JUDGMENT Bhachawat, J. This is a defendant tenant's second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 30th June. 1971 by the Second Additional District Judge, Gwalior, in Civil Appeal No 28-A of 1971 affirming the judgment and decree passed by the Second Civil Judge, Class I, Gwalior on 13-11-1970 in Civil Suit No. 121 A/68 whereby the suit of the plaintiff respondent for ejectment of the defendant was decreed. 2. The short facts are these: The defendant was the tenant on the third storey of the plaintiff's house (hereinafter referred to as the 'suit accommodation'). The plaintiff after determining the defendant's tenancy, filed a suit for his ejectment allegedly on the ground under section 12 (1) (e) of the MP. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), alleging that the plaintiff bonafide required the suit accommodation for the residence of his widowed daughter-in-law and her two children, and there is no other reasonably suitable accommodation in his possession for that purpose. The defendant, inter-alia in his written statement, contended that from the averments made in the plaint the ground for ejectment does not fall under any of the provisions of section 12 (1) of the Act. 3. The Courts below held that the requirement of the plaintiff of the suit accommodation for the residence of his widowed daughter-in-law and her two children was bonafide and this requirement squarely falls within the scope of section 12 (1) (e) of the Act. 4. The only question agitated before this Court by the learned counsel for the appellant was that from the averments made in the plaint, no ground under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act is made out. His argument was that in section 2 (e) of the Act which defines 'member of the family' 'the widowed daughter-in-law' and 'grand children' do not find place in the list of persons specifically enumerated; they can be covered under the expression 'any other relation dependant on him' provided they are dependent on the landlord, His submission was that in the instant case, the widowed daughter-in-law and her Children, i.e., the grand children of the plaintiff do not fall in the definition as neither there is an averment in the plaint, nor there is evidence on record that they are dependent on plaintiff. 5. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent while combating the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant argued in a circum gyratory manner and was vacillating in his contentions. His contentions as could best be understood were that by the relationship itself, the widowed daughter-in-law and the grand children of the plaintiff without anything more would be dependent on the plaintiff and thus fall within the definition of family member; that from the averments in the plaint specially in paragraphs No.2 and 3, it can be made out that there is an averment of the widowed daughter-in-law of the plaintiff and his grand children being dependent on the plaintiff; and that the requirement for the residence of the widowed daughter-in-law and her two children is plaintiff's own requirement. 6. The short question to be decided in this case is whether from the averments as made in the plaint, a ground under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act is made out. This section reads as under :- "that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bonafide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the land lord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned" ; 7. For deciding the question in controversy it is essential to refer to the relevant averments in the plaint which are contained in paragraphs Nos. 2 and 3 of the plaint and also section 2 (e) which contains the definition of 'member of the family' :- HINDI "(e) "member of the family" in case of any person means the spouse son unmarried daughter father, grand-father mother, grandmother, brother, unmarried sister, paternal uncle, paternal uncle's wife or widow or brother's son or unmarried daughter living jointly with, or any other relation dependent on him" ; From the fore quoted averments, it is transparently clear that the plaintiff's specific case as set up in the plaint is that he bonafide needs the suit accommodation for the residence of his widowed daughter-in-law and her children i.e. his grand children. Thus, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that the plaintiff needs the premises for himself is repelled only on the short ground that it is a new case which the plaintiff now wants to set up, for which neither there is any foundation in the plaint, nor there is any evidence on record. Therefore, the controversy now is in a very narrow compass. whether in the instant case the widowed daughter-in-law and her children fall within the expression 'any other relation dependent on him' it is a settled position in law that when a word is defined to mean a certain thing, prima-facie the definition is restrictive and exhaustive. In the fore-quoted definition albeit 'member of the family' is defined to mean, the enumeration of persons in it is not exhaustive and it is widened and made non-exhaustive by the use of the expression 'or any other relation dependent on him'. According to this expression, a person answering the following two requirements would be within the ken of 'member of the family':- (i) that he is a relation of the landlord; (ii) that he is dependent on the landlord. 8. Now reverting to the position in tee instant case; undisputedly the widowed daughter-in-law and the grand children are the relatives of the landlord and as such the first requirement is satisfied. The question remains about the second requirement. 9. I am not called upon to go into the question whether the social order customs, habits and ideas of the community to which the landlord belongs can be brought into play or not for deciding whether a particular person fall within the expression 'any other relation dependent on him' as it is a common ground as that the personal law applicable to the landlord shall have a bearing in determining the question. The question therefore to be examined is whether dependency has to be established as a fact or merely from his (i.e. landlord) relationship with the person for whom the accommodation is required the dependency would be inferred as a matter of law. 10. From the dichotomy of the expression 'any other relation dependent on him' as given in paragraph 7 of this judgment, mere relationship is not sufficient, he should further be dependent. 10. From the dichotomy of the expression 'any other relation dependent on him' as given in paragraph 7 of this judgment, mere relationship is not sufficient, he should further be dependent. If the intention of the Legislature was that persons having a particular relationship with the landlord are to be treated as his dependent irrespective of the fact whether in fact they are dependents or not the Legislature in its wisdom would have enumerated those relations specifically and would not have added the words 'dependent on him' along with the words 'any other relation'. It is a settled position in law that Legislature does not use words which are redundant. 11. How examining the case from the applicability of the personal law applicable to the landlord, the relevant law is the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Maintenance Act) as undisputedly the plaintiff landlord is a Hindu to whom this law is applicable. The relevant provisions dealing with the question are section 19 and section 21. The lower appellate Court has also rested its decision relying on these provisions. To get the proper hand of the matter and for an intelligent understanding, it is desirable to set out the relevant finding of the lower appellate Court and also to reproduce the relevant portions of the aforesaid sections :- Appellate Court's Judgment: “8. The plaintiff has alleged in plaint that he requires the suit accommodation for the residence of has widowed daughter-in-law and her two children. The defendant has admitted that plaintiff has widowed daughter-in-law and she has two minor children. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the daughter-in-law and grandsons are not members of the family, as defined in section 2 (a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as an Act), therefore, no suit lies for eviction of a tenant for their need. He has further contended that the plaintiff has not pleaded that the daughter-in-law and her two children are dependent on him, therefore, also no suit for their need can be decreed. He has relied on AIR 1950 EP 256. 9. I have considered the argument, but it can not be of any help to the appellant in the present case. The facts are required to be pleaded and the legal rights flowing there from are interred. He has relied on AIR 1950 EP 256. 9. I have considered the argument, but it can not be of any help to the appellant in the present case. The facts are required to be pleaded and the legal rights flowing there from are interred. In this case, plaintiff pleaded that he requires the suit accommodation for his widowed daughter-in-law and her two children. The defendant admitted their relationship and existence. Thus, plaintiff has a widowed daughter-in-law and her two children. When we look to the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, we find that according to section 21 (vii), widowed daughter in-law and sons of the predeceased son are included in the category of dependents of the father-in-law and grand-father respectively. The plaintiff Girdhardas is also liable to maintain them under section 19 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. 10. The result of the above discussion is that Rukmanibai and her two children are relations of the plaintiff and are dependent on him” Maintenance Act :- “S. 19. Maintenance of widowed daughter-in-law:- (1) A Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained after the death of her husband by her father-in-law:- Provided and to the extent that she is unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or other property or, where she has no property of her own, is unable to obtain maintenance- (a) from the estate of her husband or her father or mother, or (b) from her son or daughter, if any, or her estate." “S. 12. Dependants defined:-For the purposes of this chapter "dependants" mean the following relatives of the deceased:- *** *** *** (iv) his or her son or the son of his predeceased son or the son of a predeceased son of his predeceased son so long as he is a minor: Provided and to the extent that he is unable to obtain maintenance, in the case of a grandson form his father's or mother's estate and in the case of a great grandson, from the estate of his father or mother or father's father or father's mother; *** *** *** (vii) any widow of his son or of a son of his predeceased son, so long as she does not re marry: Provided and to the extent that she is unable to obtain maintenance from her husband's estate, or from her sun or daughter, if any, or his or her estate or in the case of a grandson's widow, also from her father-in-law’s estate; (Underlined-here italics-by me) 12. The lower appellate Court, as is evident from the finding set out above has taken a view that in view of the flue-quoted provision, from the mere fact of relationship as widowed daughter-in-law and grand children it follows as a matter of law that they are dependants of the plaintiff. It is not to be established that in fact they are dependants. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant was that according to the fore-quoted provisos also it had to be averred and established as a fact that the widowed daughter-in-law and the grand children are dependants on the plaintiff which is not done. 13. The argument of the learned counsel sounds correct. The provisos underlined by me clearly say so. If the reading of the section as made by the lower appellate Court as set out above is accepted it would amount to rendering the provisos otiose, nugatory which is not permissible under any cannon of interpretation of statute. It appears that the learned Judge of the lower appellate Court did not read the aforesaid provisions fully. If it had read, it would not have ignored the effect of the provisos. 14. The learned counsel for the respondent at first strongly relied on the fore-quoted provisions, but on the reading the learned counsel found himself between scylla and charybdis. It appears that the learned Judge of the lower appellate Court did not read the aforesaid provisions fully. If it had read, it would not have ignored the effect of the provisos. 14. The learned counsel for the respondent at first strongly relied on the fore-quoted provisions, but on the reading the learned counsel found himself between scylla and charybdis. If he was to accept that the provisions do not apply, the defendant has no case and if he was to accept that they do apply, then the difficulty of the plaintiff was that the question of dependency was to be averred and established as a fact. To get out of this situation, the learned counsel raised a strange argument that for determining the dependencies, the provisos in the fore-quoted provisions are to be ignored from consideration, contending that the provisos could be considered only when there was a question of grant of maintenance to the dependants under Chapter III of the Maintenance Act and argued that in the instant case, the question was of providing residence and not maintenance. This argument of the learned counsel for the respondent deserves no credence. First for the reason that according to the definition of maintenance given in section 3 (b) of the Maintenance Act maintenance includes residence and second, there is no logic behind the argument that the provisos in sections 19 and 21 are to be applied for the purpose of chapter III of the Maintenance Act and the main sections only are of general application wherever there is a question of determining the dependants of a Hindu, because the definition given in section 21 of the Maintenance Act is also for the purposes of Chapter III only as appears from the opening words of section 21. 15. Then the learned counsel appreciating the lethal consequences of the aforesaid arguments suggested that the fore-quoted averments in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the plaint. especially “VADI KO AB APNI BAHU AUR USKE BACHHON KO ALHADA JAGAH DENA ANIVARYA HAI” can well be construed to be an averment of the dependency of the widowed daughter-in-law and the grand children on the plaintiff and the defendant did not deny this averment; and he only contended that there was an alternative suitable accommodation available with the plaintiff. It is difficult to accept this argument of the learned counsel for the respondent. It is difficult to accept this argument of the learned counsel for the respondent. By no stretching, the averments in paragraphs 2 and 3 can be construed to mean that the plaintiff pleaded dependency of his widowed daughter-in-law and grand children on him. He only contended that as his other son has also died it has become imperative for him to keep the widowed daughter-in-law and the children of the son who had died earlier, with him. The learned counsel could not point out even an iota of evidence to the effect that these persons are dependent on the plaintiff. What has been pointed out is that plaintiff's son, i.e. the husband of the widowed daughter-in-law died eight years back and since then she has been living at her parents' place and now for her residence, the plaintiff needs the suit premises. From this, he wants the Court to infer that the widowed daughter-in-law is dependant on the plaintiff. 16. The Court cannot be swayed by surmise floating in mid-air, particularly when the plaintiff on whose behalf these feathery likelihoods are urged, stood mute at the trial stage plaintiff failed to speak these things to become a martyr for silence obviously under a belief that mere relationship of the widowed-daughter-in-law and her children was enough to include them within the ken of family members as appears from the case as set up in the plaint and argued in the Court below. The learned counsel for the appellant, relying on a decision of this Court in Balbhadra v. Premchand 1953 NLJ 233 argued that even if a person is not the member of the family and according to custom and moral obligation the landlord has accepted the obligation to support a near relation that would be a need covered under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act. The relevant observations of this decision are reproduced herein below :- “3. The main point canvassed before us was that the need of the widowed daughter and her children must be deemed to be the need of the landlord. In our opinion, the contention of the petitioner is correct and must be upheld. No doubt, after marriage the daughter passes out of the father's family and goes into that of the husband But the fact of marriage does not sever the blood relationship which exists between a father and his daughter. In our opinion, the contention of the petitioner is correct and must be upheld. No doubt, after marriage the daughter passes out of the father's family and goes into that of the husband But the fact of marriage does not sever the blood relationship which exists between a father and his daughter. The existence of this relationship does give rise to certain moral obligations. Where, in pursuance of such moral obligation a father affords support to his daughter and her children, their needs become his needs. There is nothing in the Rent Control Order which restricts a landlord's needs to his personal needs. As this Court has pointed out in V.M. Deshmukh v. K.M. Kothari (1951 N.L.J. 250), the word 'his' as used in clause 13 (3) (vi) of the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 must be interpreted liberally and not in a narrow way. So interpreted, we are of opinion that it would include not only the members of the landlord's family but also all those persons who are dependant on him and whose responsibilities he has accepted.” Here again, it would be seen that in the aforesaid decision also, the stress is on dependency. Further, in the C.P. & Berar Letting or Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, there was no definition of 'member of family', whereas in the Act, 'member of family' is defined, Therefore also, the fore-quoted Nagpur decision cannot be pressed into service. 17. In the light of the foregoing discussion, on account of plaintiff's failure to set up a case that his widowed daughter-in-law and grand children for whom he requires the suit accommodation were dependent on him, there is no ground made out under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act. 18. In the result, the appeal merits to be allowed, which is accordingly allowed and the impugned judgment and decree are set aside and the suit of the plaintiff-respondent is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.