Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is an Authorised Wholesale Distributor running a depot in Neyyattinkara Taluk in Trivandrum district. On 4- 7- 75 five bags of different varieties of pulse weighing 422 kilograms were seized from his shop by the second respondent, the Circle Inspector of Police (Civil Supplies Cell). The different varieties of pulses including blackgram, gram, green-gram etc., were seized as the petitioner was alleged to have no license or documents authorising him for stock purchase and sales of the pulses. There was also the allegation that it had been found during the time of inspection that the petitioner did not maintain register or bill, account of the stock of pulses as provided under the Order nor he exhibited at the entrance or some other part of the place of business a statement indicating the stock of pulses in his possession for sale. It was further alleged that there was no notice board showing the prices of the different varieties of pulses kept for sale by him as contemplated under the Kerala Essential Commodities (Maintenance of Accounts and Display of Prices of Prices of Stocks) Order, 1973. 2. The seized pulses from the shop of the petitioner were produced before the District Collector, Trivandrum for action. 3. On the basis of prima facie case of violation of Essential Commodities Act, 1955 being proved against the petitioner his authorisation to run the wholesale depot was suspended pending detailed enquiry under Clause.51(8) of the Kerala Rationing Order, 1966. After getting his explanation in the matter, the District Collector came to the conclusion that though the petitioner has applied for a licence as a dealer in pulses and he is exempt from furnishing any fresh security, his act of functioning as a dealer in pulses without a valid licence cannot be viewed lightly and hence the Collector ordered in exercise of powers conferred on him under Clause.11 of the Kerala Pulses Dealers Licensing Second Order, 1972 to forfeit a sum of Rs. 1000/ -(Rupees one thousand only), from his security deposit and to replenish the same immediately by the petitioner. The Collector in the same order also directed that the petitioner should be granted the wholesale licence under the aforementioned K.P.D.L. Second Order, 1972. 4. 1000/ -(Rupees one thousand only), from his security deposit and to replenish the same immediately by the petitioner. The Collector in the same order also directed that the petitioner should be granted the wholesale licence under the aforementioned K.P.D.L. Second Order, 1972. 4. The second respondent had also got registered by the Kattakada police against the petitioner a case crime No. 92/ 75 on 4 41975 for violation of Clause 4 of the Kerala Pulses Dealers Licensing Second Order, 1972 and Clause 3 and 6 of the Kerala Essential Commodities (Maintenance of Accounts and Display of Prices and Stocks) Order, 1973 read with S.3 and 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, on the basis of the same search and seizure. After investigation final report was submitted by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Kattakada before the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court, Nedumangad where it is numbered as S.T. No. 19 of 1975. There the case is now pending trial. 5. The petitioner has approached this court contending that the proceedings against the petitioner before the Magistrate's court is illegal and liable to be quashed alleging the same to be violative of the petitioner's fundamental right under Art.20 (2) of the Constitution of India which is as follows: "No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once." The petitioner alleges that he has been punished as per the order of the District Collector who is a court under the relevant statutory Order and therefore, he shall not be liable to be prosecuted and punished for the same offence, namely contravention of the Order and the Act again Therefore, invoking this court's jurisdiction under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution the petitioner seeks the quashing of the proceedings before the Magistrate. 6. I am afraid the petitioner is obviously under a misconception as regards the scope and ambit of Art.20 (2) of the Constitution. The law is now well settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court beginning with what is known as Maqbool Hussain's case, Maqbool Hussain v. Bombay State (AIR. 1953 SC. 325). The question that arose in that case was when can a person be said to be "prosecuted" and "punished" for an "offence" within the meaning of Art.20 (2). Bhagwathi, J., delivering the judgment of the court considered it in the light of Art.20 (1) and (3). 1953 SC. 325). The question that arose in that case was when can a person be said to be "prosecuted" and "punished" for an "offence" within the meaning of Art.20 (2). Bhagwathi, J., delivering the judgment of the court considered it in the light of Art.20 (1) and (3). This decision has been repeatedly referred to and relied on by the Supreme Court and the High Courts. I would quote in full the Article and then the relevant observations in the Supreme court decision Art.20 of the Constitution reads: "(I) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. (2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. (3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." The Supreme Court observed: "(7) The fundamental right which is guaranteed in Art.20 (2) enunciates the principle of "autrefois convict" or "double jeopardy". The roots of that principle are to be found in the well established rule of the common law of England "that where a person has been convicted of an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction, the conviction is a bar to all further criminal proceedings for the same offence." (per Charles J. In Reg. v. Miles (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 423). To the same effect is the ancient maxim "Nimo Bis Debet Puniri Pro Uno Delicto", that is to say that no one ought to be twice punished for one offence or as it is sometimes written "Pro Eadem Causa" that is for the same cause. (8) This is the principle on which the party pursued has available to him the plea of "autrefois convict" or "autrefois acquit". "The plea or 'autre fois convict' or autrefois acquit' avers that the defendant has been previously convicted or acquitted on a charge for the same offence as that in respect of which he is arraigned. (8) This is the principle on which the party pursued has available to him the plea of "autrefois convict" or "autrefois acquit". "The plea or 'autre fois convict' or autrefois acquit' avers that the defendant has been previously convicted or acquitted on a charge for the same offence as that in respect of which he is arraigned. The question for the jury on the issue is whether the defendant has previously been in jeopardy in respect of the charge on which he is arraigned, for the rule of law is that a person must not be put in peril twice for the same offence.1 he test is whether the former offence and the offence now charged have the same ingredients in the sense that the facts constituting the one are sufficient to justify a conviction of the other, not that the facts relied on by the Crown are the same in the two trials A plea of 'autrefois acquit' is not proved unless it is shown that the verdict of acquittal of the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the latter." (vide Halsbury's Laws of England Hailsham Edition vol. 9 pages 152 & 153 para 212). (9) This principle found recognition in S.26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 "Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of these enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence." and also in S.403 (1), Crl. P. C. 1898 "A person who has been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under S.236, or for which he might have been convicted under S.237." (10) The Fifth amendment of the American Constitution enunciated this principle in the manner following " nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life, or limb, nor shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be witness against himself..." Willis in his Constitutional Law, at page 528 observes that the phrase, "'jeopardy of life or limb' indicates that the immunity is restricted to crimes of the highest grade, and this is the way Black stone states the rule. Yet, by a gradual process of liberal construction the courts have extended the scope of the clause to make it applicable to all indictable offences, including misdemeanours".... "Under the United States rule, to be put in jeopardy then, must be a valid indictment or information duly presented to a court of competent jurisdiction there must be an arraignment and plea, and a lawful jury must be impaneled and sworn. It is not necessary to have a verdict. The protection is not against a second punishment but against the peril in which he is placed by the jeopardy mentioned." (11) These were the materials which formed the background of the guarantee of fundamental right given in Art 20 (2). It incorporated within its scope the plea of 'autrefois convict' as known to the British jurisprudence or the plea of double jeopardy as known to the American constitution but circumscribed it by providing that there should be not only a prosecution but also a punishment in the first instance in order to operate as a bar to a second prosecution and punishment for the same offence. (12) The words "before a court of law or judicial tribunal" are not to be found in Art.20(2). (12) The words "before a court of law or judicial tribunal" are not to be found in Art.20(2). But if regard be had to the whole background indicated above it is clear that in order that the protection of Art.20 (2) be invoked by a citizen there must have been a prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence before a court of law or a tribunal, required by law to decide the matters in controversy judicially on evidence on oath which it must be authorised by law to administer and not before a tribunal which entertains a departmental or an administrative enquiry even though set up by a statute but not required to proceed on legal evidence given on oath. The very wording of Art.20 and the words used therein:-"convicted", "commission of the act charged as an offence", "be subjected to a penalty", "commission of the offence", "prosecuted and punished", "accused of any offence", would indicate that the proceedings therein contemplated are of the nature of criminal proceedings before a court of law a judicial tribunal and the prosecution in this context would mean an initiation or starting of proceedings of a criminal nature before a court of law or a judicial tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute which creates the offence and regulates the procedure." 