B. K. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) WHAT is the width and import of Be-law No. 9 (1) of the Bye-laws of Kalol Municipality seeking to grant exemption from the liability of octroi duty to new industries and separate expanded Units of the exiting as explained therein on the raw-materials semi-finished goods plants and machinery or any articles brought within the octroi limits of Kalol Municipality for a period of five years is the only and interesting question which arises in this petition. The question arises in the context of the following circumstances: ( 2 ) AHMEDABAD Manufacturing and Calico Printing Company Limited a public limited company having its registered office at Ahmedabad (hereinafter known as as the Company for the sake of brevity) purchased the then Bharat Vijay Mills No. 1 in May 1959 and started running it under the management of its subsidiary Company Kalol Mills Private Limited which was amalgamated with the holding Company by the order of this Court of October 13 1969 with retrospective effect from April 1 1969 The textile unit of the Company at Kalol is known as Kalol Mills and is situated within the limits of Kalol Municipality which was before the application of the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 a District Municipality constituted under the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 The Company decided to expand the existing unit of Kalol Mills in or around the year 1962 and for that purpose added 75 looms which were installed during the period commencing from June 1962 to June 1963 It is claimed by the Company that a new shed was constructed for installation of 10512 spindles in the course of the period commencing from 1962 to 1964 The Company started working the aforesaid spindles somewhere in the year 1964-65. This installation will be referred to as the First Installation for the purpose of convenience. It is claimed that a separate account Known as Calico Account was maintained in respect of the raw materials and the spares consumed in the aforesaid new unit with effect from April 1 1966 It appears that the Company decided to make further expansion in the year 1969 by adding 7200 additional spindles for which a new shed was constructed on the premises of Kalol Mills. The said 7200 spindles were imported within the octroi limits of Kalol Municipality in the year 1970. The said 7200 spindles were imported within the octroi limits of Kalol Municipality in the year 1970. In the course of the period from May 4 1970 to November 30 1970 5690 spindles were actually installed and started functioning and at the time of this petition the remaining 1600 spindles were under installation. This will be referred to as the Second Installation for purposes of convenience. It is claimed by the Company that a separate account known as Kalol Account No. 2 was maintained by the Company in respect of the raw materials machinery and spares used in the aforesaid new unit set up as a result of the Second Installation. The Kalol District Municipality the predecessor of the respondent-Municipality had framed Bye law in respect of octroi in virtue of its powers under sec. 46 (1) 59 and 48 (1) (J) of the Bombay District Municipal Act. 1901. ( 3 ) PURSUANT to the application of the Gujarat Municipalities Act the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 was repealed and the respondent Municipality is now governed under the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 with effect from 1-1-1964. The respondent. Municipality amended its original Bye-laws for levy and collection of octroi by inserting new Byeof 9 (1) which in effect granted exemption from payment of octroi duty on raw materials semi-finished goods plant and machinery and any articles brought within the octroi limits of Kalol Municipality by a new industry or a separate extended unit of the existing industry for a period of five years from the date of starting of the industry or the date of corning into force of the aforesaid Bye law whichever is later. The company therefore made an application on December 12 1966 for exemption from the liability of payment of octroi duty on raw materials spare-parts and machinery imported within the octroi limits in connection with the First Installation during the period co-mmencing from 1962 to 1964. Since the respondent-Municipality did not respond favourably the Company made several reminders by its letters of March 16 1967 December 19 1968 June 21 1968 and November 25 1968 addressed to the President of the respondent-Municipality. The respondent-Municipality thereafter responded and asked the Company by its letter of April 16 1969 to send the particulars in proforma No. 1 for claiming the said exemption from the liability of octroi duty. The respondent-Municipality thereafter responded and asked the Company by its letter of April 16 1969 to send the particulars in proforma No. 1 for claiming the said exemption from the liability of octroi duty. The Company filled in the necessary particulars of the first Installation and forwarded the performa under the cover of its letter of May 14 1969 to the Municipality. Similarly the Company forwarded the particulars in the proforma in respect of the Second Installation under the cover of its letter of August 25 1969 The respondentmunicipality by its letter of December 15 1969 intimated the Company that the matter will be placed before the Central Board of the Municipality in its meeting to be held on December 17 1969 and asked the Manager of the Kalol Mills to remain present at the said meeting. The Manager of the Kalol Branch presented a Memorandum to the Central Board of the respondent-Municipality in its meeting on the aforesaid: date setting out necessary particulars justifying the claim for exemption and also pointing out that the Chairman and the Octroi Inspector of the respondent-Municipality were satisfied in all respects thereof when they visited the premises of the Kalol Mills. Inspite of the submission of necessary particulars when the respondentmunicipality did not decide the claim of the company a letter was addresto the Collector on June 17 1970 setting out all the necessary particulars in connection with its claim of exemption and particularly the discrimination practised by the respondent-Municipality in granting exemption to other industrial units situated in exactly similar situation and requested him to look into the matter and direct the Municipality to set it right. The Collector Mehsana therefore forwarded the letter of the Company under the cover of his letter of even date recommending that the exemption claimed by the Company appeared to be justified and requesting the respondent-Municipality to pass early orders in the matter under intimation to him since it was delayed for a considerable length of time. To the surprise of the Company. To the surprise of the Company. The respondent-Municipality by its letter of July 13 1970 informed that their application for exemption had been turned down by the General Board of the respondent-Municipality as resolved by Resolution No. 99 in its meeting of July 9 1970 Since nd reasons were stated in this letter for rejecting the grant of exemption the company by its letter of July 30 1970 requested the respondent-Municipality to furnish them with a copy of the said