SABYASACHI MUKHERJI, M. M. DUTT ( 1 ) THE only question that is involved in this appeal is whether the interest of the appellant in the disputed land has in the State under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. ( 2 ) THE disputed land appertains to C. S. Plots Nos. 11 and 32 of Khatians Nos. 21 and 390 respectively of Mouza Kalidaha, within P. S. Dum Dum, in the district of 24-Parganas. It is situate within the limits of the South Dum Dum Municipality and bears the Municipal Premises no. 85, Dum Dum Cossipore Road, Calcutta-28. In the C. S. record-of-rights finally published on 1931, the disputed land was recorded in the names of the father of the appellant Prosad Das Mallick and his co-sharers. The entry shows that there were pucca structures on the said Plots Nos. 11 and 32. By an indenture dated November 26, 1947, 16 Cottahs of the disputed land was leased out by the father of the appellant to the respondent no. 4 Scene Screne Limited for the purpose of construction of a cinema house. Again by another indenture of lease dated August 28, 1952, a further quantity of land measuring 2 cottahs was leased out to the respondent no. 4 for the purpose of the said cinema house. Both the leases are to expire on November 30, 1977. It is not disputed that the cinema building was constructed by the respondent no. 4 on the disputed land sometime in 1947 and said building is still in existence. After the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 came into force, the respondent no. 4 refused to pay rent to the appellant on the ground that the interest of the appellant had vested in the State under the provisions of the said Act and that accordingly, he has since then been paying rent to the State of West Bengal. It is also not disputed that the State Government has been accepting the rents from the respondent no. 4. The appellant moved a petition before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a Writ in the nature of mandamus restraining the respondent no. 1, the Junior Land Reforms Officer from realising rent from the respondent no. 4 and for a Writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order passed by the respondent no. 4. The appellant moved a petition before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a Writ in the nature of mandamus restraining the respondent no. 1, the Junior Land Reforms Officer from realising rent from the respondent no. 4 and for a Writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order passed by the respondent no. 1 relating to the realisation of rent from the respondent no. 4. On the said petition, a Rule Nisi was issued out of which the present appeal arises. ( 3 ) THE contention of the appellant was that in view of the provision of S. 6 (1) (b) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act he was entitled to retain the land comprised in and appertaining to the structures standing on the disputed land and that he had already filed a return in Form 'b' retaining the disputed land. At the time the Rule Nisi was issued, the provision of S. 6 (1) (b) was in the following terms: ?6 (1 ). Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 4 and 5, an intermediary shall, except in the cases mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (2) but subject to the other provisions of that sub-section, be entitled to retain with effect from the date of vesting - (a)* * * * * * * * * * * (b)land comprised in or appertaining to buildings and structures whether erected by the intermediary or not. ? ( 4 ) DURING the pendency of the Rule, S. 6 (1) (b) was amended with retrospective effect by the West Bengal Act IX of 1961. The words ?whether erected by the intermediary or not? was substituted by the words ?owned by the intermediary or by any person, not being a tenant, holding under him by leave or license. ? An explanation was added to clause (b) which provides that for the purpose of this clause 'tenant' shall not include a thika tenant as defined in the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949. ( 5 ) G. K. Mitter, J. (as he then was) came to the finding that both under S. 6 (1) (b) as it stood before the amendment and under the altered provisions, the appellant was not entitled to retain the disputed land covered by the structures. In that view the matter, he discharged the Rule. ( 5 ) G. K. Mitter, J. (as he then was) came to the finding that both under S. 6 (1) (b) as it stood before the amendment and under the altered provisions, the appellant was not entitled to retain the disputed land covered by the structures. In that view the matter, he discharged the Rule. After considering the scope and effect of the un-amended S. 6 (1) (b), we are of the view that the learned Judge was not correct in his interpretation of the section, particularly the words ?whether erected by the intermediary or not?. In our view, if S. 6 (1) (b) was not amended the appellant would have been entitled to retain the disputed land as comprised in or appertaining to the structures standing thereon even though the same were built by the respondent No. 4. After the amendment of S. 6 (1) (b), there can be no doubt that if the structures are not owned by the appellant he is not entitled to retain the land comprised therein or appertaining thereto under this section. ( 6 ) IT is