7. The facts in that case were that the appellant (there-before the Supreme Court) was found in possession of 107.2 tolas of gold in contravention of a notification of the Government of India dated 25-8-48. The customs authorities took action under S 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and confiscated the gold, giving to the owner of the gold an option to pay a fine of Rs. 12,000/-. Nobody claimed the ownership of the gold Subsequently, a complaint was tiled before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay against the appellant, charging him under S.8, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 read with the notification of 25-8-48. The appellant filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court and challenged the prosecution as violating Art.20 (2). The question, when the matter came to the Supreme Court, that was considered was whether the appellant's prosecution was barred by Art.20 (2) having regard to the penalty of confiscation of gold with an option to pay the fine of Rs. 12,000/ -inflicted on him. The question, when the matter came to the Supreme Court, that was considered was whether the appellant's prosecution was barred by Art.20 (2) having regard to the penalty of confiscation of gold with an option to pay the fine of Rs. 12,000/ -inflicted on him. The Supreme court said that in exercising the power of adjudging confiscation of goods under the Sea Customs Act "we are of the opinion that the Sea Customs Authorities are not a judicial tribunal and the adjudging of confiscation, increased rate of duty or penalty under the provisions of the Sea Customs Act do not constitute a judgment or order of a court or judicial tribunal necessary for the purpose of supporting a plea of double jeopardy. 8. In Venkataraman v. Union of India AIR. 1954 SC 375) it was decided that an enquiry under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 was a fact finding enquiry and because the commission under that Act though had some attributes of a judicial tribunal, that will not make him a judicial tribunal. Therefore, the dismissal by the President of the civil servant concerned, did not prevent a criminal prosecution being launched against him in respect of the acts for which he was dismissed Mukherjea, J. gave as an example the case of a member of the Bar whose name may be struck off the rolls for professional misconduct in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction, though the professional misconduct might also involve a criminal offence. Besides facing the penalty of removal from the rolls, the lawyer could certainly be prosecuted for the offence. The Supreme Court in Thomas Dana v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1959 SC. 375) cites seemingly with approval the following passage from Corpus Juris Secundum: "The doctrine applies to criminal prosecution only and generally to misdemeanours as well as felonies. A former conviction or a acquittal does not ordinarily preclude subsequent interim proceedings, civil actions to recover statutory penalties or exemplary damages, or proceedings to abate a nuisance." 9. I would also quote below the head-note A in AIR. 1970 SC. 962 Customs Collector, Bombay v. Melwami: "In order to get the benefit of S.403, Cr. A former conviction or a acquittal does not ordinarily preclude subsequent interim proceedings, civil actions to recover statutory penalties or exemplary damages, or proceedings to abate a nuisance." 9. I would also quote below the head-note A in AIR. 1970 SC. 962 Customs Collector, Bombay v. Melwami: "In order to get the benefit of S.403, Cr. P. C. or Art.20(2), it is necessary for an accused person to establish that he had been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and he is convicted or acquitted of that offence and the said conviction or acquittal is in force. If that much is established then only the accused is not liable to be tried again for the same offence nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under S.236, Cr. P.C. or for which he might have been convicted under S.273, Cr.P.C. Criminal prosecution of the accused for alleged smuggling is not barred merely because proceeding were earlier instituted against him before the collector of customs. Adjudication before a Collector of Customs is not a prosecution nor the collector of customs a court. Therefore, the rule of autrefois acquit cannot be invoked Neither the issue estoppal rule is attracted. The issue estoppel rule is but a facet of the doctrine of autrefois acquit Even though the accused was given benefit of doubt in earlier proceedings the decision of the collector of customs does not amount to a verdict of acquittal in favour of accused so as to attract the rule of issue estoppel. AIR. 1953 SC. 325, AIR. 1959 SC 375, 1950 AC. 458, AIR. 1956 SC. 415 and AIR. 1960 SC 239." 10. It will be useful and interesting in this connection to note what Seervai in his commentaries on the Constitution of India says about the decision in AIR. 1959 SC. 375(at page 493, vol. 1, 2nd Edn.): "It is submitted that the decision is correct, but should be rested on the ground that a prosecution means "a proceeding by way either of indictment or of information in the criminal courts, in order to put an offender on his trial; the exhibition of a criminal charge against a person before a court of justice. 1, 2nd Edn.): "It is submitted that the decision is correct, but should be rested on the ground that a prosecution means "a proceeding by way either of indictment or of information in the criminal courts, in order to put an offender on his trial; the exhibition of a criminal charge against a person before a court of justice. Under the British system of jurisprudence, adopted in India, a prosecution involves a prosecutor, and a judge cannot be a prosecutor and judge at the same time. The makers of the Constitution were familiar with the concept of 'a prosecution' and a 'prosecutor' and also with the basic principle that a judge cannot be a prosecutor and a judge at the same time. It is therefore reasonable to assume that in Art 20(2) the words 'Prosecuted and punished" mean'prosecuted before a criminal court or tribunal on a criminal charge by a prosecutor between whom and the accused the court or tribunal has to decide." The customs authorities are constituted investigators, prosecutors and judges with an obligation to act judicially, but this does not convert them into courts or tribunals such as are known to the English and Indian law It may be added that in Nara¬yanlal Bansilal v. Mistry (61) ASC 29 Gajendragadkar, J., said that according to the majority judgment in Dana's case, "prosecution" in Art 20(2) meant a proceeding either by way of indictment or information in a criminal court, in order to put an offender on his trial." 11. On the basis of the law laid down by the Supreme Court let us consider this case. It is no doubt true that contraventions of Orders under S.3 of the Essential Commodities Act, are made offences punishable under S.7 of the Act and all such offences are made cognizable and bailable under S 10A of the Act. The Kerala Pulses Dealers Licensing 0.1972, is made by the Government of Kerala with the prior concurrence of the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sections (1) and (2) of S.3 of the Essential Commodities Act. Contravention of Orders made under S.3 of the Act relating to Foodstuffs including pulses might amount to offences as provided in the Act but Clause.9 and H of the K. P. D. L. Second Order do not relate to imposition of punishment for such offences. Contravention of Orders made under S.3 of the Act relating to Foodstuffs including pulses might amount to offences as provided in the Act but Clause.9 and H of the K. P. D. L. Second Order do not relate to imposition of punishment for such offences. That would be clear from the provisions themselves which I herein below quote: "Contravention of conditions of licence etc. (1) No licensee under this Order or his servant or agent or any other person acting on his behalf shall contravene any of the terms and conditions of the licence of the provisions of this Order and if any such licensee or his agent or servant or any other person acting on his behalf contravenes any of the terms and condition of the licence or the provisions of this order or any other order issued by a competent authority under S.3 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 (Central) Act 10 of 1955, which is for the time being enforced and which relates to any item of the pulses mentioned in Schedule.1 to this order, then without prejudice to any other action that may be taken against him, his licence may be cancelled or suspended by the licensing authority by an order, in writing: Provided that no order shall be made under this clause unless the licensee has been given an opportunity of stating his case in writing against the proposed cancellation or suspension. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-clause (1) where a licensee has been convicted by a court of law in respect of contravention of any order made under S 3 of the Essential commodities Act 1955 (Central Act 10 of 1955) relating to foodstuffs, including pulses the licensing authority may by an order in writing cancel his licence : Provided that where such conviction is set aside in any appeal or revision, the licensing authority may, on application in form A by the person whose licence has been cancelled re-issue the licence to such person. xx 11. xx 11. Forfeiture of security deposit: (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of Clause.9, if the licensing authority is satisfied that the licensee has contravened any of the conditions of the licence, he may, after giving the licensee a reasonable opportunity of stating his case and for reasons to be recorded in writing order forfeiture of the whole or any part of the amount of security deposited by him under Clause.7 or of the security referred to in the proviso to that clause and communicate a copy of the order to the licensee. (2) The licensee shall, if the amount of security at any time falls short of the amount specified in Clause.7 or as the case may be, the security amount referred to in the proviso to that clause, forthwith deposit further security to make up that amount on being required by the by licensing authority to do so. (3) Upon due compliance by the licensee with all obligations under the licence the amount of security or such part thereof, which is not forfeited as aforesaid, shall be returned to the licensee, after the termination of the licence." 12. The District Collector in directing forfeiture of security is not acting as a court or a judicial authority before whom a prosecution in respect of the offence is launched. The fact that the District Collector is empowered to act as a court in specific cases will not make his function under Clause.11 that of a court. The order does not amount to imposition of punishment by a court The Collector in proceedings relating to suspension or cancellation of licence or forfeiture of security is conducting a departmental or administrative enquiry though such enquiry he will have to conduct in a quasi judicial manner. In any view, Art.20(2) could have no application in the present case, because as pointed out in Maqbool Hussain's case by the Supreme court, " the prosecution in this context would mean an initiation or starting of proceedings of a criminal nature before a court of law or a judicial tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute which creates the offence and regulates the procedure." The Collector acting under Clause 11 of the Order is neither a court nor a judicial authority. In the circumstances the O. P has only to be dismissed. In the circumstances the O. P has only to be dismissed. I do so so; but I make no order as to costs. Dismissed.