JUDGMENT DHARMADHIKARI J.- In this writ petition, the petitioner Municipal Council is challenging the preliminary order passed by the Third Labour Court at Nagpur dated 16th of July 1971 holding that the Conservancy Department of the petitioner Municipal Council is an 'industry' within the meaning of section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It appears from the record that the respondents Manguji and others had filed applications under section 33·C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for computation of benefit in terms, of money on account of their wages which are due to them for weekly off. Eighteen separate cases were filed against the Municipal Council in this behalf. The claim in all these cases related to the period from 15th of August 1965 to 15th of August 1969. They were filed on 7th of January 1970. The employees were in the service of the Municipal Council as sweepers in Conservancy Department. According to them, the Municipal Council made them to work from 6 a. m. to 1 p. m. and 3 p. m. to 4 p. m. on all the days of week without allowing them any weekly off. According to them, therefore, they were entitled to the benefit of over-time wages and as the Municipal Council failed to pay them the said over-time wages the employees filed the present applications before the Labour Court. 2. The petitioner Municipal Council admitted that these employees were engaged as sweepers in the Conservancy Department. However, the Municipal Council denied the allegations that they were made to work over time. The Municipal Council raised a preliminary objection that the applications are not maintainable as the Conservancy Department of the Municipal Council where the employees are in service is not an 'industry' within the meaning of section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was also pleaded that the applications filed by them were barred by limitation. According to the Municipal Council these employees were getting wages more than the minimum wage prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act and therefore, their claim for overtime is not tenable. 3. It was also pleaded that the applications filed by them were barred by limitation. According to the Municipal Council these employees were getting wages more than the minimum wage prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act and therefore, their claim for overtime is not tenable. 3. The question as to whether the Conservancy Department of the Municipal Council is an "industry' or not was heard and decided as a preliminary issue and by the aforesaid order the Labour Courtheld that as the Department renders material services to the community at large in the manner analogous to trade or business, it is an 'industry' within the meaning of the said term as defined in section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. As already observed it is this part of the order which is challenged in this writ petition . 4. Shri Mohta, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended before· us that the learned Member of the Labour Court has decided the question in dispute on the basis of a decision of the Industrial Tribunal in Reference (IT) No. 10 of 1969 between Nagar Palika, Telhara and its workmen, dated 27th of February 1971. According to Shri Mohta the same Industrial Tribunal had given a contrary decision in Reference (IT) No.9 of 1970 between the Municipal Council, Washim i.e. the petitioner Municipal Council and its workmen on 4th of January 1971, wherein it was held by the Member of the Industrial Tribunal that the activity of the Conservancy and Health Department of the Municipal Council, Washim is not an 'industry' within the meaning of the Act. According to Shri Mohta inspite of this specific decision given by the Industrial Tribunal in Industrial Reference pending before it between the same Municipal Council and its workmen, the Labour Court preferred a decision of the same Industrial Tribunal in Telhara Municipal Council's case and on that basis has answered the question posed before him. Thus it is contended by Shri Mohta that in the field there are two conflicting decisions by the said Industrial Tribunal and, therefore, though this writ petition is preferred by the Municipal Council against a preliminary order this Court should consider this question 'Over again and decide it at this stage so as to avoid further litigation and complications. 5. Mr. 5. Mr. Mohta further contended that the Labour Court committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the Conservancy Department of the Municipal Council, Washim is an 'industry' within the meaning of the said term as defined in section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. According to Shri Mohta the Municipal Council is running the said department in view of the provisions of section 49 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act which cast an obligatory duty upon the Municipal Council of cleansing public streets, places and sewers, and all spaces, not being private property which are open to the enjoyment of the public, whether such spaces are vested in the Council or not; removing noxious vegetation and abating all public nuisances. 6. Through this Department, the Municipal Council is also carrying on an obligatory duty of disposing of the night soil, rubbish etc. Therefore, according to Shri Mohta in view of the provisions of section 49 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, the Municipal Council has no other alternative but to undertake these duties. These are statutory obligations and therefore, are in the nature of statutory duties. In view of this, it is contended by Shri Mohta that it is in substance a part and parcel of the Governmental function which cannot be delegated to any private individual and, therefore, cannot be termed to be an industrial avocation or undertaking as defined in section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In support of this proposition, Shri Mohta has strongly relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in The Management of, Safdar .lung Hospital, New Delhi v. Kuldip Singh Sethil Shri Mohta further contended that in view of this latest decision of the Supreme Court the law laid down by the Supreme Court either in D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee or Nagpur Corporation v. Its Employees3, is no more good law. In this context, Shri Mobta has also relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in P. N. Dumbhare v. Director of Public Health4, as well as in Abdul Shabirkhan v. M. C. Bhandara5 and Mehkar M. C. v. Municipal Octroi Employees Union, Mehkar6. 7. As the respondents-employees had not put in any appearance before us, we requested Shri R. B. Pendharkar advocate to assist this Court as an amicus curiae on behalf of the respondents-employees. 7. As the respondents-employees had not put in any appearance before us, we requested Shri R. B. Pendharkar advocate to assist this Court as an amicus curiae on behalf of the respondents-employees. Shri Pendharkiar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the employees contended before us that the question involved in this petition is no more res integra in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in The Management of Safdar Jung Hospital's case itself (cit. supra). According to Shri Pendharkar the Conservancy Department carried on by the Municipal Council is a system of public conservancy and sanitation and is specifically included in the definition of term 'public utility service" as defined in section 2(n) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Shri Pendharkar further contended that the inclusion of the system of public Conservancy and sanitation within the scope of 'public utility service' as defined in the Act clearly indicates that it is an "industry' within the meaning of section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Apart from the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in paragraph 25 of the judgment in Safdar Jung Hospitals case which is binding upon this Court, Shri Pendharkar contended that it has also been held by the Supreme Court in D. N. Benerjee v. P. R. Mukherjee, that the Conservancy Department of a Municipal Council is an industry. According to Shri Pendharkar, the services which are rendered by the Conservancy Department of the Municipal Council are material services and are rendered with the help of organised labour force and for this purpose the capital is raised by the Municipal Council through taxation. This activity which is called on by the Municipal Council is analogous to trade and business. He further contended that in any case it is an 'undertaking' as contemplated by section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In this view of the matter, according to Shri Pendharkar the learned Judge of the Labour Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the conservancy department of the Washim Municipal Council is an 'industry' within the meaning of the said word as defined in section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 8. In this view of the matter, according to Shri Pendharkar the learned Judge of the Labour Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the conservancy department of the Washim Municipal Council is an 'industry' within the meaning of the said word as defined in section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 8. At the outset we would like to make it very clear that in this writ petition we are only concerned with the question posed before us, namely, as to whether the Conservancy Department of a Municipal Council is an 'industry' or not. We are not concerned with a general or broad proposition as to whether all or any other activity of the Municipal Council will be an 'industry' or not. Therefore, we would like to confine ourselves to the question posed before us and would not like to enter into any general controversy. 9. From the provisions of section 49 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965 itself it is quite clear that the Conservancy Department of the Municipal Council is engaged in rendering services to the general public by cleansing public streets, places and sewers and all spaces, not being private property which are open to the enjoyment of the public, whether such spaces are vested in the Councilor not. It is further engaged in removing noxious vegetation and abating all public nuisances. It also carries out a duty of rendering service of disposing of night soil and rubbish and if so required by the State Government, it is engaged in preparation of compost manure from such night-soil and rubbish. This is quite obvious from the provision of section 49 (2) (c) and (s) of the Act. It is needless to say that the services rendered by the Conservancy Department are essential services which are for the benefit of the general public. If these services are stopped the whole public life is likely to be paralysed. Therefore, it can safely be termed as 'public utility service' or an essential service. This is an obligatory duty of a Municipal Council. The Municipal Council is obliged to undertake and make a reasonable provision for rendering such services and to take effective measures in that behalf. 10. Therefore, it can safely be termed as 'public utility service' or an essential service. This is an obligatory duty of a Municipal Council. The Municipal Council is obliged to undertake and make a reasonable provision for rendering such services and to take effective measures in that behalf. 10. It is no doubt true that these services are carried out by the Municipal Council by virtue of a provision of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, but it cannot be equated with a sovereign or regal function of the Government or a Municipal Council. In a Welfare State the State itself might undertake certain activities which were formerly treated as purely commercial or welfare activities, but that will not make each and every activity undertaken by the State or the Local Authority a regal or a sovereign function. Therefore, while deciding such a question, the matter will have to be considered qua the particular activity with which the Court is concerned and then to find out as to whether that particular activity answers the description of the definition of the word 'industry' as given in section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is not possible nor it is advisable to lay down a general proposition or a general rule in this behalf which will govern all cases. The matter will have to be considered by the Court as and when it arises having regard to the material placed before the Court. 11. The question 'as to whether the activity, namely, the conservancy department of the Municipal Council, is an 'industry' or not initially fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in D. N. Banerjee v. P. R. Mukherjee. In that case the Supreme Court was concerned with a dispute raised by the employees working in the Sanitary Department of the Budge Budge Municipality. The very definition incorporated in section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in the said decision. While considering the various aspects of the said definition, the Supreme Court observed that the definition was apparently intended to include within its scope what might not strictly be called a trade or business venture. The very definition incorporated in section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in the said decision. While considering the various aspects of the said definition, the Supreme Court observed that the definition was apparently intended to include within its scope what might not strictly be called a trade or business venture. Thereafter a reference was made by the Supreme Court to the definition of term 'public utility service' as contained in clause (n) of section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and then in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the judgment the Supreme Court observed as under: "16. A public utility service such as railways, telephones and the supply of power, light or water to the public may be carried on by private companies or business corporations. Even conservancy or sanitation may be so carried on though after the introduction of local self-government this work has in almost every country been assigned as a duty to local bodies like our Municipalities or District Boards or Local Boards. A dispute in these services between employers and workmen is an industrial dispute, and the proviso to section 10 lays down that where such a dispute arises and a notice under section 22 has been given, the appropriate Government shall make a reference under the sub-section. If the public utility service is carried only by a corporation like a Municipality which is the creature of a statute and which functions under the limitations imposed by the statute does it cease to be an industry for this reasons? The only ground on which one could say that what would amount to the carrying on of an industry if it is done by a private person ceases to be so if the same work is carried on by a local body like Municipality is that in the latter there is nothing like the investment of any capital or the existence of a profit earning motive as there generally is in a business. But neither the one nor the other seems a 'sine que non' or necessary element in the modern conception of industry. 17. But neither the one nor the other seems a 'sine que non' or necessary element in the modern conception of industry. 17. In specifying the purpose to which the municipal fund is applicable, section 108, Bengal Municipal Act (15 of 1932) enumerates under 36 separate heads several things such as the construction and maintenance of streets, lighting, water supply, conservancy, maintenance of dairy farms and milk depots, the taking of markets on lease etc. They may be described as the normal functions or ordinary activities of the Municipality. Some of these functions may appertain to and partake of the nature of an industry while others may not. For instance, there is a necessary element of distinction between the supply of power and light to the inhabitants of a Municipality and the running of charitable hospitals and dispensaries for the aid of the poor. In ordinary parlance, the former might be regarded as an industry but not the latter. The very idea under lying the entrustment of such ·duties or functions to local bodies is not to take them out of the sphere of industry but to secure the substitution of public authorities in the place of private employers and to eliminate the motive of profit-making as far as Possible. The levy of taxes for the maintenance of the services of sanitation and conservancy or the supply of light and water is a method adopted and devised to make up for the absence of capital. The undertaking or the service will still remain within the ambit of what we understand by an industry though it is carried on with the aid of taxation, and no immediate material gain by way of profit is envisaged." Therefore, in that case the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that having regard to the definition and the aims and objectives that the Legislature had in view and the nature, variety and the range of dispute that Occurred between the employers and the employees, the definitions in the. Act includes also dispute that might arise between the municipalities and their employees in the branches of work that can be said to be analogous to carrying out a trade or business. 12. This case of the Supreme Court in D. N Banerjee v P. R. Mukherjee (eit. Act includes also dispute that might arise between the municipalities and their employees in the branches of work that can be said to be analogous to carrying out a trade or business. 12. This case of the Supreme Court in D. N Banerjee v P. R. Mukherjee (eit. supra) was thereafter referred to in Baroda Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen 7, Nagpur Corporation v. Its Employees and Madras Gymkhana Employees Union v. Management8. 13. It is, however, contended by Shri Mohta learned counsel for the petitioner that this decision of the Supreme Court in D. N Banerjee's case as well as the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Nagpur Corporation's case is no more good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Management of the Sufdar Jung Hospital, New Delhi v. Kuldip Singh Sethi. In Our view, it is not necessary to go into this question in the present case. However, in this context a reference could usefully be made to a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Dim,; Gampanchayat v. Shri Brahad Saurashtra Safai Kamdar Mandai, Rajkot9, wherein this question was considered by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in extenso. The Gujarat High Court was also concerned with the similar question and ultimately it came to the conclusion that the Conservancy Department of the Dhari Grampanchayat was an 'industry' within the meaning of section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. 14. From the contentions raised before us it is quite obvious that the petitioner's learned counsel Shri Mohta is mainly relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Safdar Jung Hospital's case (cit. supra,) in support of his contention. As all other earlier decisions of the Supreme Court are referred to in this decision, it is not necessary to make a detailed reference to the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court. Shri Pendharkar, the learned counsel appearing for the employees is also relying upon the same decision of the Supreme Court in Safdar Jung Hospital's case. After making a detailed reference to the earlier decisions, in paragraph 19 of the said judgment the Supreme Court observed as under: "19. Shri Pendharkar, the learned counsel appearing for the employees is also relying upon the same decision of the Supreme Court in Safdar Jung Hospital's case. After making a detailed reference to the earlier decisions, in paragraph 19 of the said judgment the Supreme Court observed as under: "19. It, therefore, follows that before an industrial dispute can be raised between employers and their employees or between employers and employers or between employees and employees in relation to the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person, there must be first established a relationship of employers and employees associating together, the former following a trade, business, manufacture, undertaking or calling of employers in the production of material goods and material services and the latter following any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of Workmen in aid of the employers' enterprise. It is not necessary that there must be a profit motive but the enterprise must be analogous to trade or business in a commercial sense." 15. Then in paragraph 24 of the judgment, the definition of the term 'public utility service' was reproduced by the Supreme Court which includes any system of public conservancy or sanitation". The said definition as incorporated in section 2 (n) reads as under: “"Public utility service" means- (i) any railway service, or any transport service, for the carriage of passangers or goods by air; (ia) any service in. The said definition as incorporated in section 2 (n) reads as under: “"Public utility service" means- (i) any railway service, or any transport service, for the carriage of passangers or goods by air; (ia) any service in. or in connection with the working of, any major port of dock; (ii) any section of an industrial establishment, on the working of which the safety of the establishment or the workmen employed therein depends; (iii) any Postal telegraph or telephone services; (iv) an industry which supplies power light or water to public; (v) any system of public conservancy or sanitation; (vi) any industry specified in the first Schedule which the appropriate Government may, if satisfied that public emergency or public interest requires by notification in the Official Gazette declare to be a public utility service for the purposes of this' Act, for such period as may be specified in the notification; Provided that the period so specified shall not, in the first instance, exceed six months but may, by a like notification, be extended from time to time by any period not exceeding six months, at anyone time if in the opinion of the appropriate Government public emergency or public interest requires such extension," Obviously this definition is in two parts. Initially the Legislature has named the service, which according to it are public utility service Then in clause (vi) it is, laid down that any industry 'specified in the First Schedule which the appropriate Government, may if satisfied that public emergency or public interest so requires by notification in the official Gazette declare to be a public utility service for the purposes of the Act, for such period as may be specified in the notification. Therefore, clause (vi) deals with the industries which are referred to in the First Schedule regarding which a declaration should be issued by the appropriate Government; whereas clauses (i) to (v) deal with the named services. Noticing this, distinction in the definition clause, in paragraph 25 the Supreme Court observed as under: "The intention behind this provision is obviously to classify certain services as public utility services with special protection for the continuance of those services. The named services in the definition answer the test of an industry run on commercial lines to produce something which the community can use. The named services in the definition answer the test of an industry run on commercial lines to produce something which the community can use. These are brought into existence in a commercial way and analogous to business in which material goods are produced and distributed for consumption." In this writ petition we are not concerned with any of the industries specified in the First Schedule. Therefore, it is not necessary to deal with that aspect of the matter in the present writ petition, but from the bare reading of these observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 25 of the judgment it is quite obvious that it has been held by the Supreme Court that the services named in the definition answer the test of an 'industry' run on commercial lines to produce something which the community can use. These are brought into existence in a commercial way and are analogous to business in which material goods are produced and distributed for consumption. In substance, therefore, it has been held by the Supreme Court that the system of public conservancy and sanitation is an undertaking analogous to business and engaged in rendering material services to the community at large and, therefore is an 'industry' within the meaning of section 2 (j) of the industrial Disputes Act. As a matter of fact in view of this decision of the Supreme Court really it is not necessary to deal with the question involved in this writ petition any further. However, even if a cursory reference is made to the various provisions of the Act, it is quite obvious that the public utility services referred to in section 2 (n) are industries within the meaning of section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Chapter III of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and particularly section 10 (1) thereof deals with the procedure for referring disputes to the Boards or Tribunals. Second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 10 reads as under: "Provided further that where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under section 22 has been given, the appropriate Government shall unless it considers that the notice has been frivolously of vexatious given or that it would be inexpedient so to do, make a reference under this sub-section notwithstanding that any other proceeding under this Act in respect of the dispute may have commenced." 16. From the bare reading of this proviso, it is quite clear that whenever an industrial dispute is raised reading to the public utility service and a notice under section 22 is given the appropriate Government is obliged to make a reference unless it considers that the notice has been frivolously or vexatiously given or that it would be inexpedient so to do. 17. Then section 12 (1) which deals with the duty of the Conciliation Officer also casts a duty upon the Conciliation Officer to hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner if a dispute relates to public utility service and a notice under section 22 of the Act is given. Even in section 22 which deals with lock-out, a specific reference is made to this public utility service and a prohibition is imposed on the strikes and lock-outs in that behalf. Therefore, in substance, specific provisions have been made in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for dealing with public utility services as defined in section 2 (n) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. However, an ingenious argument is advanced by Shri Mohta, the learned counsel for the petitioner before us that in section 2 (n) itself a different phraseology is used by the Legislature while enumerating the categories of public utility services. Whereas railway, transport, postal telegraph or telephone etc. are described as ·services' in clause (v) of section 2 (n) the conservancy and sanitation is described as mere system and not as a ·service'. Therefore, according to Shri Mohta, the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 25 of Safdar lung Hospital's case will apply only to those industries which are described as 'services' and not otherwise. It is not possible for us to accept this contention. It cannot be forgotten that what is defined in section 2 (n) is public utility services itself. Therefore, whatever is enumerated in section 2 (n) namely in sub-clauses (i) to (v) are nothing but the public utility services themselves. Only because in some sub-section the word 'service' is specifically used and in sub-section (v) the word 'system' is used an inference cannot be drawn that a system of public conservancy or sanitation is not a public utility service. Only because in some sub-section the word 'service' is specifically used and in sub-section (v) the word 'system' is used an inference cannot be drawn that a system of public conservancy or sanitation is not a public utility service. Therefore in our opinion, the obvervations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 2S in Safdar Jung Hospital's case will apply with all force even to sub-section (v) of section 2 (n) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which deals with the system of public conservancy or sanitation. 18. After the Saldar Jung Hospital's case, the Supreme Court had again an occasion to consider this aspect of the matter though in somewhat different context in Workmen T. S. Institution v. I. S. Institution10 After taking a resume of all the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 9, to and 11 the Supreme Court has observed as under: "9. What can fairly be regarded as a sufficiently elastic or flexible working principle for this purpose has been discussed in a number of decisions of this Court of which we may refer only to three, namely, the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha Case. The Madras Gymkhana -case and The Saldar Jung Hospital case. Though the language used in these decisions to \State the working principles is not uniform and there are minor variations in the formulation according as one aspect is more emphasised than the other, the working principle laid down is basically the same. Gajendragadkar J., (as he then was), speaking on behalf of the Court in the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha case stated the working principle in these terms: " .... as a working principle it may be stated that an activity systematically or habitually undertaken for the production or distribution of goods or for the rendering of material services to the community at large or a part of such community with the help of employees is an undertaking. Such an activity generally involves the co-operation of the employer and the employees; and its object is the satisfaction of material human needs. It must be organised or arranged in a manner in which trade or business is generally organised or arranged. It must not be casual nor must it be for oneself nor for pleasure. Such an activity generally involves the co-operation of the employer and the employees; and its object is the satisfaction of material human needs. It must be organised or arranged in a manner in which trade or business is generally organised or arranged. It must not be casual nor must it be for oneself nor for pleasure. Thus the manner in which the activity in question is organised or arranged, the condition of the co-operation between employer and the employee necessary for its success and its object to render material service to the community can be regarded as some of the features which are distinctive of activities to which section 2 (j) applies . It was the same working principle which was pithily expressed by this Court through Hidayatullah J., (as he then was) in the Madras Gymkhana case where it was stated: "……..before the work engaged in can be described as an industry, it must bear the definite character of 'trade' or 'business' or ‘manufacture' or ‘calling' or must be capable of being described as an undertaking resulting in material goods or material services". This last proposition taken from the judgment in the Madras Gymkhana case was in so many terms accepted as valid in the Safdat Jung Hospital case vide page 189 of the Report. This. Court speaking through Hidayatullah C. J., pointed out in the Safdar Jung Hospital case at pages 186 and 197 of the Report: "But in the collection of the terms and their definitions these terms have a definite' economic content of a particular type and on the authorities of this Court have been uniformly accepted as excluding professions and ale only concerned with the production~ distribution and consumption of wealth and the production and availability of material services. Industry has thus been accepted to mean only trade and business, manufacture, or undertaking analogous to trade or business for the production of material goods or wealth and material services." What is meant by 'material' services in this context was explained by the learned Chief Justice in these words: "Material services are not services which depend wholly or largely upon the contribution of professional knowledge, skill or dexterity for the production of a result. Such services being given individually and by individuals are services no doubt but not material services. Such services being given individually and by individuals are services no doubt but not material services. Even an establishment where many such operate cannot be said to convert their professional services into material services. Material services involve an activity carried on through co-operation between employers and employees to provide the community with the use of some thing such as electric power, water, transportation, mail delivery, telephones and the like. In providing these services there may be employment of trained men and even professional men, but the emphasis is not on what these men do but upon the productivity of a service organised as an industry and commercially valuable. Thus the services of professional men involving benefit to individuals according to their needs, such as doctors, teachers, lawyers, solicitors etc. are easily distinguishable from an activity such as transport service. The latter is of a commercial character in which something is brought into existence quite apart from the benefit to particular individuals. It is the production of this something which is described as the production of material services." The learned Chief Justice then proceeded to explain why professions must be held to be outside the ambit of industry. This is what he said: "A profession ordinarily is an occupation requiring intellectual skill, often coupled with manual skill. Thus a teacher uses purely intellectual skill while a painter uses both. In any event they are out engaged in an occupation in which employers and employees co-operate in the production or sale of commodities or arrangement for their production or sale or distribution and their services cannot be described as material services." It was for this reason, observed the learned Chief Justice, that the establishment of a solicitor was held not to be an industry °because there the services rendered by the employees were in aid of professional men and not productive of material goods or wealth or material services." National Union of Commercial Employees v. M. R. Meherl J. The learned Chief Justice pointed out that in the University of Delhi v. Ramnath12, the University was also held to be outside the ambit of industry for the same reason. The learned Chief Justice then summarised the working principle-the broad test or criterion for determining what is an undertaking analogous to trade or business-in these terms: "It, therefore, follows that before an industrial dispute can be raised between employers and their employees or between employees and employers or between employees and employees in relation to the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment of with the conditions of labour of any person, there must be first established a relationship of employers and employees associating together, the former following a trade business, manufacture, undertaking or calling of employers in the production of material goods and material services and the latter following any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial Occupation or avocation of workmen in aid of the employer's enterprise. It is not necessary that there must be a profit motive but the enterprise must be analogous to trade or business in a commercial sense.” and after referring to the observations of Isaacs and Rich JJ., in Federated Municipal and shire Council Employees of Australia v. Melbourne Corporation13, pointed out that these observations showed that "industrial disputes occur in operations in which employers and -employees associate to provide what people want and desire, in other words, where there is production of material goods or material services." (emphasis added.) 10. It would thus be seen that the broad test for determining when an undertaking can be said to be analogous to trade or business laid down in the Safdar Jung Hospital case was the same as in the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha case. The Safdar Jang Hospital case did not make any real departure from the enunciation of this test. It would thus be seen that the broad test for determining when an undertaking can be said to be analogous to trade or business laid down in the Safdar Jung Hospital case was the same as in the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha case. The Safdar Jang Hospital case did not make any real departure from the enunciation of this test. It is only in the application of this test to the case of hospitals that the Safdar June Hospital case took a different view and observed that the judgment in the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha case had taken "an extreme view of the matter which was not justified." There was also one other ground on which the decision in the Safdar Jung Hospital case disapproved of the view taken in the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha case and that ground was that the decision in the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha Case proceeded on an erroneous basis that an activity, in order to be an undertaking analogous to trade or business, need not be an economic activity and in the sense that it is productive of material goods or material services. 11. To summa rise, an activity can be regarded as an 'industry' within the meaning of section 2 (j) only if there is relationship of employer and employees and the former is engaged in 'business' trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers' and the latter, 'in any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation'. Though 'undertaking' is a word of large import and it means anything undertaken or any project or enterprise, in the Context in which it occurs, it must be read as meaning an undertaking analogous to trade or business. In order that an activity may be regarded as an undertaking analogous to trade or business, it must be 'organised or arranged in a manner in which trade or business is generally organised or arranged". It must not be casual nor must it be for co-operation between employer and employees who associate together with a view to production, sale or distribution of material goods or material services. It is entirely irrelevant whether or not there is profit motive or investment of capital in Such activity. Even without these two features an activity can be an undertaking analogous to trade or business. It is entirely irrelevant whether or not there is profit motive or investment of capital in Such activity. Even without these two features an activity can be an undertaking analogous to trade or business. It is also immaterial "that its objects are charitable or that it does not make profits or even where profits are made, they are not distributed amongst the member, Management of F.I.C.C.I v. Workment4, or that its activity' is subsidised by the Government. Again it is not necessary that "the employer must always be a private individual.... The Act, in terms, contemplates cases of industrial disputes where the Government or a local authority or a public utility service may be the employer." Madras Gymkhana case, at p. 756 of the Report (1968) 1 S C R 742=(at p. 563 of AT R 1968 S C 554). It also makes no difference that the material services rendered by the undertaking are in public interest. The concept of public interest in a modern Welfare State, where new social values are fast emerging and old dying out, is indeed so wide and so broad and comprehensive in the spectrum and range that many activities which admittedly fall within the category of 'industry' are clearly designed to sub-serve public interest. In fact, whenever any industry is carried on by the Government it would be in public interest for the Government can act in the public interest. Whether an activity is carried on in public interest or not can, therefore, never be a criterion for determining its character as an industry. Having thus examined the legal concept of industry as expounded in the decisions of this Court we may now proceed to consider whether the activity of the Institution can be characterised as an industry in the light of the broad test discussed by us: 19. If the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in this decision is applied to the present case it is quite obvious that the activity carried on by Conservancy and Sanitation Department can be regarded as an undertaking analogous to trade or business. The conservancy and the sanitary department is organised or arranged in a manner in which trade or business is generally organised or arranged. It is not merely a casual undertaking. The conservancy and the sanitary department is organised or arranged in a manner in which trade or business is generally organised or arranged. It is not merely a casual undertaking. The success of this undertaking depends upon co-operation between the employer and employee who associate together with a view to render material services to the public. As observed by the Supreme Court, it is not necessary that the employer must always be a private individual because the Act in terms contemplate cases of industrial dispute where the Government or local authority or public utility service may be an employer. It also makes no difference that the material services rendered by the undertaking are in public interest. Further the concept of public interest in modern State, where new social values are fast emerging and old dying out is indeed so wide and so broad and comprehensive in its spectrum and range that many activities which admittedly fall within the category of 'industry' are clearly designed to sub-serve public interest. It cannot be disputed nor it is disputed before that the services rendered by the Conservancy and Sanitary Department are obviously in public interest as they render material services to the community. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, applying the test laid by the Supreme Court in the latest decision in Workmen I. S. Institution v. T. S. Institution, and in The Management of Safdar Jung Hospital v. Kuldip Singh it will have to be held that the activities carried on by the Sanitary and Conservancy Department of the Municipal council is an 'industry' within the meaning of the said term as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In the view which we have taken, therefore, the Labour Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the applications filed by the respondents-employees are maintainable and it has jurisdiction to entertain and decide the said applications. 20. In the result, therefore, the petition fails and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.