JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - Respondent No. 2 Bihari Lal filed two applications under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act for permission to file suits for the eviction of the petitioner from two shops. These applications were filed on September 16, 1971. In these applications Bihari Lal alleged that he was carrying on business in partnership, but that partnership was dissolved and that business came to an end, that it was necessary for him in order to maintain himself and members of his family to start another business, that he was the owner of the two shops, which were in the tenancy of the petitioner and that be needed those shops for starting his business. These applications were opposed by the petitioners on the grounds that Bihari Lal did not genuinely need these shops for any business, as he was too old to start any business, and that the need of the petitioners for these shops was very great and genuine. 2. During the pendency of these applications the U. P. Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, came into force. By virtue of the provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 43, application under Section 3 of the old Act was to be treated as an application under Section 21 of the new Act. However, on August 28, 1972, Bihari Lal moved an application for amendment of the application by including therein a relief for the eviction of the petitioners. This amendment was allowed. 3. When the applications came up for hearing, the petitioners raised objections that the applications under Section 21 were not verified in accordance with the revisions of Rule 15 (2) and that a proper court fees, as required by Rule 35, had not been paid thereon. On these grounds they pleaded that the applications were incompetent and could not be decided on merits. The Prescribed Authority agreed with the contentions of the petitioners and held that the applications were not maintainable, as they were neither verified nor stamped with the proper amount of court fees. The Prescribed Authority, however, examined the merits of the case also and held in favour of the petitioners. It held that Bihari Lal was too old to start any business and that his need for the two shops was not genuine. The Prescribed Authority, however, examined the merits of the case also and held in favour of the petitioners. It held that Bihari Lal was too old to start any business and that his need for the two shops was not genuine. He further held that the applications made by Bihari Lal were mala fide, inasmuch as his real intention was to increase the rent of the shops and not to carry on business therein. He also held that no suitable alternative accommodation was available to the tenants and that their need for the shops was genuine. He, accordingly, rejected both the applications of the landlord. 4. Against the orders of the Prescribed Authority in the two applications the landlord filed two appeals. The District Judge had allowed both the appeals and ordered the eviction of the petitioners from the two shops. The District Judge has held that the applications made by the landlord were not required to be verified in accordance with the provisions of Rule 15(2) or to be stamped with court-fees in accordance with Rule 35. He has further observed that even if these two things were required, the Prescribed Authority should have called upon the landlord to supply the verification and the deficiency in court-fees. He has, accordingly, disagreed with the Prescribed Authority that the applications were not maintainable. On the merits the District Judge has held that mere old age of the landlord was no ground for holding that his need for starting a new business was not genuine. After examining the case of the landlord the District Judge has recorded a finding that since his old business has come to an end, the landlord genuinely wanted to start a new business and, therefore, his need for the shops in dispute was genuine. So far as the need of the tenants is concerned, the District Judge was of opinion that alternative accommodation was available to them and even though the alternative accommodation was not quite suitable. In view of the landlord's need he was entitled to an order of release. Against the order of the District Judge this writ petition has been filed by the tenants. 5. In view of the landlord's need he was entitled to an order of release. Against the order of the District Judge this writ petition has been filed by the tenants. 5. The first point urged before me by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the applications under Section 3 of the old Act, when they were converted into applications under Section 21 of the new Act by the amendment sought by the landlord, needed to be verified in accordance with Rule 15(2) and to be stamped with a court-fee of Rs. 10/- in accordance with the requirement of Rule 3 5. Section 43 (1) repeals the earlier Act. Subsection (2) provides for the consequences following the repeal. Clause (a) provides : "any application or proceeding pending immediately before the commencement of this Act before the District Magistrate under Section 3 of the old Act shall stand transferred to the prescribed authority having jurisdiction and shall be deemed to be an application or proceeding under Section 21 of this Act and shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act." This clause provides for an automatic conversion of an application under Section 3 of the old Act to an application under Section 21 of the new Act. By virtue of this provision an application under