JUDGMENT Bajpai, J. 1. This second appeal is at the instance of the landlord plaintiff whose claim for eviction of the defendant tenant has been dismissed by the Courts below. 2. Landlord's claim for eviction was based on two grounds, i.e. (i) his bonafide need of the suit accommodation for his residence at Jagdalpur, and (ii) that the defendant tenant had built three blocks suitable for his residence in Gangazuda ward of Jagdalpur town. The first block was constructed in or about the year 1964. Thereafter in the year 1971, one more block was constructed with R.C.C. roof and all sanitary facilities. Later on, during the pendency of the suit in the year 1972, one more block was constructed. All the three blocks, so built, were let out by the defendant the plaintiff, therefore, claimed that the ground to eject the tenant under section 12 (1)(i) of the MP. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 also became available. 3. The Courts below have correctly found it as a fact that the case of the bonafide need was not established. The plaintiff was already living with his family members at Bijapur. He had not disclosed the nature of illness in his pleadings which necessitated his stay at Jagdalpur. No evidence was adduced by either filing medical certificate or by examining any medical man to establish that his need of the suit house to live at Jagdalpur for his treatment was bona fide. On the contrary, from the evidence on record, it was found that the plaintiff was already in occupation of one vacant accommodation. It was disclosed that from time to time the plaintiff had been acquiring vacant possession and had let out the same to others. Had his need to live at Jagdalpur been genuine, he would have occupied such houses which became available to him. Under these circumstances, the Courts found that the plaintiff could not establish his need to occupy the suit accommodation. I do not find any reason to disturb the concurrent finding recorded by the Courts below in this respect. 4. The next point which needs determination in this appeal is regarding the availability of ground under section 12 (1) (i) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. I do not find any reason to disturb the concurrent finding recorded by the Courts below in this respect. 4. The next point which needs determination in this appeal is regarding the availability of ground under section 12 (1) (i) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The learned Lower Appellate Court was of the view that the plaintiff landlord could not avail of the ground stated under section 12 (1) (i) of the Act for the following reasons: (i) That there was no pleading that the accommodation built by the defendant-tenant was suitable for his residence. (ii) That it was not established that the defendant tenant had acquired vacant possession of any such accommodation. (iii) That the houses built by him were not available to him for occupation as they were already let out. 5. Findings recorded in this respect by the lower Appellate Court are apparently under error of law. So far as the objection regarding the defect in pleadings is concerned, it is surprising as to how the lower Appellate Court could make such remark when there was specific averment in the plaint regarding the suitability of the accommodation build by the defendant: The contents of paragraph 2 of the plaint, as reproduced below, clearly indicate that the lower Appellate Court, without taking trouble to read the allegations made in the plaint, made the observation that no such case was pleaded and therefore, the evidence in this respect could not be read :- "That the defendant has been the tenant of the aforesaid accommodation since about 1945. In or about the year 1968, the defendant acquired the land bearing sheet No. 48. plot No. 63/2, area 4059 sq ft. of Jagdalpur and constructed on it a house with two blocks in 1968. This house is suitable for the residence of the defendant. In the notice dated 15-3-1971, the year 1968 has been mentioned in place of 1964 by typographical error. During the pendency of this suit, the defdt. has constructed another flat roofed house on the above mentioned plot. This house is also suitable for the residence of the defendant." 6. The other ground on which the relief of ejectment has been refused by the lower Appellate Court under section 12 (1) (i) of the Act was that construction of the house by the defendant did not amount acquiring vacant possession of the same. This house is also suitable for the residence of the defendant." 6. The other ground on which the relief of ejectment has been refused by the lower Appellate Court under section 12 (1) (i) of the Act was that construction of the house by the defendant did not amount acquiring vacant possession of the same. This view is apparently perverse. The language or section 17 (1) (i) of the Act, as reproduced below, makes it clear that the ground for eviction becomes available under the following three circumstances :- (i) That the defendant tenant has either built an accommodation suitable for his residence; or (ii) has acquired vacant possession of an accommodation suitable for his residence; or (iii) has been allotted suitable accommodation for his residence. "Section 12 (1) (i) :- That the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, built acquired vacant possession of, or, been allotted an accommodation suitable for his residence". 7. The expectation of the lower Appellate Court that the plaintiff should have pleaded that the defendant has acquired vacant possession of an accommodation when the claim was based on the first circumstance indicated above was absolutely erroneous. Once the tenant builds a house, be naturally comes in vacant possession of the same. According to the language of section 12 (1) (i) of the Act, once a tenant has built an accommodation suitable for residence in the town, he becomes liable for eviction. 8. Perusal of the evidence on record clearly establishes that the defendant tenant had built three blocks in between 1964 to 1972. The defendant himself has admitted in paragraph 7 of his deposition that he had constructed three blocks and the same have been let out by him and they are fetching monthly rent of Rs.70/- Rs.35/-and Rs.25/- respectively. From the evidence of Ramdin (P.W 3) and Anandram (P.W.5), it has been established that the first house (block) was constructed in or about the year 1964 the other in the year 1971 and the third one in the year 1972 during the pendency of the suit. It is also admitted that after building the aforesaid blocks; the defendant tenant let out the same on monthly rent as stated above. The plan of the block constructed by the defendant (Ex.P-2) makes it clear that the accommodation built by him was suitable for his residence. It is also admitted that after building the aforesaid blocks; the defendant tenant let out the same on monthly rent as stated above. The plan of the block constructed by the defendant (Ex.P-2) makes it clear that the accommodation built by him was suitable for his residence. As shown in Ex.P-2 the accommodation comprises of two rooms, varendah, kitchen, store, office. courtyard and bathroom. The construction was with R.C.C. roof. Nothing has been said by the defendant that the house was not suitable for his residence. The only plea taken to avoid the liability of eviction under section 12 (1) (i) of the Act was that he had let out the houses built by him long before the filing of the suit and the same were not available for his occupation. 9. Looking to the language of clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act, it is apparent that there is nothing therein to require that the tenant should continue to have the vacant possession of the accommodation built by him on the date of the suit Once he had acquired vacant possession, either by building or by allotment or otherwise, and the same was suitable for his residence, all the requirements of clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act are satisfied. The consequence thereby is that the tenant becomes disentitled to protection available to him under the Act the moment he acquires vacant possession of the accommodation suitable for his residence, in other of the three circumstances stated above The language of clause (i) no where requires that on the date of the suit the vacant accommodation acquired by the tenant should be available with him for occupation As a matter of fact; this could never be possible. The plaintiff cannot immediately file a suit at the moment the defendant has built an accommodation. The tenancy will have to be determined by giving a quit notice and then alone, a suit could be filed. The defendant can always let out the accommodation after its construction and then can say that since on the date of filing of the suit by the landlord-plaintiff the accommodation was already let out he could not be evicted on the ground contained in clause (i) of the Act. The defendant can always let out the accommodation after its construction and then can say that since on the date of filing of the suit by the landlord-plaintiff the accommodation was already let out he could not be evicted on the ground contained in clause (i) of the Act. This will frustrate the very purpose of the enactment of such a provision the purpose behind the enactment of clause (i) is that due to pausity of the accommodation for residential purposes owners of the houses cannot be allowed to earn rent by letting out their own accommodations and themselves live on rent in the premises belonging to others. The provisions of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 have been enacted to protect a needy tenant. Apart from the ground under clause (i), the other provisions of section 12 (1) of the Act indicate that even in a case where the tenant has not acquired vacant possession of any accommodation for his residence, he has been made liable for eviction if the bonafide requirement and genuine need of the landlord himself to occupy the tenanted premises for his residence or business is established. Thus the need of the landlord outweighs the need of the tenant. 10. While enacting these provisions in various clauses of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act, the legislature wherever thought necessary, has made the requirement of the availability of the accommodation for occupation a condition precedent. For instance in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act, it has been provided that the landlord will not be entitled to claim eviction if he has another reasonably suitable residential accommodation in his Occupation. Similar provision has been made in clause (f) also but it is not so in clause (i). The requirements of clause (i) are satisfied if it is established that the tenant has built an accommodation suitable for his residence in the town. Similar view had been taken in the following two decisions of this Court :- Ramgopal v. Shantilal S.A.- No. 250 of 1968 decided on 23rd February 1976 and Ved Prakash and another v. Smt. Prabha Bai S.A. No. 73 of 1976 Decided on the 2nd March 1976. Both the cases are unreported. However, the first one has been digested and published as Short Note No. 84 in 1976 JLJ. Both the cases are unreported. However, the first one has been digested and published as Short Note No. 84 in 1976 JLJ. It is thus apparent that the ground for eviction becomes available to the landlord immediately on the happening of the event of building an accommodation by the tenant suitable for his residence and that right having accrued to the landlord cannot be defeated by the voluntary act of the tenant by letting out his own accommodation' so built. 11. It was also contended on behalf of the respondent that since the construction was made in the year 1964, the cause of action to bring the suit on the ground contained in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act, even if any available, accrued in or about the year 1964 and the landlord plaintiff could bring a suit for eviction within three years. According to the respondent, the period of limitation for bringing a suit for eviction of a tenant on such a case of action was to be governed by the residuary article of the Limitation Act providing for a limitation of three years because there was no other specific Article providing for a suit for eviction on the grounds under section 12 (1) (i) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The reply on behalf of the appellant was that the cause of action for bringing a suit for eviction of a tenant does not accrue prior to the determination of the tenancy by a quit notice according to the provisions of the transfer of property Act. The requirement to establish a ground under section 12 of the Act was by way of protection against eviction and on that basis it cannot be said that a suit for eviction of a tenant was such a suit for which no limitation was provided and therefore, it would be governed by the period of limitation of three years, as provided by the residuary Article. However, there is no need to deal with and decide this contention in view of the fact that from the evidence on record, it is apparent that one of the blocks was constructed in or about the year 1971, prior to the institution of the suit, and the third block was constructed during the pendency of the suit. The suit was filed on 6-10-1971 and therefore, no such question arises. 12. The suit was filed on 6-10-1971 and therefore, no such question arises. 12. For the reasons stated above, the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of eviction on the ground of section 12 (1) (i) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The judgment and decrees of the Courts below are accordingly set aside and the claim of the plaintiff for eviction is decreed. However, it is directed that the plaintiff landlord shall not be entitled to execute the decree for eviction before the expiry of two months from the date of the decree of this Court. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs throughout. counsel's fee at Rs.50/-if certified.