Order.- These three petitions arise out of P.R.C. No. 7 of 1976 pending on the file of the learned 6th Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. In that case there are as many as nine accused. Accused Nos. 9, 7 and 8 had filed Criminal Mis. Petition No. 2726 of 1976, Crl.Mis.P. No. 120 of 1977 and Crl.Mis.P.No. 141 of 1977 for quashing the proceedings against them. I have decided those petitions by a common judgment on 16th February, 1977. The facts of the case have been stated in that judgment. It is therefore not necessary for me to reproduce in this judgment the facts of the case. The facts stated therein shall be read in this judgment as if they are incorporated herein. 2. Accused 5 in that case has filed Crl. Mis.P. No. 2755 of 1976. He was accused No. 30 in the complaint filed in Chirala Court. At the time of the alleged offence he was the Inspector of Police, Crime Branch, C.I.D., since then he has been promoted to the post of a Deputy Superintendent of Police. He was connected with the investigation of the case relating to the murder of Dr. Krishna Rao. The complainant seeks to prosecute him for having committed offences under sections 120-B, 120-B read with sections 201 and 120-B read with section 500, Indian Penal Code. He is alleged to have committed these offences while investigating the case arising out of the murder of Dr. Krishna Rao. 3. Two contentions have been raised on behalf of the petitioner herein. The first contention is that the learned Magistrate was in error in taking cognizance of the offence against him without the sanction of the State Government under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The second contention which has been raised is that under section 53 of the Madras District Police Act 1859, which applies to the Andhra Area of the Andhra Pradesh State the complaint filed against him at Hyderabad was barred by time. 4. Crl.Mis.P. No. 2750 of 1976 has been filed by accused No. 3 in that case. He was accused No. 21 in the complaint filed at Chirala. He has since then been promoted to the post of a Circle Inspector of Police. 4. Crl.Mis.P. No. 2750 of 1976 has been filed by accused No. 3 in that case. He was accused No. 21 in the complaint filed at Chirala. He has since then been promoted to the post of a Circle Inspector of Police. On his behalf the only contention which has been raised is that the complaint against him was barred by time under section 53 of the Madras District Police Act 1859. 5. Therefore the second contention which has been raised in Crl. M.P. No. 2750 of 1976 is common in both the petitions while the first contention which has been raised by the petitioner in Crl. M.P. No. 2755 of 1976 arises only in that petition. Whether sanction to prosecute a police officer is required or not has to be decided with reference to the provisions of section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Sub-section (1) of section 197 inter alia provides as under: “When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction............” 6. Therefore section 197(1) applies to the case of a person who is or was a public servant not removable from his office except by the Government or with the sanction of the Government. The petitioner in Crl.Mis.P. No. 2755 of 1976 (who will hereinafter be referred to as accused 5) was the Inspector of Police, Crime Branch, C.I.D. when the offence is alleged to have been committed. Under section 10 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 he could be removed from the office of Inspector of Police by the Inspector-General of Police, Deputy Inspector-General of Police or District Superintendent of Police. Secondly his removal from that office by any one of these officers did not require the sanction of the State Government. It is therefore contended by the complainant that section 197, Criminal Procedure Code is not attracted to his case. Secondly his removal from that office by any one of these officers did not require the sanction of the State Government. It is therefore contended by the complainant that section 197, Criminal Procedure Code is not attracted to his case. However it has been contended on his behalf that provisions of section 197, Criminal Procedure Code are attracted to a public officer who is or was not removable from his office except by the Government or with the sanction of the Government. As stated above on the date of the offence he was or the Inspect of Police Crime Branch, C.I.D.. and his removal from that office did not require the sanction of the Government nor could the Government alone remove him from his office. In other words by virtue of section 10 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859, he could be removed without the sanction of the State Government by the Inspector-General of Police, Deputy Inspector General of Police or by the District Superintendent of Police. However on the date of the institution of the complaint against him at Hyderabad he was promoted to the post of a Deputy Superintendent of Police. It is not in dispute before me that as a Deputy Superintendent of Police he could be removed either by the State Government or by any competent officer with the sanction of the State Government. The question therefore which arises before me is whether a public officer who had two different capacities at two different points of time could be prosecuted in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by him in his capacity at the first point of time without the sanction of the State Government or by anyone else other than the State Government without the previous sanction of the State Government. The language of sub-section (1) of section 197 is absolutely unambiguous. The use of the expression ‘is’ as well as ‘was’ clearly shows that if a public officer at any one point of time could not be removed from his office except by the State Government or with the sanction of the State Government, he could claim the protection of section 197 and contend that no prosecution could be instituted against him without obtaining the previous sanction of the State Government. The first contention which has been raised on behalf of the petitioner is therefore well-founded. The first contention which has been raised on behalf of the petitioner is therefore well-founded. In my earlier decision to which I have referred, I have already expressed the view that sanction is required to prosecute such a police officer in respect of offences punishable under section 120-B read with section 201 and 120-B read with section 500, Indian Penal Code and that no sanction is necessary to prosecute such an officer in respect of an offence under section 120-B, Indian Penal Code alone. Therefore so far as the first contention is concerned