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1977 DIGILAW 10 (MP)

GYARSU BARIK PAWAR v. DEOKI MUNNALAL

1977-01-06

S.M.N.RAINA

body1977
JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a second appeal by the plaintiffs arising out of a suit for redemption of a mortgage. ( 2. ) THE plaintiffs-appellants are heirs and successors of Sadhu and Budhu, since deceased, who were the owners of Khasra No. 190 area 4. 97 acres and khasra No. 156 area 6. 05 acres in Mouza Andharia, tahsil Multai, district betul. On 7-2-1898 Sadhu and Budhu had executed a usufructuary mortgage of the aforesaid land in favour of Laxmichand for Rs. 300 by a registered mortgage deed vide Ex. P-6. On 30-9-1907 they executed a second mortgage in respect of khasra No. 190 which was a simple mortgage, in favour of Mohanlal for a consideration of Rs. 300 by a registered mortgage deed Ex. P-3. As Laxmichand was dispossessed he filed a suit for possession and also for foreclosure of the first mortgage in his favour. The second mortgagee Mohanlal was not made a party to the suit. On 5-7-1911 the suit was decreed and a final decree for foreclosure as well as for possession was passed in favour of Laxmichand vide ex. P-2. Subsequently Mohanlal filed suit against Laxmichand for redemption of the first mortgage. To this suit the mortgagors or their legal representatives were not joined. On 12-4-1912 a preliminary decree for redemption was passed which was followed by a final decree for redemption Ex. P-3. So far the facts are not in dispute. ( 3. ) THE plaintiffs filed the present suit against the defendants-respondents for redemption, possession and mesne profits. Defendants 1 and 2 are the legal representatives of Mohanlal while defendants 3 to 5 are purchasers of the property in dispute from the defendant No. 1. ( 4. ) THE suit was resisted by the defendants and was dismissed by the trial court. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the Additional District Judge. They have, therefore, preferred this second appeal. ( 5. ) FROM rule 3, order 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is clear that once a final decree in foreclosure suit is passed, the right of the mortgagor to redeem the mortgage is totally barred. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the Additional District Judge. They have, therefore, preferred this second appeal. ( 5. ) FROM rule 3, order 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is clear that once a final decree in foreclosure suit is passed, the right of the mortgagor to redeem the mortgage is totally barred. Shri A. R. Choubey, learned counsel for the appellant did not dispute this legal position but he urged that as soon as the puisne mortgagee, namely, Mohanlal redeemed the first mortgage, the right of redemption of the mortgagors was revived. I do not, however, find any merit in this contention for the following reasons. ( 6. ) UNDER section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act a party who pays off mortgage debt becomes subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee. In other words, it means that such a person steps into the shoes of the mortgagee and is clothed with all his rights. Section 92 was introduced by an amendment of the act in 1929. Even before the amendment equitable doctrine of subrogation was recognised in India and sections 74 and 75 of the Act prior to the amendment were based upon principle, underlying it. ( 7. ) IT would, therefore, appear that on redeeming the first mortgage in favour of Laxmichand, Mohanlal the subsequent mortgagee became clothed with all the rights of the first mortgagee, namely, Laxmichand who had obtained a final foreclosure decree against the mortgagors. The mortgagors having lost their right to redeem the mortgage in favour of Laxmichand on the passing of the final decree for foreclosure, they could not enforce the said right against mohanlal, the subsequent mortgagee who had stepped into the shoes of the first mortgagee by obtaining a decree for redemption. ( 8. ) THERE appears to be no substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that redemption of the first mortgage by second mortgagee revived the plaintiffs right to redeem the first mortgage even after the final foreclosure decree. The execution of a second mortgage cannot place the mortgagor in a better position than what he would have enjoyed if the second mortgage had not been effected. There can hardly be any doubt that if there had been no second mortgage the plaintiffs right to redeem the first mortgage was lost for ever after the foreclosure decree. The execution of a second mortgage cannot place the mortgagor in a better position than what he would have enjoyed if the second mortgage had not been effected. There can hardly be any doubt that if there had been no second mortgage the