ORDER.-In these two petitions to quash the proceedings in C.C. Nos. 160 of 1975 and 161 of 1975 an the file of the First Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate’s Court, Gudivada, a short but interesting question of perhaps of some importance is raised. The question is, whether the failure of the Executive Officer of a temple to obtain prior approval of the Trustee to institute criminal proceedings as required under section 27(4)(c) of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) is fatal to the prosecution. 2. The facts giving raise to the petitions are these. The Executive Officer of Sri Ranganayakaswamivari Temple, Machilipatnam, filed complaints before the Additional Judicial First Glass Magistrate, Machilipatnam, for an offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code against the accused K. Pakeeraiah, formerly Executive Officer of the said temple alleging that the accused had misappropriated the funds of the temple and was absconding. The Magistrate took cognizance of the cases. The accused filed a petition in the cases contending that the complainant, namely, the Executive Officer failed to obtain the prior permission of the Trustee as required under clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 27 of the Act and that the absence of such a permission was fatal to the prosecution of the accused. The learned Magistrate dismissed the petitions. Hence these two petitions by the accused under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. 3. The answer to the question raised must necessarily depend on the construction of the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 27 (4) (c) of the Act, which is relevant, reads as follows; “27 (4) (a): The Executive Officer appointed under this section shall be under the administrative control of the trustee of the institution or endowment and shall be responsible for carrying out all lawful directions issued by such trustee, from time to time. (b) ... ... ... ... Section 27 (4) (c) of the Act, which is relevant, reads as follows; “27 (4) (a): The Executive Officer appointed under this section shall be under the administrative control of the trustee of the institution or endowment and shall be responsible for carrying out all lawful directions issued by such trustee, from time to time. (b) ... ... ... ... (c) The Executive Officer shall, with the prior approval of the trustee, institute any legal proceedings in the name of the institution or endowment, or defend any such legal proceedings.” The word ‘trustees’ is defined by section 2 (28) of the Act to mean, “any person whether known as mathadipati, mahant, dharmakarta, mutawalli, muntasim or by any other name, in whom either alone or in association with any other person, the administration and management of a charitable or religious institution or endowment are vested; and includes a Board of Trustees.” 4. It is not disputed that the complaints in these cases are filed by the Executive Officer in the name of the institution. It is equally not disputed that before filing the complaints, the Executive Officer had not obtained the prior approval of the trustee. Therefore, the question is whether failure to obtain the prior approval of the trustee is fatal to the prosecution. Clause 4 (c) merely states that the Executive Officer shall institute any legal paoceedings in the name of the institution after obtaining the prior approval of the trustee. According to Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, Third Edition, the words ‘legal proceedings’ mean any civil or criminal proceeding’ or inquiry in which evidence is, or may be given; and includes an arbitration. In the Law Lexicon of British India by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, the words ‘legal proceeding’ is defined to mean, a proceeding regulated or prescribed by law in which a judicial decision may or must be given. The phrase ‘legal proceedings’, is any proceeding in a Court of justice by which a party pursues a remedy which the law afffords him. The term embraces any of the formal steps or measures employed in the prosecution on defence of a suit; it refers to the use of a judicial process, vide S.C. Abboy v. Kanniappa Chettiar.1 5. The provisions of a statute must be construed by Courts to make it effective and workable and not inept. The term embraces any of the formal steps or measures employed in the prosecution on defence of a suit; it refers to the use of a judicial process, vide S.C. Abboy v. Kanniappa Chettiar.1 5. The provisions of a statute must be construed by Courts to make it effective and workable and not inept. The words ‘legal proceeding’ in the section should be given a wide connotation and bolder construction accepted to being about an effective result. So construed, it must be held that the term ‘legal proceeding’ embraces a proceeding regulated by law whether civil or criminal. 6. Then the question is what is the effect or consequence of disregarding this provision. The Legislature has not expressly declared its intention in unambiguous terms as to what shall be the consequence of non-compliance with the provision. Construing section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which the language employed is similar to section 27(4)(c) of the Act, this Court in Zahama Bee v. Reliance Corporation (P.) Ltd.1 held as follows: “The section also itself does not expressly provide for nullification of the proceedings as a consequence of noncompliance with the requirement of the section. Leave of the winding up Court can be obtained even after the commencement of the proceedings. The object of the provision appears to be to safeguard the company from being subjected to liability or being deprived of its rights and claims without the knowledge of the winding up Court. Therefore, leave of the Court can be obtained even subsequently and with retrospective effect.” 7. In these cases also, as already noticed, the section itself does not provide for the nullification of the proceedings as a consequence of the non-compliance with the requirements. Therefore, non-compliance with the provision is not fatal to the prosecution. Approval of the trustee can also be obtained even after the commencement of the criminal prosecution. Further, it is also clear from the order of the learned Magistrate that the Board of Trustees gave approval for the prosecution of the accused on 25th August, 1976 as evidenced by the minutes book of the institution for the year 1975-76. Therefore, there can be no bar for the prosecution of the accused after 25th August, 1976. 8. Further, it is also clear from the order of the learned Magistrate that the Board of Trustees gave approval for the prosecution of the accused on 25th August, 1976 as evidenced by the minutes book of the institution for the year 1975-76. Therefore, there can be no bar for the prosecution of the accused after 25th August, 1976. 8. It is next feebly contended that a criminal prosecution can only be launched by the Commissioner under section 55 of the Act and that the Executive Officer was not competent. I do not think there is any substance in the contention. Section 55 appears in Chapter VII under the beading ‘budget, accounts and audit’. Section 55 deals with rectification of defects detected by the Commissioner either suo motu or on a report by a Deputy Commissioner Assistant Commissioner or any other officer. The prosecution in these cases does not stem out of the defects detected in audit. 9. It follows that the criminal complaint filed by the Executive Officer on behalf of the institution and in the name of the institution are competent and valid. The petitions are, therefore, dismissed.