Section 3 of the old Act becomes a full-fledged application under Section 21 of the new Act and is required to be decided under the new Act as an application under Section 21. it, thus, appears that an application which was originally filed under Section 3 of the old Act becomes a complete and competent application under Section 21 of the new Act and has to be treated as a proper and valid application under Section 21. The learned Counsel, however, relies upon clause (h) of sub-section (2) of Section 43. This clause reads : "(h) any court or authority before which any suit or other proceeding relating to the recovery or determination or fixation of rent or of eviction from any building is pending immediately before the commencement of this Act may, on an. The learned Counsel, however, relies upon clause (h) of sub-section (2) of Section 43. This clause reads : "(h) any court or authority before which any suit or other proceeding relating to the recovery or determination or fixation of rent or of eviction from any building is pending immediately before the commencement of this Act may, on an. application being made to it within sixty days from such commencement, grant leave to any party to amend its pleading in consequence of the provisions of this Act." It is urged by learned Counsel that when the landlord made an application for amendment of his applications, that application was made under clause (h) and after the amendment, the provisions of the Act and the Rules became applicable to it. In my opinion clause (h) hes no application to an application under Section 3 of the old Act, which is governed solely by clause (a). That apart, clause (h) does not say that in all the pending suits or other proceedings Rule 15 and 35 would become applicable. It appears that Rules 15 and 35 are only applicable to applications filed under the new Act after the coming into, force of the new Act. They have no application to applications or proceedings which were pending on the date of the commencement of the new Act and which are to be continued under the provisions of the new Act. The District Judge was right in holding that the applications of the landlord, which had been filed under Section 3 of the old Act, did not require to be verified under Rule 15(2) or to be stamped with court-fees requisite under Rule 35. 6. The Prescribed Authority had held that The applications filed by the landlord were mala fide, inasmuch as they had been filed with the object of getting a higher rent for the shops. The District Judge has examined all the material on this point and has taken a view that the application were not motivated by a desire to get an enhanced rent but by a desire to use the premises for his own business. He has reversed the finding of the Prescribed Authority on this point. The decision of the District Judge on this point does not suffer from any such infirmity by would render it liable to interference in a writ petition. 7. He has reversed the finding of the Prescribed Authority on this point. The decision of the District Judge on this point does not suffer from any such infirmity by would render it liable to interference in a writ petition. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioners strongly contended that the District Judge has acted in violation of the provisions of Rule 16(2)(a) and (b). This rule is quoted in the judgment of the District Judge and it cannot be said that he was not aware of this rule in substance, sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 lays down guidelines for the, comparison of the needs of the landlord and the tenant, while considering an application for release under Section 21(a) in respect of business premises. Clause (at of this Rule directs the Prescribed Authority to have regard to the fact that the greater the period of the tenancy, the less would be justification for allowing release of the premises. Clause (b) directs the Prescribed Authority to have regard to the fact that where the tenant has with him suitable accommodation, to which he can shift his business without substantial loss, there shall be greater justification for allowing release. These clause do not prohibit the Prescribed Authority from allowing the application for release, if the tenancy is of long standing or if no suitable accommodation is available to the tenant. All that these clauses require the Prescribed Authority to do is to have these factors in mind when comparing the needs of the landlord and the tenant. 8. The District Judge has up set the finding of the Prescribed Authority and has held that the need of the landlord is genuine. He has accepted the case of the landlord that the partnership. in which he was carrying on business, had been dissolved and that it was accessory for him to start another business. The petitioners had alleged that the landlord had large sums of money in the bank and it was not necessary for him to start any business. This they completely failed to establish. The finding of the District Judge that the need of the landlord to start a new business in the shop in dispute is genuine is based upon material on the record and cannot be seriously challenged. 9. This they completely failed to establish. The finding of the District Judge that the need of the landlord to start a new business in the shop in dispute is genuine is based upon material on the record and cannot be seriously challenged. 