Anmol Singh v. State of U. P — 1976 DIGILAW 882 (ALL)

JUDGMENT Sinha, J.: - This Special Appeal arises out of the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 8th March, 1976. 2. The facts leading up to this appeal can briefly be stated as under: 3. Anmol Singh (hereinafter to be called 'the appellant') was appointed as a range clerk on 10th May, 1973 by the Conservator of Forest, Southern Circle, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad, on a temporary basis. On 21st July. 1975, the Conservator of Forest, respondent No. 2, passed an order terminating his services. Aggrieved against that order, he filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the order terminating his service on the grounds that the order was passed in mala fide exercise of power; That it violated Article 16 of the Constitution inasmuch as persons junior to him were retained, and that the impugned order amounted to punishment and, was therefore, in contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution. The Conservator of Forest, the State of U. P. and the Forest Range Officer were also impleaded as opposite parties in the writ petition. The writ petition was contested on behalf of the opposite parties and the stand taken on their behalf in substance was that the services of the appellant were terminated on account of his unsatisfactory and inefficient work. It was accepted in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite parties that some persons junior to the appellant had been retained in service, but it was stated that their record was superior to that of the appellant. 4. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the order terminating the services of the appellant was not made in mala fide exercise of power, nor did it amount to punishment. It does not appear from the judgment of the learned Single Judge that the contention that the impugned order violated Article 16 of the Constitution was pressed before him. In the result the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition vide his order dated March 8, 1976, and hence this appeal. 5. The only contention that was raised before us on behalf of the appellant was that the order terminating his services amounts to punishment and, since it was passed without compliance of Article 311 of the Constitution, it must be quashed. 6. 5. The only contention that was raised before us on behalf of the appellant was that the order terminating his services amounts to punishment and, since it was passed without compliance of Article 311 of the Constitution, it must be quashed. 6. The order terminating the temporary services of the appellant, translated in English, would read as follows : "The services of Sri Anmol Singh, Range Lipik. Mirzapur. Forest Division, Mirzapur, shall stand terminated with effect from the date of the receipt of this order. Sri Anmol Singh shall be paid one month's salary in lieu of one month's notice. Sd/- Ravindra Behari Mathur Conservator of Forest S. C., U.P., Allahabad." From the above it would appear that the order terminating the services of the appellant by itself does not cast any aspersion on the appellant, nor does it carry any stigma. It is, however, true that the form of the order is not conclusive of its true nature. The form can, in some cases, be a mere cloak or camouflage for an order founded on misconduct. It is always open to the Court, before which the order is challenged, to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. The entirety of circumstances preceding or attending on the impugned order should be examined. The overriding test always is whether the misconduct is a mere motive or the very foundation of the order. There is a long chain of decisions in support of this view see S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra, AIR 1964 SC 1680 ; State of Bihar v. S.B. Misra, AIR 19711 SC 1011; Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192 ; State of Punjab v. P.S. Chemma, AIR 1975 SC 1096 and State of U.P. v. R.C. Trivedi, 1976 (4) SCC 52 : 1976 Lab IC 1647.From the above it would appear that the order terminating the services of the appellant by itself does not cast any aspersion on the appellant, nor does it carry any stigma. It is, however, true that the form of the order is not conclusive of its true nature. The form can, in some cases, be a mere cloak or camouflage for an order founded on misconduct. It is always open to the Court, before which the order is challenged, to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. The form can, in some cases, be a mere cloak or camouflage for an order founded on misconduct. It is always open to the Court, before which the order is challenged, to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. The entirety of circumstances preceding or attending on the impugned order should be examined. The overriding test always is whether the misconduct is a mere motive or the very foundation of the order. There is a long chain of decisions in support of this view see S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra, AIR 1964 SC 1680 ; State of Bihar v. S.B. Misra, AIR 19711 SC 1011; Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192 ; State of Punjab v. P.S. Chemma, AIR 1975 SC 1096 and State of U.P. v. R.C. Trivedi, 1976 (4) SCC 52 : 1976 Lab IC 1647. 7. We may, therefore, examine the (facts of the case in order to find whether the impugned order is an order of termination of service simpliciter or it amounts to punishment. 