JUDGMENT H.N. Kapoor, J.: - This is a defendants appeal against the decree and judgment dated 17-8-1967 of the Civil Judge, Shahjahanpur in Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1967, reversing the decree and judgment dated 28-9-1966 of Munsif, Shahjahanpur in Original Suit No. 395 of 1964, by which the plaintiff's suit had been dismissed. The plaintiff who was a lekhpal and had been removed from the service by the order dated 26-6-1961, brought the suit on the allegations that the order of removal was illegal and ultra vires and for declaration that he would be deemed to continue in service. He also prayed for recovery of a sum of Rs. 2,290/75 p. as arrears of pay and dearness allowance etc. 2. The suit was resisted by the State Government. On the pleadings of the parties, two main issues were framed, firstly whether the notice under Section 80, Civil P. C. is invalid and secondly whether the removal of the plaintiff from service is illegal for the reasons mentioned in paragraph 11 of the plaint? Issue No. 1 was decided in favour of the plaintiff but issue No. 2 was decided against him and the suit was dismissed on this finding. The lower appellate Court reversed the finding on issue No. 2 as it took the view that the enquiry conducted was illegal because the charges too had been framed by the Enquiring Officer i.e. the Tahsildar. With this finding he decreed the plaintiff's suit. 3. Feeling aggrieved the State has filed this appeal before this Court. The only point that arises for decision in this case is whether the order of removal of the plaintiff from service is illegal and the enquiry was not properly conducted. When the plaintiff was Lekhpal some Khasra and Khataunis, which were in his charge, had been removed. The Sub Divisional Officer, Powayan by his order dated 9-3-1961 (Ex. A-16) appointed Tahsildar, Powayan as Enquiring Officer in the case and directed that separate charges shall be framed and separate files shall be prepared in respect of each of them. On the basis of this direction the Tahsildar framed charges against the applicant and conducted enquiry. He submitted report to Sub Divisional Officer, Powayan after conducting the enquiry. Sub Divisional Officer Powayan, then issued show cause notice and after hearing the applicant passed the order of removal. On the basis of this direction the Tahsildar framed charges against the applicant and conducted enquiry. He submitted report to Sub Divisional Officer, Powayan after conducting the enquiry. Sub Divisional Officer Powayan, then issued show cause notice and after hearing the applicant passed the order of removal. It has been conceded before the lower appellate Court that in case the charges had been framed by the S. D. O. himself, who was the appointing authority, then there would have been no illegality or irregularity and then it was possible for the S. D. O. to delegate his powers to the Tahsildar to hold enquiry into the said charges. 4. The lower appellate Court relied on the case of Shardul Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1966 Madh Pra 193 and held that the enquiry was illegally conducted as the charges had been framed by the Tahsildar. It has clearly mentioned in the judgment that the Provincial Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, were not available and the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 were before him, which no doubt require that the charges should be framed by the disciplinary authority itself. Similar is the proviso in Rule 14 of Central Civil Services (C. C. A.) Rules, 1965. But under the U. P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules there was no such provision. On the other hand the form prescribed in Appendix VII for framing charges clearly shows that the charges could have been served under the signature and designation of the Enquiring Officer (for and on behalf of the disciplinary authority). In the present case the charges were framed and issued in this very form. 5. Sri S. N. Misra, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that it may be said that the rules were not (sic) (consistent ?) with the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution and that by recent amendment of 1975 in Rule 55 it has been clearly provided that the charges had got to be framed by the punishing authority. Rule 55 sub-rule (2) as amended in 1975 is as follows : "Where the punishing authority itself inquires into any charge or appoints an inquiring officer for holding an inquiry into such charge. Rule 55 sub-rule (2) as amended in 1975 is as follows : "Where the punishing authority itself inquires into any charge or appoints an inquiring officer for holding an inquiry into such charge. the punishing authority, if it considers it necessary to do so, may, by an order, appoint a Government servant or a legal practitioner, to be known as "Presenting Officer" to present on its behalf the case in support of the charge." 6. For the purpose of this case it is not necessary to decide whether by this amendment it has become mandatory that the punishing authority itself should frame the charges since the matter is of 1960 and 1961 when there was no such amendment of the rules. In the case of Pradyat Kumar Bose v. Hon'ble Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, reported in AIR 1956 SC 285 , it was held that it was possible for the appointing authority i. e. the Chief Justice in that case to appoint an Enquiring Officer (another Judge in that case) to hold enquiry and to report. It appears that there were no specific rules in this behalf but it was held that such executive functions could be delegated. Their Lordships made the following observations : "As pointed out in 'Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board, 1953 (2) QB 18 at p. 40, it is true that no judicial tribunal can delegate its functions unless it is enabled to do so expressly or by necessary implication." But the exercise of the power to appoint or dismiss an officer is the exercise not of a judicial power but of an administrative power. It is nonetheless so, by reason of the fact that an opportunity to show cause and an enquiry simulating judicial standards have to precede the exercise thereof. It is well recognised that a statutory functionary exercising such a power cannot be said to have delegated his functions merely by deputing a responsible and competent official to enquire and