JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a reference made by Sri S.K. Sarkar, Commissioner, Faizabad Division, Faizabad, recommending that the revision petition moved on behalf of Ram Sakal and twenty seven others against the order dated July 22, 1970 passed by Sri M.Z. Husain, Sub-Divisional Officer, Nawabganj, District Barabanki in proceedings under Section 198(2) of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act cancelling the leases executed in favour of the revisionists, may be dismissed. 2. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Nawabganj by his order dated May 25, 1967 decided to take suo motu action for cancellation of the leases granted to the revisionists by the Land Management Committee, Paharpur Kutlupur, as he was satisfied that the leases were prima facie illegal. He therefore, called upon the lessees to appear in his Court along with the leases to show causes why the leases be not cancelled under Section 198(2). Before that a number of applications had been addressed to the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner by certain residents of the village complaining about the illegality of the leases. The lessees in their written statement took the plea that the leases were valid and in accordance with the rules, and that the proceedings for cancellation of the leases were time-barred. By the impugned order dated July 22, 1970 the Sub-Divisional Officer cancelled the leases holding that they were not in accordance with the procedure of law and, therefore, are liable to be cancelled. 4. The first contention of the learned counsel for the revisionists is that the proceedings before the trial court were legally vitiated inasmuch as there has been no compliance of Rule 170-A of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules which are mandatory. This contention has no force at all as Rule 170-A does not exist in the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules. The question of its compliance, therefore, does not arise. 5. The next contention of the learned counsel for the revisionists is that the Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti not having been impleaded as a party not having been given on an opportunity to be heard as laid down in Rule 178-A(2), the trial court has exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it by law in ordering the cancellation of the leases. 5. The next contention of the learned counsel for the revisionists is that the Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti not having been impleaded as a party not having been given on an opportunity to be heard as laid down in Rule 178-A(2), the trial court has exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it by law in ordering the cancellation of the leases. It is true that in any enquiry under sub-section (2) of Section 198, the Land Management Committee shall be made a party. The record, however, shows that Natha Ram, who was one of the applicants against the revisionists, had moved an application before the Sub-Divisional Officer on August 14, 1967 for summoning the Pradhan and another lessee namely Tribhuwan Singh and the Sub-Divisional Officer had passed the following order on September 6, 1967: "Chairman Land Management Committee and Tribhuwan Singh be made party and notices be issued to them." Thus the compliance of Rule 178-A(2) was fully made. It would appear that the Chairman Land Management Committee avoided putting appearance in the Court though notice were issued to him again and again. A perusal of the trial court's record shows that notices were issued to the Chairman Land Management Committee on September 6, 1967, September 28, 1967, October 18, 1967 and thereafter on November 16, 1967 the Sub-Divisional Officer ordered that the Chairman Land Management Committee be served by proclamation. The revisionists, on the other hand, moved an application on May 24, 1968 to the effect that as the Chairman, Land Management Committee had been summoned on a number of dates but was not appearing resulting in harassment to the revisionists, the order summoning the Chairman, Land Management may be cancelled. The revisionists had further stated in the application that the Chairman, Land Management Committee was not a necessary party. The Sub-Divisional Officer passed a detailed order on this application on May 27, 1968 holding that the Chairman was a necessary party and that con stent efforts were being made to procure his attendance. A further notice was served to the Pradhan through the Tahsildar. The Chairman, Land Management did put in appearance on May 18, 1968 in the Court. 6. The question may be raised at this stage whether the Land Management Committee or the Gaon Sabha had been made a party. A further notice was served to the Pradhan through the Tahsildar. The Chairman, Land Management did put in appearance on May 18, 1968 in the Court. 6. The question may be raised at this stage whether the Land Management Committee or the Gaon Sabha had been made a party. It is clear from the above narration that the learned Sub-Divisional Officer had correctly ordered that the Land Management Committee be impleaded. Since, however, the Chairman of the Land Management Committee and the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha are the same and the Land Management Committee itself is a committee of the Gaon Sabha, it is natural that the Chairman of the Land Management Committee has described himself as Pradhan. This, however, does not alter the fact that the Pradhan was the Chairman of the Land Management Committee and represented the Committee. It is further significant to note that the revisionists had taken the plea before the Sub-Divisional Officer that the Land Management Committee was not a necessary party but their plea was rightly overruled by the Sub-Divisional Officer. The revisionists have now turned a somersault and taken the plea that the proceedings were vitiated on account of the Land Management Committee not having been made a party. This plea is entirely against the record and has no substance whatsoever. 