JUDGMENT - G.N. VAIDYA, J.:---The above Contempt Petition is filed by Phiroze Soarabji Mogrelia, who was the respondent in Appeal No. 66 of 1967 and the plaintiff in R.A.E. Suit No. 1237 of 1963 of the Small Causes Court at Bombay, in which undertakings were given as follows by respondents Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 : “We, Messrs. Mohanlal Bhogilal Shah, Chandrakumar Daulatchand Jhaveri and Shantikumar Daulatchand Jhaveri, all partners of the Appellants above named, and Mohanlal Dharamdas Bhatia, solemnly affirm and state as under : We, hereby give a solemn undertaking to this Court that we shall hand over to the respondent vacant and peaceful possession of Cabin No. 4 of the suit premises on or before 31st July, 1968. We, Messrs, Mohanlal Bhogilal Shah, Chandrakumar Daulatchand Jhaveri, hereby give a solemn undertaking to this Court that we shall use Cabin 2 admeasuring about 72 sq. ft. for the purpose of our own business only, and we shall not take Mohanlal Dharamdas Bhatia as partner or employee in Malcolm Co., nor shall we allow anybody else except our servants, and Cabin No. 2 in the suit premises.” Solemnly affirmed at Bombay this 26th day of April, 1968. 2. Alleging that despite the said undertakings the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 and allowed respondents Nos. 5 and 6 to use the said cabin under the leave and licence, the petitioner moved the Small Causes Court at Bombay by an Interlocutory Notice No. 7760 of 1963 in R.A.E. Suit No. 5491 of 1972 for an appropriate action against the respondent. 3. That Court dismissed the application on April 7, 1975 on the grounds that the petitioner should have moved the Appeal Court and not the trial Court. Thereafter the present petition was filed on September 29, 1975, alleging that all the respondents Nos. 1 to 6 had committed the contempt of the Court by committing breach of the undertakings given on April 26, 1968 as above in Appeal No. 66 of 1967. 4. The petition is resisted, firstly, on the ground that the petition is barred by time under section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which lays down that no Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. 5. 5. Mr. Daji, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, relied on section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, and submitted that the period from December 17, 1973 to April 7, 1975 deserved to be excluded under section 14 of the Limitation Act as the petitioner had bona fide proceeded with the matter before the trial Court and expected the trial Court to make a report to this Court. 6. As against this, Mr. Kanuga submitted that the undertaking was given on April 26, 1968 and respondents Nos. 5 and 6 were allowed to use the premises in January, 1971 and, therefore, the period of one year had already expired before the petitioner took up proceedings in the Small Causes Court on December 17, 1973. 7. There is no doubt, considerable force in the argument of Mr. Kanuga; but we would not like him to rest the judgment in this case merely by upholding the plea of limitation, because the Contempt of Courts Act is in addition to and not in derogation of any other law relating to contempt; and if we are satisfied that there was clear breach committed of the undertaking to the Court, which required to be punished under the contempt jurisdiction of this Court, the aforesaid delay would not have deterred us form taking action against the respondents. 8. There is, however, a very serious hurdle in the way of the petitioner, because the very terms quoted above would show that it has referred to the consent terms which were arrived at, and which, inter alia, stated that the respondent No. 1 should continue as statutory tenant of the premises, i.e., cabin No. 2, subject to payment of rent and future permitted increases, if any. Having agreed to admit the statutory tenancy, it was not open to the petitioner to impose an undertaking which was not part or incident of the statutory tenancy. 9. If a statutory tenancy is created, terms and conditions of it must conform to the Statute. The parties have no freedom to vary these terms as they like. Any undertaking inconsistent with the statue cannot be enforced. The petitioner does not urge that the undertaking given was consistent with the statutory tenancy or that the breach of the undertaking amounted to a breach of any of the terms of statutory tenancy. 10. The parties have no freedom to vary these terms as they like. Any undertaking inconsistent with the statue cannot be enforced. The petitioner does not urge that the undertaking given was consistent with the statutory tenancy or that the breach of the undertaking amounted to a breach of any of the terms of statutory tenancy. 10. It is further necessary to note that if at all the petitioner has any remedy to pursue in respect of the undertakings, it is open for him to do so under the ordinary law. The Contempt of Courts Act cannot be converted into an engine of oppression in order to enforce property rights of an individual. The Act exists only for one purpose, viz., to vindicate the dignity and the prestige of the administration of justice. 11. Section 13 of the Act, therefore, lays down that, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no Court shall impose a sentence under this Act for a contempt of Court unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of a such a nature that it substantially interferes of tends to interfere with the due course of justice. 12. It cannot be said that merely because section 15-A of the Rent Act allowed the licensees subsequently to be protected by amendment of the Rent Act, the respondents interfered with the due course of justice. It is the Legislature which has interfered with the rights of the petitioner. It is not the respondents who have interfered with their rights in such a way as to justify a complaint of a grievance which substantially interferes, or tends substantially to interfere or amounts to interference with the due course of justice. 13. We, therefore, hold that this is not a fit case for an action under the Contempt of Courts Act. The Contempt of Courts Act is not meant for serving as a weapon in the hands of a property owner to recover possession of the premises or to enforce rights and obligations in respect of property, for which they should follow the ordinary law under the Code of Civil Procedure or the Rent Act as the case may be or the Specific Relief Act. 14. In the result, the petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. -----