Resolution No. 99 as well as the relevant papers in connection therewith. The respdndentmunicipality forwarded copy of the resolution under the cover of its letter of August 22 1970 The grievance of the Company is that the said resolution did not state any reasons for denying the exemption to the company on the goods and articles brought within the octroi limits of the respondent-Municipality in connection with the First Installation and Second Installation. The Company was therefore compelled to move this Court for appropriate writ order and direction challenging the impugned resolution as ultra vires its powers under the Act and the relevant Bye-laws without authority of law and unconstitutional inasmuch as it was in violation of the fundamental rights of the company under Articles 14 19 and 31 of the Constitution of India and therefore void and ineffective and also for enjoining the respondent-Municipality to grant exemption to the Company on machinery spare-parts raw materials brought within the octroi limits of the respondent-Municipality in condition with the First and Second Installations and more particularly described in Annexures (B) and E to the petition and to make refund of the amounts illegally collected and restraining the respondent-Municipality from collecting octroi on machinery spares and raw material imported or to be imported as detailed in Annexure E to the petition. ( 4 ) THIS petition has been resisted by the respondent-Municipality and various affidavits have been filed on its behalf at different stages of this petition. Since in the impugned resolution the reasons were not stated for negativing the claim of the company of exemption and a cryptic statement has been made therein that for the reasons mentioned in the statement-report the claim for exemption is rejected I have asked the respondent-Municipality to produce the statement report which has been produced now and placed on record with consent of the parties hereto. Broadly stated the case of the respondent-Municipality was of denial about the facts of the First and Second Installations as well the import of machinery raw materials and spare-parts in connection therewith during the period as averred by the company and that they did not constitute separate expanded units as required by Bye-law No. 9a which postulates necessarily that the expansion of the existing industry must be a self-contained block in order to earn exemption from the liability of payment of octroi duty under the relevant Bye-laws and in any case the obligations prescribed under the said Bye-law of making necessary declaration of articles to the Municipality at the time of their import and of their use for the purpose for which they were imported were not satisfied. ( 5 ) AT the time of hearing of this petition. Mr. Vakil learned Advocate appearing for the respondent-Municipality raised preliminary objection that this Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction and relegate the parties to a regular civil suit in a competent court of law as disputed questions of facts arise in this petition. In his submission the questions (1) whether the expansion of the Company constituted separate expanded unit or new industry (2) whether the articles brought within the octroi limits were declared at the time of import or which of them were used for the purpose of alleged installations and therefore entitled to exemption and (3) what is the exact period for which the exemption is available; are purely questions of facts which cannot be decided in these proceedings and the parties must be left to get adjudication from the Civil Court in regular action. Mr. Vakil also objected to the Court going into the merits of legal contentions only as the Court will not be able nor be competent to decide the disputed questions of facts since it would be otherwise embarking upon investigation and adjudication of academic questions which the Courts should not do. Mr. Vakil also objected to the Court going into the merits of legal contentions only as the Court will not be able nor be competent to decide the disputed questions of facts since it would be otherwise embarking upon investigation and adjudication of academic questions which the Courts should not do. ( 6 ) ON behalf of the Company it was urged that since the basic facts are not in dispute between the parties inasmuch as it is more or less an admitted position as disclosed from the statement report in which reasons are slated for negativing the claim made and which has been accepted in the impugned resolution the aforesaid questions raised on behalf of the respondent-Municipality are merely inferences from the basic fact and therefore this Court should not refuse the discretion to grant writs as prayed for if the Company is really entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 7 ) IT is no doubt true that it is not the practise of Courts to decide disputed questions of facts in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (vide: UNION OF INDIA V. T. R. VARMA A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 882; KAMINI KUMAR DAS CHOUDHURY V. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 2060; AND JAGDISH PRASAD V. STATE OF U. P. A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 1224 IN D. L. F. HOUSING CONSTRUCTION P. LTD. V. DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND OTHERS A. I. R. 1976 S C. 386 where one D. L. F. Housing Construction Private Limited which was carrying on business of establishing colonies and development of lands in Delhi sought appropriate writs etc against the Delhi Municipal Corporation from interfering with the peaceful possession and ownership of the plot of lands in those colonies developed by the petitioner-Company in that case as they were the owners and in possession of the land which was disputed by the Municipal Corporation. Sarkaria J. speaking for the Court observed:"in a case where the basic facts are disputed and complicated questions of law and fact depending on evidence are involved the writ Court is not the proper forum for seeking relief". Sarkaria J. speaking for the Court observed:"in a case where the basic facts are disputed and complicated questions of law and fact depending on evidence are involved the writ Court is not the proper forum for seeking relief". However I do not think that there is any merit in this preliminary objection since in the statement report which was submitted before the General Meeting of the respondent-Municipality held on December 17 1969 the case of the Company about the installation of 10512 spindles and 75 looms and installation of 7200 spindles is admitted. However these installations in the opinion of the respondent-Municipality would not entitle the Company to exemption inasmuch as there was no separate blow room or throstle department for these spindles or the spinning or weaving departments and therefore they would not constitute separate expanded unit. The necessary averments about the installation of 10512 spindles and 75 looms in a newly constructed shed has been made in paragraph 3 of the petition. It is no doubt true that the respondent-Municipality has in paragraph 9 of the affidavit-in-reply of its Chief Officer has broadly denied this averment. However in affidavit-in-rejoinder filed on behalf of the Company it has been asserted unequivocally in paragraph 4 as under in respect of the First and Second Installations:. . . "the petitioner company has in its possession the building permission from the respondent Municipality for the construction of the said unit. The petitioner company craves leave to refer to and rely upon the said building permission at the hearing of the petition. The petitioner company also has in its possession plans of the construction of the above unit referred to as the first installation. The petitioner company has also bills and the vouchers with regard to the construction of the above new unit during the period mentioned in para 1 of the petition. The petitioner company will give inspection of the same to the respondent municipality as and when demanded and will refer to and rely upon the same at the hearing of the petition". After the above unit was set up the municipality had itself granted to the petitioner company permission to occupy the same also Thus it is amply evident from the documentary records that a separate shed as referred to in para 1 of the petition was constructed by the petitioner company. After the above unit was set up the municipality had itself granted to the petitioner company permission to occupy the same also Thus it is amply evident from the documentary records that a separate shed as referred to in para 1 of the petition was constructed by the petitioner company. In this separate shed 10512 spindles were installed during the period mentioned in para 1 of the petition. I further say that a separate account known as Calico Account was maintained in respect of the raw materials and spare to be used in the looms and spindles set up in the new unit known as Calico Unit and referred to in the petition as first installation from April 1966. I further say that the officers of the respondent municipality have visited the first installation and have taken inspection of all the relevant records of the company. Further the petitioner company has been claiming exemption since December 12 1966 with regard to the raw material and spares used in the aforesaid new unit. At no time the respondent Municipality or its officers have disputed the basic facts relating to the claim of the petitioner company. They have never disputed in the past that the first installation was not newly set up nor have they ever disputed in the past that no separate account was maintained with regard to the raw materials and the spares used in the new unit known as the first installation. The petitioner company states that with regard to the old and already existing unit an account known as Kalol Mills Account was being maintained. The Calico Account started being maintained with regard to the first installation only. The Octroi Registers Consumption Registers and the Receipt and Stock Registers have been inspected by the officers of the respondent Municipality and they have never disputed in the past the basic facts relating to the claim of the petitioner company mentioned in the correspondence since December 1966 They have never disputed that the goods were imported for use as raw materials and as spares in the machinery in the first installation and they were in fact also used in the first installation for the purpose for which they were imported viz. for manufacturing in the new unit. I further say that the petitioner company has account current with the respondent municipality. for manufacturing in the new unit. I further say that the petitioner company has account current with the respondent municipality. Sec. 128 of the Gujarat Municipality Act 1963 allows any firm or persons or mercantile firm or public body to have an account kept with regard to the octroi with the Municipality. The slid account has to be settled at intervals not exceeding three months and the person the firm or the public body has to furnish sufficient security deposit to the respondent municipality. The petitioner company has account current with the respondent municipality since the beginning. The petitioner company had declared the goods imported to be used for manufacturing in the newly set up unit in regard to which a separate Calico Account was maintained. Every month the petitioner company used to furnish to the municipality a statement with regard to the cotton bales received on Calico Account. This statement gave details of the merchants from whom the goods were purchased the weight and the value of the goods. These details were furnished every month to the respondent municipality. It was specifically mentioned in the statement that cotton bales were received on Calico Account which meant that they were to be used on the spindles installed in the newly expanded unit referred to as the first installation (Colico Account ). From the above it would be clear that the goods were declared by the petitioner company at the time of import as to be used in the newly expanded unit known as Calico Unit and referred to in the petition as the first installation. Further the above goods were in fact used for the purpose of manufacture in the newly expanded unit. The respondent Municipality or its officers have never disputed the fact that the goods imported on Calico Account were in fact used on the spindles covered by the Calico Account and the first installation as referred to in the petition. . "5 The petitioner company has in its possession building permission and the permission for occupation given by the respondent municipality after the completion of the new shed This would clearly show that the new shed was constructed in the year 1969 by the petitioner company as per the plans approved by the Kalol Municipality. This was known as Kalol Account No. 2. This was known as Kalol Account No. 2. The petitioner company has in its possession bills for construction of the new sheds also. The petitioner company is ready and willing to give inspection of the above materials to the respondentmunicipality and crave leave to refer to and rely upon the same at the hearing of the petition. The petitioner company has also written a letter dated December 17 1969 addressed to the President and the members of therefore Municipality stating that they have constructed a new shed for installing 7200 new spindles. They have also stated that the company will maintain separate accounts with regard to them and had filled in and submitted form No 1 for exemption from octroi with regard to the unit known Kalol Unit No. 2 They had also stated that the nest shed was constructed for installing 200 spindles and that this shed is known as Kalol Unit No. 2 and a separate account will be maintained for the same. They had also stated that the Chairman and the Octroi Inspector had come for Inspecting the same and were satisfied with regard to the basic facts relating to the claim of the petitioner company for exemption. . . . "in affidavit-in-sur-rejoinder of its Chief Officer the respondentmunicipality contended as under in reply to the facts stated by the Company in its affidavit-in-rejoinder as extracted above: i say the spindles are one of the ingredients of Mill and only some spindles were increased whereas other department remained same. So unit started by the Petitioners company cannot be treated as New Separate expanded unit. I say that it is true that the file containing plans and re-constructed shed was shown to the petitioners Advocate but deny that the plans clearly showed that a new shed was to be constructed by the petitioner Mills. I say that the addition in the Existing construction as shown in the said plan was undertaken by Kalol Mills Ltd. as an Additional Part of their original unit and it was never shown in the application or any other plan that new shed was a separate unit or construction was intended unit as separate expanded unit. I say that the addition in the Existing construction as shown in the said plan was undertaken by Kalol Mills Ltd. as an Additional Part of their original unit and it was never shown in the application or any other plan that new shed was a separate unit or construction was intended unit as separate expanded unit. A further affidavit-in-sur-rejoinder on behalf of the respondent-Municipality has been filed on 6th December 1976 wherein in paragraph 2 it has been contended with reference to the aforesaid averments in the affidavitin-rejoinder of the Company as under: i say that the same building cannot be called a separate expanded unit of the petitioner-company. I say that no declaration was made by the petitioner-company at the octroi make while exporting any of the spares or spindles mentioned in the said paragraph. I deny that at no time the respondent or its officers have disputed the basic facts relating to the claim of the petitioner-company. I also deny that the respondent never disputed in the past that the first installation has not newly set up nor have they ever disputed in past that no separate account was maintained with regard to the raw materials and the spares used in the nest unit known as the first installation. I say that the concerned officer visited the petitioner company and he saw whether the octroi account as to the octroi has been maintained or not. It has no relevance with the exemption of the octroi as the Board had not decided regarding exemption. I deny that a separate account known as Calico Account was maintained in respect of raw materials and spares to be used in the looms and spindles set up in new unit known as Calico Unit referred to in the petition as the first installation from April 1966. I say that as the petitioner-company has furnished the statements after the goods have been consumed. the respondent-Municipality has no source to know that which goods have been consumed in the new account. I deny that the petitioner-Company had declared the goods imported to be used for manufacturing in the newly set up unit in regard to which a separate account was maintained. the respondent-Municipality has no source to know that which goods have been consumed in the new account. I deny that the petitioner-Company had declared the goods imported to be used for manufacturing in the newly set up unit in regard to which a separate account was maintained. From the rival pleadings extracted above I agree with the learned Advocate for the Company that the basic facts are not in dispute since the real both of contention between the parties is that the installations of spindles and looms in a new shed which was merely extension of the existing factory building and the expansion was not a self-contained unit by itself inasmuch as the therefore room the blow room and other departments were not set up along with these installations the Company was not entitled to claim exemption as the relevant bye-law granted the exemption from the liability of octroi either to the new industry or to the separate expanded unit of existing industry which postulates that the expansion of the existing industry in order to be qualified to exemption must be a self-contained unit. The dispute now raised by the respondent-Municipality regarding the fact of the construction of new shed appears to be an after-thought Mr. Vakil for the respondent-Muncipality has fairly conceded that he did not dispute the construction of new shed. The second question of fact which is sought to be disputed that the good were not decision at the time of import is not essentially a question of fact since it is not in dispute that what goods and articles brought by the Company within the municipal limits were declared at the octroi out-post and they were entered in the current account of the Company which the Municipality is maintaining The dispute sought to be raised in the return filed by the respondent-Municipality to this petition appears to be that the goods which are said to have been used for the expansion were not clearly earmarked and declared accordingly at the time of import. It is also clear that the basic fact that the Company is maintaining two separate accounts known as Calico Account and Kalol Account No. 2 in connection with the First and Second Installations respectively and that they were examined by the officers of the respondent-Municipality is also not in dispute. It is also clear that the basic fact that the Company is maintaining two separate accounts known as Calico Account and Kalol Account No. 2 in connection with the First and Second Installations respectively and that they were examined by the officers of the respondent-Municipality is also not in dispute. The exemptions have been claimed according to these accounts which were also furnished to the respondent-Municipality from time to time. The only dispute is whether the Bye-law required as a condition precedent before successfully claiming the exemption that the articles actually used in new industry or expanded industry should be earmarked and declared as such before these articles or goods are brought within the municipal limits. In other words what was the point of time at which these goods should be earmarked and declared ? That is a question of law the answer to which would determine whether it is a condition precedent and if so whether it is satisfied or not. The question as to the period cannot be in my opinion a question of fact because it is on the interpretation of Clause B of Bye-law No. 9 (1) that the period of exemption will be determined. The Company is claiming exemption on raw materials etc. brought and consumed by them in respect of the First Installation from April 1966 and for the Second Installation in about 1968-69. The preliminary objection therefore has no merit in it and should be rejected. ( 8 ) THE objection of Mr. Vakil that this Court should not embark upon academic inquiry and advice of the legal contentions since the Court would not be competent to go into the disputed questions of facts should also be rejected in the view of the matter which I am taking on the preliminary contention of Mr. Vakil as stated above. It is no doubt true that Courts ordinarily ought not to go into academic questions as cautioned by the Supreme Court in CHANDRA SHEKHAR SINGH BHOI V. STATE OF ORISSA where the validity of Orissa Land Reforms Act 16 of 1916 as amended by Act No. 13 of 1965 was sought to be challenged though Chapter IV of the Principal Act was not brought in force. In that context the Supreme Court observed that Courts ordinarily ought not to go into the question of the validity of an Act or a provision of the Act unless it has been brought into force because such a question till then would be academic since nobody can be said to be aggrieved by a provision of law which is a dormant and which cannot be enforced. The objection of Mr. Vakil therefore in the situation as it arises in the present petition before me cannot be upheld because the respondent-Municipality has in effect and substance negatived the claim of exemption of the petitioner-Company on the construction of a legal provision contained in the relevant Bye-law. As a matter of fact it has assumed and satisfied itself on certain basic facts as stated above and therefore it would not be academic for the Court to try to adjudicate the question whether the construction preferred by the respondent-Municipality was correct or not. In any case even assuming that the facts have not been fully ascertained or there are some disputed aspects of the factual position even then the rejection of the claim of the petitioner-Company on the construction of the legal provision contained in the relevant Bye-law would certainly furnish a cause of action to the aggrieved party namely the petitioner-Company to seek the decision of the Court on the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the respondent-Municipality. To that extent it cannot be urged successfully that the Court is embarking upon any academic inquiry and advice. ( 9 ) THAT takes me to the main question as to what is the width and import of Bye-law No. 9 (1) which grants exemption to new industry or separate expanded unit of the existing industry from payment of octroi duty on raw materials semi-finished goods plant and machinery or any articles brought within the municipal limits ?bye-law No. 9 (1) should be Set out in extension in order to appreciate the various facets of the rival contentions. The said Bye-law reads as under: "bye-law No. 9 (1 ). The said Bye-law reads as under: "bye-law No. 9 (1 ). A. This bye-law shall only be applicable the New Industries and separate expanded units of the existing industries as mentioned below: (i) Raw materials semi-finished goods plant and machinery or any articles brought within the limits of the Kalol District Municipality by a new industry not for sale but manufacturing any goods or for erecting any factory. Explanation: 1. a. Any industry established on or after the 1st May 1960 b. any industry which has been established before 1st May 1960 but in which the production of goods has commenced after the 1st May 1960; c. in the case of any industry established before the 1st May 1960 but which has undergone or which undergoes expansion after that date the expanded part of such industry explanation: 2 for the purpose of this Clause Expansion shall not include replacement or overhauling of any existing machinery. B. The exemption granted by this clause in respect of any new Industry shall remain in force for a period of five years from the date of starting of such industry or the date of coming into force of this clause whichever date is later. C. The articles which require exemption from the payment of octroi must be declared to the Municipality at the time of their import. D. The articles imported for new industry or for the expanded part of the existing industry must be used for the purpose for which they are imported and in case the articles or part thereof are not to be used for the purpose for which they are imported or are to be disposed of the importer shall be liable to pay the octroi duty on the said articles before their disposal. If the importer fails to comply with the above clause octroi shall be recovered from him. Recovery of octroi shall not absolve the importer from Criminal Prosecution under the B. D. M. Act 1901 (Bombay Act No. III of 1901 ). It must be conceded that this Bye-law is the best illustration of ill-conceived scheme of exemption indifferent draftsmanship and inadvertant State and local self-Governments which in number of cases presumably result in misfire of legislative intent. It must be conceded that this Bye-law is the best illustration of ill-conceived scheme of exemption indifferent draftsmanship and inadvertant State and local self-Governments which in number of cases presumably result in misfire of legislative intent. I have not been able to appreciate inspite of taking charitable view of the matter as to how such a halfhearted attempt has found its place on the statute book of the Bye-laws of the Municipality inspite of the fact that this must have been considered and approved by the Development Commissioner of the State Government before granting necessary sanction. Nowhere in the Bye-law we find a clear mandate to grant exemption. This is the most unfortunate state of affair that though all parties agree that the respondent-Municipality decided to grant exemption to new industries and to provide for such exemption the Bye-laws for levy and collection of octroi duty were amended by inserting an appropriate provision in connection therewith the relevant Bye-law did not in terms provide for granting the exemption. What is new industry is also not clearly defined. The structure of the relevant Bye-law is so ill-conceived that it is very difficult to spell out what was the intent of the local authority. The scope of the Explanations is well understood and recognised in the art of drafting of statute. Whether the Explanations in the relevant Bye-law with which I am concerned define the term or clarify the scope of main enactment is a matter of everybodys guess. The fate of the tax administrator and the tax-payer in these circumstances is really pitiable and in my opinion the entire fault is of the competent authority of the State Government who is supposed to apply mind and direct and guide the Municipality in such important matters of taxation including tax exemption. The fate of the tax administrator and the tax-payer in these circumstances is really pitiable and in my opinion the entire fault is of the competent authority of the State Government who is supposed to apply mind and direct and guide the Municipality in such important matters of taxation including tax exemption. Any way the learned Advocate for the respondent-Municipality fairly stated that the respondent-Municipality did not want to take an extreme stand that the relevant Bye-law does not provide for exemption though he admitted clearly that such an extreme proposition is plausible but since the respondent-Municipality is granting exemption to various industries situated within its municipal limits he did not propose to adopt such a stand and he requested the Court to proceed on the concession that by Bye-law No. 9 (1) the Municipality has granted exemption from the payment of octroi duty on raw materials semi-finished goods plant machinery and other articles brought within the octroi limits by a new industry for manufacturing any goods or creating any factory. He only joined issue with the Company on the question as to what is the meaning of the terms new industry and separate expanded unit of existing industry which are admittedly entitled to exemption under the said Bye-law He also joined issue on the question as to the declaration of articles on which the exemption is claimed in that whether the articles should be earmarked and declared to the Municipality at the time of import or not and what is the period for which such an exemption is available. ( 10 ) I have therefore to construe the terms new industry and separate expanded unit of the existing industry which are entitled to Exemption as prescribed