report. That is the ordinary mode of exercise of any administrative power. What cannot be delegated except where the law specifically so provides is the ultimate responsibility for the exercise of such power." In that case it appears that the Chief Justice had passed the following order:- "I considered this report and the evidence most anxiously and found myself in entire agreement with the learned Judge. Sri. What cannot be delegated except where the law specifically so provides is the ultimate responsibility for the exercise of such power." In that case it appears that the Chief Justice had passed the following order:- "I considered this report and the evidence most anxiously and found myself in entire agreement with the learned Judge. Sri. P. K. Bose was, in my view, clearly guilty of the matter comprised in the charges specified by K. C. Das Gupta J." 7. Sri. S. C. Verma Standing Counsel has argued that this clearly shows that the charges had been actually framed by K. C. Das Gupta, J. in that case. Sri S. N. Misra, however, relied on earlier passage which was to the effect that a full and thorough enquiry was held by K. C Das Gupta, J. into the charges made against Sri P. K. Bose, and has argued that this shows that the charges had already been framed against P. K. Bose by the Chief Justice. In my opinion by using the words that the charges were specified by K. C. Das Gupta, J. it was clearly meant that the charges which were served on P. K. Bose had been actually framed by the Enquiring Officer Judge. There might have been various allegations against P. K. Bose when the enquiry was handed over to the Enquiring Judge. Charges had to be framed or specified on the basis of those allegations. Sri S. N. Misra has argued that Article 311 of the Constitution contemplates that only the appointing authority has to take a decision whether to initiate enquiry which may result in the dismissal or removal of a person or not and it is implied that the charges must be framed '"v the appointing authority. He has also drawn a distinction between the power of such authority and procedure which may be followed in holding the enquiry. In my opinion when the appointing authority passes an order for framing charges and holding an en quirt' on the basis of some material before him which might be only a complaint. he does initiate proceedings and the charges only remain to be specified on the basis of the material which he for wards to the Enquiring Officer. In my opinion when the appointing authority passes an order for framing charges and holding an en quirt' on the basis of some material before him which might be only a complaint. he does initiate proceedings and the charges only remain to be specified on the basis of the material which he for wards to the Enquiring Officer. If the power to hold enquiry can be delegated, there is no reason why that very Enquiring Officer cannot frame or specify the charges unless of course there was ;some statutory bar. It may be said that in the case of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules there is such a statutory bar. 8. In the case of Union of India v. J.A. Munaff, reported in (1968) 17 Fac LR 14 (SC) it was held that it was possible for the 'disciplinary authority' under the Railway Establishment Code for purpose of imposing penalty of compulsory retirement, removal or dismissal to appoint an Enquiring Officer to frame charges and conduct enquiry provided such Enquiring Officer was the person who could have imposed minor penalties as contemplated under Rule 1907. This procedure is prescribed under Rules 1709 to 1712. 9. There was thus no absolute bar under Article 311 that charges could not be framed by the Enquiring Officer and had to be framed only by the punishing authority. As already observed above it will depend on the statutory rules governing particular service. 10. The lower appellate Court has placed reliance on the case Shardul Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1966 Madh Pra 193. In that case the Superintendent of Police at his own initiative framed charges and conducted enquiry against a Sub-Inspector and then made a report to the Inspector General of Police through the D. I. G. and then the Inspector General of Police served final notice and ultimately terminated the services of the Sub-Inspector. It was held that no power was given under the Police Act or the regulations to the Superintendent of Police to initiate enquiry and frame charges. This case was distinguished by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Union of India v. J.A. Munaff, reported in (1968) 17 Fac LR 14 (supra). It was held that no power was given under the Police Act or the regulations to the Superintendent of Police to initiate enquiry and frame charges. This case was distinguished by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Union of India v. J.A. Munaff, reported in (1968) 17 Fac LR 14 (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court did not express any definite opinion about the correctness of the judgment of this case but obviously it was held no such hard and fast rule can be laid down that Enquiring Officer properly appointed cannot frame charges, depending of course on the statutory rules. In every case power for framing charge and holding enquiry is to be delegated to such Enquiring Officer by the appointing or punishing authority. No officer can suo mote initiate the disciplinary proceedings by framing charges and holding enquiry and then reporting the matter to the disciplinary authority without having been appointed an Enquiring Officer initially by that authority. 11. Learned Standing Counsel has also placed reliance on the case of U.P. Government v. Tabarakh Husain, AIR 1956 All 151 in which it was held that when the proper prescribed procedure was not followed in holding an enquiry in case of a police officer, the order of dismissal was not proper but it cannot be said that that order was passed by a person having no authority to pass that order and as such it was not a nullity. 12. In my opinion in the present case it cannot be said that the procedure followed was illegal and that the order of removal was illegal and void. 13. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The decree and judgment dated 17-8-1967 of the lower appellate Court are set aside and those of trial Court are restored. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal.