Judgement JUDGMENT:- This Second Appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs. Their suit, being Title Suit No. 151 of 1967 and Title Appeal No. 102 of 1976 have been dismissed by the Courts below. 2. The plaintiffs-appellants filed a suit for specific performance of contract and/or damages along with other consequential reliefs. The plaintiffs case inter alia is that the defendants were the owners of a house which was rented to them and the said house was gutted by fire in the year 1963. Thereafter the present defendants as plaintiffs filed a Title Suit being No. 17 of 1963 for ejectment of the present plaintiffs. In due course the parties in the said Suit came to a settlement and the terms of the settlement were recorded in a compromise deed or "Sulehnama" on 24-7-1963 and the same was submitted to the said Court trying the said suit and the trial Court disposed of the suit in terms of the said compromise deed and passed a decree in terms thereof. The plaintiffs case is that the defendants, who were bound to construct the house providing three rooms for the three defendants, were not done in accordance with the terms of the compromise deed nor the kitchens (cook-shed) were constructed accordingly. The construction of the house and the kitchens was not done within the stipulated period of six months. The defendants also failed to construct the latrine situated behind the house meant for the common use of the plaintiffs. According to the plaintiffs the compromise deed contained reciprocal promises by both the parties to the said suit and that the plaintiffs performed all the obligations contained in the said compromise deed in terms thereof whereas the present defendants could not (1) construct the house in terms of the compromise deed; (2) failed to construct accordingly the kitchens, and the latrine was not at all constructed. The plaintiffs averred that they were and are always willing to fulfil their part of the terms of the compromise deed where for the plaintiffs in terms of the compromise are entitled to take recourse to the help of the Court directing the defendants to build the house in accordance with the terms and conditions of the deed in question or in the alternative the plaintiffs claimed that they should be awarded with the damages or compensation for the loss sustained by them for the breach and also for the loss sustained by them due to the default of the defendants. They also prayed for other reliefs which are not relevant for the purpose of the appeal. 3. The defendants appeared and filed written statement and their case inter alia was that (1) there was no violation of the terms of the compromise deed and they constructed the house within the stipulated period of six months from the date of recording of the compromise, namely, from 8-8-1963 and (2) that the plaintiffs themselves violated many of the terms of the compromise and were not entitled to get any relief whatsoever. 4. The following issues were settled by the Court: "1. Is there any cause of action? 2. Is the suit maintainable in its present form? 3. Is the suit barred by limitation? 4. Is the suit land properly and correctly described? 5. Have the defendant constructed the house and cookshed within the period prescribed by the sulehnama in question? 6. Did the defendant receive (sic) for the contract as alleged by plaintiffs? 7. Did the plaintiffs raise any structure in the suit land? 8. Are the plaintiffs entitled to get a decree as claimed? 9. What relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled to?" The Issues Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 were decided by both the Courts below in favour of the plaintiffs and the Issue Nos. 5 to 9 were decided against the plaintiffs. 5. The trial Court held that the date of compromise became effective on and from 8-8-1963 and not from 24-7-1963 and as such, the period of six months within which the defendants were to construct the house started from 8-8-1963. The trial Court further held that the plaintiffs violated the terms and conditions of the sulehnama by entering into the premises and taking over possession within six months from 8-8-1963. The trial Court further held that the plaintiffs violated the terms and conditions of the sulehnama by entering into the premises and taking over possession within six months from 8-8-1963. The trial Court held that within one month of the sulehnama the plaintiffs violating the terms thereof occupied the cookshed The trial Court further held that the plaintiffs entered into the premises in violation of the terms of the agreement without executing the kerayanama which amounted to the violation of the terms of the sulehnama. The trial Court further held that whatsoever were the terms and conditions of the sulehnama, the plaintiffs accepted the holdings in the then existing condition and did not serve any notice to the defendants to fulfil the terms and conditions of the sulehnama. In view of the violattions of the terms of the sulehnama, the trial Court held that the plaintiffs were disentitled to get any relief either in the form of specific performance of contract or by way of damages. The trial Court also held that the plaintiffs, after the construction of the house by the defendants accepted the position that they were the tenants under the defendants and continued to remain as such. The appellate Court also held that the sulehnama became operative only from 8-8-1963 and the plaintiffs themselves violated the terms of the sulehnama. The first appellate Court further found that the present defendants were entitled to get khas possession of the premises on and from 8-8-1963 and to remain in khas possession until six months therefrom but the plaintiffs violated the terms of the sulehnama by entering into the premises within one month from the date and held that the trial Court was correct in holding the plaintiff were themselves responsible for the violation of the terms and as such, they are not entitled to get any relief whatsoever. The first appellate Court also found that plaintiffs were recognised as tenants by the defendants and were occupying the holdings under the defendants having taken over the possession of the holdings in the then condition and they having derived the benefit of such possession and having violated the terms of the agreement were not entitled to get any relief inasmuch as the plaintiffs themselves failed to perform their part of the contract and they were estopped from demanding the performance by the defendants. 6. 6. Therefore, there are concurrent findings of fact by both the Courts below that (1) the sulehnama was operative from 8-8-1963 and not from 24-7-1963; (2) the plaintiffs have failed to perform their part of the contract and not only failed to perform their part, they, themselves violated the terms of the sulehnama and are not entitled to get any relief either by way of specific relief or damages or any other reliefs. 7. Mr. S.K. Senapati, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants entirely and exclusively concentrated on the following points before me: (i) That the findings of fact that the plaintiffs have violated the terms of the contract was entirely based on a wrong interpretation given by the trial Court as to the date of the operation of Ext. 2 the "sulehnama." According to the learned Counsel, on a true and correct interpretation of the document and taking into consideration the facts and surrounding circumstances, the Courts below should have held that in fact the sulehnama became effective on and from 24-7-1963, the date on which it was written and not on the which date on which it was submitted to the Court for recording a decree in terms of the said deed of compromise. (ii) That in any view of the matter, the latrine not having been constructed by the defendants within the period of six months from 8-8-1963, the plaintiffs at any rate are entitled to get the relief sought for, at least in respect of the latrine in question. (iii) That apart from the question of the plaintiffs right based on contract, they were entitled to get relief under equity. 8. Besides the aforesaid points no other points have been urged by the learned Counsel for the appellants. 9. Realising the position that the finding arrived at by the Courts in regard to the violation of the terms and conditions being finding of fact and this being a second appeal the learned Counsel very rightly did not invite me to disturb the said findings. His main ground of attack in regard to Point No. 1 was that the Courts below erred in holding that the period of six months commenced from 8-8-1963. His main ground of attack in regard to Point No. 1 was that the Courts below erred in holding that the period of six months commenced from 8-8-1963. His submissions are that the agreement was written on 24-7-1963 and it became effective and operative against the parties on and from 24-7-1963 and once if it be held that the compromise deed was effective or operative from 24-7-1963, the findings of the Courts below that the plaintiffs violated the terms of the agreement cannot operate as a bar for the plaintiffs to get the reliefs in the present suit. The learned Counsel means to say thereby that if the date of commencement of the compromise is taken as on 24-7-1963, on a true and correct interpretation of the sulehnama, the findings as to the violation made by the plaintiffs of the terms of the agreement as found by the Court below cannot be sustained and that the judgment and decree of the Courts below are liable to be set aside and a decree for either specific performance of the contract or the damages and/or both must be passed in favour of the plaintiffs. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the said findings of the Courts below as to the date on which the terms of the compromise should be effective or operative are all based on question of facts and as such the appellants are not entitled to agitate the question in a second appeal in view of the very limited scope of this Court. Let me examine the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellants and try to consider as to how far they are sustainable. The findings of fact concluded by the Courts below are that within a month from 8-8-1963, the plaintiffs occupied the kitchens and continued to remain there. Therefore, whether in fact the terms were operative on and from 24-7-1963 or not, the findings of the Courts below that the plaintiffs themselves violated the terms of the compromise is also established even if the date of operation of the compromise is assumed as on 24-7-1963 and not on 8-8-1963. As such, I hold that the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants is not sustainable. In fact, the compromise deed does not expressly specify the date of operation and/or commencement of the terms of the deed. As such, I hold that the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants is not sustainable. In fact, the compromise deed does not expressly specify the date of operation and/or commencement of the terms of the deed. When there is no date of commencement in the deed itself, the said date is to be understood on perusal of the deed itself, the facts and the the surrounding circumstances of the case and also how the parties understood and acted upon it. Ext. 2, the sulehnama is an application made before the Court containing reciprocal promises and it concluded with a prayer that in accordance with the terms and conditions of the sulehnama in question the Court may be pleased to decree the suit and treat the sulhenama as a part of the decree. It is the case of the plaintiffs that in terms of the compromise, the Court passed an order directing that the agreement be recorded and thereafter passed a decree in accordance therewith. It may be stated here that the present defendants agreed to withdraw the suit on compromise and such withdrawal of the suit became effective on and from 8-8-1963 and not from any other earlier date. It is therefore clear that it was an application made to the Court under O.23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Court gave effect to the compromise and recorded the same and it formed the part of the decree. It is well known that without the stroke of the judicial pen no order of this nature can be passed under O.23 R.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that in the absence of any other intention of the parties appearing from the sulehnama or the application it must be held that it became effective on and from the date on which the Court ordered recording the agreement and passed a decree in terms thereof. Under these circumstances, I hold that on the facts and circumstances of this case the Courts below were justified in coming to the conclusion that the application and/or the sulehnama became effective and operative on and from 8-8-1963. Apart from the above, it is abundantly clear from the evidence on record to show that the parties understood the correct date of commencement of Ext. 2. Apart from the above, it is abundantly clear from the evidence on record to show that the parties understood the correct date of commencement of Ext. 2. It was the clear and specific case of the defendant that he understood that the date of commencement of Ext. 2. was on and from 8-8-1963. Therefore, one of the parties understood the date as on 8-8-1963. Let me now consider as to what the plaintiffs understood as to the date of commencement or operation of the agreement. The finding of the learned Munsiff as to what the plaintiff No. 3 understood as to the date of commencement of Ext. 2 is quoted herein below:- "The plaintiff No. 3 in his deposition says that within one month from the date of filing of sulehnama, they were to pay arrear rent and the advances. He further says that within 6 months from the date of filing of sulehnama the construction of the house was to be made." These findings of the learned Munsiff have not been challenged by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs. I have also checked up the evidence and I find that the said finding is based on evidence. As such, besides the defendants, the plaintiff No. 3 also understood that the sulehnama was to commence on and from 8-8-1963 and not from 24-7-1963. Under these circumstances, when the plaintiff No. 3 as also the defendants clearly understood that the date of commencement of the sulehnama was on and from 8-8-1963. I have no other alternative but to hold that the findings arrived at by the Courts below on the point must be sustained. The evidence of the plaintiff No. 3 is a clear admission. Apart from that, the most reasonable interpretation of the commencement of the terms of the agreement was given by the Courts below. It was well-nigh impossible for the plaintiffs of the present suit to give up possession on and from 24-7-1963 in terms of the agreement until the same was duly recorded by the Court. Similarly in the absence of any decree in terms of the sulehnama the defendant of the present suit could not have commenced any construction on the land from 24-7-1963, when in regard to the same subject matter there was a pending suit before the learned Munsiff. Similarly in the absence of any decree in terms of the sulehnama the defendant of the present suit could not have commenced any construction on the land from 24-7-1963, when in regard to the same subject matter there was a pending suit before the learned Munsiff. It is not also the case of the plaintiffs that they on and from 24-7-1963 gave up possession of the holdings. Even in the plaint it was never averred that the sulehnama became effective on and from 24-7-1963 and not from 8-8-1963. Be that as it may, having considered all the facts and circumstances of the case and taking into consideration all relevant matters on record, I arrive at the irresistible conclusion that the findings of the Court below that the sulehnama became effective and operative on