Judgment S. Sarwar Ali, J. 1. This Miscellaneous Second Appeal arises out of a restitution matter. An application under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restitution of properties mentioned in Schedule I of the application was died before the Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Muzaffarpur. This application was dismissed. There was an appeal against the aforesaid decision. On appeal restitution has been allowed and hence this Second Miscellaneous Appeal. 2. The circumstances leading to the filing of the restitution application under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be briefly stated. A Title Suit being Title Suit No. 74 of 1949 was filed by Mathura Prasad Missir. The suit was for declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of sixteen annas share of tauzi No. 19555 in the district of Muzaffarpur. The suit was dismissed. A First Appeal was preferred First Appeal 465 of 1954. This appeal was allowed and the plaintiff-appellant was held entitled to recover possession of the suit properties from the defendants. After the disposal of the first Appeal Execution case 13 of 1963 was started and the plaintiff decree holder obtained delivery of possession on 22.12.1963. Since the zamindary interest had already vested in the State of Bihar, the possession was obviously obtained in respect of the bakast lands. The Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. 96 of 1960 (hereinafter to be referred as L.P.A.) was filed by some of the respondents in the First Appeal. The L.P.A. was allowed to this extent that while the title of the plaintiff to the proprietary interest till the date of vesting was declared, his prayer for recovery of possession was disallowed. The judgment in L.P.A. 96 of 1960 was delivered on 16.4.1965. Soon hereafter an application under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restitution of the properties mentioned n Schedule-I of that application was filed giving rise to Miscellaneous Case No. 23 of 1965. 3. The first contention that has been raised by the learned Counsel for he appellant is that the effect of the decision in L.P.A. 96 of 1960 was not to disturb the decision in the First Appeal (sic) concerned. Learned Counsel contended that what was held was that the plaintiff could not get recovery of possession of the proprietory interest in the said tauzi. Learned Counsel contended that what was held was that the plaintiff could not get recovery of possession of the proprietory interest in the said tauzi. So far as the right to recover possession of bakast lands are concerned it remained unaffected by the decision in the Letters Patent Appeal. It is difficult to accept this contention. There is no specific mention of bakast lands in the plaint. Neither the judgment of the trial court nor of this Court in First Appeal mentioned anything specifically about the bakast lands. The contest both in the trial court and the First Appellate Court. (High Court) was in relation to recovery of possession of the tauzi in question. It is in this context that the observation in the Letters Patent Appeal has to be under stood and appreciated. Learned Counsel for the appellant relied on the following sentences in the judgment of the Letters Patent Appeal: Hence the plaintiff cannot possibly get recovery of possession of the proprietory interest in the said tauzi. His prayer for recovery of possession must, therefore, be rejected. The judgment in L.P.A. emphasises the aspect of the recovery of possession of proprietory interest because the contest throughout has been in respect of recovery of the proprietory interest. The opening paragraph of the judgment in the L.P.A. makes this clear when it is said: The disputed property was 16 annas share of tauzi No. 19555, Thana No.... It is, therefore, not possible to hold that the effect of the decision in L.P.A. is that the Plaintiffs right to recover bakast lands remained unaffected by the aforesaid decision. 4. Two other contentions have been raised on behalf of the appellant. (sic) (1) Since the contesting defendants (applicants in Miscellaneous Case 23 of 1995) have been held to have no title to the suit property including the bakast lands, and since in view of the several decisions of the Supreme Court the bakast land vests in the State of Bihar, the applicants in the Miscellaneous Case, cannot be said to be parties "entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise," (2) The plaintiff had taken settlement of the disputed land from the Stale of Bihar during the pendency of the litigation and as such there could not be an order of restitution in the instanted case. 5. 5. The learned Counsel for the appellant relying on the observations in Mahadeo Prasad Shaw v. Calcutta Deying and Cleaning Company 1961 Calcutta 70 contended that since the applicants were trespassers they were not entitled to restitution. He also relied on the observations of the Privy Council in S.N. Banerji v. Kuchwar Lime and Stone Co. Ltd. 1941 P.C. 128 to the effect Justice does not require such a preposterous conclusion as that they (trespassers) should be put back in a position which they have no right to occupy.... But, in my view, these observations do not apply to a case where there is a competition between two trespassers. It is well settled that possession is good title against all but the true owner. A person, in possession is, therefore entitled to maintain his possession against all except the true owner. Thus if the plaintiff and defendants are both trespassers then, in my view, the defendant who is in possession can, ordinarily, maintain an application for restitution on the basis of his prior possession in respect of the disputed property. The observation of the Privy Council cannot be read devoid from its context. In the Privy Council case the respondent was held to be in lawful possession of the premises and it was in that context the observations quoted above were made. 6. The position is, however, different in respect of bakast lands which were not in "khas possession" of the intermediary on the date of vesting. That such an intermediary will not be a raiyat in respect of such bakast lands and that the same vests in the State admits of no doubt in view of the decision in the case of Suraj Ahir v. Prithi Nath Singh A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 545. This case also makes it clear that it is the State which has right to recover possession from a trespasser (See paragraph 22). Section 4(f) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act is specific that the Collector must be deemed to have taken charge of the estate or tenure and all interests vested in the State under the Act. Bakasht land, not in "Khas possession" of the intermediary, and in possession of trespasser, on the date of vesting, must obviously be deemed to have been taken charge of by the State. Section 4(g) authorises the Collector to take steps for obtaining actual physical possession. Bakasht land, not in "Khas possession" of the intermediary, and in possession of trespasser, on the date of vesting, must obviously be deemed to have been taken charge of by the State. Section 4(g) authorises the Collector to take steps for obtaining actual physical possession. The effect of Section 4(f) and 4(g) taken together is that the State is deemed to have taken charge of such bakast lands as have vested in the State and for obtaining the actual possession action can be taken under Section 4(g). In such a situation if the State in whom the bakast land vests, settles, or recognises any persons raiyat of, the bakast land then, in my opinion, a trespasser cannot claim the benefit of Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure and claim that he is entitled to benefit by way of restitution. The person claiming restitution was trespasser on the date of the suit. The person against whom he is claiming restitution is in lawful possession on the date of filing of petition for restitution in view of his having been inducted, on recognised, as a raiyat by the State, in whom the property vested by virtue of the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. It is in such a situation that the observation of the Privy Council in S.N. Banerjis case as quoted above, would be applicable. I am thus of the view that if the appellant can successfully show that there is a valid settlement in his favour, he is entitled to resist the application for restitution. 7. The court below and the learned Counsel for the respondents relied on the decision in Prithi Nath Singh v. Suraj Ahir , but that case, in my view, is distinguishable. There on facts it was held that it was not a case where respondents could be said to be a trespasser. In that case it was observed that since the respondent had not been declared to be a trespasser and it might have been open to the defendant to show that he had acquired raiyati right in the lands the respondent was entitled to restitution. In the instant case, on the findings arrived at in the first appeal, it. is clear that the respondents were trespassers. In the instant case, on the findings arrived at in the first appeal, it. is clear that the respondents were trespassers. In such a situation if the appellant can successfully show that he has acquired a right to the lands in question during the pendency of the litigation it cannot be held that the trespassers, who, when in, would have no right to retain possession, must be first put back in possession and thereafter another suit should be instituted for recovery of possession to the property, subject matter of the restitution proceeding, by the party who has validly acquired title and right of possession. The courts are entitled to take note of events that have been taken place during the pendency of a litigation and the instant case is one of those cases where in the interest of justice, note of subsequent events should be taken. See 1941 Federal Court 5 and . 8. Taking the totality of circumstances into consideration I am of the opinion that in view of the claim of the appellant that he has become raiyat of the bakast lands after the decision in the First Appeal, and he is now validly in possession raiyat of the State of Bihar, in whom the bakast lands vested under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, it is a fit case in which there should be a remand to the court below for determination of the question whether the appellant is now in possession of the bakast lands as raiyat of the State of Bihar. The remand is necessary as this question has not been determined by the courts below. 9. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the order of the court below is set aside and the case is remanded to the lower appellate court for determination whether the appellant has become, or has been recognised, a raiyat of the State of Bihar, and thereafter to decide the appeal in the light of observations made in this judgment. In the Circumstances of this case, there would be no order as to costs.