( 1 ) THIS appeal arising out of the proceedings initiated before the Land tribunal, Bangalore South Taluk (respondent-4) on the application of the appellant under Sec. 48a (l) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, (hereinafter called 'the Act'), is directed against the order dt. Oct. 21, 1976 made in WP. 3288 of 1976 by Bhimiah, J, allowing the said Writ Petition and quashing the order of the Land Tribunal dt. Febry 20, 1976 granting the application of the appellant for registration of occupancy in respect of three ariculturral lands in Survey Nos. 19/2, 65 and 94, measuring in all, 11 Acres and 29 Guntas, situate in Vijnapur village, Krishnarajapura Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk over-ruling the contention of respondents-1 and 2 that the said lands are under their personal cultivationl. Stated briefly, the facts relevant for the purpose of this appeal are: the three lands which are the subject matter of the proceedings before the land Tribunal are situate in Vijanapura village, which was an Inam village of which the late B. M. Muniswamappa father of respondents 1 and 2 was the Inamdar. Personal and Miscellaneous Inams in the erstwhile State of mysore were abolished under the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) inams Abolition Act, 1954, hereinafter called "the Inams Abolition Act". ( 2 ) THE Inams Abolition Act provided for vesting of Inams in the State and grant of occupancy rights to the former Inamdars and certain classes of tenants described as (a)Kadim tenant, (b) Permanent tenant and (c) Quasipermanent tenant, and also for recognition of the rights of 'other tenants'. The Notification vesting the Inam village of Vijanapura is said to have been issued in the year 1956. Late Muniswamappa, as also the appellant, made separate applications for registration of occupancy rights in respect of the aforesaid lands before the Special Deputy Commissioner for Inams Abolition. The application of late Muniswamappa was made under S. 9 of the Inams Abolition Act for grant of occupancy; the application of the appellant was one either under S. 4, 5 or 6 of that Act. The application of late Muniswamappa was allowed by granting him occupancy right by order dt. 19-4-1958 in Case No. 1 of 1957-58 on the file of the Special Deputy Commr for Inams Abolition. The application of the appellant was rejected in Case No. 43 of 1956-57. The application of late Muniswamappa was allowed by granting him occupancy right by order dt. 19-4-1958 in Case No. 1 of 1957-58 on the file of the Special Deputy Commr for Inams Abolition. The application of the appellant was rejected in Case No. 43 of 1956-57. The appellant unsuccessfully challenged the said order of the Special Deputy Commr by appeal and revision and even by a writ petition before this Court. It is sufficient to state that all the proceedings under the Inams Abolition Act in respect of the lands in question have concluded and become final and that no proceedings under the said Act are pending. The result, therefore, is that the father of respondents 1 and 2 was registered as occupant of the said lands under S. 9 of the Inams Abolition Act, negativing the claim of the appellant that he was entitled to be registered as a tenant under the said Act. ( 3 ) THE Act (Karnataka Land Reforms Act) which enacts a uniform law relating to land reforms in the State of Karnataka was enacted by the state Legislature and was brought into force on 2-10-1965; the provisions of Chap-III for conferment of ownership on tenants, however were not drought into -force until the Act was amended by Act 1 of 1974. The said amendment Act made revolutionary changes in the Act. ( 4 ) ON 26-8-1974, the appellant made an application before the 4th Respt land Tribunal in Form No. 7, under S. 48a (1) of the Act for registering him as an occupant of 3 Acres and 9 Guntas of land in Sy No. 65 of Vijayapura village under S. 45 of the Act. The said application stated that the appellant, his father and grandfather have been cultivating the said land as tenants since about 60 years and that the appellant has been cultivating the land as tenant for 30 years. The application further proceeded to state that the family, of which the appellant is a member, is the owner of the lands comprised in Sy Nos. 19/2 and 94 of Vijanapura village. On 26-12-1974, he filed another application for registering him as the occupant of all the three lands, viz, Sy Nos. l9|2, 65 and 94 under S. 45 of the act. It stated that the appellant has been cultivating the said lands as a tenant for over 40 yers. 19/2 and 94 of Vijanapura village. On 26-12-1974, he filed another application for registering him as the occupant of all the three lands, viz, Sy Nos. l9|2, 65 and 94 under S. 45 of the act. It stated that the appellant has been cultivating the said lands as a tenant for over 40 yers. On receipt of the said applications, the 4th Respt tribunal issued notices to respondents 1 and 2. In the said proceedings, the Land Tribunal made an order on 20-2-1976 holding that the appellant is a 'deemed tenant' of the aforesaid three lands and is entitled to be registered as the occupant under S. 45. The said order was challenged by respondents 1 and 2 in WP. 3238 of 1976 on the grounds that the writ petitioners were denied fair hearing by the 4th Respt Tribunal. Earlier, they had filed WP. 2167 of 1976 for a writ in the nature of prohibition against the 4th Respt Tribunal to forbear from proceeding with the enquiry. After the disposal of the appellant's application for registration of occupancy by the order made on 20-2-1976, the Tribunal, when it had become functus officio, made an order of injunction on 9-3-1976 restraining respondents 1 