JUDGMENT G.S. Sial, M. - This is a second appeal against the judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner, Meerut, Division, in first appeal arising out of a suit under Section 176 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the plaintiff-appellant, instituted the suit with the allegation that his share in the land in dispute has been declared to be half by the court in the preliminary decree and this has already become final between the parties. Thereafter, he applied for the preparation of final decree and alleged that he had no other land in the Circle except the land in suit and, therefore, according to the provisions of Sections 178 and 179 of the Z.A. and L.R. Act and Rule 159-B the land in suit may be sold to him after ascertaining its value according to Rule 159-A. The value was ascertained and no objection was filed to the report of the Lekhpal about valuation. According to the finding of the trial court the defendant has land, other than the land in suit, in the Circle. The trial court directed that the land in suit be sold to the plaintiff-appellant at the ascertained valuation. The appellant deposited the price. Thereafter the defendant-respondent filed an appeal and the lower appellate court allowed the appeal holding that the auction of the land ought to have taken place and the tenure-holders should be ordered to bid interest. Hence the second appeal. 3. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant referred to Sections 178 and 179 and submitted that the learned Additional Commissioner has wrongly interpreted the Rule 160 in coming to his conclusion. The plaintiff-appellant is admittedly a preferential person. He stated that the sections will prevail over the Rule. He referred to R.D. 1971 page 341 and R.D. 1973, page 321 in support of his argument. 4. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondent submitted that the concept of co-tenancy exists only under the Tenancy Act in Section 33 wherein it is stipulated that a co-tenant can bring a suit against the co-tenure holders for division of the holding. He submitted that there is no concept of co-tenancy under the Z.A. and L.R. Act and therefore while interpreting who are co-tenants the provisions of the U.P. Tenancy Act should be referred to. He submitted that there is no concept of co-tenancy under the Z.A. and L.R. Act and therefore while interpreting who are co-tenants the provisions of the U.P. Tenancy Act should be referred to. He stated that Section 49 of the U.P.Tenancy Act permits a co-tenant to claim partition of the holding but there is no parallel provision in Section 176 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. He stated that the plaintiff-appellant is not a co-tenant and he being a Bhumidhar of share by right of purchase he is a distinct Bhumidhar of his share alone. He can get the holding divided officially under Section 176 but such a person cannot be categorized or defined as a co-tenant. The case is, therefore, not covered by the provisions of Rule 159-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules and therefore, the judgment of the lower appellate court is correct. 5. In reply, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant stated that concept of co-tenant defined under the U.P.Tenancy Act cannot be imported into Z.A. and L.R. Act as it has been repealed. Therefore, the ordinary meaning of co-tenant will be taken. Any person who is joint with other tenure holder would be a co-tenure-holder. Admittedly, the appellant being purchaser of share he is co-sharer and accordingly co-tenure-holder. Therefore Sections 178 and 179 read with Rule 159 will apply to the facts of this case. He also submitted that assuming that the appellant is not a co-tenure holder along with the respondent then the provisions of Sections 178, 179 and 180 will become meaningless, for in that case the holding less than 3? acres will be divided on the spot by metes and bounds and this will negate the provisions of the Act. He, lastly, submitted that in second appeal the jurisdiction of this court is confined within the ambit of provisions of law and if equity goes against the provisions of law, provisions of law shall prevail and not the equity. 6. I have considered the arguments and gone through the record of the case. The preliminary decree passed in the case which exists on the file shows that the plaintiff-appellant has already been declared on April 15, 1971 to be a bhumidhar of share. It was also ordered that because the land is less than 3? acres it would be auctioned between the two parties. The preliminary decree passed in the case which exists on the file shows that the plaintiff-appellant has already been declared on April 15, 1971 to be a bhumidhar of share. It was also ordered that because the land is less than 3? acres it would be auctioned between the two parties. Later, on an application of Iswari Prasad that he has no land other than the one under dispute he may be allowed to purchase the land under Rule 159-B as a preferential claimant, the court on July 16, 1971 after taking the evidence of the Lekhpal ordered the land to be sold to the plaintiff-appellant. Being dissatisfied with this order of the trial court the defendant-respondent filed an appeal before the learned Additional Commissioner who ordered that the defendant-respondent should be allowed an opportunity of bidding and accordingly a fresh sale may be held. Hence this appeal against the order of the first appellate court. The learned counsel for the appellant rested his case on the two decisions of the Hon'ble High Court reported in 1971 R.D., page 341 and R.D. 1973, page 321. A perusal of these rulings show that in a case of a division of holding when it is found that the holding does not exceed 3? acres, the court shall not divide the holding, instead it shall direct the sale of the holding distribute the proceeds thereof to as per the shares of co-tenure-holders already determined by the court. After an order for sale has been made under Section 178 of the Act the court has to determine the valuation of the holding and thereafter it is required to offer the holding for sale to one or more of the co-tenure-holder according to the order of preference as prescribed in Rule 159-B. In the present case the trial court determined the shares and a preliminary decree was passed. The land in dispute could not be divided as it was less than the prescribed area. The trial court accordingly determined the valuation of the land and thereafter determined the preferential right of purchase of co-tenure-holders. The plaintiff-appellant was held to have the preferential right of purchase and the court offered the sale of the holding in question to him who accepted the offer and deposited the sale money. The trial court accordingly determined the valuation of the land and thereafter determined the preferential right of purchase of co-tenure-holders. The plaintiff-appellant was held to have the preferential right of purchase and the court offered the sale of the holding in question to him who accepted the offer and deposited the sale money. Thus it appears that the trial court determined the substantive rights of the parties when it decided the question of shares and then again it decided the substantive rights of the parties when it determined the question preferential right of purchase and offered the holding for sale to the preferential tenure-holder. It appears that there has been a complete compliance of the provisions of law and the rules and there was no illegality in the order passed by the trial court. 7. The only point advanced by the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent is that the plaintiff-appellant is not a co-tenant in the ordinary sense of the word and he being a Bhumidhar of share by right of purchase he is a distinct Bhumidhar of his share alone. Such a person can certainly get the holding divided under Section 176 but he cannot be categorized as a co-tenant. The fact as revealed during the course of arguments is that the plaintiff-appellant has purchased the holding for about Rs. 10,000/- and would be getting the remaining at about Rs. 700/- only. The learned counsel, therefore, claimed that on the ground of equity the orders passed by the learned Additional Commissioner should be upheld. He brought in the analogy of co-tenancy as it existed in the U.P. Tenancy Act and argued that a similar concept should be held to apply to proceedings for division under Section 176 of the Act. I am afraid, it is not possible to agree with his line of reasoning. Section 176 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act gives the right to a Bhumidhar or Sirdar to sue for division of his holding. It does not provide any investigation how the Bhumidhar has become entitled to claim division of holding. So long as he has the right to claim a division a tenure-holder can apply for it and thereafter the provisions relating thereto become applicable. It does not provide any investigation how the Bhumidhar has become entitled to claim division of holding. So long as he has the right to claim a division a tenure-holder can apply for it and thereafter the provisions relating thereto become applicable. Section 178 makes it obligatory that in a suit for division if the court finds that the aggregate area does not exceed three-and-one-eight acres, the court shall direct the sale of the same and distribute the proceeds in accordance with the principle prescribed in the rules. Section 179 says that the valuation of the holding shall be made in the prescribed manner and it is not contended that the principle of valuation have not been observed. Thus, as already stated above, the sale is in accord with the rules and there is no illegality in the sale proceedings. 8. Under the circumstances, stated above, I do not find any force in the contention of the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent and accordingly allow the second appeal, set aside the order of the lower appellate court and restore that of the trial court. Costs easy.