JUDGMENT P.C. Saxena, M. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated October 7, 1970 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Varanasi Division, Varanasi. 2. The suit was filed under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act with the allegation that he himself and Deoki Nandan Pande wee co-Bhumidhars and co-Sirdars of the land in suit. Deoki Nandan died on April 6, 1963 and thereafter he himself was the sole tenant. It was alleged that defendant Smt. Jagwanti Devi who had got her name recorded in revenue papers in conclusion with the Lekhpal and Kanungo had no concern with the land in suit, that she was not the legally wedded wife of Deoki Nandan and was actually the daughter of one Ahaku Garariya and that she had illicit connection with Deoki she had illicit connection with Deoli Nandan and was actually the daughter of one Ahaku Garariya and that she had illicit connection with Deoki Nandan. 3. Smt. Jagwanti, who contested the suit, conceded ? share to the plaintiff but claimed the remainder as widow of Deoki Nandan. She claimed to the daughter of Ramu Panda. 4. The trial court recorded evidence which included witnesses from the family of Ahaku Garariya who deposed that defendant had no concern with them and also examined witnesses who gave evidence in respect of the marriage ceremony between Deoki Nandan and Smt. Jagwanti. Documentary evidence also was found conclusively to prove the case of the defendant. The witnesses produced by the plaintiff were found either to be false or admitting the case of the defendant. The trial court dismissed the suit. 5. In appeal, the Additional Commissioner party modified the judgment and decree of the trial court by declaring plaintiff as co-tenant with Smt. Jagwanti. The findings of fact recorded by the trial court were upheld in respect or both of the parentage of Smt. Jagwanti and her claim that she had been the legally wedded wife of Deoki Nandan. 6. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has argued that Smt. Jagwanti was a Garariya by caste and she cannot therefore, be held to have been legally married, by held to have been legally married to Deoki Nandan, who was a Brahmin. No law has however been shown to support of the contention that a marriage between a Garariya and a Brahmin must be held invalid under Hindu law. 7. No law has however been shown to support of the contention that a marriage between a Garariya and a Brahmin must be held invalid under Hindu law. 7. Learned counsel has, however, cited paragraph 439 of the work entitled 'Principles of Hindu Law' which is to the effect that whether a man in a Brahmin or Asura, two ceremonies are essential for a valid marriage ; (i) the invocation before the sacred fire and (2) the Saptapadi which means the seven steps to be taken by the bridegroom and bride jointly before the sacred fire. Learned counsel has asserted that since these ingredients have not been proved the theory of marriage cannot be accepted. 8. The implication of the above argument appears to be that all Hindus are to be divided into two classes ; Brahmins and Asuras. Smt. Jagwanti not being a Brahmin according to the plaintiff, she must be an Asura. It, however, appears to be admitted by appellant that a Brahmin may marry an Asura. 9. The record shows that the evidence in the trial court was to the effect that the marriage between Deoki Nandan and Smt. Jagwanti had taken place according to the Hindu Dharma Shastra. It must, therefore, be presumed that both the above ingredients were fulfilled by the couple when they embarked on the state of matrimony. The argument of the learned counsel has, therefore, no force. 10. The facts stated above would show that false allegations had been made against the defendant Smt. Jagwanti. The most important of these are that she is not a Brahmin by caste and that she was not the legally wedded wife of Deoki Nandan, but a concubine. While the first charge might now lower her prestige among at least the educated class of society in this country generally which may accord the same prestige to a Garariya as to Brahmin, it must be held that even this class generally is not as yet sufficiently advanced so as to accord the same social status to a concubine as it would to a legally wedded wife. The allegation must, therefore, be deemed to be highly vexatious to the defendant. It having been proved to the false, this is a fit case for award of special compensatory costs to her. 11. The allegation must, therefore, be deemed to be highly vexatious to the defendant. It having been proved to the false, this is a fit case for award of special compensatory costs to her. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant has stated that Section 35-A(1) of the C.P.C. as amendment in Uttar Pradesh does not empower a court of appeal such as the Board of Revenue to award any compensatory costs. The Section is as follows : "If in any suit or other proceedings including proceedings in execution, but not being an appeal or revision, the Court finds that the claim or defence or any part thereof is false or vexatious to the knowledge of the party by whom it has been put forward and if such claim or defence or such part is disallowed, abandoned or withdrawn in whole or in part, the Court may, after recording its reasons for holding such claim or defence to be false or vexatious, make an order for the payment to the successful party of costs by way of compensation irrespective of the decisions on other issues in the case." 12. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that since the Board of Revenue is an appellate court it is specifically excluded by the section from awarding costs. In my opinion, the correct interpretation of the section is otherwise. The intention of the law is that if the false or vexatious claim mentioned in the section is made at the stage of the first hearing of the suit or other proceedings, costs can be awarded but if it is made for the first time at the stage of appeal or revision, no costs can be levied. In the present case, the false allegation was made at the initial stage and, therefore, costs can be levied by an appellate court as well. 13. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with special compensatory costs amounting to Rs. 1,000 /- to respondent Smt. Jagwanti.