and 2 from interfering with the appellant's alleged possession of the disputed lands. The said order was challengtd in WP. 5844 of 1976. ( 5 ) THE Said writ petitions were clubbed together, heard and disposed ot by Bhimiah, J, by a common order made on 15-10-1976, by which WP. 2167 of 1976 was also allowed. The said order was however modified by an order dt. 21-10-1976 holding that WP. 2167 of 1976 does not survive as a result of quashing of the impugned order in WP. 3288 of 1976. The learned Judge has, in detail, referred to the manner of conduct of the proceedings from the very inception before the 4th Respt Tribunal and shown how respondents 1 and 2 who had contested the claim of the appellant were denied fair hearing and therefore the entire proceedings were conducted in gross violation of the Rules of Natural Justice. The learned Judge has, in detail, referred to the manner of conduct of the proceedings from the very inception before the 4th Respt Tribunal and shown how respondents 1 and 2 who had contested the claim of the appellant were denied fair hearing and therefore the entire proceedings were conducted in gross violation of the Rules of Natural Justice. After holding that the Land Tribunal denied fair hearing to respondents 1 and 2 and there was a clear breach of the Rules of Natural Justice in the conduct of the proceedings, the learned Judge proceeded to examine the merits of the claim of the appellant for grant of registration of occupancy right under S. 45 and came to the conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a tenant or a 'deemed tenant' in view of the fact that his claim for registration of occupancy under the Inams Abolition Act had been rejected under, the said Act. This is what the learned Judge has stated:" It is clear, therefore, that the claims of the 3rd Respt falling under Ss. 4 to 9a, were examined and the petitioners' father (late muniswamappa) was registered as an occupant of the lands. Therefore, there was nothing left for the 3rd Respt to agitate before the 2nd Respt-Tribunol. It is a relevant circumstance which, has got a bearing on the rights of the parties. This is one aseect of the matter," ( 6 ) AGGRIEVED by the order of the learned single Judge, the appellant has preferred this appeal. Sri U. L. Narayana Rau, learned Counsel for the appellant, rightly, has not challenged the conclusion of the learned single Judge that respondents 1 and 2 were denied fair hearing by the Tribunal and consequently the entire proceedings were vitiated on account of the breach of the Rules of Natural Justice. The appellant's only grievance is that the learned single Judge ought not to have given a decision on the merits of the claim of the appellant and that matter should have been remanded to the tribunal. The appellant's only grievance is that the learned single Judge ought not to have given a decision on the merits of the claim of the appellant and that matter should have been remanded to the tribunal. ( 7 ) THE argument of Sri Narayana Rau is that under the Act, the Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to decide the claim of the party claiming that he is entitled to be registered as an occupant under S. 45 and it is not for this Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, to sit as a Court of Appeal or Revision. This submission of Sri Narayana, Rau was supported by Sri Chandrakantraj Urs, senior High Court. Govt Advocate, appearing for the third respondent state of Karnataka. Sri B. P. Holla, learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 2, contended that on the basis of the very applications filed by the appellant before the Tribunal, he cannot be held to be a tenant or a 'deemed tenant'. ( 8 ) IT is a fundamental requirement of our system of law that all Tribunals or Authorities vested with the power to adjudicate upon the rights of parties affecting their rights to life or property, shall comply with the rules of Natural Justice. This basic requirement is not an empty formality. Violation of the Rules of Natural Justice renders the decision void even where the law provides for an appeal. In Ridge v. Baldwin ( (1964) AC. 40 at page 60) the house of Lords held that a decision given without regard to the principles of Natural Justice is void. In General Medical Council v. Spademan ( (1943) AC. 627), lord Wright said :" If the principles of natural justice are violated in respect of any decision, it is indeed, immaterial whether the same decision would have been arrived at in the absence of the departure from the essential principles of justice. The decision must be declared to be no decision. " ( 9 ) BHIMIAH, J, has taken great pains to demonstrate as to how the entire proceedings before the 4th Respondent Tribunal violated the principles of natural Justice. He has stated how Respts-1 and 2. The decision must be declared to be no decision. " ( 9 ) BHIMIAH, J, has taken great pains to demonstrate as to how the entire proceedings before the 4th Respondent Tribunal violated the principles of natural Justice. He has stated how Respts-1 and 2. who were contesting the claim of the appellant, were denied the opportunity of presenting their case; one of them was detained by the Police on the report of the Chairman of the Tribunal; the Tribunal refused to receive the documents produced in support of their contention. ( 10 ) NEITHER the Counsel for the appellant nor Sri Chandrakant Raj Urs, learned Senior High Court Govt Advocate appearing for the State, did challenge before us the correctness of the conclusion reached by Bhimiah, j, that the proceedings before the Tribunal violated the rules of Natural justice. ( 11 ) PERSONS affected by the provisions of the Act expect their rights