JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a reference made by Sri S.K. Ahmed, Additional Commissioner, Jhansi Division, recommending that the revision against the judgment and decree dated September 29, 1970 passed by the Assistant Collector, First Class, Mahoba, district Hamirpur, in Case No. 158 of 1968 under Section 229-B, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act may be allowed. 2. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. The facts of the case are as follows: Takhat Singh had filed a suit under Section 229-B, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, on November 17, 1965 against Lochan Singh and others. The suit was dismissed in default on May 5, 1970. A restoration application was moved by Takhat Singh on the same day on the ground that he had gone to call his counsel. The trial court however, dismissed this application. The trial court further maintained the order of dismissal by his subsequent order dated September 29, 1970. Takhat Singh has come up in revision against this order. 4. The learned Additional Commissioner has held that the trial court did not apply its mind and has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law. I entirely agree with this view of the learned Additional Commissioner. A court should not be so rigid in its approach as to insist that the parties and their counsels must remain at the back and call of the Court every single minute on the date of the hearing. The parties must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to call their counsels. No order for dismissal in default should be passed when the party has gone to call his counsel. If by mistake or omission a party fails to tell the Presiding Officer of his presence and fails to make a request for reasonable opportunity to call the counsel, and a case is dismissed in default under the impression that the plaintiff is absent, the Presiding Officer should have no hitch in restoring the case if the restoration application is moved the same day and the cause of default of appearance explained. The effort of the Court should be as far as possible, to provide justice to the parties and not to dismiss the suit on technicalities. The effort of the Court should be as far as possible, to provide justice to the parties and not to dismiss the suit on technicalities. In the present case, it is fully established that the plaintiff-revisionist was in fact present in the Court on May 5, 1970 when the suit was dismissed in default, though he may have not been present at a particular moment when he went to call his counsel. Even if the trial court dismissed the suit at that very moment, the restoration application which was moved on the same day explaining the default should have been allowed. The trial court thus failed to apply its mind in refusing the restoration application. 5. The learned counsel for the defendant-opposite parties has argued that the suit of the plaintiff-revisionists was dismissed in default on May 5, 1970, their application for restoring the suit was dismissed in default on May 12, 1970, their application for restoring the application for restoring the suit was also dismissed in default on June 16, 1970, and ultimately their application dated June 29, 1970 for review was also dismissed on September 29, 1970, and the learned Additional Commissioner has acted against law and beyond jurisdiction in making recommendation for setting aside all the said orders at one time. The learned counsel has contended that wrong exposition of law, a wrong application of law or failure to apply the appropriate law cannot be considered a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that an erroneous decision on a question of law having no relation to question of jurisdiction will not be corrected in a revision. The leanred counsel has further referred to Pandurang Dhondi v. Mauriti Hari Jadhav, AIR 1966 S.C. 153 ; Ved Ram v. Suraj Pal, 1956 R.D. 174 and Thakur Krishun Chand Singh v. Munshi Makund Sarup, 1938 Alld. 308. 6. As far as these decisions are concerned, there can be no dispute about the soundness of the principles laid down in them, but these decisions laid down in them, but these decisions have no applicability to the present case at all. 308. 6. As far as these decisions are concerned, there can be no dispute about the soundness of the principles laid down in them, but these decisions laid down in them, but these decisions have no applicability to the present case at all. Where the trial court fails to apply its mind and thereby passes an order depriving a party of its rights to prosecute the case, this results in miscarriage of justice and constitutes a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law. Therefore, in such a case a revision would lie. The present case is not a case of an erroneous decision on a question of law or of wrong exposition of law. The trial court failed to exercise jurisdiction and thereby caused miscarriage of justice by passing the order dated May, 5, 1970 dismissing the suit in default. The subsequent orders of the trial court dated May 12, 1970, June 16, 1970 and September 29, 1970 also are a continuation of failure to exercise jurisdiction a repetition of miscarriage of justice. Thus, the learned Additional Commissioner has not committed any irregularity or illegality in recommending that all these orders should be set aside. 7. The learned Additional Commissioner has rightly observed that Order XVII Rule 2, C.P.C. was applicable in the case. This rule provides that where on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the parties or any of them fail to appear, the Court may proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf by Order IX or make such other order as it thinks fit. Under Order IX Rule 9, C.P.C. it has been provided that where a suit is dismissed in default, the plaintiff may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside and if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the suit was called on for bearing the Court shall make an order setting aside the dismissal upon such terms as to the costs or otherwise as it thinks fit. Thus, in the present case, the trial court should have passed an order in accordance with Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. Thus, in the present case, the trial court should have passed an order in accordance with Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. Agreeing with the recommendation made by the learned Additional Commissioner, I hereby allow the revision and set aside the order of the trial court dated September 29, 1970 as well as the previous orders dated June 16, 1970, May 12, 1970 and May 5, 1970. The trial court shall not proceed to dispose of the suit in accordance with the provisions of law.