in the aforesaid Bye-law. On behalf of the petitioner-company it has been urged that Explanation I to Clause A (i) of the aforesaid Bye-law defines what is new industry as well separate expanded unit of the existing industry. In submission of the learned Advocate for the Company the phrases new industry and separate expanded unit of the existing industry are compendious terms which should not be dissected into two water tight compartments so as to mean new industries as established for the first time and expansions of already existing industries. Explanation 1 in submission of the learned Advocate for the Company broadly defines both the categories of industry which are entitled to exemption. Explanation 1 in submission of the learned Advocate for the Company broadly defines both the categories of industry which are entitled to exemption. On the other hand it has been contended on behalf of the respondent-Municipality that there is a clear dichotomy made in the main enactment contained in Clause-A of Bye-law 9 (1) as to the industries which are entitled to exemption. This dichotomy according to the learned Advocate for the respondent-Municipality is new industries and existing industries. If an industry is established for the first time before 1 May 1960 or though established before 1st May 1960 has commenced production thereafter it would be a new industry. If on the other hand the industry has been established and commenced its production before 1st May 1960 it would be an existing industry and in case of such an existing industry the expansion thereof would qualify itself for exemption provided it is separate expanded unit. It has been strenuously urged on behalf of the respondent-Municipality that Clauses (a) and (b) of Explanation 1 define new industry while Clause (c) defines expansion of existing industry. None-the-less an existing industry cannot successfully claim exemption in respect of its expansion unless it satisfies the condition laid down in the main enactment in Clause-A namely expansion must be a separate unit by itself. ( 11 ) IT is in this context that I have to determine what is the width and scope of the exemption. It must be borne in mind that the Municipality is seeking to provide for exemption from the liability of octroi duty so as to give fillip to new industry including the expansions and therefore no conditions should be read in the Bye-law which are not warranted so as to defeat its purpose. It is equally true that the Bye-law is in the nature of a concession providing exemption to new industries from the liability of octroi duty and it should therefore be construed liberally and in favour of tax-payer (vide KAMESHWAR SING V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX (1957) 32 ITR 587 and COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-LAX V. CHUGANDAS AND CO. (1965) 55 ITR 17 ). The provisions of a statute allowing deduction are also to be liberally construed (vide NEW SHRROCK SPG. and MFG. CO. LTD. V COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX 30 ITR 338 ). (1965) 55 ITR 17 ). The provisions of a statute allowing deduction are also to be liberally construed (vide NEW SHRROCK SPG. and MFG. CO. LTD. V COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX 30 ITR 338 ). It is no doubt true that if the exemption is subject to conditions which are prescribed to prevent fraud and collusion in an attempt to evade tax and facilitate administrative efficiency the conditions must be satisfied (vide KEDARNATH JUTE MFG. CO. LTD. V. COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICERS AND OTHERS A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 12 ). It cannot be gainsaid that Bye-law 9 (1) provides a concession and give incentive to new industries. It would be travesty of the language to say that the expansion of an existing industry would not be a new industry at all unless the expansion is a new self-contained unit by itself. If the interpretation urged on behalf of the respondent-Municipality that the expansion qualifies for exemption only if it constitutes a self-contained separate unit it would not only defeat the purpose but would result in tautology inasmuch as it would be entitled to claim exemption as new industry on its own. It is no doubt true that we have to give full effect to the words of the main enactment granting exemption but at the same time we must not attribute any exercise in futility to the Municipality in providing the exemption or indulging in tautology when once the exemption is already provided by prescribing superfluous words. Mr. Vakil was right when he contended on behalf of the respondent-Municipality that the exemption is sought to be provided in the main enactment in Clause A to the industries which have come into existence for the first time after 1st of May 1960 and to the expanded units of the industries which were already in existence before that date and therefore there is a clear dichotomy between the new industries and the existing industries However from that dichotomy it would not be justified to reach the conclusion that the existing industry can claim exemption in respect of its expansion only if the expansion is a self-contained block by itself. This inference was sought to be made good by relying on the words separate expanded units. It was sought to be emphasised that unit postulates that the expansion must be self-contained. This inference was sought to be made good by relying on the words separate expanded units. It was sought to be emphasised that unit postulates that the expansion must be self-contained. I am afraid I cannot agree with this submission of the learned Advocate for the respondent-Municipality because in that case Clause (c) of Explanation I becomes otiose. Explanation 1 as stated above is trying to clarify and explain as to which industries are entitled to exemption The combined effect of Clauses (a) and (b) of the said Explanation is to provide exemption for the new industries which have gone into production after 1st May 1960. Clause (c) on the other hand provides by necessary implications exemption for expansion of an industry which has already went into production before 1 May 1960. On true construction and effect of Clause (c) it is clear that the Municipality extended the concession to the expanded part of the industry established before 1st May 1960 which has undergone or which undergoes expansion after the said date. In other words the exemption is granted to the extent of the expanded part of the existing industry which is in production before 1st May 1960 and has undergone expansion thereafter. If the interpretation canvassed on behalf of the respondentmunicipality is accepted the intention evinced in Clause (c) to exempt the expanded part of the industry already in existence before 1st May 1960 and expanding thereafter from the liability of octroi duty would be defeated. It is the expanded part of the industry which is entitled to exemption and not the entire industry in existence and production before the prescribed date. It was therefore urged by Mr. Vakil on behalf of the respondent-Municipality that he had no quarrel with the proposition that the expanded part of the industry is entitled to exemption but is subject to further qualification prescribed in the main enactment contained in Clause (a) that it should be a separate unit of the existing industry and the word unit would mean a self-contained and self-sufficient block by itself. It is no doubt true that the dictionary meaning of word unit is to denote a standard of measurement in terms of which other quantities may be expressed and that such standard should be single and complete in itself. It is no doubt true that the dictionary meaning of word unit is to denote a standard of measurement in terms of which other quantities may be expressed and that such standard should be single and complete in itself. However this dictionary meaning cannot be imported wholly in construing the provision contained in the main enactment and it is to be read and construed in the context in which it is used otherwise it would be self-defeating. As stated above the interpretation canvassed on behalf of the respondent-Municipality of the words separate expanded unit of existing industry is accepted rot only there will be a tautology in some part of the Bye-law and some part would become otiose but the expanded part of the industry would not earn and qualify for exemption unless the existing industry sets up and establishes a new unit of the industry itself. For illustration a textile mill would rot be entitled to exemption unless it establishes a complete weaving or spinning department or a cement factory unless it sets up a new unit of slurrykiln and grinding mill because till then the cement cannot be manufactured. I am not therefore inclined to accept this interpretation which has been canvassed on behalf of the respondent-Municipality. There is also another reason and inherent indication in the Bye-law for the view which I am taking. Expansion clarifies what is expansion by prescribing that replacement or overhauling of existing machinery should not be expansion. It appears that the Municipality has sorrowed this provision of exemption from the Gujarat Gram and Nagar Panchayats Taxes and Fees Rules 1964 prescribed in exercise of the powers conferred by sec. 323 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1961 Part III of the said Rules prescribes rules for octroi and Rule 36 provides for exemption from octroi. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 36 provides that subject to certain conditions prescribed in subrule (4) building materials plants machinery stores spare parts raw materials semi-finished goods or any other articles brought within the limits of gram or nagar not for sale but for the use thereof in the manufacture of any goods or in erecting any factory by any new industry shall be exempt from the payment of octroi duty. What is new industry has been defined as under: "subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2a) for the purpose of sub-rule (2 ). What is new industry has been defined as under: "subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2a) for the purpose of sub-rule (2 ). new industry means (I) any industry established within the limits of the gram or as the case may be nagar on or after the 1st May 1960. (II) any industry established within such limits before the 1st May 1960 but the production of goods in which commenced after the 1st May 1960 and (III) in the case of an industry which has been established before the 1st May 1960 but which has undergone or which undergoes expansion after that date the expanded part of the industry:provided that an industry shall not be deemed to undergo expansion merely on account of replacement or overhauling of any existing machinery. (4) The exemption under sub-rule (2) shall not be available to a new industry after the expiry of five years from the date on which the first lot of manufactured goods is produced by it for sale or after the expiry of seven years from the date of its establishment whichever event occurs earlier. Explanation :- For the purposes of sub-rule (4) the date of establishment of an industry means the date on which any of the building materials or other articles referred to in sub-rule (2) are brought within the limits of the gram or nagar as the case may be for the first time for erecting any factory by such industry. ( 12 ) IT is no doubt true that these rules have clarified the commencement of period of exemption as well as the date of establishment of industry in precise terms. But the scheme as to what is the new industry appears to be more or less the same as the one incorporated in the By-law 9 (1) with which I am concerned in this petition. It is no doubt true that Clause-A of Bye-law 9 (1) saws that it will only be applicable to new industries and separate expanded units of the existing industries as mentioned therein. It was urged by Mr. Vakil on behalf of the respondent-Municipality that the scheme in Bye-law 9 (1) appears to be slightly different from the one contained in the Panchayat Rules. It was urged by Mr. Vakil on behalf of the respondent-Municipality that the scheme in Bye-law 9 (1) appears to be slightly different from the one contained in the Panchayat Rules. I do not think that the submission is justified because the concession is sought to be extended to the industries which are newly established industries which have gone into production after 1st May 1960 for the first time and also to the expanded parts of the industries which were in production before that date. It has been rightly urged by Mr. Daru for the Company that the industries entitled to exemption have been described by a phrase of compendious words as new industries and separate expanded units of the existing industries. I am therefore not inclined to accept the interpretation canvassed on behalf of the respondent-Municipality and hold that even the examined part of the existing industry which is in production before 1st May 1960 would be entitled to exemption to the extent of its expanded part. ( 13 ) THE next question therefore which arises is whether Clauses (c) and (d) of the said Bye-law prescribe any condition precedent before the exemption could be claimed. Much emphasis had been laid on the obligation of the importer before claiming exemption on any articles brought within the octroi limits that such articles should be declared at the time of import. It is nobodys case that the Company herein does not make declaration about their articles brought within the municipal limits at the time of entry because it is an admitted position that the Municipality is maintaining current account of the goods and articles brought by the petitioner-Company within the municipal limits. The insistence of the respondent-Municipality so far as the question of exemption is concerned is that those articles on which exemption is claimed should be earmarked and declared separately at the time of the entry. I do not think that Clause (c) warrants that reading which the respondent-Municipality wants me to read. The effect and substance of Clause (c) is that the articles on which exemption is claimed should have been declared to the Municipality at the time of their import or if they are brought along with the other articles and goods they should have been included in the declaration made of the articles and goods in general. The effect and substance of Clause (c) is that the articles on which exemption is claimed should have been declared to the Municipality at the time of their import or if they