Judgment :- (KAILASAM, J.) 1. The appellant Messrs Sukraj and Co. No. 7 Kasi Chetti St. Madras 1. have preferred this writ appeal against the order of Ramaprasada Rao J. in W.P. 3323 of 1971, dismissing its petition for the issue of writ of certiorari, concurring with the finding of the fact found by the Customs authorities that the goods that were displayed in the shop of the appellant were confiscatable under S. 111(0) of the Customs Act, 1962. 2. The short facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as follows:—On a search made of the premises of the appellant on 6th August 1965, the customs authorities seized a number of articles valued at Rs. 16,905-50. The proprietor Sukhraj was away at Rajastan and his brother Nainmul was in charge of the shop at the time of search. On 9th August 1965 Nainmul stated that Sukhraj and Co. was owned by his brother Sukhraj and he was looking after the business in his absence. A show cause notice was issu ed by the Assistant Collector of Customs on the appellant on 19th October 1965. It is stated that Nainmul undertook to direct Sukhraj to produce the bills and no one has produced such documentary evidence in the Customs house. In the absence of such documentary evidence, the Assistant Collector of Customs was of the view that the goods seized should be deemed to have been acquired from passengers to whom they were passed free of duty and accordingly, there was a clear contravention of the provisions of the Customs Act. The Assistant Collector of Customs, after hearing the appellants recorded his findings. In his findings, he rejected the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the Baggage Rules spoken to under Cl. 11(g) of the Rules are applicable exclusively to the goods that were cleared by passengers without payment of duty and are not applicable to goods which were released by the Customs authorities on payment of duty. On appeal the Central Board of Excise and Customs found that the Cl. 11(g) with the restrictions embodied therein, would covet goods cleared as baggage under the additional I.T.C. (Notice dated 2nd January 1961) allowance and, therefore, until the value of the goods had depreciated to the extent mentioned in Cl. 11(g) they could not be sold or offered for sale. It rejected the contention that Cl. 11(g) with the restrictions embodied therein, would covet goods cleared as baggage under the additional I.T.C. (Notice dated 2nd January 1961) allowance and, therefore, until the value of the goods had depreciated to the extent mentioned in Cl. 11(g) they could not be sold or offered for sale. It rejected the contention that Cl. 11(g) did not apply to goods on which duty was paid. The revision to the Government of India also failed. The Government of India dismissed the revision petition on the ground that the rstriction it applicable not only as regards the goods which were cleared free of duty but also to goods which were cleared on payment of duty. However, while dismissing the petition it allowed the appellant to redeem the goods on payment of fine. Against the order of the Government of India declining to interfere with the orders of the Customs authorities and the Government of India, W.P. 3323 of was filed, and Ramaprasada Rao, J., in dispelling of the petition agreed with the conclusions arrived at by the authorities. He rejected the contention of the appellant that the onus of proof was wrongly cast on the appellant. We found on the materials placed by delinquent himself the authorities were entitled to come to a proper conclusion. On the facts he agreed with the authorities below and found that several of the authorities below found that several of the receipts and vouchers produced by the appellant were not genuine. 3. In the writ appeal before us, Mr. R.K. Venugopal, learned counsel for the appellant, raised two contentions; firstly, he submitted that the condition that is applicable under Cl. 11(g) of the Imports Control Order 1965 is applicable only to passengers Baggage, cleared free of duty and so far as goods which were cleared on payment of duly is concerned, Cl. 11(g) is not applicable, and, therefore, the condition attached to the Cl. 11(g) by second proviso to Cl. (g) is not applicable to goods cleared on payment of duty. He submitted that the goods that have been cleared en payment of duty is accordance with the Public Notice No. 1/I.T.C. RN 61, 2nd January, 1961 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Import Trade Control, New Delhi. 11(g) by second proviso to Cl. (g) is not applicable to goods cleared on payment of duty. He submitted that the goods that have been cleared en payment of duty is accordance with the Public Notice No. 1/I.T.C. RN 61, 2nd January, 1961 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Import Trade Control, New Delhi. According to the learned counsel, this notification which deals with goods which can be cleared by the passengers on payment of duty is one issued under S. 11(i) which relates to orders to import of any goods covered by the executive instructions issued by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports to the Customs Authorities. His submission, therefore, is that as regards the goods that were cleared on payment of duty by the passengers, the restriction laid under proviso (2) to Cl. (g) is not applicable. The second contention was that In any event the burden of proving, that the market price of the goods has not depreciated to less than 50 percent and that the goods were exhibited for sale after the market price has depreciated to less than 50 percent of the market price when new, was on the respondent. 4. The Import and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 empowers the Central Government to prohibit or to make restriction on import of certain goods. Cl. 11(g) of the Import Control Order, 1955, saves certain goods from the total prohibition of imports. One of such rules relates to the passengers baggage, that is, 11(g). It is tree as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that Cl. 11(g) on the face of it relates only to the passenger baggage to the extent admissible under the Baggage Rules for the time being in force. Now the Baggage Rules is contained in Passengers and (Non-tourists) Baggage Rules, 1960 framed under S. 75, Sea Customs Act, 1878. It provides under R. 5 that in addition to the articles specified In R. 4, a passenger may be allowed to import goods free of duty at the discretion of proper officer, articles not exceeding Rs. 800 in value. This Rule deals only with goods that are cleared without payment of duty. But on a careful reading of the Public Notice No. 1. 800 in value. This Rule deals only with goods that are cleared without payment of duty. But on a careful reading of the Public Notice No. 1. ITC PN 61 dated 2nd January, 1961, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that these instructions were not in pursuance of R. 11(g) but only under R. 11(i). The subject that is mentioned in the public notice is: ‘Subject: Import of goods as personal baggage under the Baggage Rules.” In the body R. 2 refers to R. 5 of the Baggage Rules and states that at the discretion of the proper Customs officer that it has been decided that the passengers, who were staying in abroad for a reasonable time may be allowed to import goods upto an additional value of Rs. 800 provided these articles are bona fide baggage under the type mentioned in R. 3 of the Baggage Rules without an import licence but on payment of customs duties. The rule obviously is intended as addition to the Baggage Rules. The authorities have explained and relaxed the Baggage Rules to certain extent. In the notice relating to passengers (Non-tourist (Baggages Rules, 1960 it is stated that this notice explains the Baggage Rules. We do not find any justification for holding that this public notice is in pursuance of the power conferred on the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports under R. 11(i). A reading of the entire provisions of R. 11(g) makes it clear that so far as the Baggage Rules are concerned it is covered under R. 11(g). They are not strictly rules, but the authorities are entitled to notify to the public that to the extent it is specified in the public notice, the passengers would be allowed to import goods after satisfying the conditions. R. 11(i) defines that the claim for exemption of the goods should be concerned by ex ecutive instructions issued by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports to the Customs authorities—the notice is not the nature of instructions to customs authorities, It may be noted that this plea was not raised before the learned single Judge, who disposed of the writ Petition; nor before the customs authorities in the manner in which it has been raised before us. 5. 5. The second contention of the learned counsel was that the authorities were in error in casting the onus of proving that there was a contravention of the Baggage Rules was on the appellant. According to the learned counsel, the burden of proving that the goods were exhibited for sale before the market price has depreciated to less than 30 percent of their market price when new is not on the appellant but on the authorities. In passing, the Central Board of Excise and Customs in appeal has observed that it was of the view that until the value of the goods had depreciated to the extent mentioned in clause 11(g); they could not be sold or offered for sale. Obviously, the authority proceeded on the basis that it was the common case that the goods had not depreciated to less than 50 percent of the value. We do not find that this contention that the authorities have failed to prove that the goods were not depreciated to less than 50 percent of its value, was raised before any of the authorities or before the learned single Judge who disposed of the writ petition. In the circumstances, it will not be proper for us to consider as to whether the authorities have proved that the market price of the goods had depreciated to less than 50 percent. This point being one of fact not having been taken, before the learned single Judge, it would not be proper for us to consider the same. 6. In the result, we reject the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant and dismiss the appeal. But under the circumstances, there will be no order at to costs.