( 1 ) THE question that arises for determination in this Civil Revision petition is whether the provisions of Rule 9 of Order IX, CPC, apply and are attracted to an application for the restoration of another application filed under Rule 13 of Order IX in turn made for setting aside an ex-parte decree. ( 2 ) PETITIONER was the plaintiff in OS. 38 of 1974 on the file of the principal Munsiff at Mandya and owing to the failure of appearance of the Respondent, who was defendant therein, the suit came to be decreed ex-parte on 26-8-1974. Respondent instituted proceedings in Misc. 5 of 1975 invoking Rule 13 of Order IX for setting aside the said ex-parte decree on 13-6-1975, the said application, Misc. 5 of 1975 was itself dismissed for default and Misc. 37 of 1975, from which this revision petition arises, came to be filed under Rule 9 of Order IX read with S. 151 CPC for the restoration of Misc. 5 of 1975. By his order dt. 19-8-1975 the learned Munsiff allowed Misc. 37 of 1975 and restored Misc. 5 of 1975 to file. The correctness of this is challenged in this petition. ( 3 ) SRI Rama Bhat, learned Advocate, for the petitioner contends that the provisions of Order IX, Rule 9 are not available for the restoration of an application under Rule 13 of Order IX which is dismissed for default and that at all events, the respondent had not shown sufficient cause for his absence in Court on 13-6-1975 in consequence of which the said Misc. 5 of 1975 came to be dismissed. ( 4 ) I have heard Sri Rama Bhat, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Dasappa,, learned Counsel for the respondent. The contentions urged by Sri Rama Bhat proceed on the basis that neither Rule 9 of order IX nor the inherent powers of the Court could be invoked for the purpose,, as according to the argument, the former provisions do not apply, as the proceedings sought to be restored are not in the nature of a suit; and the inherent powers of Court saved by S. 151 CPC also do not apply in view of specific provisions in Order XLIII, Rule 1 (d) CPC providing for an appeal. Sri Dasappa, however, contends that provisions of rule 9 of Order IX apply. Sri Dasappa, however, contends that provisions of rule 9 of Order IX apply. The learned Counsel have cited a number of decisions in support of their respective contentions, from the cases cited by the learned Advocates on either side, a wide divergence of judicial opinion on the question is discernible. In ravukumara Raja Appa Row v. Veera Raghava Raju Choudary, AIR 1966 AP 263 . Anantanarayana Ayyar, J has taken the view that a second application under rule 9 of Order IX read with S. 141 CPC is maintainable for the restoration of an application under Rule 9 of Order IX earlier dismissed for default. A Bench of this Court in Shivaraya v. Sharnappa, 1960 Myslj 135. which had an occasion to deal with this question observed as follows :" The better view seems to be that no application under Or. 9, r. 9 will lie for an application for restoration. The rule applies in terms to suits and not to applications. But the possible view of the matter may be that Or. 9 R. 9 read with S. 141 of the CPC should cover this application. We are however inclined to the view that the application could be entertained by the Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Sec. 151 of the CPC and we respectfully agree with the High Courts which have taken this view". (Underlining (italics) supplied) the view that the provisions of Order IX, Rule 9 read with S. 141, CPC could govern an application of the kind we are concerned with, commended itself as a distinct possibility. S. 141 of the CPC provides that the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any Court of civil Jurisdiction. The question is whether the proceeding in Misc. 5 of 1975 was a, 'civil proceeding' to which provisions in the Code relating to suits would, by virtue of Sec. 141, apply. If they do, then Rule 9 of Order IX would in terms apply, and while the existence of a provision for appeal in order XLIII Rule 1 (d) would not detract from such applicability, the the question whether Court can effect restoration in exercise of its inherent powers would not also arise for consideration. If they do, then Rule 9 of Order IX would in terms apply, and while the existence of a provision for appeal in order XLIII Rule 1 (d) would not detract from such applicability, the the question whether Court can effect restoration in exercise of its inherent powers would not also arise for consideration. In Ram Chandra Aggarwal v. State of U. P. , AIR 1966 SC 1888 . the Supreme Court explaining the amplitude of the provisions in s. 141 of the CPC staged thus :" Though there is no discussion, this Court has acted upon the view that the expression 'civil proceeding' in