apparent that the appellant claimed the right of retention under the un-amended S. 6 (1) (b) and he took the simple course of pleading that he was entitled to retain the disputed land, for it was beyond his contemplation that S. 6 (1) (b) would be amended with retrospective effect. Be that as it may, in this appeal, the appellant has taken an additional ground, namely, that apart from the cinema building there are other structures which were erected by his predecessor-in-interest and, as such, he is entitled to retain the land comprised in those structures. A further point that has been taken by the appellant before us is that he is not an intermediary within the meaning of the Act as he is no-agricultural tenant in respect of the disputed land and accordingly, there is no question of vesting of his interest in view of S. 5 (c) of the Act. This appeal came up for hearing before the Bench consisting of Tarun Kumar Basu and M. N. Roy JJ. So far as the first point is concerned their Lordships took the view that there should be a definite finding and determination of the point which involves questions of fact. They adjourned the hearing of the appeal and directed the respondent no. So far as the first point is concerned their Lordships took the view that there should be a definite finding and determination of the point which involves questions of fact. They adjourned the hearing of the appeal and directed the respondent no. 2, the Estates Acquisition Collector, 24-Parganas to give his findings on the point and send a report to this Court. Further, it was directed that the respondent no. 2 should also keep in this view the contention made on behalf of the Government that the land in question being situate in Dihi Parchanagram, is Khasmahal land of the Government and so the appellant had no right to retain them. The appeal was directed not to be treated as heard in part by their Lordships. As directed the respondent no. 2 has submitted his report dated September 14, 1976. In this report it has been found by him that there is a pucca structure in the extreme south of C. S. Plot no. 11 measuring 570 sq. ft. which has been in the possession of a refugee family for the last 25 years. It is further stated by him in his report that on enquiry, he learnt that when the refugees had taken over possession of the land it was in a dilapidated condition and some 'dom' used to live there. He has drawn an inference from the above fact that the original structure was made for the servants of the then owner of the land. This finding of the respondent no. 2 relates to the question of the appellant's retention of the disputed land under S. 6 (1) (b) as amended. The appellant owned the said structure on the date of vesting as the same was erected by him predecessors-in-interest. In any event, therefore, he is entitled to retain the land comprised in the said structure under S. 6 (1) (b ). ( 7 ) BUT the most important question seems to be whether the appellant is a non-agricultural tenant as contended on his behalf at the hearing of this appeal. The disputed land being situated within Dihi Parchanagram is Government Khasmahal land. The G. S. record-of-rights describes the predecessors-in-interest of the appellant including his father as tenure-holders under a superior landlord in respect of four plots of land including the said plots nos. 11 and 32. It also records the existence of ?dalan? The disputed land being situated within Dihi Parchanagram is Government Khasmahal land. The G. S. record-of-rights describes the predecessors-in-interest of the appellant including his father as tenure-holders under a superior landlord in respect of four plots of land including the said plots nos. 11 and 32. It also records the existence of ?dalan? which means brick-built structures on both the plots. The revisional record-of-rights also records the same thing as in the C. S. record-of-rights except that in respect of plots nos. 11 and 32 the cinema hall has been specifically recorded. ( 8 ) AT this stage, we may refer to some of the provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. Section 4 provides that the State Government may from time to time by notification declare that with effect from the date mentioned in the notification, all estates and the rights of every intermediary in each such estate situated in any district or part of a district specified in the notification, shall vest in the State free from all encumbrances. The notification under S. 4 was published by the State Government and the date of vesting as mentioned in the notification was Baisakh 1, 1362 B. S. corresponding to April 15, 1955. Section 5 (1) deals with the effect of a notification under S. 4. It provides inter alia that upon the due publication of a notification under S. 4, on and from the date of vesting the estates and the rights of intermediaries in the estates to which the declaration applies, shall vest in the State free from all encumbrances, namely, rights in sub-soil including rights in mines and minerals, rights in hats, bazaars, ferries, fisheries, tolls and other sairati interests, all lands in any estate comprised in a forest together with all rights to the trees therein or to the produce thereof and held by an intermediary or any other person, and all grants of, and confirmation of titles