being adjudicated upon by the Tribunal in a fair and just mannerr conforming to standards expected of all impartial Tribunals inspiring public confidence; openness, fairness and impartiality are the three essentials which are required of any Tribunal which is entrusted with the power of adjudicating upon the rights of persons to life and property. Openness requires the publicity of the proceedings and knowledge of the essential reasoning underlying the decision; fairness requires adoption of a dear procedure which enables the parties to know their rights, to present their case fully and to know the case which they have to meet; impartiality requires the freedom of Tribunals from the influence, real or apparent, of extraneous agencies. These requirements constitute the essence of the rules of Natural justice. If the principles of Natural Justice are violated by the Tribunal, its decision must be declared to be no decision and therefore void. ( 12 ) THE broad proposition as urged by Sri U. L. Narayana Rau, learned counsel for the appellant, that the learned single Judge, after quashing the order of the Tribunal, should have remitted the matter 'to the Tribunal for adjudication afresh on the question whether the appellant is or is not a tenant entitled to registration of occupancy under S. 45 of the Act and that no decision on merits of his claim should have been rendered in the proceedings under Arts. 226 and 227 of 'the Constitution, is correct. 226 and 227 of 'the Constitution, is correct. Sri narayana Rau further urged that the view of the learned single Judge that there was nothing left for the appellant to agitate before the Land tribunal after his claim under Ss. 4 to 9a were examined by the Special deputy Commx and Munjswamappa was registered as the occupant of the lands, is erroneous. ( 13 ) SRI B. P. Holla, learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 2, contended that his clients had not only challenged the decision of the Tribunal by seeking relief in the nature of certiprari, but had also filed WP. 2167 of 1976 for a writ in the nature of prohibition against the Tribunal to forbear from proceeding with the enquiry on the two applications of the appellant on the ground that the Tribunal is seeking to re-open, indirectly, the order granting occupancy to Muniswamappa under S. 9 of the Inams Abolition act which is barred under S. 141 of the Act. Sri Holla submitted that it is not the case of the appellant before the Tribunal that his tenancy right originated subsequent to the grant of occupancy to Muniswamappa by the order of the Special. Deputy Commr for Inams Abolition made on 19-4-1958, or, that he was recognised by the Special Deputy Commr for Inams Abolition, in the enquiry held under S. 10 of the Inams Abolition Act, as a tenant coming within the scope of S. 9a of the said Act. Sri Holla did not dispute before us that if the appellant's claim as a tenant falling under S. 9a of the Inams Abolition Act had been allowed by the Special Deputy Commr, be would be entitled to registration as occupant under S. 45 of the Act. He also did not dispute that if the appellant's case is that his tenancy originated after 19-4-1958, the date of the grant of occupancy under S. 9 to the father of respondents 1 and 2, the Tribunal under S. 48a of the Act alone has the jurisdiction to decide that question. ( 14 ) THE jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited by the provisions of the act; it has to function within the limits circumscribed by the Act. If it attempts to transgress the limits of its jurisdiction, this Court is entitled to intervene and order the Tribunal not to travel outside the limits of its jurisdiction. ( 14 ) THE jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited by the provisions of the act; it has to function within the limits circumscribed by the Act. If it attempts to transgress the limits of its jurisdiction, this Court is entitled to intervene and order the Tribunal not to travel outside the limits of its jurisdiction. S. 141 of the Act prohibits the Tribunal from re-openng or annulling the decision of the Special Dy Commr under the Inams Abolition act conferring right of occupancy. Under the pretext of granting occupancy right under S. 45 of the Act, the Tribunal indirectly cannot reopen the questions concluded in the proceedings under Chap. II of the inams Abolition Act. Sri Narayana Rau conceded and, in our opinion, rightly, that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to re-open or annul the decision of the Special Deputy Commr in proceedings for grant of occupancy right under the Inams Abolition Act. Sri Holla supported the decision of Bhimiah, J. on the ground that the appellant has no case except that he was a tenant before the lands vested in the State under the Inams abolition Act and that not with standing the grant of occupancy to late muniswamappa, he continued as a tenant, and as it is not his case that the lands were granted by either late Muniswamappa or respondents 1 and 2 on lease after 19-4-1958, there is no need to remit the matter to the Tribunal for adjudication. ( 15 ) THE question is whether the matter shoud be remitted to the Tribunal for a fresh adjudication of the claim of the appellant. In order to pronounce our judgment on this question, we considered it necessary that the appellant should state precisely what his case is and, by our order made on Feby 3, 1977, directed him to state his case with reference to the following points : (1) In the enquiry held by the Special Deputy Commr for Inams abolition under S. 10 of the Inams Abolition Act, whether the appellant had claimed that he was a tenant coming within the scope of S. 9a of the said Act and|or whether his claim to tenancy, if any, under S. 9a was recognised by the Special Deputy Commr? If so, the particulars of the order of the Special Deputy Commissioner. If so, the particulars of the order of the Special Deputy Commissioner. (2) If the claim of tenancy under S. 9a was not made or allowed in the enquiry under S. 10 of the Inams Abolition Act, is it the appellant's case in the proceedings before the Land Tribunal that after the grant of occupancy right to Muniswamappa, father of respondents 1 and 2, by the order of the Special Deputy Commr dt. 19-4-1958, the appellant was granted any lease by the said Muniswamappa or by his successors? (3) If it is not the case of the appellant that there was any grant of lease by Muniswamappa or his successors in favour of the appellant subsequent to 19-4-1958, what is the basis cf the claim of tenancy alleged by him for registration of occupancy under S. 45 of the Karnataka Land reforms Act? ( 16 ) IN obedience to our order, the appellant's Counsel has filed a statement wherein it is stated as follows :" (1) The appellant had not claimed under the Inams Act that he was a tenant coming with the scope of S. 9a of the Act. (2) It is the specific case of the appellant that he and his predecessors in interest since about 40 years have been cultivating the lands under Muniswamappa on half crop share basis, notwithstanding the adjudication under the Inams Act in favour of Muniswamappa. It is further the case of the appellant that in any event, with effect from 1963-64 in the Record of Rights and Pahani extracts produced along with the Statement of Objections in WP. 3288/76 the appellant's name has been shown in the cultivator's column that continued for the years 1970-71, 1971-72, 1972-73 and 1974-75. Even for year 1975- 76 the name of the appellant is shown in the cultivator's column. The appellant has been lawfully cultivating the land as on 1-3-1974 and that he is a 'deemed tenant' as contemplated under Sec. 4 of the act entitled to be registered as 'occupant'. The said Muniswamappa, father of 1st and 2nd respondents died in the year about 1965. Subsequent to the adjudication under the Inams Act in favour o-f Muniswamappa on 19-4-1958 the appellant continued to be in possession as a tenant under Muniswamappa as stated above on half crop share basis as evidenced from the Record of Rights and Pahanis for the year 1963-64 onwards. Subsequent to the adjudication under the Inams Act in favour o-f Muniswamappa on 19-4-1958 the appellant continued to be in possession as a tenant under Muniswamappa as stated above on half crop share basis as evidenced from the Record of Rights and Pahanis for the year 1963-64 onwards. Hence entitled for registration of occupancy right under s. 45 of the Act. The appellant, along with his family members is residing in a house situate in Sy Nos. 59jl, and 5912 adjacent to the petition properties all these years and has got agricultural operators. (3) Regarding querry No. 3:-The claim of 'tenancy' was not made under the Inams Abolition Act as the appellant could not be described as a 'tenant' within the meaning of that Special Act. Nor is the claim based on any grant by the landlord subsequent to 19-4-58. The specific case is, that the position of the appellant in relation to the lands, that existed for the last 40 years, falls within the special definition of 'tenant' as defined under the Land Reforms Act 1961. That is the basis of the present claim. In view of the extended definition of 'tenant' in the Land Reforms Act 1961, the appellant claims to be a tenant for the last 40 years. The position of such a tenant who is a 'tenant' only within the meaning of Land Reforms Act but not otherwise, is analogous to S. 9a tenant or that of a tenant inducted by inamdar after 19-4-1958. " ( 17 ) NOW, the case of the appellant has been made clear; He was not recognised as a 'tenant' withi in the scope of S. 9a of the Inams Abolition Act; late Muniswamappa, father of respondents 1 and 2, was registered as an occupant by the order of the Special Deputy Ccmmr. made on 19-4-1958 and the application of the appellant for registration of occupancy under the Inams Abolition Act was rejected. His further case is that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been cultivating the lands under late Muniswamappa on half crop-share basis both before and after the date of vesting of the lands under the Inams Abolition Act, and that after Muniswamappa's death, he has been cultivating the lands on crop-share basis under respondents 1 and 2. The definite stand of the appellant now is th? The definite stand of the appellant now is th? he is a person coming wijthin the meaning of the term 'deemed tenant' under S. 4 of the Act. ( 18 ) IT was conceded by Sri B. P. Holla, learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 2, and in our opinion rightly, that agricultural lands in the former inam Villages are not excluded from the purview of the Act. The Inams abolition Act is one of the Acts enacted by the Stat legislature for abolition of Inam tenures and conversion of the tenure ol such lands into Ryotwari tenure. That purpose was sought to be achieved by vesting all lands in the Inam Villages in 'the State Govt on the issue of Notifications under sub-sec (4) of S. 1. The consequence of vesting of Inam lands in the State is declared by S. 3. In Ke-tnpamma v. Kempanna (1964 (2) Myslj. 444), explaining the consequence of vesting of Inams, this Court stated that the relationship of landlord and tenant as between the Inamdar and the tenant (whether 'kadim tenant', 'permanent tenant' or 'quasi-permanent tenant' became extinguished when the Inam village vested in the Govt and the only right given to such tenants is the right to make application for grant of occupancy under Ss. 4, 5 or 6, and if in an enquiry held under the said Act it is found that any such person is entitled to be registered under Ss. 4, 5 or 6, the Inamdar is not entitled to be registered as an occupant under s. 9. S. 9, which provides for grant of occupancy 'to the Inamdar, reads: 9. Lands and buildings to vest in the Inamdar.- (1) Every inamdar shall, with effect on and from the date of vesting, be entitled to be registered as an occupant of all lands other than- , (i) * * (ii) lands in respect of which any person is entitled to be registered under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8; (iii) * * * only three classes of tenants, viz Kadim tenants, Permanent tenants or quasi-permanent tenants are entitled to be registered as occupants; provision is made by S. 9a that every tenant of the Inamdar, other than the tenants entitled to be registered as occupants under Ss. 4, 5 and 6, shall, with effect on and from the date of vesting and subject to the provisions of chap-111a be entitled to continue as a tenant of the land in respect of which he was a tenant immediately before the date of vesting. Chap-IIIA contains provisions applicable to tenants contilnued under Section 9a. ( 19 ) SEC. 10, inter alia, provides that-" The Deputy Commr. shall examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which any person claims to be continued as tenant under sec. 9a. . . . . . and decide in respect of which lands the claims should be allowed. "sub-sec (2) of Sec. 10 states that a tenant found to be in possession of any land on the first day of July, 1948, shall be presumed to be a, quasi-permanent tenant as denned in clause (H) of sub-sec (l) of S. 2. S. 10a provides for entries to be made in the Record of Rights after determination of the claims under Section 10. ( 20 ) THE lands vest absolutely in the State and all rights of the Inamdar and the tenants under him are extinguished an^l the only right of the inamdar and his tenants, whether Kadim tenant, Permanent tenant or quasi-permanent tenant, is to make applications for grant of occupancy. The State thereafter, when it grants occupancy, whether under Ss. 4, 5, 6 or 9, confers fresh title on the grantees of occupancy; all prior rights are extinguished except as provided in S. 9a whereunder in the case of 'other tenants', they shall be entitled to continue as tenants of the lands of which they were tenants immediately before the date of vesting. The rights of such 'other tenants' after the date of vesting is governed by Chap-IIIA. It is conceded that the appellant was not recognised as a tenant coming within S. 9a and his name has not been entered in the Record of Rights under S. 10a, but late Muniswamappa obtained registration of occupancy under S. 9 in respect of the lands in question by the order of the Special deputy Commissioner dated 19-4-1958. ( 21 ) THE Act came into force on 2-10-1965; it applies to all agricultural lands in the State inclusive of lands in the former inam Villages. ( 21 ) THE Act came into force on 2-10-1965; it applies to all agricultural lands in the State inclusive of lands in the former inam Villages. When the Act was enacted, all Inams in the State had not been abolished as is obvious from Schedule II to the Act. The kanataka Village Officers Abolition Act, 1961 and the Bombay Pargana and Kulkarni Watans (Abolition) Act, 1950 were inserted in Sch. II by act 6 of 1970. S. 126 of the Act declares that the provisions of the Act in so far as they confer any rights and impose obligations on tenants and landlords shall be applicable to tenants holding lands in Inam and other alienated villages or lands and to landlords and Inamdars holding in such villages or lands. So far as the lands in Inam Villages which were abolished are concerned, provision is made by S. 141 of the Act to declare as follows :" Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of any of the Land tenures Abolition Acts specified in Schedule II to the Act, in so far as such provisions relate to the conferment of the right of an occupant or grant of a ryotwari patta in favour of any inferior holder or tenant in respect of any land held by him. " ( 22 ) THIS provision has been incorporated in the Act to make it clear that the proceedings for conferment of occupancy under the inams Abolition Act and other Acts specified in Schedule II, do not abate, nor orders made thereunder are annulled. ( 23 ) THE argument of Sri Holla is that if the appellant were permitted to urge before the Tribunal that he and his predecessors-in-intexest were cultivating the lands as tenants of late Muniswamappa before the date of vesting of the Inam village in the State Govt under the Inams Abolition act and the Tribunal were to uphold such a plea, it would amount to indirectly annulling the order made by the Special Deputy Commr under s. 9 of the Inams Abolition Act and re-opening the issue of tenancy which has been rejected. Sri Narayana Rau, learned Counsel for the appellant, (argued that the Inams Abolition Act was concerned with Kadim tenants, permanent tenants, Quasi-permanent tenants and 'other tenants' of the inamdar, but no. Sri Narayana Rau, learned Counsel for the appellant, (argued that the Inams Abolition Act was concerned with Kadim tenants, permanent tenants, Quasi-permanent tenants and 'other tenants' of the inamdar, but no. t with 'deemed tenants' as defined in S. 4 of the Act andd the Tribunal is not precluded from considering the evidence of 'deemed tenancy' prior to the date of vesting under the Inams Abolition Act. The purpose and scope of the two Acts are distinct. The Inams Abolition act, as stated earlier, was enacted for the purpose of abolition of inam tenures and conversion of such tenures into ryotwari tenure and in that process, grant occupancy rights to the Inamdars and the three classes of tenants. The purpose of the Land Reforms Act, however, is different. It is a legislation enacted to. effectuate radical agrarian reforms by imposing ceilings of land holdings and termination of landlord and tenant relationship in respect of tenanted lands and further conferment of occupancy rights on tenants personally cultivating the lands. Chapter-III cf the Act contains provisions for termination of relationship of landlord and tenant, vesting of tenanted lands in the State and thereafter grant of occupancy right to the tenants. The material date with reference to which the rights under Chap-III have to be determined is 1st March, 1974. S. 44 provides that all lands held by or in possession of tenants including tenants against whom a decree or order for eviction or a certificate for resumption is made or issued) immediately prior to the date of commencement of the Amendment Act, other than lands held by them under leases permitted under S. 5, shall with effect from the said date, stand transferred to and vest in the State Government. ( 24 ) SEC. 45 provides for registration of tenants as occupants. Sub-sec (1) of S. 45 which is relevant for the purpose of this appeal reads thus :" Subject to the provisions of the succeeding sections of this Chapter, every person who was a permanent tenant, protected tenant or other tenant or where a tenant has lawfully sublet, such sub-tenant shall, with effect on and from the date of vesting, be entitled to be registered as an occupant in respect of the lands of which he was a permanent tenant, protected tenant or other tenant or sub-tenant before the date of vesting and which he has been cultivating personally. " ( 25 ) SEC. 48a provides for making applications by persons entitled to be registered as occupants under S. 45 to the Tribunal constituted under Section 48. Under the Scheme of the Act all lands held by or in possession of tenants immediately prior to the first day of March 1974, vest in the State Govt' and the tenant or sub-tenant who has been personally cultivating the lands before the date of vesting is entitled to be registered as occupant of such land subject to certain conditions which are not material for the purpose of this appeal. Ss. 44 and 45 have to be read together; the former section provides for vesting of tenanted lands in the State and the latter sectipn provides for grant of occupancy to the tenants personally cultivating such lands. ( 26 ) IT is relevant to observe that under the Inams Abolition Act all lands' in Inam Villages vested in the State Govt. But under the Act, not all agricultural lands vest in the State; only lands held by or in possession of tenants immediately prior to 1st March 1974 vest in the State Govt. The claim of the tenant or tenants for registration of occupancy under the Act has to be decided with reference to the date of vesting under S. 44, viz, 1st March, 1974. Under the Inams Abolition Act. the rights of the Inamdars and tenants were decided with reference to the date of. vesting under the said Act. The lands in question vested in the State Govt under the inams Abolition Act in about 1956. The material dates under the two Acts and the scope and purpose of the two Acts being different, the termination of the proceedings under the Inams Abolition Act in regard to grant of occupancy cannot bar an investigation of the claim under Section 45 of the Act by the Land Tribunal. What the Tribunal, under the Act, has to enquire into, is whether the lands claimed by the applicant before It, have vested in the State Govt under S. 44. For that purpose it has to decide whether the lands were held by or in the possession of any tenant immediately prior to 1st March 1974. The next question the Tribunal has to decide is Who is the person that has been cultivating such lands personally immediately prior to 1st March 1974? For that purpose it has to decide whether the lands were held by or in the possession of any tenant immediately prior to 1st March 1974. The next question the Tribunal has to decide is Who is the person that has been cultivating such lands personally immediately prior to 1st March 1974? the two questions being closely related have to be dealt with and disposed of together. Besides, the person claiming to be the tenant of the lands, the State is an interested party to the proceedings before the Tribunal. If the land is a tenanted land, even in the absence of any application by tenant, it stands transferred to and vested in the State Govt. There may be instances where tenants have not filed applications for registration of occupancy and yet, such lands vest in the State Govt under Sec. 44. ( 27 ) WHETHER or not a person who cultivates land belonging to another is a tenant, is not always a, simple question of fact; sometimes the question raises complex questions of law and fact. The word 'tenant' has been defined in Section 2 (34) of the Act thus" 'tenant' means an agriculturist who cultivates personally the land he holds on lease from a landlord and includes,- (i) a person who is deemed to be a tenant under Section 4; (ii) a person who was protected from eviction from any land by the Karnataka Tenants (Temporary Protection from Eviction) Act, 1961; (iii) a person who is a permanent tenant, and (iv) a person who is a protected tenant, (Explanation omitted as unnecessary ). " ( 28 ) SECTION 4 reads :"4. " ( 28 ) SECTION 4 reads :"4. Persons to be deemed tenants.