Judgment :- 1. By the order dated 29 111974, the Taluk Land Board, Quilandy determined the surplus lands held by the petitioner to be 1.72 acres. In reaching this conclusion the Board bad treated as valid certain gift deeds executed by him between 1970 and 1974 in favour of bis adult children and in that view excluded from computation 4 acres of land covered by the gift deeds. In the decision of this Court in C. R.P. Nos. 677 add 1027 of 1974 (Narayanan Namboodiri v. Land Board, 1975 KLT. 171) it was held, in the mean while, that transfers after 111970 will have to be ignored in determining the surplus lands of the transferor. The Taluk Land Board therefore issued the petitioner a notice asking him to show cause why the order dated 29-11-1974 should not be set aside under S.85 (9) of the Land Reforms Act and proceedings started afresh. In answer to the notice the petitioner filed an objection contending that the Board had no power to re-open the proceeding in view of the order dated 29 111974 and that if it was reopened he should be allowed to contest the entire case afresh. By the order under revision the Board rejected these objections, reserving him liberty to argue his points relating to the gifts alone. 2. Mr. By the order under revision the Board rejected these objections, reserving him liberty to argue his points relating to the gifts alone. 2. Mr. Viswanatha Iyer's first contention that by reason of the order dated 29 111974 which had finally decided the case, the Board has no jurisdiction to reopen the proceeding can be shortly dealt with as it is contrary to the provisions of S.85 (9) which reads thus: "The Taluk Land Board may, if it is satisfied that the extent of lands surrendered by or assumed from a person under S.86 is less than the extent of lands which he was liable to surrender under the provisions of this Act or that the lands surrendered by, or assumed from, a person were not lawfully owned or held by him, set aside its order under sub-section (5) or sub-section (7), as the case may be, in respect of such lands and shall proceed afresh under that sub-section:" It is obvious that S 85 (9) postulates an earlier decision and empowers the Board within the limits prescribed, to set aside that decision if two conditions are present (1) that the extent of lands surrendered by, or assumed from, a person under S.86 is less than the extent of lands which he was liable to surrender under the provisions of the Act and (2) that the lands surrendered by or assumed from, a person were not lawfully owned or held by him. (This power is however subject to two more restrictions imposed by the two provisos which follow-that before setting aside the order the Board has to give the person affected an opportunity of being heard and that the order cannot be set aside after the expiry of three years. Neither of these restrictions is relevant in this case). As the Section itself postulates an earlier decision which is allowed to be re-opened, there is do point in the contention that the prior decision precludes reopening of the proceeding. Subject to the requirements of prior notice and the time limit prescribed by the two provisos the only circumstances for the operation of sub section (9) are the two conditions noticed above. Subject to the requirements of prior notice and the time limit prescribed by the two provisos the only circumstances for the operation of sub section (9) are the two conditions noticed above. Of these the second condition is not applicable here, while it is clear that the first does apply for the lands surrendered by the petitioner or assumed from him as surplus lands are less than the lands which he was liable to surrender because the former did not take into account the lands covered by the invalid gift deeds.1 must therefore reject the contention against the Board's jurisdiction. 3. The more important contention however was directed to the scope of the order setting aside the previous order and to the rights of the person against whom the order is made. Now what sub-s. (9) contemplates is the setting aside of the order under sub-section (5) or Sub-section (7). Sub-section (5) provides for the order determining the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered by the person filing the statement and sub-section (7) provides for a like order against persons who default in filing the statements under relevant provisions of S.85. In either case therefore the Board sets aside "its order under sub-section (5) or sub-section (7), as the case may be in respect of such lands and shall proceed afresh under that sub-section." The answer to the contention on this aspect thus turns upon the true construction of the words "set aside its order in respect of such lands and proceed afresh under that sub-section" Reading the conditions under which sub-section (9) operates, it is obvious that the power of rectification which it confers comes into play where the entent of the lands that are surrendered by or assumed under S.86 is less than what a person was liable to surrender as also where the lands surrendered by or a summed from a person were not lawfully owned or held by him. It must follow that the order of setting aside is thus limited to such lands so that the error that vitiated the prior order under sub-section (5) or (7) could be corrected The language of sub-section (9) does not empower the Board to set aside its earlier order completely nor does the object of the sub-section permit the expression "in respect of such lands" to be construed as in respect of all the lands of the person. The same limitation must attach to the subsequent proceedings, contemplated by the words and may proceed afresh under that sub-section" i.e., sub-section (5) or (7); in other words, after setting aside the order to the extent permitted by sub-section (9), the Board is to proceed afresh under sub-section (5) or (7) for determining the correct surplus land. It is also impossible, unless compelled by the statute, to hold that where an authority re-opens apart of the prior adjudication for a limited purpose, the entire proceedings are again at large or that the party affected can re-agitate other questions concluded by the prior adjudication and which the authority is not authorised or did not mean to re-open. Counsel for the petitioner however contended that unless the entire order is re-opened and objections in respect of all the lands are permitted, sub-section (9) may work injustice or in any case cause difficulties in such matters as option to surrender excess lands. There is no question of injustice as his objections had already been heard and decided and apart from the statute there is no scope for appealing to justice or injustice. As for the difficulty of exercising option suggested by counsel, it is more fancied than real, for the option is only incidental to the determination of the correct surplus land in so far as it is rendered necessary by the re-opening order and the fresh proceedings. Even if there be any difficulty, I do not see how that would entitle the petitioner to claim in the limited fresh proceedings proceedings whose scope is limited by sub-section (9) the unlimited right to contest not only what has been re-opened and has thus become alive but also what had been closed. On the terms and scheme of sub-section (9) I find it impossible to accept the petitioner's contention. 4. On the terms and scheme of sub-section (9) I find it impossible to accept the petitioner's contention. 4. It only remains to see whether certain decisions on which counsel for the petitioner relied support his contention. Subramanya Ayyar v. Govindasami Moopanar, AIR. 1953 Madras 826, was concerned with an order under 0.47, R.8, CPC., allowing the application for review of an appellate decree - whether it had limited the scope of the enquiry or had allowed rehearing of the appeal. Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) held that as the order had stated that in the nature of the questions involved the appeal itself would be re-opened and reheard under 0.47, R.8, the scope of the re-bearing was not limited. In the course of the judgment the learned judge discussed the relevant rules of 0.47 and a few important decisions and observed that under the wide terms of R.8, the court could: "confine the scope of rehearing to that part of the appeal or suit which was vitiated by the defect found or affected by the now evidence discovered. The discretion is vested in the Court directing rehearing, as otherwise on the pretext of an error on the face of the record affecting an insignificant part of the decree the entire trial sometimes covering a wide field and involving an examination of innumerable witnesses and a scrutiny of countless documents will have to be reheard, though the trial was otherwise free from any defect. It is unnecessary to attribute that intention to the Legislature, unless the clear words compel that conclusion." 5. The learned judge continued that the words "the Court may at once rehear the case or make such order in regard to the rehearing as it thinks fit". In 0.47, R.8 "have been designedly used by the Legislature conferring a discretionary jurisdiction on a Court directing a rehearing of a concluded trial. Of course, if the Court allowing a review petition does not restrict the scope of the enquiry, it may reasonably be held that it intended to reopen the entire case " 6. The language of 0.47. R.8 which was considered in that decision is totally different from S 85 (9) of the Act; while it gives a discretion whether or not to re-open the entire case the latter provision strictly circumscribes the scope of the re-opening. The language of 0.47. R.8 which was considered in that decision is totally different from S 85 (9) of the Act; while it gives a discretion whether or not to re-open the entire case the latter provision strictly circumscribes the scope of the re-opening. It is also worth noting that the learned judge emphasised that an intention to re-open the entire order could never be attributed to the Legislature, unless the clear words compel that conclusion (which is not the position here) and also that a court can reasonably be held to intend to re-open the entire case if only it does not restrict the scope of the enquiry while allowing the review (which again is not the position here even if we equate the re-opening under sub-section (9) to a review) This decision affords no support to the petitioner's contention. 7. Gangaraju v. Venkatarayulu Naidu, AIR. 1943 Madras 235, which is one of the cases followed in AIR. 1953 Madras 826 merely states without much discussion that when the Court grants an application for review it might hear the case in full. In Bhargavi Amma v. Sankara Panicker, 1961 KLJ. 650, Raman Nayar J. (as he then was) held that the necessary result of the grant of an application for review under 0.47 R.8 is to vacate the order or decree already passed. These two decisions like AIR. 1953 Madras 826 were concerned with 0.47, R.8 and cannot govern this case which involves a provision whose language, object and effect are totally different. Sub-section (9) does not arm a party with a right of review; what it does is to invest the Taluk Land Board with the power to re-open the prior decision to the extent indicated therein so as to benefit the State by securing the full extent of the surplus lands in the one case and by getting rid of lands to which the party has no title in the other case and proceed afresh There is no parallel between that provision and an application for review governed by 0.47, C. P. C., which is wider in scope. 8. 8. In Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. H. M. Esufali H, M. Abdulali, (1973) XXXII S.T.C. 77 (SC.), an assessment order made primarily on the basis of the returns and books of accounts of the assessee was re-opened on the recovery of a bill book concealed by him in his business premises. The Sales Tax Officer initiated reassessment proceedings and made a fresh order of "best judgment assessment". While upholding the "best judgment assessment" of which the validity had been challenged by the assessee, the Supreme Court observed (page 85): "What is true of the assessment must also be true of re-assessment because re-assessment is nothing but a fresh assessment. When reassessment is made under S.19 the former assessment incompletely reopened and in its place fresh assessment is made. While reassessing a dealer, the assessing authority does not merely assess him on the escaped turnover but it assesses him on his total estimated turnover." 9. I do not see how these observations about the scope of a re-assessment after the previous assessment is completely re-opened would help the petitioner in the construction of S.85 (9). That sub-section must be construed on its terms and so construed I do not find it possible to accept the contentions of the petitioner. The order of the Taluk Land Board is confirmed and the revision is dismissed but without costs. Dismissed.