8. As already mentioned earlier, the appellant was appointed as a Range Clerk through an order dated 9th May, 1973 (Annexure 1' to the counter-affidavit of Sri K. K. Chaudhary). An nexure 'IV' of the counter-affidavit is a copy of a letter dated 3rd July, 1974 sent by Harish Chand Pandey, the then Range Officer, to the Divisional Forest Officer complaining that the appellant was an irresponsible, inefficient and careless person and that he unauthorisedly absented him self from 30th of June, 1974 to 3rd of July, 1974. It further transpires from this paper that communications had also been sent by the then Range Officer on 14th of June, 1974 and 18th of June, 1974, complaining against the appellant and asking for his transfer from the range. Annexure 'III' of the counter-affidavit is a copy of the letter dated July 22, 1974, sent by the Divisional Forest Officer to the appellant pointing out to him the mistakes committed by him in the preparation of the bill for the month of June, 1974. It was further stated in the letter that the appellant was not giving due attention to his work and that he was being severely warned that, if his work was not found satisfactory, a recommendation shall he made to the Conservator of Forest for the termination of his services. It was further stated in the letter that the appellant was not giving due attention to his work and that he was being severely warned that, if his work was not found satisfactory, a recommendation shall he made to the Conservator of Forest for the termination of his services. Annexure 'V' is a copy of a letter dated 22nd August 1974 sent by K. K. Chaudhary, Range Officer. respondent No. 3. to the Divisional Forest Officer making a number of complaints against the appellant. These complaints included unauthorised absence from duty, and non-co-operation with the Range Officer. Annexure 'VI' is a copy of another letter dated 29th August, 1974 sent by respondent No. 3 as a Range Officer to the Divisional Forest Officer complaining against the work and conduct of the appellant. Annexure 'II' of the counter-affidavit is a copy of a letter dated 4th of September, 1974 sent by the Divisional Forest Officer to the Conservator of Forest making a number of complaints against the appellant and recommending for the termination of his services. Besides other things it was also mentioned in this letter that the appellant unauthorisedly absented himself from duty on some dates ignoring the orders of the Range Officer and that he refused to submit his explanation when called upon to do so. Annexure 'VII' is a copy of the letter dated 2nd January, 1975 by the Conservator of Forest addressed to the appellant warning him that, if he did not do his work carefully, severe action would be taken against him. A copy of this letter was endorsed to the Divisional Forest Officer, Mirzapur, calling for a report after a period of three months whether the appellant did or did not improve. The impugned order terminating the services of the appellant was passed on 21st of July, 1975. 9. From what has been said above it would transpire that there were continuous complaints against the work and conduct of the appellant and it was as a result thereof that his services were terminated. In other words, it was on the over-all assessment of the performance of the appellant that the Conservator of Forest came to the conclusion that the appellant was not a suitable person to continue to hold the post and, therefore, terminated his services. 10. In other words, it was on the over-all assessment of the performance of the appellant that the Conservator of Forest came to the conclusion that the appellant was not a suitable person to continue to hold the post and, therefore, terminated his services. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that when there is complaint of misconduct against a temporary Government employee and his services are terminated on account thereof it amounts to punishment and will be hit by Article 311 of the Constitution. Learned Counsel then invited our attention to letter dated 24-12-1974 (Annexure 'IX' of the counter affidavit) sent by respondent No. 3 to the Divisional Forest Officer alleging that the appellant realised one sum of Rs. 600/- and another sum of Rs. 285/- from the contractor as Government dues but did not deposit the same. Learned counsel then invited our attention to the copy of the first information report dated 12-12-1975, lodged by the respondent No. 3 in the police charging the petitioner with having misappropriated the aforesaid amounts. It was urged that even the act of unauthorisedly absenting from duty amounts to misconduct but, in any case, the allegation of misappropriating Government money was a serious charge involving moral turpitude and, consequently, the termination of the service of the appellant without a formal enquiry must amount to punishment. 