Judgment H. L. Agrawal, J. This is an application In revision against the order dated the 6th August 1975 of the District Judge, Patna, rejecting the prayer of the petitioners for transfer of a :and encroachment proceeding under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure pending before be Deputy Collector, Land Reforms. Patna acting as Collector within the meaning of section 2 (1) of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, (Bihar Act, XV of 1956) (briefly the Act), to some other Collector. 2. The learned District Judge, taking a view that the Collector acting under the Act, being not a Civil Court subordinate to the District Court, had no authority to Act, under section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code, rejected the petition for transfer of the proceeding. 3. A proceeding for removal of encroachment under the Act, was started against opposite party No.1 at the instance of petitioner No.1. In course of the pendency of the proceeding, the petitioners became apprehensive that he would .not receive a fair trial at the bands of the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms as opposite party No.1, who is a Magistrate, was on friendly and visiting terms with him. They cited a number of instances in the revisional application to suport their apprehension. It is, however not necessary to deal with the grounds for transfer as the question that arises for determination is quite different and has nothing to do with the merits of the grounds for transfer, as already indicated earlier. 4. In order to appreciate and resolve the point emerging for consideration, it would be necessary to refer to some of the relevant provisions of the Act, .The preamble of the Act, says that it was enacted to make better provision for removal and prevention of encroachment on public lands. Section 3 prescribes the procedure for initiation of a proceeding under the Act. It provides that if it appears to the Collector from an application made by any person or upon information received from any source that any person is likely to make or is making or has already made any encroachment on any public land, he may cause to be served upon such person a notice in the prescribed form requiring him to appear and show cause on a date specified in the notice. The term Collector has been defined in section 2 (1) to mean "the Collector of the district and includes any officer empowered by the State Government to discharge all or any of the functions of a Collector under this Act. "Section 5 provides for hearing of the matter on the date fixed on taking "such other evidence as may be adduced in that behalf", and under section 6, he has to make a final order" after hearing the persons concerned and taking other evidence, if any, under section 5 and after making such enquiry as he deems necessary". Under the provision of section 8, all proceedings under the Act, have been directed to be heard and disposed of in a summary manner. The Collector, however, has been empowered under section 10 for the purpose of the enquiry under the Act, to issue commission, to hold local inspection, to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel the production of documents as a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Section II provides for appeal against the final order passed by the Collector under section 6 with powers of suspension of the execution of the order appealed against. Sub-section (3) of section 11 provides that appeals under this section shall be heard and disposed of in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. By section 19, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been ousted and it has been specifically provided that no suit shall be in respect of any encroachment upon public land." 5. Mr. Rama Kant Verma appearing for the petitioners advanced his argument on the sole basis that in as much as an appeal has been provided against the final order passed by the Collector, to the District Judge and the High Court (depending upon the valuation of the public land), the court of the Collector must be deemed to be a court subordinate to it and, therefore, competent to exercise the general power of transfer and withdrawal as under section 24 of the Code of Civil procedure. The contention of Mr. S.C. Ghose appearing for opposite party No. 1 however, was that the Deputy Collector, who was acting as the Collector in this case, was not a court, much Jess subordinate to the District Court or for a matter of that, not a court at all. The contention of Mr. S.C. Ghose appearing for opposite party No. 1 however, was that the Deputy Collector, who was acting as the Collector in this case, was not a court, much Jess subordinate to the District Court or for a matter of that, not a court at all. He further contended that the provision of appeal contained in section 11 of the Act, was only to save the statute from unconstitutionality and on that account the Collector would not be Collector subordinate to the District Court." Mr. Ghose further contended that the other condition for transferring a suit or a proceeding for trial or disposal to any court subordinate and competent to try or dispose of the same cannot be fulfilled in this case as in a district there may not be any other officer empowered by the State Government to discharge an or any of the functions of a Collector under this Act, and therefore, the general power of transfer and withdrawal contemplated under section 24 of the Code would not apply. It has, therefore, to be seen as to whether the proceeding initiated under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, is a suit or proceeding pending before any "Court" subordinate to the District Court as it is plain that before any suit or proceeding is ordered to be transferred from one Court to another, it must be shown that the suit or proceeding which is being transferred is pending before a Court subordinate to the District Court or the High Court. It is only then that the District Court or the High Court will have jurisdiction to entertain a petition under section 24 of the Code. 