9. Some attempt was made by the tenants to show that the landlord had got another shop vacated earlier, but later on be let it out on a higher rent, thereby suggesting that he has not really in need of any shop. The District Judge has not accepted this contention on the ground that the petitioners failed to show when the shop was got vacated and when it was let out to a new tenant. From the material placed before me in this connection it appears that the vacation of the shop and its letting out again took place long before the application under Section 3 were filed. Apparently, it was even before the partnership business of the landlord was dissolved. It could have no possible effect on the landlord's present claim that he needed the shops for starting a new business. 10. As regards the needs of the tenants, admittedly, they are carrying on cloth business in the shops in dispute. The District Judge has found that petitioners are members of a joint family, which owns two other houses, one at Imarti Road and the other at Baji Rao Katra. In both these houses there are shops. There appear to be two shops in the house at Imarti Road, one of which is let out to one Dr. Har Swarup and in the other some member of the family carries on business in kerosene oil. In the, house at Baji Rao Katra also there is a shop in which one of the members of the family carries out kerosene oil business. In view of these facts the District judge has held that alternative accommodation is available to the tenants in their own shops. It was urged before the District Judge that the shops belonging to the tenants at Imarti Road and Baji Rao Katra are not suitable for carrying out cloth business. The District Judge has observed that even if that be so, the need of the landlord for the shops in dispute is greater, as he cannot start his business anywhere else while the tenants can shift to their own shops. The District Judge has observed that even if that be so, the need of the landlord for the shops in dispute is greater, as he cannot start his business anywhere else while the tenants can shift to their own shops. He has observed that the loss suffered by the tenants for loss of goodwill can be compensated by awarding them compensation under the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21. 11. Now the question is whether the District Judge can be said to have acted in disregard to the provisions of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16. There can be no manner of doubt that the District judge had the provisions of these clauses in mind. He has recorded a finding of fact that the tenants had alternative accommodation available to them. though at place which was not suitable for cloth business. He has recorded a finding of fact that the landlord had no other accommodation, except these shops, to start his business and to satisfy his genuine need. Comparing the needs of the two in the light of these findings the District judge was justified in holding that the need of the landlord was greater than that of the tenants, since an alternative accommodation was available to the tenants whilst no alternative accommodation was available to the landlord. In this situation, when the District Judge found that alternative accommodation was available to the tenants, the question relating to the period of the tenancy of the tenants lost all its importance. 12. Having carefully perused the order of the District Judge, I am satisfied that substantially the District Judge has considered the needs of the landlord and the tenants and has compared them properly. Some complaint was made by the learned Counsel for the tenants that the District Judge has not considered all the material on the record. This complaint does not appear to be justified The order of the District Judge is a long and detailed one in which all aspects of the case have been considered. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has not been able to specify that on any particular point the District Judge has failed to take into account any relevant evidence led by the parties. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has not been able to specify that on any particular point the District Judge has failed to take into account any relevant evidence led by the parties. The learned Counsel also urged that on the landlord's own case he had no interest left in the property, as he had created a trust thereof in favour of his alleged adopted son. In the applications under Section 3 the landlord had alleged that he was the owner of the shops in dispute and this fact was admitted by the tenants. In some affidavit the landlord appears to have alleged that he had created a trust in favour of his adopted son, but it was not stated therein that the shops in dispute were also subject matter of the trust. The learned Counsel for the petitioners stated that in an affidavit filed by one Satya Narain it was stated that the trust covered the disputed shops also. I do not think that a trust can be proved in this informal manner. In the first place, the petitioners had admitted that Bihari Lal was the owner and landlord of the premises. In the second place, the trust deed was not brought on the record and there is nothing to show that any valid trust in accordance with law was created. It was asserted on behalf of the landlord that in fact it was a will and not a trust. In this state of affairs, no finding that the shops in dispute were trust property could be at all recorded. 13. The District Judge has not violated either any provisions of the Act or of the Rules in recording his findings. His decision does not suffer from any manifest error of law or any error of jurisdiction. 14. In the result the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs of this writ petition. The stay order is vacated.