TEXTILE and ALLIED INDUSTRIES RESEARCH ORGANISATION (TAIRO) v. R. R. SAHAE,regional PROVIDENT FUND COMMI. GUJARAT
1976-07-14
A.D.DESAI, N.H.BHATT
body1976
DigiLaw.ai
N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) * * * * ( 2 ) TWO points were urged by Mr. I. C. Bhatt the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner-institution. They are: (1) The respondent Regional Provident Fund Commissioner had no authority to decide the question arising in the inquiry because the petitioner urged the contention regarding the number of persons employed in the establishment was a matter for the Central Government to decide and (2) The Authority had not applied its mind to the material regarding the number of persons employed and no reasons were recorded in respect of the material on the basis of which he purported to arrive at the said decision. ( 3 ) AS far as the first contention is concerned it is devoid of any merit. Sec. 7 A (of Employees Provident Fund and Family Pension Fund Act.) reads as follows:-7 (1) The Central Provident Fund Commissioner any Deputy Provident Fund Commissioner or any Regional Provident Fund Commissioner may by order deter- mine the amount due from any employer under any provision of this Act (the scheme or the Family Pension Scheme as the case may be) and for this purpose may conduct such inquiry as he may deem necessary. (2) The officer conducting the inquiry under sub-sec. (i) shall for the purposes of such inquiry have the same powers as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 for trying a suit in respect of the following matters namely: (a) enforcing the attendance of any person or examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witness; and any such inquiry shall be deemed to boa judicial proceeding within the meaning of secs. 193 and 228 and for the purpose of sec. 196 of the Indian Penal Code. Even a casual glance at the sub-sec. (1) is sufficient to convince us that whole holding the inquiry under sec. 7a the respondent is acting as a quasi-judicial authority the primary function of which is to determine the amount due from any employer under any provision of this Act Scheme or Family Pension Scheme as the case may be and for this purpose he is authorised to conduct the inquiry as he may deem necessary.
7a the respondent is acting as a quasi-judicial authority the primary function of which is to determine the amount due from any employer under any provision of this Act Scheme or Family Pension Scheme as the case may be and for this purpose he is authorised to conduct the inquiry as he may deem necessary. In other words he is clothed with the authority to determine all the questions which ultimately lead to his determination of the amount due from any employer. If the employer contends that he does not fall within the pur- view of the Act either because the industry is not of the type mentioned in Schedule I or because the number of persons employed in the establish- ment does not reach the requisite number of 20 or more or any other ground which may be open to him and if such questions are dropping up before him it would be certainly within his competence to deal with them in order to enable him to decide his substantive power of deter- mining the amount due Those questions are questions which are basic questions on the basis of which the question of the amount due has got to be determined. ( 4 ) MR. Bhatt however contended by reference to sec. 19a of the Act that it was the power of the Central Government to decide various questions enumerated there in clauses (i) to (iv) and as the State Govern- ment has been entrusted with the duty and power to decide those questions the jurisdiction of the authority under sec. 7a was by necessary implication barred. We are not required to decide the scope of sec. 19a of the Act in this case and therefore we refrain from examining the same in the larger context. The exclusion of any authoritys jurisdiction which on the face of the provisions seems to have been provided for cannot necessarily be inferred. As we have already said it is implicit in the provisions of Sec. 7a itself that the authority under that Act has power to decide all the questions which ultimately enable it to determine the amount of compensation. We do not find anything in Sec. 19a which takes away the jurisdiction of the authority under sec. 7a to decide the question regarding the applicability of the Act.
We do not find anything in Sec. 19a which takes away the jurisdiction of the authority under sec. 7a to decide the question regarding the applicability of the Act. ( 5 ) IF any authority in support of this obvious proposition is required we can refer with advantage to the case of BALASORE MOTOR ASSOCIATION V. THE REGIONAL PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER ORISSA A. I. R. 1970 ORISSA PAGE 199 It was there held that the determination of the liability of the employer was a condition precedent to the making of an order under Sec. 7-A of the Act It therefore follows that if the authority has got power to determine the amount then it has got by necessary and inevitable implication the power to decide all the conditions precedent to the making of that ultimate determination. To the same effect are the findings of the Madras High Court in a reported case of MESSRS CHOKKAN PALANI VILAS V. THE REGIONAL PROVI- DENT FUND COMMISSIONER MADRAS (1973) I L. L. J. PAGE 139 (142 ). ( 6 ) MR. Bhatt for the petitioner however had invited our attention to the case of 1964 Vol. I page 528 Dhanalakshi Weaving Works and others v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Trivandrum. It was a case decided on 20th August 1962 when Sec. 7-A which is before us for consideration was not even born The authority therefore cannot be of any assistance to us though it certainly supports the point canvassed by Mr. Bhatt. Petition allowed .