plaintiffs right to redeem the first mortgage was lost for ever after the foreclosure decree. The mere fact that the mortgagors had effected a second mortgage after the first mortgage, does not and cannot place them in a better position. ( 9. ) IT is no doubt true that the rights of second mortgagee vis-a-vis the first mortgagee as well as the mortgagors remained unaffected by the foreclosure decree in respect of the first mortgage as they were not made parties thereto. But that is entirely a different matter. Mohanlal had a right to be joined to the suit for foreclosure and as he was not so joined, he could redeem the first mortgage and acquire all the rights of the first mortgagee. But this does not enhance, enlarge or revive the rights of the mortgagor to redeem the first mortgage and acquire all the rights of the first mortgagee in view of the decree against them. ( 10. ) IN Kurumpakochika v. Narayana ( AIR 1959 Ker. 56 .) a Division Bench of the Kerala high Court held that where a prior mortgagee brings the mortgaged property to sale without joining the puisne mortgagee, the purchaser, in the sale on the first mortgage obtains an equity of redemption also, unless it is expressly excluded, and once the equity of redemption has passed out of the mortgagor to the first mortgagee purchaser there can be no question of revival of such a right in the mortgagor when the puisne mortgagee redeems or pays off the prior mortgagee. The principle laid down in this case would in my view, be equally applicable to a case where under a foreclosure decree obtained by the first mortgagee, the mortgagor loses his right of redemption of the first mortgage. In such a case the mortgagors right to redeem cannot be revived on the redemption of the first mortgage by the second mortgagee. It may be mentioned that in the aforesaid case the decisions of the various High Courts in Gopi Kanta v. Kalikanta (AIR 1950 Assam 59.), wahid-Un-Nissa v. Gobardhan Das (ILR 25 All. In such a case the mortgagors right to redeem cannot be revived on the redemption of the first mortgage by the second mortgagee. It may be mentioned that in the aforesaid case the decisions of the various High Courts in Gopi Kanta v. Kalikanta (AIR 1950 Assam 59.), wahid-Un-Nissa v. Gobardhan Das (ILR 25 All. 388.) and in Dhana Koeri v. Ram Kewal (AIR 1930 Pat. 570.) on whichthe learned counsel for the appellant has relied were considered. The Allahabad decision was not considered of any help. As regards the Patna case it was observed in paragraph 12 that if the decision is considered to lay down that the equity of redemption of the original mortgagors is revived in the circumstances indicated above, the learned Judges would dissent therefrom. A similar observation was made regarding the Assam case in paragraph 13. I entirely agree with the view taken by the Kerala High Court. ( 11. ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant also relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Hirabai v. Ganesh ( AIR 1959 Bom. 172 .) but that decision does not appear to be in point because in that case the question of extinction of the right of redemption22 of a mortgagor by a decree of foreclosure does not seem to have been considered. ( 12. ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant further relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sidhakamal Nayan v. Bira Naik ( AIR 1954 SC 336 .) but this decision is also of no help to the appellant because there the decision rested mainly on a construction of section 225 of the Bihar and Orissa Tenancy Act, 1913. Learned counsel for the appellant frankly conceded that he has not been able to find out a direct authority on the point and on first principles as discussed above, I am clearly of the view that once the right of the mortgagor to redeem the first mortgage is lost by a foreclosure decree it cannot be revived by redemption of the first mortgage by the puisne mortgagee. ( 13. ) I, therefore, hold that the appellants are not entitled to redeem the first mortgage. ( 13. ) I, therefore, hold that the appellants are not entitled to redeem the first mortgage. Shri Choubey urged that the plaintiffs are in any case entitled to redeem the second mortgage but they would not gain anything by merely redeeming the second mortgage because they cannot obtain possession of the property in suit unless they are held entitled to redeem the first mortgage also. In fact, from the plaint it appears that the plaintiffs filed a suit for the redemption of the second mortgage only although the trial proceeded on the basis as if the plaintiffs wanted to redeem both the mortgages. I, therefore, do not find any justification for interference in this case. ( 14. ) THE appeal, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Counsels fee according to scale, if certified. Appeal dismissed.