it must be upheld to the extent that accused-5 cannot be prosecuted without the previous sanction of the State Government for offences punishable under section, 120-B read with section 201 and 120-B read with section 500, Indian Penal Code 7. The second contention which is common in both the petitions raises the question of limitation. Section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 inter alia provides as follows: “All actions and prosecutions against any person, which may be lawfully brought for anything done or intended to be done, under the provisions of this Act, or under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force conferring powers on the police shall be commenced within three months after the act complained of shall have been committee and not otherwise............” Section 53 in terms applies to prosecutions. The prosecutions which are contemplated by section 53 must be under the provisions of the Madras District Police Act, 1859, or “under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force conferring powers on the police............”to prosecute accused 5 and accused 3 who are the petitioners in Crl.Mis.P. No. 2755 of 1976 and Crl.Mis.P.No. 2750 of 1976 in respect of offences alleged to have been committed by them under sections 120-B read section 201, Indian Penal Code and 120-B read with section 500, Indian Penal Code. The expression “under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force conferring powers on the police....”makes section 53 of the Madras District Police Act 1859 applicable to prosecutions under the Indian Penal Code. It has been contended by the complainant that Indian Penal Code does not confer any power upon the police and that therefore section 53 is not attracted to prosecutions under Indian Penal Code. I am not impressed by this argument. It has been contended by the complainant that Indian Penal Code does not confer any power upon the police and that therefore section 53 is not attracted to prosecutions under Indian Penal Code. I am not impressed by this argument. Whereas Indian Penal Code defines the substantive offences the Criminal Procedure Code prescribes procedure for investigation of those offences and confers power upon the police in that behalf. Therefore in a situation like this reference made to Indian Penal Code is a reference made to Criminal Procedure Code as well. Section 21 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 lays down that every police officer shall be considered to be always on duty and shall have the powers of a police officer in every part of the general Police District. Amongst the duties of the Police Officer which section 21 lays down, ‘to detect and bring offenders to justice’ is one. Section 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 provides that all offences under the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions contained in the Code. In my opinion therefore section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 when read in light of section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 certainly applied to the prosecutions under Indian Penal Code. 8. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Venugopal1, a similar question arose before the Supreme Court. It has been laid down in that decision that the effect of section 53 of Madras District Police Act is that all prosecutions whether against a police officer or a person other than a police officer must be commenced within three months after the act complained of if that act is one which has been done or intended to be done under any of the provisions of the Police Act. It has further been laid down in that decision that the protection under section 53 also extends to acts done or intended to be done under the provisions of any other law conferring powers upon the police and that one such law is the Code of Criminal Procedure which confers numerous powers on the police in respect of arrest, search and investigation. 9. In reply two contentions have been raised by the complainant. 9. In reply two contentions have been raised by the complainant. His first contention is that section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, by implication bars the application of section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859. Sub-section (1) of section 469 provides as follows: “Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognisance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation.” Sub-section (2) specifies three categories of offences. The cognizance of cases punishable with fine only cannot be taken after the expiry of six months. Cognizance of cases punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year cannot be taken after expiry of one year and the cognizance of cases which are punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years cannot be taken after the expiry of three years. 10. Section 468 categorises the offences in respect of which cognizance cannot be taken after the expiry of the period specified therein irrespective of who has committed the offence. The benefit of section 468 therefore is available to every offender whether he is a private individual or a public servant if his case falls within the purview of section 468, Criminal Procedure Code. 11. Section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 does not provide for limitation in relation to particular categories of offences unlike section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973. It provides for limitation in respect of prosecutions, irrespective of their nature instituted against police officers. 12. It is therefore clear that section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 operate in different fields. They do not overlap each other. It is therefore erroneous to think that section 468 supersedes or overlaps section 53. Section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 in my opinion is a special provision in regard to police officers while section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 is a general provision in regard to offenders in general. It is therefore erroneous to think that section 468 supersedes or overlaps section 53. Section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 in my opinion is a special provision in regard to police officers while section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 is a general provision in regard to offenders in general. Therefore firstly these two sections do not operate in the same field or area and do not overlap and secondly the provision of section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859, which is in my opinion a special provision, must prevail over the general law enacted in section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The first contention raised in reply therefore is without any substance and is rejected. 