6. The word "Court" is not defined in the Civil Procedure Code. The Indian Evidence Act, however, contains a definition in section 3 which is in the following terms: "Court' includes all judges, magistrate and all persons except arbitrators legally authorised to take evidence." In this connection preamble of the Code of Civil Procedure may also be relevant which reads; "Whereas it is expedient to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature" This preamble shows that the provisions under the Code are meant to apply only to ordinary Civil Courts. In this connection reference to section 9 of the Code may also be usefully made, according to which the courts shall (subject to the provision therein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or implied barred. There is abundant authority, both English and Indian to show that there are tribunals with many of the trapplings of a court which, nevertheless, are not courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power. The point has been elaborately dealt with in a judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Shell Co. of Australia Vs. Federal Commissioner of Taxation. The Lord Chancellor has enumerated a series of negative propositions. He observes:- "(1) A tribunal is not necessarily a Court in that strict sense because it gives a final declaration (2) Nor because it hears witnesses on oath. (3) Nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide. (4). Nor because it gives decision which attract the rights of subjects. (5) Nor because there is an appeal to a Court. (6) Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body." From the above discussion, it becomes dear that it is usual to find many common features between a Court and an administrative or quasijudicial tribunal. The presence or absence of these features, therefore does not furnish any conclusive test to determine whether a particular body is a judicial body or not. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Virindra Kumar Satyawadi Vs. Stale of Punjab where a distinction between a quasi-judicial tribunal and a court has been indicated as follows :- It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide dispute in a judicial manner and declare the right of parties in a definite judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also import an obligation On the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. And it also import an obligation On the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act, is a Court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act, it possesses all the attributes of a court," From the above discussion we may broadly say that "Court of law" is a tribunal dealing with and adjudicating upon civil disputes by the operation of law in a judicial manner untroubled by ulterior consideration or matters of executive policy and observing certain definite rules and procedure which are either defined by Statute or recognised by practice. It may be that a tribunal falling under this definition may yet not be a Court of law but from the above discussion it will be clear that if any of these attributes is missing, the tribunal falls short of being a court of law. 7. In this background and applying as clearly as possible the tests mentioned above, it has to be seen whether the Collector in the Bihar Act, in question is a Court within the meaning of section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On a reference to the relevant provisions of the Bihar Act, which I have sufficiently indicated earlier, power has been conferred on authorised officers designated by the State Government for that purpose, as in the present case the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, was the authorised officer. A special procedure has been evolved for the purpose of determination of the enquiry. Section 11 provides for appeal before the appellate authority, which is named in the Act, and subject to the decision of the appellate authority, an order of the Collector has been made final, and any suit or any other legal proceeding in respect of any order passed under the Act, has been barred in a Civil Court the Act, therefore, clearly makes a distinction between a Civil Court and the Collector. Although, therefore the Collector may have some of the powers of a Civil Court regarding summoning of the witnesses and enforcing their attendance or issuing commission and holding local inspection and the like, in other words, some or many trapplings of a Court, he cannot be said to be a Court. The Bihar Act, and the rules framed thereunder evolve a scheme in regard to the regulation and control of the public land and prevention of unauthorised encroachment thereupon. The Act, read as a whole provides some provision which, in my opinion, cannot be called purely of a judicial nature. 8. I may refer to a few cases in support of this view. In this court, in the case of Arjun Rautera V. Maharaja Krishna Chandra Gajpati Namyan Deo a question had arisen as to whether the Court of the Deputy Collector and the Collector while trying cases or hearing appeals under the Orissa Tenancy Act, were Civil Courts it was held that they were not Civil Court, but were only Revenue Courts although they might be trying suits or proceedings of Civil nature. Reference in this connection was made to section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure declaring subordination of different Courts, particularly to the expression" every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court... is subordinate to the High Court and District Court. It cannot be contended that the Court of the Collector in the present case is a Civil Court within the meaning of the Code. Again in the case of Onkar Dutta Shastri Vs. The Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board a question arose in this court as to whet her the District Judge hearing appeals under section 70 (2)(b) of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950, against an order of the Superintendent of the Board levying a fee on the income of the Trust was a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115 of the Code and therefore an order passed by the District Judge was fit to be revisable by the High Court, or whether he acts as a person a designate. Under the provisions of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, an appeal has been provided before the prescribed authority by a trustees against an order of surcharge or charge made against him. Under the provisions of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, an appeal has been provided before the prescribed authority by a trustees against an order of surcharge or charge made against him. On a reference to a large number of authorities, it was held that the appeal provision was a mere safeguard to avoid any possibility of injustice and the District Judge was acting merely as a person designate, and hence the High Court had no jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code to interfere with an order passed by the District Judge on appeal. In this case the learned single Judge distinguished the case of the Calcutta High Court in Govinda Chandra Salta vs. Reshmoni Dessya arising under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors' Act, where a revision Was entertained against an order of the Additional District Judge in exercise of his powers under section 40A on the ground that the proviso to section 40A of the aforesaid Bengal Act, empowered the District Judge to transfer all the functions which he could exercise under section 40A to an Additional District Judge, subordinate to him to be a circumstance that the District Judge was to exercise the authority not in his personal capacity, but as a court. It was specifically observed that, as a person a designate, he cannot have any judicial officer subordinate to him. 9. In Firm of S. Mohd. Ali and sons and others Vs. V.V. Madhava rao and Others the Andhra Pradesh High Court was considering a somewhat similar question, as to whether the Rent Controller under the Andhra Pradesh (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, was a court subordinate within the meaning of section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code, and if that be so whether the High Court could transfer any case pending before him to any other Rent Controller. The learned single Judge, if I may say so with great respect, has taken great pains in his elaborate judgment to answer the question with reference to a large number of English and Indian authorities and has held that the Rent Controller was not acting as a Civil Court and therefore, the High Court can not transfer any case pending before him in its general power to transfer and withdrawal of cases and proceedings. 10. The last case to which reference may be made is the case of Smt. Sushila Devi. Vs. 10. The last case to which reference may be made is the case of Smt. Sushila Devi. Vs. Bamnandan Prasad and others a case from this High Court. In this case again the question for consideration was the meaning of the expression "Collector" in Kosi Area (Restoration of Lands to Raiyats) Act, (30 of 1951). One of the questions that arose for consideration in this case was as to whether after coming into force of the new Limitation Act, respondent No. 1 had a right to ask the court concerned to condone the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, in depositing the instalment money. The Patna High Court had held that the Collector exercising the powers of appeal against the order of the Circle Officer had the necessary power of condoning the delay. It may be mentioned that under section 15 of the Act, in question, he Was vested with certain specified powers under the Code of Civil Procedure as in the case on hand. Reversing the decision of this Court. the Supreme Court held that the Collector was not a Court and, therefore, he had no authority to entertain an application to extend the time and the provisions contained under section 5 of the Limitation Act, did not apply. This decision, therefore, can be relied upon for the proposition that merely on the existence of certain specified powers under the Code of Civil Procedure vested in an executive authority, that would not necessarily become a Court, much less a Civil Court within the meaning of either section 3 or section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It must. therefore, be held that the District Judge acting as a Court of appeal against the first-order passed by the Collector under section 6 of the Bihar Act, was not exercising the power of appeal against an order of the Court subordinate to him, but was acting as a person designate, and the general powers of transfer and withdrawal of any suit or proceeding pending before a Collector under the provisions of the Bihar Act, cannot be exercised. 11. There is set another circumstance which goes against the contention of Mr. Verma. Section 24 of the Code contemplates for transfer of a suit or proceeding after withdrawal from one Court subordinate to it to any other court which must be competent to try or dispose of the same. 11. There is set another circumstance which goes against the contention of Mr. Verma. Section 24 of the Code contemplates for transfer of a suit or proceeding after withdrawal from one Court subordinate to it to any other court which must be competent to try or dispose of the same. From the scheme of the Bihar Act, it is clear that the power under the Act, is to be exercised by special officer who may specifically empowered by the State Government in this behalf to discharge all or any of the functions of a Collector under the Act. The proceeding, therefore, can be disposed of only by a named officer. In this view of the matter, there cannot be a transfer of the proceeding from such an officer to any other officer. It is, therefore, obvious that the scheme of the Act, does not contemplate the transfer of proceedings from the specified officer to any other officer. The learned District Judge has, therefore, taken a correct view of the law. 12. I would, accordingly, dismiss this application, but in the circumstances shall make no order as to costs. Application dismissed.