11. Now, so far as the allegation regarding misappropriation of money is concerned, it does not appear from the counter-affidavits sworn by respondents Nos. 2 and 3 that it was taken into consideration, while passing the impugned order. But, even assuming that it was taken into account, that should have been along with the other complaints about the appellant being inefficient irresponsible, and careless in the discharge of his duties. We do not think anything can turn on it. If any temporary Government servant is guilty of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification the Government has two courses open to' it. It may either take action under the; rules pertaining the temporary employee to terminate his services without anything further, or it may, in its discretion, choose to draw up formal departmental proceedings to punish him. In the case of Parshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 it was said: "Cases may arise where the Government may find a servant unsuitable for the post on account of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification. In the case of Parshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 it was said: "Cases may arise where the Government may find a servant unsuitable for the post on account of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification. If such a servant was appointed to a post, permanent or temporary, either on probation or on an officiating basis, then the very transitory character of the employment implies that the employment was terminable at any time on reasonable notice given by the Government. Again if the servant was. appointed to a post, permanent or temporary, on the express condition or term that the employment would be terminable on say a month's notice as in the case of Satish Chander v. Union of India, 1953 SCR 655 : AIR 1953 SC 250 then the Government might at any time serve the requisite notice. In both cases the Government may proceed to take action against the servant in exercise of its powers under the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, or under the rules regulating the conditions of service, if any be applicable, and ordinarily in such a situation the Government will take this course. But the Government may take the view that a simple termination of service is not enough and that the conduct of the servant has been such that he deserves a punishment entailing penal consequences. In such a case the Government may choose to proceed against the servant on the basis of his misconduct, negligence, in-efficiency or the like and inflict on him the punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction carrying with it the penal consequences. In such a case the servant will be entitled to the protection of Article 311 (2)." In the case of Champak Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 1854 it was said: "It is well known that Government does not terminate the services of a public servant he be even a temporary servant, without reason; nor is it usual for Government to reduce a public servant in rank without reason even though he may be holding the higher rank only temporarily. One reason for terminating the services of a temporary servant may be that the post that he is holding comes to an end. In that case there is nothing further to be said and his services terminate when the post comes to an end. One reason for terminating the services of a temporary servant may be that the post that he is holding comes to an end. In that case there is nothing further to be said and his services terminate when the post comes to an end. Similarly a Government servant temporarily officiating in a higher rank may have to be reverted to his substantive post where the incumbent of the higher post comes back to duty or where the higher post created for a temporary period comes to an end. But besides the above, the Government may find it necessary to terminate the services of a temporary servant if it is not satisfied with his conduct or his suitability for the job and/or his work. The same may apply to the reversion of a public servant from a higher post to a lower post where the post is held as a temporary measure. This dissatisfaction with the work and/or conduct of a temporary servant may arise on complaint against him. In such cases two courses are open to Government. It may decide to dispense with the services of the servant or revert him to substantive post without any action being taken to punish him for his bad work and/or conduct. Or the Government may decide to punish such a servant for his had work or misconduct, in which case even though the servant may be temporary he will have the protection of Article 311 (2)." (underlining by us). 12. In the case of Union of India v. R.S. Dhaba, (1969) 3 SCC 603 it was said (at page 606) : "Further, Even though misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the express or implied terms of the contract of employment or under the statutory rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is wholly irrelevant The test for attracting Article 311 (2) of the Constitution in such a case is whether the misconduct or negligence is a mere motive for the order of reversion or termination of service or whether it is the very foundation of the order of termination of service of the temporary employee." 13. In the case of Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192 at p. 2205 : 1974 Lab IC 1380 at p. 1393 it was said: "The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may result in dismissal or removal or an enquiry. But in those cases the authority may rot hold an enquiry and may simply discharge the probationer with a view to give him a chance to make good in other walks of life without a stigma at the time of termination of probation. If, on the other hand, the probationer is faced with an enquiry on charges of misconduct or inefficiency or corruption, and if his services are terminated without following the provisions of Article 311 (2), he can claim protection." 