13. The second contention which has been raised in reply arises out of the decision of the Supreme Court in Maulad Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh1, in which the Supreme Court has considered section 42 of the Police Act, 1861. The principle which the Supreme Court had laid down in that decision is that section 42 of the Police Act, 1861 does not apply to prosecutions against any person for anything done under the provisions of any other Act or under police powers conferred under any other Act. Relying upon this principle it has been contended in reply by the complainant that section 53 of Madras District Police Act, 1859 would also not apply to prosecutions against any person for anything done under the provisions of any Act other than the Madras District Police Act, 1859. The contention which has been raised is not at all well-founded. There is material difference in the language of section 42. Section 42 of the Police Act, 1861 and section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859, are not pari materia. The contention which has been raised is not at all well-founded. There is material difference in the language of section 42. Section 42 of the Police Act, 1861 and section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859, are not pari materia. Section 42 of Police Act, 1861 inter alia provides: “All prosecutions against any person, which may be lawfully brought for anything done or intended to be done under the provisions of the Act, or under the general police powers hereby given shall be commenced within three months after the act complained of shall have been committed, and not otherwise.” Section 53 of Madras District Police Act, 1859, the material part of which has been extracted above, uses the language “under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force conferring powers on the police.” Therefore whereas section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 is made applicable, to prosecutions against police officers “under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force”, section 42 of the Police Act 1861 has been made applicable to prosecutions against police officers “lawfully brought for anything done or intended to be done under the general police powers hereby given” I have therefore no doubt in my mind that whereas the expression “under the general police powers hereby given” confines the applicability of section 42 of Police Act, 1861 to that Act alone, the expression “under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force conferring powers on the police” used in section 53 of the Madras District Police Act extends its applicability to prosecutions in respect of offences committed under other Acts as well. Therefore this decision of the Supreme Court has no application to the instant case. 14. The next decision to which my attention has been invited is that of the Supreme Court in Ajaib Singh v. Joginder Singh2. In that case also the Supreme Court has considered the amplitude of section 42 of the Police Act, 1861. For the reasons which I have already stated that decision also cannot be applied to the instant case in view of the different language used in section 53 of Madras District Police Act, 1859. 15. Now the offences with which the two police officers-accused 5 and 3-have been charged are concerned they are alleged to have been committed on 14th January, 1975. 15. Now the offences with which the two police officers-accused 5 and 3-have been charged are concerned they are alleged to have been committed on 14th January, 1975. The complaint at Hyderabad (P.R.C. No. 7 of 1976) was instituted on 29th June, 1976 more than three months after those offences are alleged to have been committed. The prosecutions against accused 3 and 5 therefore are barred by time under section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859. Therefore they are liable to be quashed. 16. So far as Crl.Mis.P. No. 206 of 1977 is concerned it has been filed by accused 1 and 2 in this very case. Both of them are private individuals-accused 1 is the brother-in-law of the deceased Mr. Krishna Rao and accused 2 is a practising advocate at Chirala. They have been charged with having committee offences under section 120-B, 120-B read with section 201 and 120-B read with section 500,Indian Penal Code. An attempt has been made to make out two grounds for quashing the complaint against them. The first ground is that the institution of the complaint at Hyderabad after the institution of the complaint at Chirala constitutes harassment of those two accused and that therefore the complaint at Hyderabad should be quashed. An attempt has been made to show that if any undue harassment is caused to any accused by the repeated institutions of complaints then this Court has jurisdiction to quash the subsequent complaints. That principle in my opinion has no application to the instant case because indisputably these two accused were not charged in the complaint at Chirala with having committed an offence under section 120-B read with section 500, Indian Penal Code though the other two offences were there. It is difficult under these circumstances to uphold the first contention which has been raised on their behalf. 17. The next contention which has been raised is that there is no evidence to prima facie connect these two accused with the crimes which have been alleged against them. In my earlier judgment to which reference has been made above I have already expressed the view that in proceedings instituted under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code it is ordinarily not desirable for this Court to examine evidence with the object of deciding whether the proceedings should be quashed. In my earlier judgment to which reference has been made above I have already expressed the view that in proceedings instituted under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code it is ordinarily not desirable for this Court to examine evidence with the object of deciding whether the proceedings should be quashed. It is always open to the accused to convince the learned Magistrate and show that there is no evidence. This Court cannot assume the role of a Magistrate or a Sessions Judge. I am therefore unable to uphold the second contention which has been raised on behalf of accused 1 and 2 in Crl.Mis.P. No. 206 of 1977. 18. The result is Crl.Mis.P. Nos. 2755 and 2750 of 1976 are allowed and the P.R.C. No. 7 of 1976 as against the accused 3 and 5 pending on the file of the learned 6th Metropolitan Magistrate is quashed. The Crl.Mis.P. No. 206 of 1977 for the reasons stated in this judgment is dismissed.