JUDGMENT 1. - This is a second appeal under Section 100, CPC against the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge, Udaipur dated September 25, 1973. 2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that Roshanlal filed a suit against Yar Mohammad for ejectment on the grounds of personal necessity and default in payment of rent. The learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff on January 5, 1973, holding that the defendant has committed default in payment of rent, and as such, he is liable for ejectment. The defendant, feeling aggrieved against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, filed an appeal before the learned Civil Judge, Udaipur. The appeal was also dismissed on September 25, 1973, and it was held that the defendant did commit default and is, therefore, liable for ejectment. In this second appeal, it has been strenuously argued that there has been no default in payment of rent and that the interpretation put up by the learned lower Courts on the provisions of Section 7(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act), is wholly incorrect. It was further contended that, in the alternative, after the coming into force of the Ordinance, an application under Section 13-A of the Act was also moved on October 28, 1975. 3. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that an application for fixation of standard rent was moved. The rent was provisionally determined. the rent so determined was deposited by the tenant regularly before the 15th of the following month. The lower Court, however, held that in view of Section 7(4) of the Act, the provisional rent ought to have been paid and not deposited in the Court. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that this interpretation of law is wholly unwarranted. In the alternative, it was contended that as an application under Section 13-A of the Act has already been moved within time, the question whether the rent ought to have been tendered or was deposited in the Court pales into insignificance. 4. On behalf of the respondent, it was contended that the provisions of Section 13-A of the Act do not cover the contingencies of default as contemplated under Section 7(4) of the Act. 4. On behalf of the respondent, it was contended that the provisions of Section 13-A of the Act do not cover the contingencies of default as contemplated under Section 7(4) of the Act. It was further contended that there was an application for fixation of standard rent, while Section 7(4) contemplates the institution of a suit. Reference was also made to the provisions of Sections 6, 7, 13 and 13-A of the Act with a view to substantiate the contention that the provisions of Section 13-A shall not apply in the present case. 5. The respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties have been considered and the record of the case carefully perused. It emerges out as an admitted position that the tenant did deposit the provisional rent fixed by the Court within time. The provisional rent was, however, not paid in person to the landlord. Section 6 of the Act provides that upon the institution of a suit under Section 6, the Court shall forthwith make an order fixing in summary manner the provisional rent for the premises in question. Sub-section (4) of Section 7 of the Act provides that any failure to pay the provisional rent for any month by the fifteenth day of the following month shall render the tenant liable to eviction under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 13. Section 13 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any law, or contract, no Court shall pass any evidence of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefore to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him of six months. Section 13-A provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act as it existed before the commencement of the Amending Ordinance or in any other law no Court shall, in any proceeding pending on the date of commencement of the amending Ordinance pass any decree in favour of a landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent, if the tenant applies under clause (b) and pays to the landlord, or deposits in Court, within such time aggregate of the amount or rent in arrears, interest thereon and full costs of the suit as may be directed by the Court under and in accordance with that clause. 6. In view of these provisions of law, it is necessary to determined the amount of rent, costs and interest payable by the tenant to the landlord. 7. For the reasons stated above, the appeal filed by the tenant is hereby allowed. The judgments and decrees of both the lower Courts are hereby set aside. The case is remanded to the learned trial Court with the directions that the amount payable by the tenant as arrears of rent, costs and interest shall be determined, and if the tenant pays the amount so determined by the learned trial Court within the time fixed by it, the suit of the plaintiff shall stand dismissed. If the tenant fails to deposit the arrears of rent, costs and interest within the stipulated time, then the suit shall be disposed of on merits. The costs of this appeal shall be the costs in the cause.Appeal allowed. *******