S. 141. is not necessarily confined to an original proceeding like a suit or an application for appointment of a guardian etc, but that it applies also to a proceeding which is not an original proceeding. "in the AIR Commentaries on the Code of Civil Procedure, Vol. 2 Page 249, the learned authors dealing with this aspect, observe :". . . . . But there has been a conflict of opinion in respect of the following points due to different interpretations of the said Privy council decision : (1) * * * (2) Whether an application to restore a suit dismissed for default is an original matter in the nature of a suit. (3) Whether S. 141 applies only to original matters or to all matters whether original or not,, provided they are not execution proceedings. * * * * on the second and third questions it is now settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramachandra v. State of U. P. ( AIR 1966 SC 1888 ) that the words ' civil proceedings' in this Section are not necessarily confined to an original proceeding like a suit or an application for the appointment of guardian, etc, but apply also to proceedings which, are not original proceedings. The undermentioned cases (8) can all be supported on the basis of the said decision of the Supreme Court though some of the decisions rested their view on the ground that the proceeding in question was an original proceeding. The contrary view expressed in the cases noted below can no longer be considered good law (9)". The undermentioned cases (8) can all be supported on the basis of the said decision of the Supreme Court though some of the decisions rested their view on the ground that the proceeding in question was an original proceeding. The contrary view expressed in the cases noted below can no longer be considered good law (9)". The cases referred to in the above passage as being supportable on the basis of the interpretation of S. 141 CPC approved by the Supreme Court include in Ravukumara Raja Appa Row's case (1), where, as stated earlier, a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken the view that provisions of Rule 9 of Order IX read with S. 141 CPC applies to applications for restoration of an earlier application dismissed for default. ( 5 ) IN the case of B. Muniappa v Abdul Razack, 3 Myslj. 36. a Single Judge of the Old Mysore High Court held that applications to have the ex-parte decree set aside are to be treated as original applications and, as the procedure applicable to suits is applicable to miscellaneous proceedings, an application to restore to file a dismissed miscellaneous application which in turn, sought to have an ex-parte decree set aside is maintainable under Order IX, Rule 9 CPC. ( 6 ) I respectfully agree with the view taken in the decisions which hold that the provisions of Rule 9 of Order IX read with S. 141 are, in terms, applicable to applications of the kind we are now concerned with and accordingly, hold that the application Misc. 37 of 1975 before the court below was maintainable under Rule 9 of Order IX read with section 141 of the CPC. The Court below restored Misc. 5 of 1975 ,to file exercising its inherent powers; but its conclusion could be supported on the basis that provisions of Rule 9 of Order IX were applicable. ( 7 ) WHAT remains to be considered is the contention that respondent had not shown sufficient cause for his absence on 13-6-1975. It is seen that the application for restoration was supported by an affidavit filed by the respondent, in which he sought what, according to him, was sufficient cause ior his absence. Petitioner, however, contented himself by filing a counter-affidavit and did not move the Court under Rule 2 of Or. XIX ior an opportunity to cross-examine the respondent. It is seen that the application for restoration was supported by an affidavit filed by the respondent, in which he sought what, according to him, was sufficient cause ior his absence. Petitioner, however, contented himself by filing a counter-affidavit and did not move the Court under Rule 2 of Or. XIX ior an opportunity to cross-examine the respondent. It is borne out by respondent's affidavit that on 13-6-1975 his aunt died and that he had to attend the cremation. The circumstance set out in the affidavit of the respondent commended itself to the trial Court as constituting sufficient cause for his absence in Court on 13-6-1975. There is no material on record to compel a contrary view. That apart the impugned order, in the circumstances, is essentially a, just order and a Court of revision will not interfere in such cases. There is no error of jurisdiction nor any material irregularity in its exercise. For the reasons stated above, this Revision Petition fails and is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .