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1977 DIGILAW 109 (PAT)

Sardar Tara Singh v. Priti Lall

1977-07-02

R.B.N.SINGH

body1977
Judgment K. B. N. Singh, C. J. 1. This revision petition is directed against an order dated 15.2.1977 of Munsif, Second Court, Patna striking off the defence against ejectment of the defendants. 2. Plaintiff-opposite party no.1 filed a suit in 1969 for eviction of the defendants including the petitioner under the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the grounds of arrears of rent since April, 1969 and personal necessity. During the pendency of the suit the plaintiff filed an application under section 11-A of the Act seeking a direction from the court that the defendants be directed to deposit arrears of rent as well as future rent in respect of the premises let out to the defendants at the rate of 65/- per month. On the 4th February, 1975 the Court passed necessary order for payment of arrears of rent as also the monthly rent and the future rent from the month to month to be deposited by 15th of the following month. There is no dispute that the Courts order under section 11-A was complied with till before October, 1976. However, there was default in depositing the rent for the month of October, 1976! thereafter the plaintiff filed an application on 25th January, 1977 before the learned Munsif for necessary orders directing the defence against ejectment to be struck off. To that the defendant petitioner filed a rejoinder mainly alleging that as the life of the Act under which the order under section 11-A was passed, expired on 31.3.76 and the Act being nonest the court had no jurisdiction to pass an order striking off the defence. The learned Munsif after hearing the parties has ordered that the defence against ejectment of the defendants be struck off. Hence, this application in revision. 3. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has urged that as the Act in question has lapsed on 31st of March, 1976 and it was not extended by any subsequent Legislation or by any necessary notification, the court had no jurisdiction to pass the order under section 11-A, the Act having lapsed. Hence, this application in revision. 3. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has urged that as the Act in question has lapsed on 31st of March, 1976 and it was not extended by any subsequent Legislation or by any necessary notification, the court had no jurisdiction to pass the order under section 11-A, the Act having lapsed. Sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Act on which both sides have relied may usefully be quoted below : "it shall remain in force for such period as the provincial Government may, by notification fix : provided that the provincial Government may from time to time, by notification, extend such period: provided further that the expiration of this Act under the operation of this sub-ssction shall not - (a) render recoverable any sum which during the continuance thereof was irrecoverable or affect the right of a tenant to recover any sum which during the continuance of this Act was recoverable by him thereunder; (b) affect any liability incurred under this Act or any punishment incurred in respect of any contravention of this Act, or any order made thereunder ; (c) affect any investigation or legal proceeding in respect of any such liability or punishment as aforesaid ; and any such investigation or legal proceeding may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such punishment may be imposed, as if this Act had not expired. " 4. From the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 1 it is manifest that the duration of the Act in question was to be fixed by the provincial Government by notification. It is not disputed that by necessary notification issued from time to time the life of the Act was being extended up to 31st of March, 1961 till we came to the Bihar Act I of 1961. This Act, called the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control (Amendment) Act, 1960, was assented to on the 25th January, 1961 by the President of India and was published in the Bihar Gazette, Extraordinary of the 17th February, 1961. This Act amended sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Bihar Act 111 of 1947 and reads as follows : "2. This Act amended sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Bihar Act 111 of 1947 and reads as follows : "2. Amendment of section 1 of Bihar Act III of 1947.- In sub-section (3)of section 1 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction)Control Act, 1947 (Bihar Act III of 1947), for the words and figures "upto and including the 31st March, 1961", the words and figures" upto and including the 31st March, 1966" shall be substituted. " Its further. extension was brought by the Bihar Act VI of 1966 (The Bihar buildings (Lease, Rent, and Eviction) Control (Amendment) Act, 1966. By this act its life was further extended for a period of five years, i. e. upto 31st March, 1971 and section 2 of this Act by which the amendment was brought about may usefully be quoted as follows : "for sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (Bihar Act III of 1947) the following sub-section shall be substituted, namely : -" (3) It shall remain in force up to the 31st March, 1971. " 5. The life of the Act was further extended upto 31st March, 1976 by clause 2 of the Bihar Ordinance no.26 of 1971, wherein it is stated : 6. From a reference to the aforesaid amending Acts it is apparent that the life of the Act was extended from time to time upto 31st March, 1976. The question that arises for consideration is whether the saving clause incorporated in the second proviso to sub-rule (3) was kept alive or not. 7. From the Bihar Act 1 of 1961 already quoted above, there cannot be any manner of doubt that the saving provisions contained in the second proviso to section (3) continued as the amending provisions stated that for the words "upto and including the 31st March 1961" the words and figures" the 31st March, 1966" shall be substituted. On the basis of amendment brought by the Bihar Act VI of 1966 a submission has been made before me that whole of sub-section (3) including the proviso was substituted and all that remained of it was that "it shall remain in force upto 31st March, 1971". On the basis of amendment brought by the Bihar Act VI of 1966 a submission has been made before me that whole of sub-section (3) including the proviso was substituted and all that remained of it was that "it shall remain in force upto 31st March, 1971". That this could not have been the intention of the Legislature is obvious from the fact that even subsequent thereto by Ordinance the life of the Act has further been extended by Bihar Ordinance 26 of 1971 upto 31st March, 1976 under the first proviso. The Act was passed for regulating and controlling the rent of the building and to prevent unreasonable eviction of the tenant therefrom. Merely on account of the fact that it is mentioned in the Bihar Act VI of 1966 that "for sub-section (3)of section 1 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (Bihar Act III of 1947) the following sub-section shall be substituted", does not mean that both the provisos were also obliterated. Sub-section (3) contains two provisos - the first gives power to the State Government for extending the period of the Act and the second part is saving clause with regard to past acts. What is sought to be amended by the Bihar Act, 1966 is only to extend the period of the Act and not the saving clause contained in the proviso. The object of the amending Act (Bihar Act VI of 1966) being to extend the life of the parent act up to 31st March, 1971, there was no meaning in keeping the parent Act alive without its saving provision, as that would be contrary to the intention of the Legislature of protecting the tenants both from eviction and charging of exorbitant rent. If the saving clauses contained in the provisions are not kept alive, then persons found guilty of infringement of the Act or disobedience of the provisions of the Act done in the past or in respect of whom legal proceedings are pendings would go scot free. It is well-settled rule of construction of statute that interpretation which aids in furtherance of the object for which statute was enacted should be preferred to one which will frustrate its very object. It is well-settled rule of construction of statute that interpretation which aids in furtherance of the object for which statute was enacted should be preferred to one which will frustrate its very object. I have, therefore, no doubt in my mind that the saving provisions contained in the proviso have not been deleted either by the Bihar Act VI of 1966 or Bihar Ordinance 26 of 1971. 8. Coming to the saving clause contained in clauses (a) (b) and (c) of the proviso, it is manifest that the rights and liabilities under the Act or any liability incurred under the Act or any order passed thereunder will not be affected and any such investigation or legal proceeding will continue as if the force of the Act has not expired. The idea was to make the right and liability incurred under the Act enforceable even after the Act ceased to be operative. Therefore, an order passed under section 11-A when the Act was in existence, did not lapse after the life of the Act expires and legal consequences flowing therefrom will be enforceable as the courts order has been kept alive under the second proviso. The learned Munsif, therefore, was justified in striking off the defence against ejectment. 9. In the result, there is no merit in this revision application and is accordingly dismissed ; but, in the circumstances without costs. Application dismissed.