A. M. AHMADI, J. ( 1 ) * * * * ( 2 ) THE respondents relied on certified copies of four title deeds in respect of the suit property bearing house no. 74. Three of these four documents were produced with the list ex. 83. The first is a certified copy of a mortgage deed executed on 1st April 1902 by Laxmidas-predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff and Hiralal who was the owner of the adjacent house no. 75 at the relevant point of time. The second is the rent note executed by Chhaganlal Laxmidas and Hiralal in favour of the mortgagee on 2nd August 1905 The third document is a certified copy of a mortgage deed executed by Chhaganlal Laxmidas the father of the plaintiff and one Hirabhai Narottam on 2nd April 1907 The fourth is the sale deed executed by Makanbhai in favour of his wife Diwaliben on 23 June 1932 produced with list ex. 39. The original documents are not forthcoming on the plea that they are lost. The defendants therefore sought to introduce certified copies of these four registered documents in evidence but the plaintiff successfully thwarted their attempt in the trial Court. The trial Court came to the conclusion that sec. 90 of the Evidence Act cannot be pressed in service for introducing these certified copies in evidence as the statutory presumption arising under sec. 90 can be availed of only if the original documents are produced on record. This view of the learned trial Judge seems to be correct on a plain reading of sec. 90 which provides that where any document purporting or proved to be 30 years old is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person is in that persons handwriting and in the case of a document executed or attested that it was duly executed and attested by the person by whom it purports to be executed and attested. The words any document and is produced used in sec. 90 indicate that reference is to the original document and not to the certified copy of that defendant. The Supreme Court in Harihar Prasad Singh and Another v. Must. The words any document and is produced used in sec. 90 indicate that reference is to the original document and not to the certified copy of that defendant. The Supreme Court in Harihar Prasad Singh and Another v. Must. of Munshi Nath Prasad and Others 1956 S. C. R 1 held that there could be no presumption of genuineness in favour of certified copies of documents under sec. 90 of the Evidence Act. This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Tilak Chand Kureel v. Bhim Raj 1969 (III) S. C. C. 367 in the following words: It was said that the presumption under sec. 90 of the Evidence Act was not applicable as copies were produced and not the original documents. In our opinion this argument is well founded. In Basant v. Brijlal. 62 I. A. the it was held by the Privy Council that the presumption enacted in sec. 90 of the Evidence Act can be applied only with regard to original documents and not copies thereof. The Fame view was taken by this court in Harihar Prasad Singh v. Mst. of Munshi Nath Prasad (supra ). THEREFORE the view that the certified copies of the four documents in respect of the suit property cannot be admissible in evidence under sec 90 of the Evidence Act cannot be assailed. ( 3 ) THE learned first appellate Judge has however come to the conclusion that the aforesaid certified copies of old title deeds would be admissible in evidence as secondary evidence as the original title deeds were lost. This view of the learned first appellate Judge was seriously challenged before me by Mr. Raju the learned advocate for the appellant plaintiff. In order to decide whether the view taken by the learned first appellate Judge is correct it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act as well as the Registration Act. Sec. 61 of the Evidence Act lays down that the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence; primary evidence means the document itself whereas secondary evidence means and includes certified copies given under the provisions mentioned in the Act or copies made from or compared with the original. Sec. 64 states that the documents must be proved by primary evidence except in cases mentioned in the next following sections. The conjoint reading of secs. Sec. 64 states that the documents must be proved by primary evidence except in cases mentioned in the next following sections. The conjoint reading of secs. 61 and 64 is that ordinarily the contents of a document must be proved by the production of the original document except in cases mentioned in the sections immediately following. According to sec. 65 secondary evidence may be given of the existence condition or contents of a document if (a) the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power of person against whom the document is sought to be proved or (b) the original has been destroyed or 1031 or (c) when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect produce it in reasonable time or (d) the original is the document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act or (e) by any other law in force in India to be given in evidence. Sec. 66 however enjoins upon the party seeking to tender secondary evidence to serve the party in whose possession the original document is or appears to be with a notice before tendering the secondary evidence. However in cases where the adverse party is expected to know from the facts of the case that the document is required to be produced and fails to produce the same or in cases which the court considers appropriate the non-service of notice shall not preclude the party from leading secondary evidence. So also when the loss of the document is admitted by the adverse party or his agent there would be no need to serve a notice before tendering secondary evidence. Now in the present case the case of the plaintiff is that he has not produced the original title deeds in respect of his property because they are not traced and are lost. In the circumstances there can be no room for doubt that the respondents were entitled in law to lead secondary evidence regarding the contents of the old title deeds in respect of the disputed property. Sec. 89 therefore provides that the Court shall presume that every document called for and not produced after notice to produce was attested stamped and executed in the manner required by law. The contention of Mr. Raju however was that sec. Sec. 89 therefore provides that the Court shall presume that every document called for and not produced after notice to produce was attested stamped and executed in the manner required by law. The contention of Mr. Raju however was that sec. 89 would have no application because in the instant ease admittedly the defendants had not served the plaintiff with a notice for production of the original title deeds in respect of house no. 74. In support of his contention he invited my attention to the case of Smt. Mira Bai v. Jai Singh and Others A. I. R. 1971 Rajasthan 303 In that case it was held that the language of sec. 89 clearly indicates that its operation is restricted to cases where a notice to produce a document has been given to the opposite party. Referring to the facts of that case Lodha J. observed that admittedly the defendants were not given notice to produce the document and therefore sec. 89 cannot come to the plaintiffs aid. In my opinion this decision has no application to the facts of the present case. In the instant case once the plaintiff excuses himself from the production of the original documents on the plea that they are not traced or are lost the question of giving notice for production does not arise. If the plaintiff states before the court as in the present