannot be said that there is any trespass upon the field of adjudication by the Land Tribunal. In other words, it is not as if the Two Tribunals under the same Act are empowered to decide the identical question resulting in an unhappy situation. The question which is to be decided is what is indicated in the proviso. Hence it cannot be said that there is any trespass upon the field of adjudication by the Land Tribunal. In other words, it is not as if the Two Tribunals under the same Act are empowered to decide the identical question resulting in an unhappy situation. Of course, if the language of the statute be explicit and the statute provides for determination by the two Tribunals for two different purposes there would be no justification to ignore or overlook the powers conferred on one or other of the Tribunals. The situation would be a proper subject for legislative treatment. But that situation has not arisen here. As we have indicated, the decision by the Land Tribunal for the purpose of the tenancy provisions of the Act does not in any way directly come into conflict with the power of determination conferred upon the Land Board and the Taluk Land Boards, for, the Boards determine a different question, the question of land to be surrendered. Incidentally they may determine whether a particular land should be excluded and the question to be posed is not whether the lease is true or not That an authority invested with the power to decide a particular question has ancillary power to determine all matters necessary to reach such decision is of course a rule well-settled. It goes without saying that the Board has power to determine the question arising under S.85 (1) proviso. 7. It will be interesting to consider the consequences of taking a contrary view. It appears to us that the result will be anomalous. If the Land Board has no power incidentally to consider the question whether the tenancy set up by the declarant is true or not, it would mean that in a case where a tenancy is pleaded by a person who does not have any material to support the plea and in respect of land about which there is no proceeding before the Land Tribunal the land would he outside the ceiling provisions for all time. In other words, it would mean that to defeat the provisions relating to surrender of excess land it would be sufficient for any person merely to plead that the property which is said to be excess and said to be in his hands is held under an oral lease by someone or other. The truth or otherwise of this plea is not open to consideration by the Taluk Land Board. If none chooses to file an application for purchase before the Tribunal there would be no adjudication on that question at any time. It would mean that escape from the Act is not merely easy but a matter of course. Mere setting up of such a plea would be sufficient. 8. S.85 (9) which has been brought to our notice by way of answer is no answer. That sub-section reads: "The Land Board may, if it is satisfied that the extent of lands surrendered by, or assumed from, a person under S.86 is less than the extent of lands which be was liable to surrender under the provisions of this Act or that the lands surrendered by, or assumed from, a person were not lawfully owned or held by him, set aside its order under sub-section (5) or sub-section (7), as the case may be, in respect of such lands and shall proceed afresh under that sub-section: Provided that the Land Board shall not set aside any order under this sub-section without giving the persons affected thereby an opportunity of being heard: Provided further that the Land Board shall not initiate any proceedings under this subsection after the expiry of three years from the date on which the order sought to be set aside has become final. EXPLANATION: For the purposes of this section and S.86. "hold" with reference to land shall include "possess land under mortgage with possession " This is intended to cover cases where there is escapement otherwise. If a plea available at the time when the declarant files any return is a valid plea that will continue to be so even after a lapse of time, for, there is no obligation to do anything beyond setting up the plea. Even otherwise the power under S.85 (9) is one exercisable only within a limited period of time. S.72C is also no answer. That section runs: 72C. Assignment where application is not made, by cultivating tenant. Even otherwise the power under S.85 (9) is one exercisable only within a limited period of time. S.72C is also no answer. That section runs: 72C. Assignment where application is not made, by cultivating tenant. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of S.72B or S.72BB the Land Tribunal may, subject to such rules as may be made by the Government in this behalf, at any time after the vesting of the right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in the Government under S.72, assign such right, title and interest to the cultivating tenants entitled there to, and the cultivating tenants shall be bound to accept such assignment." This is only a provision which enables the Land Tribunal to assign right, title add interest to the cultivating tenants. That question does not arise here. The question of determination whether the lease is true is not covered by S.72C. 9. The position is not different where an application is filed before the Land Tribunal but no decision is reached. Even where a decision is reached it would not be as if the Tribunal '$ decision is to be the last word. That is because in spite of the decision of the Tribunal, in determining the question arising under the proviso to S.85(1) it may be necessary for the Land Board to decide that the land is not to be excluded. For instance, if the Land Board has before it a case with regard to ceiling and surrender of lands by the lessee as declarant and the lessee is one who is having excess land to be surrendered a fact which is proved to the satisfaction of the Board the fact that mistakenly such lessee has been permitted to purchase in his name will not be an answer, for, there is undisputable material before the Land Board that he is not a cultivating tenant entitled to purchase the land comprised in his holding. The land is shown to be not liable to be purchased on the materials available before the Land Board. Should the Board close its eyes to the materials available to it, materials about which there is no controversy and then merely act upon the fact that the Land Tribunal had determined the matter erroneously without having had occasion to get at all the tacts? That would be abdicating the power conferred on the Board under S.85(1). 