14. Similar views were reiterated by the Supreme Court in the cases of Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar, AIR 1976 SC 1766 : 1976 Lab IC 1146 and State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi, (1976) 4 SCC 52 : (1976) Lab IC 1647. 15. Therefore, even if the charge of misappropriation of money was taken into account, it was so along with the other complaints against the appellant and the maximum that can be said on behalf of the appellant is that it may also have contributed in the concerned authority coming to the conclusion that the appellant was not a suitable person to hold post of Range Clerk. Admittedly no formal departmental enquiry into the misconduct of the appellant was instituted. The impugned order also does not contain any express words casting any aspersion on the conduct of the appellant. It cannot, therefore, be said that the charge of misappropriation was the foundation of the order terminating the services of the appellant. 16. It may be worthwhile to refer to some cases in which there were complaints of misconduct against a temporary employee resulting in the termination of his services or reversion to a lower post and yet the order terminating his services or reverting him to the lower post was not held to be a punishment. 17. In the case of State of Punjab v. Sukhraj Bahadur, AIR 1968 SC 1089 one of the charges against the petitioner was affecting his integrity for which he received a charge-sheet from the Secretary Anti-Corruption Department. 17. In the case of State of Punjab v. Sukhraj Bahadur, AIR 1968 SC 1089 one of the charges against the petitioner was affecting his integrity for which he received a charge-sheet from the Secretary Anti-Corruption Department. The petitioner replied to that charge and asked for an opportunity to be heard in person. The Government, however, passed an order reverting him from his officiating post and yet it was held that the order did not amount to punishment. 18. In the case of Ram Gopal Chaturvedi v. State of M.P., AIR 1970 SC 158 the charge against the petitioner (a Civil Judicial Officer) was that he was having illicit relations with the daughter of a chaukidar whom he was keeping with him against the wishes of her parents. The Chief Justice on enquiry found it to be correct. Thereafter his services were terminated. He filed a writ petition challenging the termination order. The order was upheld with the following observations: "No charge-sheet was served on the appellant nor was any departmental inquiry held against him. On March 10. 1964, the Madhya Pradesh High Court passed a resolution that the State Government should terminate the appellant's services. Having regard to this resolution the State Government passed the impugned order dated March 25, 1964. On the face of it, the order did not cast stigma on the appellant's character or integrity nor did it visit him with any evil consequences. It was not passed by way of punishment and the provisions of Article 311 were not attracted. It was immaterial that the order was preceded by an informal inquiry into the appellant's conduct with a view to ascertain whether he should be retained in service." 19. In the case of R.S. Sial v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 1317 the petitioner was officiating as a General Manager in Gorakhpur Region of the Transport Department. He was reverted from that post and he challenged the reversion order. On examining the attending circumstances, it was found that there were some complaints of corruption against the petitioner. The order was however upheld and it was observed : "Keeping in view the principles enunciated above, we have looked at the facts of the case and are not satisfied that the order of reversion of the appellant was by way of punishment. The order was however upheld and it was observed : "Keeping in view the principles enunciated above, we have looked at the facts of the case and are not satisfied that the order of reversion of the appellant was by way of punishment. It has already been mentioned above that no aspersion was cast on the appellant in the order of reversion and as a result of that order no stigma attachis to his name. The appellant was merely officiating in a higher power and the impugned order had the effect of reverting him to his substantive post. The attendant circumstances to which our attention has been invited with a view to show that the order of reversion was by way of punishment are two letters dated July 12. 1967. One of those letters was addressed by the Deputy Secretary, Vigilance Department to the Director of vigilance wherein reference was made to the report of the officers of the intelligence and Evaluation Cell. It was requested that an open enquiry might be made into the allegations of involvement of the appellant in a matter relating to the supply of non-genuine and sub-standard motor parts by a Delhi dealer. In the other letter addressed to the Secretary to Uttar Pradesh Government, Transport Department a request was made by the Deputy Secretary, Vigilance Department that in case the appellant was not confirmed on the post of General Manager, he might be reverted since an enquiry made by the CID into the allegations of corruption against the appellant had revealed that there was substance in those allegations. The above letters would show that the authorities concerned came to the conclusion that pending the holding of an open enquiry into the charges of corruption against the appellant. he should not be allowed to officiate in a higher post. It cannot, in our opinion, be inferred therefrom that the reversion of the appellant was by way of punishment. All that can be said is that the contemplated enquiry into the charges of corruption against the appellant provided the motive for the reversion of the appellant. The existence of such a motive cannot, in our opinion, vitiate the order for the reversion of the appellant. All that can be said is that the contemplated enquiry into the charges of corruption against the appellant provided the motive for the reversion of the appellant. The existence of such a motive cannot, in our opinion, vitiate the order for the reversion of the appellant. It may be taken to be well settled that even though misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualifications may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the express or implied terms of the contract of employment or under the statutory rule. nevertheless if a right exists under contract or the rules to terminate the services the motive operating on the mind of the Government is wholly immaterial (see Union of India v. R.S. Dhaba, (1969) 3 SCC 603 : AIR 1969 NSC 21. The same rule would hold good if the order passed is not for termination of service, but for reversion of a Government servant from a higher post to a lower post which he holds in a substantive capacity." 20. In the case of State of U.P. v. R.C. Trivedi, 1976 Lab IC 1647 (SC) (supra) the charge against the petitioner was that he got himself impersonated by another clerk at a departmental examination which he had to pass. Explanations of the petitioner and the clerk, who impersonated shim, were taken and then the petitioner's services were terminated. He filed a suit challenging the order terminating his services. The matter ultimately reached the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court, after considering almost all the decisions on the point upto date, upheld the order with the following observations: "Keeping in view the principles extracted above, the respondent's suit could not be decreed in his favour. He was a temporary hand and had no right to the post. It is also not denied that both under the contract of service and the service rules governing the respondent, the State had a right to terminate hi; services by giving him one month's notice. The order to which exception is taken is ex facie an order of termination of service simpliciter. It does not cast any stigma on the respondent nor doe.; it visit him with evil consequences, nor is it founded on misconduct. The order to which exception is taken is ex facie an order of termination of service simpliciter. It does not cast any stigma on the respondent nor doe.; it visit him with evil consequences, nor is it founded on misconduct. In the circumstances, the respondent could not invite the Court to go into the motive behind the order and claim the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution." 21. In the case of Union of India v. R.S. Dhaba, 1969 (3) SCC 603 (supra) the petitioner was reverted from the post of Income-tax Officer Class II to the post of Income-tax Inspector. He filed a writ petition challenging that order. It was found that the Commissioner of Income tax, in passing the order, was influenced by complaints affecting the integrity of the petitioner. The order was, however, upheld and it was observed : "It was pointed out that in his demi-official letter dated February 6. 1964. Mr. M. Kasivisvanatha Pillai, the then Commissioner of Income-tax, said that the respondent should be reverted because of the large number of complaints which the department had received against the integrity of the respondent and the bad reports received by h'm from his superiors. It was said that the Commissioner was largely influenced by the complaints received against the respondent about his honesty while coming to the conclusion that he was not suitable for the post of Income-tax Officer. We are unable to accept the argument of Mr. Sen that the order of reversion is punitive in character and that the procedure of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution is applicable to this case. In the order of reversion dated May 22, 1964 there is nothing to show that a stigma was attached to the respondent. No reference is made to the imputation on the integrity of the respondent and the only reason given is that the respondent was found unsuitable to hold the post of Income-tax Officer, Class II. It is well-established that a Government servant who is officiating in a post has no right to hold it for all time and the Government servant who is given an officiating post holds it on the implied term that he will have to be reverted if his work was found unsuitable. It is well-established that a Government servant who is officiating in a post has no right to hold it for all time and the Government servant who is given an officiating post holds it on the implied term that he will have to be reverted if his work was found unsuitable. In a case of this description a reversion on the ground of unsuitability is an action in accordance with the terms of which the officiating post is held and not a reduction in rank by way of punishment to which Article 311 of the Constitution could be attracted." 21-A. Reference may also be made to this connection to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Writ Petn. No. 11840 of 1975. (Priya Kumar Chatterji v. State of U.P. decided on 11-11-1976) (All). It was contended, as before us, in that case also : "that if the main and basic reason for termination of service of a Government servant is his misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, such termination of service being founded on misconduct etc. would amount to punishment of dismissal or removal from service attracting the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution." 22. The Court while rejecting the above argument observed : "Acceptance of the argument of the petitioner that whenever the real and substantial reason of termination of service of a Government servant is misconduct, it must be taken that it is founded on misconduct would mean that the only method of getting rid of a temporary Government servant, who in the opinion of the Government is not suitable for the post as he has misconducted himself, will be by proceeding to punish him by dismissing or removing him from service and it would not -be possible for the Government to terminate the service in accordance with the rules of service applicable to him. This argument certainly runs counter to what has been specifically stated by the Supreme Court in paragraph 27 of the judgment in P. L. Dinghra's case." 23. Reference may now be made to the cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention that whenever terminating the services of a temporary employee or reverting him from a higher post is motivated by misconduct, it means a punishment and is hit by Article 311 of the Constitution. Reference may now be made to the cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention that whenever terminating the services of a temporary employee or reverting him from a higher post is motivated by misconduct, it means a punishment and is hit by Article 311 of the Constitution. The cases relied upon by him are : (i) Appar Apar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1970) 3 SCC 338 ; (ii) Debesh Charan Dass v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 77 ; (iii) State of Bihar v. S.B. Misra, AIR 1971 SC 1011 : 1971 Lab IC 724; (iv) Madan Mohan Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1973 SC 1133 : 1973 Lab IC 918 and (v) State of U.P. v. Sughar Singh, AIR 1974 SC 423 : 1974 Lab IC 353. 24. In the case of Appar Apar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1970) 3 SCC 338 (Supra) what happened was that on the occasion of the annual prise distribution function, when a number of persons including the parents of girl students were present, a charge was openly made by one of the Professors against the petitioner. then officiating a, Principal of the College. that he came drunk to the stage and did make up of the girls. Some of the parents demanded an enquiry and the Director of Public Instruction then and there made a promise to depute two senior officers to make the enquiry. Two Deputy Directors were accordingly appointed to make an enquiry, inter aria, into the allegations made against t, i e petitioner and they found the allegations correct. The enquiring officers addressed a questionnaire to the petitioner and also interrogated a number of persons before reaching their conclusion. They recommended exemplary punishment against the petitioner. The findings of the Enquiry Officers were accepted by the Government while passing the order of reversion against the petitioner. It was in the totality of these circumstances that the Court held: "No doubt, the order by itself and on the face of it is innocuous, but, in our view, the finding recorded by the Deputy Directors against the appellant and the recommendation to impose punishment upon the appellant are the very foundation for the Government for passing the order reverting the appellant from P.E.S. Class I to P. E. S. Class II. It would thus appear that the case was clearly distinguishable on facts. 25. In the case of Dibesh Charan Das v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 77 (supra) the petitioner held the post of Secretary in the Government of India since July 29. 1964 till 1966 when the orders were passed reverting him to a lower post in the State of Assam. The order was challenged by shim. The Court found that the post of Secretaries and equivalent posts in the Government of India were tenure posts : the tenure being 5 years. The question formulated for decision by the Supreme Court, therefore, was as follows : "The short question in this case is whether his reversion to the Assam State before the expiry of the tenure to a post carrying a similar salary amounts to reduction in rank and involves stigma upon him." 26. In view of the fact that the post held by the petitioner was a tenure post and the tenure had not yet expired when the order reverting him was passed, together with the fact that in the letter sent by the Cabinet Secretary to the petitioner it was suggested that the petitioner was not capable of meeting new challenges, the Court held that the order of reversion involved a stigma against the petitioner and amounted to a punishment. The case in hand is distinguishable on the ground that the post held by the appellant was not a tenure post, but was a purely temporary post. The observations made by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case cannot, therefore, be employed in this case. 27. In the cage of State of Bihar v. S.B. Misra, 1971 Lab IC 724 (SC) (Supra) what happened was that the petitioner, while officiating as Subedar Major, had assaulted his orderly. A complaint about the same was made to the superior officer and he was reverted to the lower post. On the facts of the case, the High Court found that the report of the Commandant charging the petitioner with having assaulted his orderly was the foundation of the reversion order and the Supreme Court accepted that finding in the case before us, as already stated, there was a string of complaints against the petitioner and it was on over all assessment that the services of the petitioner were terminated. It is not based upon any solitary instance. Therefore. It is not based upon any solitary instance. Therefore. there can be no analogy in the case in hand and that cited by the learned counsel. 28. In the case of Madan Mohan Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1973 Lab IC 918 (SC) the order terminating the services of the Munsif were held to carry a stigma because, before the order was passed, the Chief Minister of State had made a statement on the floor of the House that the services of Munsif were held to carry a stigma because, before the order was passed, the Chief Minister of the State had made a statement on the floor of the House that the services of the Munsif were not satisfactory and the Government was considering to serve a notice on him. It was in the context of this statement made by the Chief Minister on the floor of the House that the Court held that the order terminating the services of the petitioner amounted to punishment. Needless to say that this case is also clearly distinguishable. 29. In so far as the case of State of U.P. v. Sughar Singh, 1974 Lab IC 353 (SC) (Supra) is concerned, the Supreme Court itself considered it and explained it in the case of State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi, 1976 Lab IC 1647 (SC) (Supra). It was observed : "The decision of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sughar Singh (Supra) where the order of the respondent's reversion was held to have been passed by way of punishment to which our attention has been drawn by Mr. It was observed : "The decision of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sughar Singh (Supra) where the order of the respondent's reversion was held to have been passed by way of punishment to which our attention has been drawn by Mr. Garg and which has led to a certain amount of misunderstanding turned upon a clear statement made before the High Court by the Standing Counsel for the State that the foundation of the order of reversion was the adverse entry made in his confidential character roll." The Supreme Court then referred to its decision in the case of Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, 1976 Lab IC 1146 (SC) (Supra), in which also the case of Sughar Singh was explained and it was said : "We do not think that Sughar Singh's case in any way, conflicts with what has been laid down by this Court previously on Article 311 (2) of the Constitution or Article 16 of the Constitution." The case of Sughar Singh having been decided on the basis of its own facts, the said case can be of no help to the appellant of this case. 30. It will thus appear that all the cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant are distinguishable on facts and, consequently, they do not help him. 31. As a result of the discussion attempted above we conclude that the order terminating the services of the appellant, on the facts of the case, cannot be held to be punishment. 32. It was said by the learned counsel for the appellant at the time of arguments that the learned single & accepted the counter-affidavit of ' Conservator of Forest (respondent No. at a very late stage without accepting the rejoinder affidavit from the appellant. On a perusal of the record, we find that the counter-affidavit of the Conservator of Forest was taken on record on 4th of March, 1976, on which date the case was listed for final hearing and the case was then directed to be listed for hearing again on 8th of March, 1976. It was open to the appellant to file his rejoinder affidavit any time between 4th March, 1976 and 8th of March, 1976 or to ask for further time. It does not appear from the record that the appellant either filed the rejoinder-affidavit before the learned single Judge or asked for time. It was open to the appellant to file his rejoinder affidavit any time between 4th March, 1976 and 8th of March, 1976 or to ask for further time. It does not appear from the record that the appellant either filed the rejoinder-affidavit before the learned single Judge or asked for time. The appellant cannot, therefore, have any grievance on that score. However, in order to afford satisfaction to him, we accepted his rejoinder-affidavit in appeal. We however, find that no reference whatsoever was made to the rejoinder-affidavit during the arguments addressed before us on behalf of the appellant. 33. No other contention having been raised, we find that this appeal should fail. The appeal, accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed. No order is, however, made as to costs.