are brought along with the other articles and goods they should have been included in the declaration made of the articles and goods in general. The insistence of the respondent-Municipality that the articles on which the exemption could be claimed should be declared separately as such is impossible of performance in the very nature of things. The articles and goods required and consumed by a textile mill would be brought in bulk from time to time and at that point of time it is always difficult to say which raw materials would go in consumption for the existing unit or the new unit or in the expanded unit. No doubt the Municipality has to be satisfied that a particular quantity of raw material has been consumed by an importer in his new industry or in expanded unit of his industry. He can claim exemption only in respect of that part of the quantity of raw material brought within the municipal limits which is consumed in the new industry or expanded part of the existing industry. In the present case the established position is that the Company is maintaining two separate accounts in connection with there respective installations and these accounts are inspected and verified by the officers of the Municipality. It is not the case of the Municipality before me that the Company is claiming exemption in respect of the raw materials which have not been consumed by it in its expansion. The Municipality can always satisfy itself as to whether the alleged consumption of raw materials is more than what is physically possible having regard to the capacity of spindles and looms or having regard to the actual working of a particular department of the Mill company and also having regard to the stock which it has manufactured actually. The condition contained in Clause (d) also is another facet of the same argument namely whether the articles in respect of which exemption is claimed must have been used for the purposes for which they are imported. The condition contained in Clause (d) also is another facet of the same argument namely whether the articles in respect of which exemption is claimed must have been used for the purposes for which they are imported. The provisions contained in Clause (d) of the relevant Bye-law in my opinion is more in nature of an enabling power to the Municipality to recover the octroi on goods which have been used for purpose other than for which they are imported over and above the power to prosecute the importer under the relevant provisions of the Municipal Act. It has been strenuously urged that clause (c) and (d) prescribe condition precedent and unless these conditions are satisfied an importer is not entitled to exemption. In the statement report filed before the General Meeting of the respondent-Municipality on 17th December 1969 no reference is made to the non-satisfaction of these two conditions. In the circumstances therefore I do not agree with the learned Advocate for the respondent-Municipality that the petitioner-company has failed to comply with the requirements contained in Clauses (c) and (d) of the relevant Bye-law. ( 14 ) THE only question which remains to be disposed of is what is the period for which this exemption is available ? The exemption is available for a period of five years from the date of starting of the industry or the date of coming into force of the Bye-law 9 (1) whichever is later. This has been provided by Clause-B of the said Bye-law. Three possible views can be urged as to what is the meaning of the date of starting of the industry. It may be (1) the commencement of the process of establishment; (2) completion of the establishment or (3) commencement of production in the industry. According to the learned Advocate for the respondent-Municipality the first view has commended to the respondentmunicipality in the matter of administration of this concession. In other words the commencement of the process of establishment is the date of starting of the industrynow this view accords with the provision made in Explanation to sub-rule (4) of Rule 36 set out above. According to the learned Advocate for the respondent-Municipality the first view has commended to the respondentmunicipality in the matter of administration of this concession. In other words the commencement of the process of establishment is the date of starting of the industrynow this view accords with the provision made in Explanation to sub-rule (4) of Rule 36 set out above. The date of establishment of industry for purposes of the period of the availability of the exemption is defined in the Explanation as to mean the date on which any of the building materials or other materials referred to in subrule (2) are brought within the limits of Gram or Nagar Panchayat for the first time for erecting any factory. In other words the commencement of the process of erection of the factory or expansion of the industry in my opinion which is the accepted practice by the respondent-Municipality not only accords with the accepted view of the State Government for purposes of administration of this concession by their Panchayats but also meets with the requirement of industries since the industrialists have to import capital goods as well building materials for commencing the direction of factories with a view to set up now industries. It would also meet with the requires not of the existing industrialists who import building materials or capital goods for purposes of expanding their existing industries. In that view of the matter I am of the opinion that the date of starting of industry would be the date on which building materials plants machinery spears spare-parts etc are brought within the municipal limits for the first time for erecting any factory of a now industry or expansion of existing industry. The date of the availability of the exemption would be therefore the date of the starting of the industry as stated above or the date of coming into force of the Bye-law 9 (1) (which is 7th October 1964 whichever is later. The date of the availability of the exemption would be therefore the date of the starting of the industry as stated above or the date of coming into force of the Bye-law 9 (1) (which is 7th October 1964 whichever is later. ( 15 ) IN that view of the matter therefore I am of the opinion that this petition should be allowed and the impugned resolution No. 99 of July 9 1970 should be quashed and set aside and the respondent-Municipality is directed to grant exemption according to the correct principles of law as stated above on the goods and articles mentioned in Clause-A of By-law 9 (1) brought within the municipal limits in connection with the First and Second Installations and make a refund of the octroi duty already collected on such articles and goods as may be determined by it after giving the Company an opportunity to satisfy the respondent-Municipality as to its claim in the matter. Subject to this clarification that since the first Installation was over before the Bye-law in question came into force that is 7th October 1964 the Company would not be entitled to any exemption from octroi duty on spinals looms and spare-parts imported within the municipal limits for purples of the First Installation as rightly conceded by Mr. Daru learned Advocate for the Company. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. .