7. The next contention of the learned counsel for the revisionists is that the revisionists were granted separate leases in respect of different plots of land by the Land Management Committee and the trial court has erred in law in holding a joint trial in respect of all the leases which has resulted in great prejudice to the revisionists and failure of justice. A perusal of the record shows that the leases were executed in favour of the revisionists by a common resolution of the Gaon Sabha and related to the same land which formed a Talab or Jheel. The various applications given by the villagers for the cancellation of the leases were to the effect that this Talab was used for the irrigation of the entire village. Thus, the granting of the leases as well as the proceedings for cancellation of the leases really constituted a single transaction. The revisionists before the trial court filed a joint written statement though notices were sent to them individually. Thus, the granting of the leases as well as the proceedings for cancellation of the leases really constituted a single transaction. The revisionists before the trial court filed a joint written statement though notices were sent to them individually. The revisionists did not take any plea of prejudice before the Sub-Divisional Officer on the ground that proceedings were taken against them jointly. This, there has neither been any illegality nor failure of justice. Where leases are granted to different individuals by different resolutions of the Land Management Committee and where the ground for cancellation of the leases is different, in such cases separate proceedings have to be taken where, however, the leases have been granted by a common resolution of the Land Management Committee and the grounds for cancellation are common, joint proceedings for cancellation of the leases can be taken and there is no illegality in passing a common order in such proceedings. 8. Yet another contention of the learned counsel for the revisionists is that the trial court has acted illegally in the exercise of its jurisdiction in not framing any issues. This contention is legally not sound. Issues are to be framed under Order XIV, Rule 1, C.P.C. for hearing of suits. It does not mean that issues have to be framed for all kinds of judicial proceedings which do not constitute 'suits'. Proceedings under Section 198(2) cannot be described as suits. As a matter of fact, Schedule 1st of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act itself gives the description of various judicial proceedings. Thus, proceedings under Section 138, Section 163 Section 167, Section 176, Section 191, Section 198(4), Section 202, Section 206, Section 208, Section 209 and so on are described as suits in the Schedule, whereas proceedings under Section 134 and Section 137 (application for acquisition of Bhumidhari rights), Section 140 (application for refund), Section 183 and Section 184 (application for surrender) and Section 198(2) are described as applications. The legal distinction is that whereas in the hearing of suits framing of issues is necessary, no issues need be framed for hearing of application. 9. The legal distinction is that whereas in the hearing of suits framing of issues is necessary, no issues need be framed for hearing of application. 9. The learned counsel for the revisionists has also contended that the trial court has acted with material irregularity in ignoring documentary evidence adduced by the revisionists in the shape of electoral rolls and Khasra entries to prove that they were the residents of the village and that the land in dispute was not a Jheel. The record shows that the revisionists filed no extract from the Khasra at all to show that the land in question is not a Jheel. On the other hand, the learned Sub-Divisional Officer has rightly held on the basis of the evidence on record that the land in question is Jheel in which Sirdari rights cannot accrue. As regards the question whether or not the revisionists are the residents of the village, the learned Sub-Divisional Officer has not cancelled the lease on this ground. On the other hand, the learned Sub-Divisional Officer has held that proper publication for the grant of the leases was not done and also that there were many landless agricultural labourers residents within the village but they were not given any lease. Thus, whether the electoral rolls show the revisionists to be residents of the village is not material at all. 10. The learned counsel for the revisionists has also contended that the proceedings were time barred. This contention is found to be incorrect. The leases in question were granted on February 28, 1966. The Sub-Divisional Officer has issued notice for taking suo motu action on May 25, 1967. The learned District Government Counsel has contended that the limitation for suo motu action by the Sub-Divisional Officer is three years from the date of knowledge. In the present cases, the Sub-Divisional Officer came to know of the leases from a note of the Deputy Commissioner dated April 30, 1967 addressed to him for making an inquiry. The suo motu action was taken by the Sub-Divisional Officer within one month of the date of knowledge and within fifteen months of the date of the grant of the leases. Thus the suo motu proceedings were very much within time. 11. The suo motu action was taken by the Sub-Divisional Officer within one month of the date of knowledge and within fifteen months of the date of the grant of the leases. Thus the suo motu proceedings were very much within time. 11. The learned counsel for the revisionists has referred to Raja Harbansh Singh Uchtarmadhyamik Vidyalaya v. L.M.C., 1972 R.D. 292 in which a learned Member has held that the power of the Sub-Divisional Officer under sub-section (2) of Section 198 of the Act is confined to the cancellation of an allotment made by the L.M.C. under Sub-section (1) in admitting any person as Sirdar of Asammi under Section 195 of 197 of the Act. It gives no power to him to cancel an outright gift by the Land Management Committee. This ruling does not help the revisionists, inasmuch as, in the present case, the revisionists were admitted to land as Sirdars and were not given any outright gift by the Land Management Committee. 12. The learned counsel for the revisionists has also referred to Jata Shanker v. State, 1973 R.D. 82, in which it has been held that an order cancelling a lease under Section 198(2) can only be passed after making enquiry in the manner prescribed and the procedure is laid down in Rule 178-A. This rule inter alia lays down that the Land Management Committee and the allottee shall be made parties and given an opportunity of being heard before final orders are passed. It has already been seen and discussed above that both the Land Management Committee and the allottees were made parties and given due opportunity of being heard in the present case. 13. After carefully scrutinising the record, I find that the trial court has not committed any illegality or irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and that no revisional interference is called for. The revision has no force and is hereby dismissed.