-A person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner and if such person is not- (a) a member of the owner's family, or (b) a servant or a hired labourer on wages payable in cash of kind but not in crop share cultivating the land under the personal supervision of the owner or any member of the owner's family, or (c) a mortgagee in possession ; provided that if upon an application made by the owner within one year from the appointed day- (i) the Tribunal declares that such person is not a tenant and its decision is not reversed on appeal, or (ii) the Tribunal refuses to make such declaration but its decision is reversed on appeal, such person shall not be deemed to be a tenant. " ( 29 ) A person who unlawfully enters on the land of another and cultivates the same cannot claim the status of a 'deemed tenant' under S. 4. Ordinarily, the concept of tenancy requires proof of grant of a lease by a landlord to the person claiming to be tenant; in such a case the tenant is put in possession of the land leased in consideration of payment of rent. S. 4, by fiction of law, extends the meaning of 'tenant' to a person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person. S. 4 of the Act is in pari materia with s. 4 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. S. 4 of the Bombay Act came up for interpretation before Courts. In Jasvantrai tricumlal Vyas v. Bai Jiwi (59 Bomlr. 168), the object of S. 4 of the Bombay Act was explained thus by Chagla, CJ :" The one idea that runs through the Tenancy Act is that the actual tiller on the land should not be evicted provided the title of the actual tiller is derived from some legal incident and is not the result of an unlawful act. " ( 30 ) IN Dahya Lala v. Rasul Mahommed Abdul Rahim (AIR. 1964 SC. " ( 30 ) IN Dahya Lala v. Rasul Mahommed Abdul Rahim (AIR. 1964 SC. 1320) where the question was whether a tenant inducted by a mortgagee in possession could be regarded as a 'deemed tenant' entitled to protection under the Bombay tenancy Act after the mortgage had been redeemed by the mortgagor, it was held that though under the general law a tenant inducted by a mortgagee in possession cannot be regarded as a tenant after redemption, such a person comes within the term 'deemed tenant'. In the course of the judgment, Shah, J (as he then was), stated: " The Act of 1948, it is undisputed, seeks to encompass in its bene- ficient provisions not only tenants who held land for purpose of cultivaitton under contracts from the land owners but persons who are deemed to be tenants also. The point in controversy is whether a person claiming the status of a deemed tenant must have been cultivating land with the consent or under the authority of the owner. Counsel for the appellants submits that tenancy postulates a, relation based on contract between the owner of land, and the person in occupation of the land, and there can be no tenancy without the consent or authority of the owner to the occupation of that land. But the Act has by S. 2 (18) devised a special definition of tenant and included therein persons who are not contractual tenants. It would therefore be difficult to assume in construing S. 4 that the person who claims the sta,tus of a deemed tenant must be cultivating land with the consent or authority of the owner. The relevant condition imposed by the statute is only that the person claiming the status of a deemed tenant must be cultivating land 'lawfully': it is not the. condition that he must cultivate land with the consent of or under authority derived directly from the owner. To import such a condition is to re-write the section, and destroy its practical utility. A person who derives his right to cultivate land. from the owners would normally be a contractual tenant and he will obviously not be a 'deemed tenant'. condition that he must cultivate land with the consent of or under authority derived directly from the owner. To import such a condition is to re-write the section, and destroy its practical utility. A person who derives his right to cultivate land. from the owners would normally be a contractual tenant and he will obviously not be a 'deemed tenant'. Persons such as licencees from the owner may certainly be regarded as falling within the class of persons lawfully cultivating land belonging to others, but it cannot be assumed therefrom that they are the only persons who are covered by the section. The Act affords protection to all persons who hold agricultural land as contractual tenants and subject to the exceptions specified all persons lawfully cultivating lands belonging to others, and it would be unduly restricting the intension of the legislature to limit the benefit of its provisions to persons who derive their authority from the owner, either under a contract of tenancy, or otherwise. In our view, all persons other than those mentioned in cls. (d), (b) and (c) of Sec. 4 who lawfully cultivate land belonging to other persons whether or not their authority is derived directly from the owner of the land must be deemed tenants of the lands. " ( 31 ) IN M. C. Chockallngam v. V. Manickavasagam (AIR. 1974 SC. 104) the Supreme Court explained, though in a different context, the import of the idea of 'lawful possession' thus :" Lawful possession cannot be established without the concomitant existence of a lawful relationship between the landlord and the tenant. This relationship cannot be established against the consent of the landlord unless, however, in view of a special law, his consent becomes irrelevant. Lawful possession is not litigious possession and must have some foundation in a legal right to possess the property which cannot be equated with a temporary right to enforce recovery of the property in a case a person is wrongfully or forcibly dispossessed from it. This Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh's case ( (1968) 2 SCR 203 = air 1968 SC 620 ) had not to consider whether judiciaj possession in that case was also lawful possession We are clearly of opinion that judicial possession is possession protected by law against wrongful dispossession but cannot per se always be equated with lawfull possession. This Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh's case ( (1968) 2 SCR 203 = air 1968 SC 620 ) had not to consider whether judiciaj possession in that case was also lawful possession We are clearly of opinion that judicial possession is possession protected by law against wrongful dispossession but cannot per se always be equated with lawfull possession. " ( 32 ) IT is unnecessary for the purpose of disposal of this appeal, to lay down as to who are the persons entitled to the status of 'deemed tenant'. Relying on the observation of the Supreme Court in Dahya Lala's case (5), Sri narayana Rau, learned Counsel for the appellant, contended that a licensee comes within the class of 'deemed tenants' and that his case is that the appellant is a licensee. We asked Sri Narayana Rau whether the appellant claims to be a contractual tenant; Sri Narayana Rau submitted that it is not the case of the appellant that he was cultivating the lands in question under any contract subsequent to the grant of occupancy to the father of respondents 1 and 2 under the Inams Abolition Act. If the appellant was cultivating the lands subsequent to 1958 on crop-share basis then he would be a contractual tenant. Sri Rau gave up before this Court any case of contractual tenancy and made it clear that his client was a licensee under the respondents since 1958. ( 33 ) SRI B. P. Holla, learned Counsel for the contesting respondents, contended that the observation in Dahya Lala's case (5), that a licensee may come within the class of 'deemed tenants' is a mere obiter as that question did not arise for determination in that case, and that, in his submission, a licensee cannot claim the status of a tenant. Assuming, without deciding, that a licensee comes within the class of 'deemed tenants', Sri Holla isubmit'ed that in view cf the categorical statement made by the appellant in this Court in response to the three questions put to him, the appellant cannot even claim to be a licensee. Assuming, without deciding, that a licensee comes within the class of 'deemed tenants', Sri Holla isubmit'ed that in view cf the categorical statement made by the appellant in this Court in response to the three questions put to him, the appellant cannot even claim to be a licensee. Sri Holla pointed out that the appellant, in answer to Query No. 3, has clearly stated that his claim is not based on any grant made by the landlord subsequent to 1958 and since licence can only be the result of a grant by one person to another, there cannot be a licence without any grant. Vide Sec. 52 of the Easements Act. When the appellant has made clear before this Court that he does not claim the status of a contractual tenant or any grant made by the landlord subsequent to 19-4-1958, he cannot come within the definition of 'tenant' under the Act even assuming that he was personality cultivating the lands immediately prior to 1-3-1974. In order to hold that the lands were held by the appellant as a tenant immediately prior to 1st March, 1974, it has to be pleaded and shown that he was in possession of the lands either under a contract of lease or at least that he was originally inducted under a contract of lease or licence granted by the landlord and that his possession continued thereafter undisturbed. In the instant case, there is no such plea pleaded by the appellant. Therefore, in our judgment, there is no case to go before the Tribunal for adjudication. If the appellant has been unauthorisedly cultivating the lands and has perfected his title by prescription, then his remedy is to have that right decided in a competent civil Court and not by making an application to the Land Tribunal. We would have remitted the matter to the Land Tribunal for adjudication if the appellant had pleaded at least before this Court that he was inducted a,s a tenant or licensee after 1958 either by Muniswamappa or his successors and that he was cultivating the lands under a contract of crop-sharing; but that is not his case asserted before us. ( 34 ) IN cur opinion, the dispute between the parties is not one arising out of agrarian relations. The scope of the Act is limited to questions arising cut of agrarian relations. ( 34 ) IN cur opinion, the dispute between the parties is not one arising out of agrarian relations. The scope of the Act is limited to questions arising cut of agrarian relations. A person whose possession of agricultural lands does not rest on agrarian relations, cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the land Tribunal under S. 45 of the Land Reforms Act. Since the appellant, on the basis of his own pleadings before this Court, does not base his rights founded on agrarian relations, there is, in our judgment, no case to go before the Tribunal for adjudication, Bhimiah, J would have been right in allowing the writ petition and refusing to remand the matter to the Tribunal on the ground that on the admitted pleadings of the appellant there is no case of agrarian relations for adjudication to go before the tribunal. We do not express any opinion on the question whether the appellant or the respondents are in actual possessi6n of the disputed lands which question has necessarily to be decided by a competent Civil Court. For the reasons stated above, we dismiss the appeal, though for reasons different from those given by Bhimiah, J. In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .