Short Note : 1. It was an appeal by the wife-appellant against the judgment and decree dated 6-7-1976 of the District Judge, Mandla, whereby he dismissed the appellant's application for judicial separation under section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Held : Per Bhachawat, J. The first question that is to be considered in this appeal is whether the appeal is in time and if barred by time, whether the application of the appellant under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act for condonation of the delay deserves to be allowed. Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act which relates to appeals from decrees and orders made by the Court in any proceedings under this Act. On perusal of the unamended section, it is clear that there was no special period of limitation provided in it and the period of limitation for appeals was governed by the Indian Limitation Act. As the appeal against a decree passed under the Act lies to the High Court, the period of limitation was, therefore, 90 days from the date of decree under the Indian Limitation Act, Article 116, before the amendment in section 28 of the Act. Now under sub-section (4) of the amended section, special period of limitation has been provided and it is 30 days from the date of the decree. Now, it is to be determined whether the period of limitation for the instant appeal would be 90 days or 30 days as provided under the amended section. To determine this question, the brief facts relevant are these the application under section 10 of the Act dated 25-1-1973 was presented before the coming into force of the amended section 28, which came into force from 1st June, 1976. The impugned judgment and decree were passed on 30-6-1976 i.e. after the coming into force of the amended section 28. The law of limitation is procedural in character, therefore, limitation applicable to a suit or proceeding would be governed by the law in force on the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding. It is true that it is also a settled position that a right of appeal is a vested right and that right of appeal is vested in the parties to the suit or proceedings on the date of institution of the suit or proceedings. It is true that it is also a settled position that a right of appeal is a vested right and that right of appeal is vested in the parties to the suit or proceedings on the date of institution of the suit or proceedings. But the right of filing an appeal within a particular time is not a vested right. In the above view of the matter, unless the new provision governing the limitation provided otherwise or justify an inference to the contrary, the limitation applicable to an appeal would be governed by law in force at the time of appeal. On a plain reading of amended section 28, this Court neither finds a specific provision nor we find anything from which it can be inferred that the period of limitation for appeal provided therein was to apply only to a decree or order passed in proceedings instituted subsequent to the coming into force of the amended section: In the light of the aforesaid di3cussion, this Court's conclusion is that the period of limitation far the instant appeal was 30 days. The instant appeal was filed on 23-8-1976. The impugned decree is dated 30-6-1976. The copying days required in obtaining the copies of the judgment and the decree are 11 (copy was applied for on 24-7-1976 and it was obtained on 3-8-1976). Excluding this period, the appeal is out of time by 13 days. Ranjit Singh Rao (Major) v. Raja Bai Saheba, 1968 JLJ 108 , relied on. 2. The application for condonation of delay has teen filed by the applicant stating that the last date for filing the appeal was 16-8-1976 But as the appellant was on emergency duty, from 7 A.M. to 7 P.M. she could not get time to contact her lawyer. Taking it to be true that the emergency duty of the appellant was from 7 A.M. to 7 P.M., still it cannot be said that there was no time for the appellant to have approached her counsel. She could approach the counsel after her duty hours. Taking it to be true that the emergency duty of the appellant was from 7 A.M. to 7 P.M., still it cannot be said that there was no time for the appellant to have approached her counsel. She could approach the counsel after her duty hours. It is a matter of common experience that the advocates offices, function generally after 7 P.M. Further, it cannot be believed that when the copy was obtained on 3-8-1976, in between 3-8-1976 and 10-8-1976 which was in fact and law the last date for filing the appeal after excluding the copying days or even taking 16-8-1976 to be the last day as per the appellant, there was no off day available to the appellant. This apart, when the counsel who filed the instant appeal and is appearing for the appellant is the same who conducted the case in the trial Court, the appellants could have sent the papers and necessary expenses to him for filing the appeal, if she was careful in filing the appeal. This Court finds that the appellant was negligent and a cause arising from the negligence of the party cannot be said to be beyond the control of the party and cannot be termed as sufficient cause under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Appeal time barred was dismissed. 3. Per S.R. Vays, J.-The main question to be determined in this case was as to whether the period of limitation for this appeal was 30 days, as provided by S. 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act as amended by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act No. 68 of 1976). Before this section was introduced by the aforesaid Amendment Act, there was no specific period of limitation prescribed by the Hindu Marriage Act for an appeal to this Court against a decree passed by a District Court, The period of limitation was then governed by the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act and according to Article, an appeal could be filed within 90 days. In this case, the decree under appeal was passed on 30th June 1976, when S. 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act as amended by the Amendment Act had already come into force with effect from 27th May 1976. In this case, the decree under appeal was passed on 30th June 1976, when S. 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act as amended by the Amendment Act had already come into force with effect from 27th May 1976. Consequently, the question of limitation for this appeal bad to be considered in accordance with the law that was in force on the date when the decree under appeal was passed. The appellant could not and, indeed, did not contend that she could file the present appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act and it was precisely for that reason that an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay was made by the appellant. According to S. 29 of the Limitation Act, the provisions of that Act would apply only when no specific period of Limitation has been prescribed for any suit or appeal or other proceedings under any special or local law and since, in the instant case, the special law viz. the Hindu Marriage Act as amended by the Amendment Act did not specify a period of 30 days for filing the present appeal and further; since S. 28 had already come into force when the decree under appeal was passed, it was necessary for the appellant to file the appeal within that period of limitation which was prescribed by S. 28 and not by the period prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act. A question may arise as to what would be the period of limitation applicable to an appeal preferred against a decree passed in a suit which was instituted when a particular period of limitation was prescribed for filing an appeal against the decree that may be passed in that suit. The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right will be governed by the law as it was in force on the date when the suit is instituted. But a litigant has no vested right so far as the period of limitation is concerned. This is not a case where a decree under the Hindu Marriage Act was passed prior to the introduction of S. 28 as amended by the Amendment Act, and a period of limitation had started. On the contrary, this is a case where the period of limitation commenced to run only after the decree under appeal was passed. This is not a case where a decree under the Hindu Marriage Act was passed prior to the introduction of S. 28 as amended by the Amendment Act, and a period of limitation had started. On the contrary, this is a case where the period of limitation commenced to run only after the decree under appeal was passed. In that event it is only the law of Limitation in force on the date of the decree that would govern computation of the period of limitation and not the old law which was in force when the lis was commenced. In the opinion of this Court, therefore, in this case the period of limitation for the present appeal will have to be considered in the light of the amended provisions of section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act. As already mentioned, the decree under appeal itself was passed after the Act was amended and any appeal from such a decree would be governed by the rule of limitation as was in force on the date the decree under appeal was passed. In this view of the matter, the appeal was, admittedly, filed beyond the period of 30 days and must be held as barred by time. Syed Yousuf Yar Khan and others v. Syed Mohammad Yar Khan, AIR 1967 SC 1318 , Mosque Shahid Ganj and others v. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, AIR 1940 PC 116 , Ram Karan Singh and another v. Ramdas Singh and others, AIR 1931 All. 635 (FB), Bankeylal v. Sabu and others AIR 1953 All. 747 (FB) Gopidas Ganpatdas and another v. Tribhuwan and others, AIR 1921 Bombay 40, relied on. 4. On the question of the application made tinder section 5 of the Limitation Act, this Court agrees with the view taken by learned brother Bhachawat, J. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.