10. Should the Board close its eyes to the materials available to it, materials about which there is no controversy and then merely act upon the fact that the Land Tribunal had determined the matter erroneously without having had occasion to get at all the tacts? That would be abdicating the power conferred on the Board under S.85(1). 10. Hence we find no substance in the plea that the Land Board is precluded from going into the question of extent of properties to be surrendered and the plea of the declarant that the property is liable to be purchased by a cultivating tenant merely because that plea has been set up. It is the duty of the Land Board or the Taluk Land Board as the case may be to determine the question in accordance with the proviso. That would call for consideration of the question whether the declarant bonafide believes that the land was liable to be purchased by the cultivating tenant. The mere averment that somebody claims the property under an alleged lease as is the case with the plea made by the petitioner in C. R. P. 505 of 1974 or a vague statement that there is some lease or other of some lands without stating that the lease is one which enables the cultivating tenant to purchase the land covered by the lease would not be sufficient. We are saying this because instances have come to our notice where leases are pleaded without specifying the dates and these leases have been found to be subsequent to 141964. Such leases are void under the provisions of the Act. Therefore no question of the lessee purchasing the land would arise in such a case. That the lease is one held by a cultivating tenant and the land is liable to be purchased by the tenant is a matter for pleading. Where such pleading has been made whether the person bonafide believed it is a matter for assessment by the Board. Even when he may not be able to prove a lease he may show reasonable belief that the cultivating tenant was entitled to purchase the land by reason of the course a litigation has taken. He may not be a party to the lease by himself and he may bonafide believe that the lease is true and hence the land is liable to be purchased. He may not be a party to the lease by himself and he may bonafide believe that the lease is true and hence the land is liable to be purchased. We are only illustrating instances. Even where a party is unable to prove a lease it will be a matter for assessment by the Land Board or the Taluk Land Board whether the declarant bonafide believes that the land which is sought to be excluded from the ceiling provision is liable to be purchased by the cultivating tenant. 11. Before we come to the facts of these cases we should advert to the decision of our learned brother Viswanatha Iyer J. in C. R P. 888 of 1975. The question raised in that case was whether a plea of a lease supported by a purchase certificate issued by the Land Tribunal should be sufficient to debar the Board from adjudicating on that question. It was contended before the learned judge that the Board had no jurisdiction to question the correctness of the certificate of purchase issued by the Land Tribunal The learned judge found that this contention cannot stand. This was because, considering the powers of the Board, it was found that if the procedure leading to the issue of a certificate of purchase is only a make-belief it is open to the Land Board to go into that question and take an independent decision. That is the view taken by us here. We are in respectful agreement with the learned judge on this aspect of the question. But the learned judge proceeds to consider the effect of issue of a certificate of purchase. But, with great respect to the learned judge, we are unable to agree with the following observations of the learned judge in the judgment: "When a statutory authority is invested with power to find out whether the provisions of the Act are sought to be defeated before taking a decision, such a decision in exercise of that power cannot be ignored and the Taluk Land Board independently decide this question whether the property belongs to the declarant or not. Unless it is shown that this certificate of purchase was obtained by fraud or collusion for which there should be clear proof beyond any reasonable doubt, the certificate of purchase must be given effect to by another authority functioning under the same Act." This is on the assumption that the question to be decided by the Board is identical with the question to be decided by the Tribunal We have shown that it is not so though incidentally that question also may call for notice. In practice it would not be possible for the Taluk Land Board to find that any adjudication obtained from the Land Tribunal by the parties before it are fraudulent or collusive. The Taluk Land Board is not a party to the proceeding before the Land Tribunal Even the decision reached collusively may have all the trappings of a decision obtained on contest. Theoretical possibility apart, there will be very few instances, if not none, where the Land Board will be able to say that it is not proposing to act upon the decision of the Land Tribunal for the reason that it was tainted by fraud or collusion. We have necessarily to bear in mind that the adjudication by the Land Tribunal is for entirely different purposes and that adjudication confers rights on parties which are envisaged under the Act. When dealing with the provisions of Chapter III the question that the Taluk Land Board or Land Board has to decide is the question of excess land, a matter on which powers have been conferred on the said Boards and only on them That calls for determination of the question envisaged in the Chapter. We need not be taken to have said that the issue of a purchase certificate by the Land Tribunal is not to be noticed by the Board. That is one of the materials that may be noticed in coming to an independent decision. But it is not as if when once a decision is reached by the Land Tribunal the Board is powerless to decide the question for the purpose of Chapter III independently. 12. Mow we come to the facts of these petitions. In C. R. P. 505 of 1974 the land owner filed a declaration under S.85 (2) of the Act. But it is not as if when once a decision is reached by the Land Tribunal the Board is powerless to decide the question for the purpose of Chapter III independently. 12. Mow we come to the facts of these petitions. In C. R. P. 505 of 1974 the land owner filed a declaration under S.85 (2) of the Act. In the objection to the draft statement prepared by the Land Board he had referred to a claim under a lease by one Kunjanujan Thampuran who is the petitioner in C.R.P. 453 of 1974. It is interesting to notice that he does not even admit the lease let alone set up a case that the land is to be excluded as it is liable to be purchased by a cultivating tenant. What is stated is "After the statement was filed one Kunjanujan Thampuran of Kilimanoor Palace have filed O. A. 460/ 72 before the Kilimanoor Land Tribunal claiming a tenancy over 20 acres of land as per an alleged oral lease given by my great uncle deceased K. R. Ravivarma and the O. A. is pending." Evidently he does not put forward any claim for exclusion of this land and what he wants is that since some others have a claim over the land notice of the draft statement is to be served on these persons also and their objection heard. Kunjanujan Thampuran has filed an independent objection dated 13-11-1973. It is evident from that objection that he is the person looking after the properties of the declarant. He would set up, in the objection, a case of lease in regard to 181/2 acres of land in himself. But strangely enough not even the year of the lease is pleaded, for, the Taluk Land Board is to be told whether the lease is on or after 1-4-1964. That is not mentioned. On the basis of the authorised Officer's report which has found that the declarant himself was in possession of the property and the alleged lease which is said to be evidenced by payment of tax is an idea conceived only recently. Therefore on the materials pleaded by these petitioners we do not see any case set up that the land is liable to be purchased by the cultivating tenant. As such the finding of the Land Board that this land is not to be excluded calls for no disturbance. Therefore on the materials pleaded by these petitioners we do not see any case set up that the land is liable to be purchased by the cultivating tenant. As such the finding of the Land Board that this land is not to be excluded calls for no disturbance. In C.R.P 505 of 1974 the petitioner who is the land owner has raised a further contention. That is by way of objection to the finding that respondents 3 and 4 are tenants. It is not as if the Taluk Land Board declares that they are tenants. Those persons appeared before the Land Board and claimed that they are in possession of certain lands and these lands are to be excluded. That is not to the prejudice of the petitioner. Is does not harm the petitioner at all. We make it clear that whatever has been said as to the leasts in favour of respondents 3 and 4 need not be taken as good for any purpose other than the proceedings for surrender. 13. Now we come to C. R. P. Nos. 459 and 464 of 1974 and 1001 of 1975. The last of these is by one Mohanachandran who is said to possess land in excess of the ceiling area and he has been called upon to surrender the excess. The petitioner in C. R. P. 459 of 1974 is one Devaki Amma and in 464 of 1974 is one Vayambil Raman. They claim to be lessees of portions of the lands of Mohanachandran. Devaki Amma claims that she is a lessee of 2 acres of land belonging to Mohanachandran and 10 acres of adjoining land belonging to his brother thus making up 12 acres as lessee. Vayambil Raman claims that he is a lessee of 15 acres. It is not even suggested that any petition for purchase is pending. There was no case before the Board that any applications are pending. The Land Board on the materials before it found against the case and that finding is a finding of fact which does not call for any interference. The authorised officer found that Vayambil Raman is a kudikidappukaran and the entire properties are in the possession of the declarant. There was no case before the Board that any applications are pending. The Land Board on the materials before it found against the case and that finding is a finding of fact which does not call for any interference. The authorised officer found that Vayambil Raman is a kudikidappukaran and the entire properties are in the possession of the declarant. In view of large extents claimed by Devaki Amma and Vayambil Raman as lessees, it goes without saying that even assuming that the lease is true whether they are entitled to purchase would have been a matter for pleading and proof. There was no pleading for the petitioners in any of these cases before the Taluk Land Board that the leaseholds were liable to be purchased by the cultivating tenants. In the facts and circumstances of the case the Land Board has not found the belief to be bonafide. This also calls for no interference. In these circumstances all the Revision Petitions are dismissed. Parties are directed to suffer costs. Dismissed.