and from 8-8-1963 are very much justified. Under these circumstances, in view of the clear findings of facts arrived at by the trial Court that the plaintiffs failed to perform their part of the contract and further violated the terms thereof must also be sustained and as such, I reject the first contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant as not sustainable. In connection with the point above, the learned Counsel for the appellant cited a decision reported in AIR 1960 Madhya Pradesh 280, Ram Juwan v. Devendra Nath Gupta, in support of his above contention. The Single Bench decision of the Gwalior Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court referred to above, in my view, is not at all applicable to the present case. The decision lays down that when there is a consent decree containing terms that do not relate to the suit, such terms cannot be enforced in execution of the decree but it may be enforced as a contract by a separate suit. The Courts below have never found that the relevant terms and conditions of the sulehnama related to the subject-matter of Title Suit No. 17 of 1963. In fact, there is no issue to the effect that the suit is not maintainable and that an application under Section 47, C.P.C. was the only remedy available to the plaintiffs. On the contrary the Courts below have held that the suit is maintainable. Under these circumstances, I hold that the decision cited is not at all to the point. 10. On the contrary the Courts below have held that the suit is maintainable. Under these circumstances, I hold that the decision cited is not at all to the point. 10. The next contention of the learned counsel is based on the findings of the Courts below that the defendants did not construct the latrine at all. The Courts below have held that the plaintiffs were primarily responsible for the breach of the agreement and as such they were not entitled to get any relief. Till that finding is there, the plaintiffs are estopped from getting any relief in respect of the latrine as well. I have perused the records of the case and I find that there was a pre-existing latrine even during the previous suit as well. The stipulation as contained in the agreement was that on construction of the house and the kitchens the defendants shall be entitled to get rent at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month from each of the plaintiffs. Therefore, the term of the rent was based on the construction of the house and the kitchens and was not dependent on the construction of the latrine in question. There is a stipulation in the agreement providing that in default of the construction of the house and the kitchens the plaintiffs shall be entitled to get the construction done through the intervention of the Court, but there is no such penal clause in regard to the construction or non-construction of the latrine. In regard to the construction of the latrine, the item is located in a completely separate and detached place. The stipulation was that in place of old latrine the defendants were to construct a new pucca latrine. Now, the findings of fact concluded by the Courts below are that before the period of six months the plaintiffs themselves, in violation of the terms of the agreement, have taken over possession of the premises and committed various other breaches. Under these circumstances, I feel that the Courts below were justified in not granting the relief sought for by the plaintiffs in respect of the latrine. Under these circumstances, I feel that the Courts below were justified in not granting the relief sought for by the plaintiffs in respect of the latrine. Apart from the above, it is apparent that the plaintiffs themselves realised that if at all they were entitled to get any relief in the form of specific relief or damages, they were entitled to get it on account of the defendants default in constructing or completing the construction of the house and the cook-sheds in strict compliance with the specifications contained in Ex. 2 and not in respect of the latrine, in view of the stipulations contained in Ext. 2. This is quite evident from the issues themselves. The Issue No. 5 is very relevant for the purpose. The said Issue specifically mentions the house and the cook-sheds but does not include the latrine. As such, the question of non-construction of the latrine was never an issue before the Courts below at any time. The plaintiffs also did not ask the Court to frame an issue in that regard. Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs are not entitled to get any relief for non-construction of the latrine as well. 11. The last point, namely, that the plaintiffs are entitled to get relief in equity has not been very seriously contended by the learned Counsel. He has not contended seriously on the score that there are specific and clear findings of the Courts below that the plaintiffs did not come to Court with clean hands and that they were themselves responsible for the breach of the agreement. Under these circumstances, I hold that the plaintiff are not entitled to get any relief sought for by them. 12. In the result the appeal is dismissed and the judgments of the Courts below are affirmed. On the facts and circumstances of the case I leave the parties to bear their respective costs. Appeal dismissed.