case that the original title deeds are lost and he is not in a position to produce the same it would be futile to insist on a notice of production to bring into play sec. 89 of the Evidence Act. I therefore do not see any substance in the objection raised before me by Mr. Raju the learned advocate for the appellant-plaintiff as regards the applicability of sec. 89 of the Evidence Act. ( 4 ) REFERENCE may now be made to a few relevant provisions of the Registration Act which bear on the question of admissibility of the afore said certified copies of the relevant title deeds. Sec. 17 of the Act provides that non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create declare assign limit or extinguish whether in present or in future any right title or interest whether vested or contingent of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immoveable property shall be compulsorily registerable. Sec. 17 of the Act provides that non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create declare assign limit or extinguish whether in present or in future any right title or interest whether vested or contingent of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immoveable property shall be compulsorily registerable. Mortgage deeds and leases of immoveable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent would require registration by virtue of sec. 17 of the said Act. Sec. 18 lays down that instruments (other than instruments of gift and wills) which purport or operate to create declare assign limit or extinguish whether in present or in future any right title or interest whether vested or contingent of a value less than one hundred rupees to or in immoveable property may be registered. Therefore according to this provision if the value of the immoveable property in respect of which the instrument is executed is less than one hundred rupees registration of the document is optional. Sec. 21 next provides that no non-testamentary document relating to immoveable property shall be accepted for registration unless it contains a description of such property sufficient to in dentify the same. Reference may now be made to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 51 which indicates the register of books to be kept in the several offices of registering officers and book no. 1 register of non-testamentary documents relating to immoveable property is one of them. According to sub-sec. (2) of sec. 51 in book no. 1 shall be entered or filed all documents or memo- randa registered under secs. 17 18 and 89 which relate to immoveable property and are not wills. Then comes the last relevant provision contained in sec. 57; sub-sec. (1) whereof provides that subject to the previous payment of the fees payable in that behalf copies of entries in book no. 1 shall be given to all persons applying for the same. Sub-sec. (5) of sec. 57 next provides that all copies given under this section shall be signed and sealed by the registering officer and shall be admissible for the purpose of proving the contents of the original documents. It becomes immediately clear on a plain reading of this group of sections that a certified copy of an entry of a document made in book no. It becomes immediately clear on a plain reading of this group of sections that a certified copy of an entry of a document made in book no. 1 maintained under the provisions of the Registration Act shall be admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the contents of the original document. It is in deed true that the party relying on the certified copy would be entitled to tender it in evidence only if the adversary party refuses to produce the original document after having been called upon to do so. ( 5 ) THE above discussion establishes that the respondents were obliged to produce the certified copies of the title deeds in respect of the property owned by the plaintiff because the latter refused to produce the original documents on the plea that they were lost. There can be no doubt that the original documents would be in possession of the plaintiff unless they are lost or destroyed. Therefore in any view of the matter on the failure of the plaintiff to produce the original title deeds the defendants were entitled to lead secondary evidence under the provisions of secs. 65 and 66 of the Evidence Act. Sec. 89 entitles the court to presume that the document was attested stamped and executed in the manner required by law. Sec. 57 (5) of the Registration Act next provides that all copies of documents given under sub-sec. (1) shall be admissible for the purpose of proving the contents of the original document. A combined reading of these provisions leaves no doubt in my mind that once it is established that the original title deeds are lost or destroyed or are being deliberately withheld by the party against whom they are sought to be used secondary evidence in respect of those title deeds can be tendered and if the secondary evidence happens to be certified copies of registered documents entered in book no. 1 the contents thereof can be read in evidence by virtue of sub-sec. (5) of sec. 57 of the Registration Act. I am therefore of the opinion that the learned first appellate Judge was right in taking the view that the certified copies of the aforesaid old title deeds in respect of the plaintiffs house No. 74 were admissible in evidence and the learned trial Judge had committed an error in refusing to admit them in evidence. I am therefore of the opinion that the learned first appellate Judge was right in taking the view that the certified copies of the aforesaid old title deeds in respect of the plaintiffs house No. 74 were admissible in evidence and the learned trial Judge had committed an error in refusing to admit them in evidence. ( 6 ) IN Vishwanath Vithoba v. Genu Kisan and Others A. I. R. 1956 Bombay 555 a similar question arose for consideration. In that case the plaintiff had produced certified copies of three sale deeds at Ex. 75 76 and 77 It was urged that these copies of the sale deeds were not admissible in evidence. The plaintiff had deposed that the original sale deeds were not in his possession and were with the first defendant. No notice for the production of the original sale deeds was given by the plaintiff to the first defendant. It was therefore urged that the certified copies could not be admitted in evidence as no notice for production of the originals was received by the first defendant as required by cl. (a) of sec. 65 of Evidence Act. The proviso to sec. 66 however was resorted to to dispense with such notice because as observed by the Privy Council in Surendra Krishna v. Mirza Mahamed Syed Ali 1936 P. C. 15 the only purpose of a notice under secs. 65 and 6o Evidence Act is to give the party an opportunity of producing the original document to secure. if he pleases the best evidence of its contents In the background of these facts it was observed that secondary evidence is admissible when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot for any reason not arising from his own default or neglect produce the original document in reasonable time and under sec. 66 the court has absolute power when it thinks fit to dispense with the notice. This decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court which is binding on me clearly supports the view that I have taken on an analysis of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and the Registration Act. For these reasons I think that the contention of Mr. Raju that the certified copies of the old title deeds in respect of the suit property i. e. house No. 74 could not be admitted in evidence is not well founded. .