to, estates and rights therein. Section 5 (1) (c) inter alia provides that every non-agricultural tenant holding any land under an intermediary shall hold the same directly under the State. Under S. 5 (1) (d) every non-agricultural tenant holding under an intermediary shall be bound to pay to the State his rent and other dues in respect of his land, accruing on and from the date of vesting. Section 2 is the definition section. Under S. 5 (1) (d) every non-agricultural tenant holding under an intermediary shall be bound to pay to the State his rent and other dues in respect of his land, accruing on and from the date of vesting. Section 2 is the definition section. Clause (b) of S. 2 defines agricultural land as meaning land ordinarily used for purpose of agriculture or horticulture and includes such land, notwithstanding that it may be lying fallow for the time being. Clause (i) of S. 2 defines an intermediary as meaning a proprietor, tenure-holder, under-tenure-holder or any other intermediary above a raiyat or a non-agricultural tenant and includes a service tenure-holder and, in relation to mines and minerals, includes a lessee and a sub-lessee. Under clause (j) of S. 2 non-agricultural land means land other than agricultural land or other than land comprised in a forest. Clause (k) of S. 2 defines a non-agricultural tenant as meaning a tenant of non-agricultural land who holds under a proprietor, a tenure-holder, a service tenure-holder or an under tenure-holder. ( 9 ) IT is clear from the definition of the term ?intermediary? that the interest of a on-agricultural tenant will not vest in the State, for an intermediary is a person above a non-agricultural tenant or a raiyat. S. 5 (1) (c) has made the position more clear as it provides that a non-agricultural tenant shall hold the land directly under the State, and under S. 5 (1) (d) he has t pay rent to the State. In Shibsankar Nandy v. Prabartak Sangha and others, AIR 1967 SC 940 , the Supreme Court has also laid down that a non-agricultural tenant does not come within the definition of the word 'intermediary' in S. 2 (i ). In other words, a non-agricultural tenant is not an intermediary. ( 10 ) THE dispute in this case is whether the appellant is a non-agricultural tenant. In order that a person may be said to be a non-agricultural tenant he must be a tenant of non-agricultural land holding under a proprietor, a tenure-holder, a service tenure-holder or an under tenure-holder. It has been already noticed that the disputed land is a non-agricultural land and the appellant's predecessors-in-interest including his father were tenants under one Krishna Kamini Chowdhurani in respect of the disputed land as per the C. S. record-of-rights. It has been already noticed that the disputed land is a non-agricultural land and the appellant's predecessors-in-interest including his father were tenants under one Krishna Kamini Chowdhurani in respect of the disputed land as per the C. S. record-of-rights. The position on the date of vesting which appears from the revisional record-of-rights is that the appellant is the holder of the superior interest in respect of the said two plots and the respondent no. 4 is the possessor of the said plots. In the C. S. record-of-rights the predecessors-in-interest of the appellant were recorded is ?madhyasatwadhikari Chirasthai? which expression means ?permanent tenure-holder?. It is contended n behalf of the respondent that as the appellant or his predecessors-in-interest were tenure-holders on the date of vesting they were intermediaries and accordingly, their interests in disputed land vested in the State. The term ?tenure-holder? has not been defined in the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. Clause (p) of S. 2 of the Act, however, provides that expressions used in this Act and not otherwise defined have in relation to the areas to which the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, applies, the same meaning as in that Act and in relation to other areas meaning as similar thereto as the existing law relating to land tenures applying to such areas, permits. By virtue of clause (p), the meaning of the term ?tenure-holder? and the meaning of the expression under-tenure-holder and other expressions not defined in the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act have to be understood from the definition of those expressions as given in the Bengal Tenancy Act. Under S. 4 (1) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, of the four clauses of tenants, tenure-holder, including under-tenure-holders from one class. Section 5 (1) of the Bengal Tenancy Act provides that ?tenure-holder? means primarily a person who has acquired from a proprietor or from another tenure-holder a right to hold land for the purpose of collecting rents or bringing it under cultivation by establishing tenants on it, and includes also the successor-in-interest of persons who have acquired such a right. It is now well settled that the Bengal Tenancy Act applies only to leases of agricultural lands for agricultural purposes. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of a Division Bench consisting of Maclean CJ. and Banerjee J. in Umrao Bibi and another v. Syed Mohamed Rojabi, 4 C. W. N. 76. It is now well settled that the Bengal Tenancy Act applies only to leases of agricultural lands for agricultural purposes. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of a Division Bench consisting of Maclean CJ. and Banerjee J. in Umrao Bibi and another v. Syed Mohamed Rojabi, 4 C. W. N. 76. In that case, Maclean C. J. held that a tenure-holder, within the contemplation of the Bengal Tenancy Act must be a person who holds land which is used for agricultural or horticultural purposes. As per the other learned Judge Banerjee J. the distinction between the case coming under the Transfer of Property Act and those coming under the ordinary Rent Law is constituted by the fact of the land being non-agricultural or agricultural. It follows from this decision that in order that a person may be said to be a tenure-holder the land must be used for agricultural or horticultural purposes. Under the Bengal Tenancy Act a tenure of non-agricultural land cannot be conceived of. But in the instant case, the interest of the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant was recorded as that of a tenure-holder under the superior interest. At the same time, it is apparent from the C. S. record-of-rights and the Revisional record-of-rights that the disputed land is being used for non-agricultural purposes at least since 1931 when the C. S. record-of-rights was finally published. There is no evidence before us that the disputed land was ever used for agricultural purpose at any point of time. The disputed land not having been used for purposes of agriculture or horticulture it does not, therefore, fall under the definition of agricultural land as given in clause (b) of S. 2. The ordinary use of the disputed land being non-agriculture, it is non-agricultural land within the meaning of clause (j) of S. 2. The position, therefore, comes to this that the appellant is a tenant in respect of non-agricultural land holding under a proprietor or a tenure-holder and so he is a non-agricultural tenant within the meaning of clause (k) of S. 2. ( 11 ) MR. Smriti Kumar Roy Chowdhury, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State Government has strenuously urged that the disputed land being a Government Khasmahal land, the appellant or his father was a proprietor and not a non-agricultural tenant. ( 11 ) MR. Smriti Kumar Roy Chowdhury, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State Government has strenuously urged that the disputed land being a Government Khasmahal land, the appellant or his father was a proprietor and not a non-agricultural tenant. He has placed much reliance on certain observations of the Privy Council in Gunga Gobind Mundal v. The Collector of the Twenty Four Parganas, 11 M. I. A. 345 as referred to in Saradacharan Mitra's Tagore Law Lectures on the Land Law of Bengal. In this Tagore Law Lectures, 2nd Edition, page 32, Saradacharan Mitra observed as follows: ?a Khas Mahal is an estate held by Government standing in the place of the proprietor. . . In the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 Government Khas Mahals are ?estates?, and the Government is a ?proprietor? owning estates. The Government is also a ?landlord? like other landholders. ? as the disputed land is a part of Government khas mahal land, it must have been settled to the predecessors-in-interests of the appellant by the Government. The relationship between the Government and the predecessors-in-interest of the appellant as per the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act would be that of landlord and tenants which is clear from the above observation. In the case of Gunga Gobind Mundal the Privy Council was considering the interest of one Johnson holding Khas Mahal land under the Government. The Privy Council observed: ?if there was anything in the nature of the title of the Government to lands in the Twenty-four Pergunnahs, or any usage or custom in force there, which gave a less permanent interest to the possessors of proprietary right, some authority for, or some evidence of such a variation from, and limitation of the general law, should have been adduced to their Lordships. Their Lordships themselves are aware of nothing to take these title out of the operation of the principles established by the cases above referred to:. . . The interest of the person in possession is not a limited but an absolute interest; the title to the lands is one inheritance, the title, to the khiraj or rent is another. Their Lordships themselves are aware of nothing to take these title out of the operation of the principles established by the cases above referred to:. . . The interest of the person in possession is not a limited but an absolute interest; the title to the lands is one inheritance, the title, to the khiraj or rent is another. Though these lands are treated as part of the khas mehals, yet there is no proof in this case of any relation of landlord and tenant ever existing between Johnson and the Government; Johnson appears to have been the absolute owner, and not reversion to have existed in the Government. It is not the case of a lease at all, still less of a lease of temporary duration; it is the case of an absolute ownership of the lands; and the title of the of the Government rather resembles a seignory than that of a lessor with a reversion. . . There is no relation of Landlord and tenant in such a case between the Government and the owner of the lands, who is the landlord, and not a Ryot. The Government has a title to the rent or jumma. But whatever name it be called the right and title is to the rent substantially; it does not include a right to the possession of the lands, though such a right might arise by forfeiture or extinction of the ownership. ? ( 12 ) THE decision of the Privy Council referred to above was given in 1867, that is, long before the enactment of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885. It was held by the Privy Council that the interest of Johnson was that of a proprietor and that there was no proof of any relation of landlord and tenant ever existing between Johnson and the Government. It may be mentioned in this connection that in the Privy Council case, it was the contention of the appellant that the land was held as Lakhiraj and no rent was every assessed upon or paid in respect of his land to the Government. Relying n this Privy Council decision it is contended on behalf of the respondents that the appellant's predecessor-in-interest were proprietors and hence the appellant is an intermediary within the meaning of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act and not a non-agricultural tenant. Relying n this Privy Council decision it is contended on behalf of the respondents that the appellant's predecessor-in-interest were proprietors and hence the appellant is an intermediary within the meaning of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act and not a non-agricultural tenant. It has been already pointed out that the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant including his father held under one Krishna kamini Chowdhurani. It is, therefore, apparent that the appellant or his father could not be a proprietor but they were holding as tenants under a proprietor. In the revisional record-of-rights the name of the appellant has not been recorded as a proprietor but as the holder of the superior interest liable to pay a sum of Rs. 16. 20 as yearly rent. The respondent no. 4 has been recorded as possessor under the appellant. The word 'possessor' or its Bengali equivalent 'dakhalkar' is recorded only in respect of non-agricultural land. There is no dispute that the respondent no. 4 is a non-agricultural tenant. In the C. S. record-of-rights the names of the predecessors-in-interest of the appellant including the name of his father having been recorded as tenure-holders we must proceed on the basis that the appellant is a tenure-holder. But there is no evidence that the disputed land was ever used for agricultural purposes; on the contrary there being positive evidence that the disputed land is being used for non-agricultural purposes at least since 1931 and the appellant being a tenant liable to pay rent, he is a non-agricultural tenant. ( 13 ) IT is, however, contended on behalf of the respondents that the appellant having only a rent receiving interest, he must be held to be an intermediary. It is true that a person having a rent receiving interest will be ordinarily an intermediary, but this theory does not apply to the case of a non-agricultural tenant. A non-agricultural tenant may create several grades of tenants under him and reduce his interest to that of a rent-receiving interest. But because of his interest being a rent-receiving one, he will not fall under the definition of intermediary. A non-agricultural tenant may create several grades of tenants under him and reduce his interest to that of a rent-receiving interest. But because of his interest being a rent-receiving one, he will not fall under the definition of intermediary. In the case before the Supreme Court in Shibsankar Nandy v. Prabartak Sangha and others referred to above, a similar contention was made before the Supreme Court that the first respondent having merely the right to receive rent, it was an 'intermediary' within the meaning of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act and that the interests of such an intermediary vested in the State. The Supreme Court overruled the said contention and held that the first respondent being itself a non-agricultural tenant in respect of the entire land including the land in dispute it did not fall within the definition of intermediary, and so it was impossible to say that its interests in the land in dispute vested in the State. So, merely because the appellant has only a right to receive rent, that will not make him an intermediary, as he is a non-agricultural tenant. ( 14 ) IT has been observed earlier that a tenure of land used for non-agricultural purposes cannot be conceived of under the Bengal Tenancy Act. We are not inclined to consider why the names of the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant were recorded as tenure-holders in the C. S. record-of-rights when the user of the disputed land has been all through for non-agricultural purposes. We do not think that the said question is necessary to be considered. In our view, the question of vesting of one's interest will depend on the provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act read with the definition of some of the expressions as given in the Bengal Tenancy Act. In support of his contention that a tenure of non-agricultural land is also contemplated by the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, Mr. Roy Chowdhury has drawn out attention to the proviso to S. 42 (1 ). In support of his contention that a tenure of non-agricultural land is also contemplated by the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, Mr. Roy Chowdhury has drawn out attention to the proviso to S. 42 (1 ). Section 42 (1) is as follows: ?42.- Intermediary liable to ay rent.- (1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), when an intermediary is entitled to retain possession of any land under sub-section (1) of Section 6, then except in cases of land retained under clause (h) or (i), and except in the cases referred to in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 6, the Revenue Officer shall determine the rent payable in the prescribed manner and in accordance with the following principles, that is to say, - (i)if the land be agricultural land, on the basis of the rate of rent paid by raiyats or other persons holding lands of similar description and with similar advantage in the vicinity; (ii)if the land be non-agricultural land, at a rate which the Revenue Officer may deem fair and equitable having regard to the rent generally paid for non-agricultural lands of similar description and with similar advantages in the vicinity: or where such non-agricultural lands are not available in the vicinity or the rent generally paid for such non-agricultural lands cannot be readily ascertained, at such rate, not exceeding five per centum of the net annual income from the land estimated in the prescribed manner, as the Revenue Officer may deem fair and equitable: provided that in the case of an intermediary, who immediately before the date of vesting held any tenure comprising exclusively of non-agricultural lands, he shall, subject to any law for the time being in force for assessment or re-assessment of rent, (a)pay the same rent as he was paying immediately before the date of vesting if he retains all such lands; (b)pay as rent an amount which shall bear the same proportion to the rent he was paying immediately before the date of vesting, as the area of the land retained by him bears to the area of all the lands which were comprised in the tenure if he retains only part of such lands; (c)pay no rent for the land retained by him if he held such land rent-free immediately before the date of vesting. ? ? ( 15 ) IT is true that in the proviso a tenure comprising exclusively of non-agricultural lands is contemplated but there can be no doubt that such a tenure could not be created under the Bengal Tenancy Act. We do not think that by the proviso the creation of a tenure comprising exclusively of non-agricultural land has been recognised. But it seems to us that all that has been intended to mean by the proviso is that the tenure though initially created of agricultural lands was found to be comprised exclusively of non-agricultural lands on the date of vesting. Though the proviso refers to such a tenure-holder as an intermediary, yet it does not affect his interest. He will pay the same rent as he was paying immediately before the date of vesting if he retains all such lands, or pay as rent an amount which shall bear the same proportion to the rent he was paying immediately before the date of vesting, as the area of the land retained by him bears to the area of all the lands which were comprised in the tenure if he retains only part of such lands, or pay no rent for the land retained by him if he held such land rent-free immediately before the date of vesting. The option to retain all his lands is with him. The legislature has made an exception in his case by the proviso, and he has been treated as a non-agricultural tenant in regard to his liability to pay rent. This also supports the view that if the lands were found to be non-agricultural on the date of vesting, the person who held such lands as a tenant would be a non-agricultural tenant. The intermediary referred to in the proviso holding non-agricultural lands has been treated differently from an intermediary under-clause (ii) of S. 42 (1) also holding non-agricultural lands. The proviso, in our view, does not at all support the contention of the respondents; on the other hand, it is quite consistent with the view holding the appellant to be a non-agricultural tenant of the disputed land. In these circumstances, we hold that the appellant is a non-agricultural tenant. No other point has been argued in this appeal. ( 16 ) THE appeal is allowed. The judgment of the learned Judge is set aside. In these circumstances, we hold that the appellant is a non-agricultural tenant. No other point has been argued in this appeal. ( 16 ) THE appeal is allowed. The judgment of the learned Judge is set aside. Let a writ in the nature of Mandamus issue commanding the respondents not to realise rent from the respondent no. 4 who holds as a tenant under the appellant. Further, let a writ in the nature of Certiorari issue quashing the order of the State Government or its officers, directing to treat the disputed land as vested land and to realise rent from the respondent no. 4 in respect thereof. The Rule is made absolute without any order as to costs. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal. Sabyasachi Mukharji, J: I agree. Appeal allowed.