JUDGMENT - M.N. CHANDURKAR, J.:---The material facts in this case are not in dispute. The opponent is a member of the petitioner co-operative society and he borrowed two loans amounting to Rs. 3200/- and Rs. 7,500/- at 6% p.a. on 11th and 21st January, 1967 respectively. By way of security he pledged 177 bags of ground nut and 31 bags of coriander with the society. The prices of both these commodities fell in July 1967 before the amount became due. The amount was repayable to the society on or before 30th September, 1967. The petitioner society, therefore, by a notice dated 3rd August, 1967 called upon the opponent to furnish additional security for Rs. 5,550/-. By the said notice the opponent was also informed that if he failed to furnish additional security the pledged goods would be sold. The opponent immediately informed the society that the goods should be sold off. However, in the expectation that prices would again rise, the petitioner society did not sell the pledged goods immediately, but they were sold in two instalments on 2nd August, 1968 and 7th August, 1968 and the total amount recovered was Rs. 8,067.70. The balance due, according to the society, was Rs, 4,643/- and finally when a claim was made before the officer on Special Duty under section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, the actual amount claimed was Rs. 5,251.85. The opponent contested the claim essentially on three grounds. The first ground was that the goods should have been sold immediately after the opponent had directed the society to sell them. The second ground was that the goods were sold by the society without notice to the opponent and the third ground was that the goods were not sold by public auction, but they were sold by private negotiation. The Officer on special duty negatived these defences and found that out of a total amount of Rs. 10,700/- and interest due, after giving credit for Rs. 8,067.70, the opponent was liable to pay Rs, 4,645/- on 1st September, 1968. On this amount interest was made payable at 12% p.a. from 1-9-68 till the date of suit and the amount due till the date of the claim was found to be Rs. 5,251.85 which the society was found entitled to recover. Future interest at 9% p.a. was awarded on Rs. 4,645/-. On this amount interest was made payable at 12% p.a. from 1-9-68 till the date of suit and the amount due till the date of the claim was found to be Rs. 5,251.85 which the society was found entitled to recover. Future interest at 9% p.a. was awarded on Rs. 4,645/-. The opponent filed an appeal against the award of he officer on special duty before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The co-operative Tribunal took the view that notice as required by section 176 of the Contract Act was not given by the society and the failure to give notice was fatal to the claim of the society. The Tribunal also held that the opponent was justified in making a grievance that his goods were not sold by public auction in the market yard and evidence was accepted that the prevailing rates of ground-nut in August 1968 varied between Rs. 115/- to Rs. 130/- and for coriander the rate was Rs. 120/- per quintal. The pledged goods were sold by the society at the rate of Rs. 90/- per quintal for ground-nut and Rs. 120/- for coriander. The Tribunal found that if this was the only "drawback in the case", the claim of the society could not have been reduced which was, however, not necessary because of the earlier finding with regard to non-compliance with the provisions of section 176 of the Contract Act. The sale was, therefore, held to be illegal and the award of the officer on special duty was set aside. The petitioner society has now filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Limaye appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that in view of Clause 12 of the agreement between the society and the member which governed the borrowing of debts by the member, the notice given on 3rd August, 1967 would amount to substantial compliance with section 176 of the Contract Act and he has challenged the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the breach of section 176 of the Contract Act was fatal to the claim of the society. Clause 12 of the agreement expressly provides that even though a time for repayment of the loan is fixed by agreement of the parties, the loan will always be understood to be one which was repayable on demand and the borrower undertakes to return the loan as soon as the society makes a demand for it. The effect of this clause is that though by agreement the loan was made repayable on or before 30th September, 1967, it was open to the society to make a demand for the repayment of the loan at any earlier point of time. That question, however, does not become relevant in the instant case because it is found as a fact that after the notice demanding additional security was served on 3rd August, 1967, the opponent had clearly authorised the society to sell away the pledged goods. Where the opponent has himself authorised the society to sell away the goods even before the time for repayment had arrived, it is difficult to see how the provisions of section 176 of the Contract Act would be attracted. Section 176 of the Contract Act deals with the right of the pawnee to bring a suit against the owner upon the debt if the pawner makes default in payment of debt at the stipulated time in respect of which the goods were pledged and the other right which is given to the pawnee is to sell the thing pledged on giving to the pawner reasonable notice of the sale. This provision will be attracted where the pawnee want to sell the pledged articles in a case where the debtor commits a default in payment of the debt. Where, however, the pawner himself authorises the pawnee even before the due date to sell away the articles and recover his money, the question of compliance with the provisions of section 176 of the Contract Act will not arise. The tribunal was, therefore, not justified in holding that non-compliance with section 176 of the Contract Act was fatal to the claim of the society. However, even in spite of this finding in favour of the society on facts, it is not possible for us to grant any relief to the society in this petition. Admittedly the pawner had directed the society to sell away the pledged goods immediately. However, even in spite of this finding in favour of the society on facts, it is not possible for us to grant any relief to the society in this petition. Admittedly the pawner had directed the society to sell away the pledged goods immediately. It is, no doubt, true that the society waited for almost a year in the vein hope of a possible rise in the prices. But it would be possible for the pawner to show that at the time when he authorised the pawnee to sell the articles the rates of the pledged articles were such that if they were sold, either an amount more than the debt liability would have been recovered or, in any case, the debt liability would have been wiped out, and in such a case it is difficult to see how it would be open to the society to claim any amount from the opponent on the ground that it had recovered lesser amount by the sale of the pledged articles. We have already quoted above the rates which were prevalent admittedly in August 1967 when the pawner had directed the society to sell away the articles. If 177 bags of ground nut and 31 bags of coriander would have been sold in August 1967, the society would have recovered more than Rs. 16,000/- by the sale of the said articles. Thus wiping out the debt liability of the opponent, the opponent would have received the balance of the price fetched by the sale of the pledged goods. If the petitioner society had failed to sell away the articles at the time when it was authorised and had waited for a possible rise in the prices, the opponent could not be penalised for this lapse on the part of the society. Therefore, even though we have held in favour of the society that the ground on which the Tribunal had rejected the claim of the society was not justified in law, on facts found, it is not possible to interfere with the final decision reversing the decision of the officer on special duty. The petition thus fails. Rule discharged with costs. -----