Judgment Hari Lal Agrawul, J. 1. This appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court by the appellants is directed against the judgment of learned single Judge of this Court passed in C. W. J. C. No.1236 of 1976 on 9th of february, 1977. 2. The Managing Committee of Middle School, Ekauna (Respondent no.1) and its Secretary (Respondent No.2) had filed the above writ application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing an order dated 18th February, 1976 passed by appellant No.1 (Annexure 1 to the wrei application), by which appellant No.1 had superseded the Managing Committee and instead, appointed an Ad-hoc Committee, on the ground that the school in question was not an "aided school" within the meaning of rule 64 of the Bihar primary and Middle Education Rules, 1961 (briefly the Rules) inasmuch as the school did not receive any aid out of the District Education Fund. 3. Although this stand of the writ petitioner, namely, Respondent No.1, was controverted by the appellant No.1 in the counter-affidavit and it was asserted on his behalf that the school was receiving aid out of the District education Fund regularly, inasmuch as the necessary documents were not produced at the time of hearing of the writ application, the learned single Judge on taking a view that "no reliable document has been produced by the respondents to suggest that Ekauna Middle School receives any aid from the District Education fund. . . " quashed the order contained in Annexure 1 to the writ application. 4. The appellants have stated in their memorandum of appeal that although the date of hearing according to the show cause notice was fixed on 17.2.1977, the case was actually taken up for hearing on 9th February, 1977 and the prayer made on behalf of the appellants for an opportunity to file the necessary counter-affidavit and produce the necessary evidence in support of their case was refused by the learned Judge. The appellants have now filed an application under Order XLI, rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure for admitting the documents, which were appended as Annexures to the memorandum of appeal, as additional evidence. The originals of the two annexures to the memorandum of appeal, namely, Annexures 1 and 2, have also been filed along with the petition. The appellants have now filed an application under Order XLI, rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure for admitting the documents, which were appended as Annexures to the memorandum of appeal, as additional evidence. The originals of the two annexures to the memorandum of appeal, namely, Annexures 1 and 2, have also been filed along with the petition. From the statements made in the petition and the memorandum of appeal, it is apparent that the statements made by the appellants that the writ application was taken up for hearing by this Court even before the date of hearing fixed in the notice that was issued to them are correct. In my opinion, therefore, a case has been made out by the appellants for grant of. their application for taking the abovementioned documents as additional evidence in the appeal. 5. On a scrutiny of the above documents, it is clear that the school in question was receiving aid from the District Board fund, namely, the District education Fund since 1949 and from 1955, although the salaries of the teachers were met out of the tuition fee realised from the students of the school, their enhaneed salary and dearners allowance were paid from the District Education fund which, however, remained suspended from May 1967 to June 1976 when the old Managing Committee of the school had refused to carry out the order of appellant No.1 to reinstate the Headmaster. 6. These facts have not been controverted before us on behalf of the respondents. Their stand, however, was entirely different and that was that although the teachers had been paid part of their salaries out of the District education Fund, the payment not having been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed for sanctioning the aid or grant, the payments in question cannot be said as aid within the meaning of the Rules and, therefore, the school in question cannot be held to be an aided school. 7. In order to appreciate the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the contesting parties, I would refer to some of the relevant provisions of the rules. The Rules in question have been made by the State Government under the provisions of the Bihar and Orissa Local Self-Government Act (Bengal Act iii of 1885 ). 7. In order to appreciate the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the contesting parties, I would refer to some of the relevant provisions of the rules. The Rules in question have been made by the State Government under the provisions of the Bihar and Orissa Local Self-Government Act (Bengal Act iii of 1885 ). The expression "aided school" has been defined in rule 2 (6), which means "a school under private management receiving financial assistance from the District Education Fund". The expression "district Education Fund" has again been defined to mean the fund formed under section 54-A of the Act", namely, the Bihar and Orissa Local Self-Government Act. Sec.54-A of the Act provides for "constitution of District Education fund", and according to the said provision, the fund in question shall be vested in the District Board, which will he operated by the District Superintendent of education. The fund is to be constituted of various sums mentions in the section itself. Learned counsel for the respondents invited our attention to part IV of the Rules which prescribes the procedure for receiving aid out of the district Education Fund by unaided schools, and the relevant rules in this connection are rule 53 and onwards. The provision contemplates an application for grant-in-aid containing various informations, which have to be processed through the Planning Committee and ultimately to be approved by the Director. On the basis of these provisions, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the said statutory provision was not adhered to in the present case and as such, the aid, if vany, could not constitute the school in question into an aided school. 8. Reliance was also placed on behalf of the respondents on a decision in kameshwar Prasad V/s. The State of Bihar and others, ( 1975 BBCJ 236 ). Having considered the arguments and examining the relevant provisions of the Rules and the Local Self-Government Act, in my view, the contentions advanced on behalf of the respondents are erroneous and must be rejected. The procedure mentioned under different rules of the Rules calling for an application for grant-in-aid and its due scrutiny and approval would be of no consequence inasmuch as that, in my opinion, would be attracted where any aid is given on the application of any school. The procedure mentioned under different rules of the Rules calling for an application for grant-in-aid and its due scrutiny and approval would be of no consequence inasmuch as that, in my opinion, would be attracted where any aid is given on the application of any school. But there is no bar for the authority concerned to provide any aid or assistance to any educational institution in absence of any application. The salary and dearness allowance of teachers of private schools were also raised by a governmental decision in order to raise the teaching standard of the schools; and in order to meet the additional financial burden, the government itself took upon the responsibility to meet the same out of the education Fund. The respondents admittedly have been receiving the said fund on submission of bills according to the new enhanced scales. There is, therefore, apparently no scope for any contention that inasmuch as the grant was voluntary and without any application on behalf of the school, that would not make the school an aided school, although the amount was being paid out of the District education Fund. The decision cited above also has no application to the facts of the present case. The question following for consideration in the said case was as to whether a privately managed Middle School receiving aid from the Municipal Fund, but not from the District Education Fund, could be said to be an aided school. 9. In my view, the definition of the expression "aided school" in rule 2 (b) of the Rules is quite clear and admits no ambiguity. The only condition occurring in the said provision is that a privately managed school received financial assistance from the District Education Fund. This condition is admittedly satisfied in this case. Even assuming that some so-called procedure was not properly followed by the authorities of the Education Department in sanctioning the fund, that would not make the assistance and the aid rendered to the school in question in any way unlawful, and the respondent Managing Committee itself having been receiving the aid, is estopped in law to challenge its validity and propriety. 10. As a result of the above discussions, this appeal must succeed and is, accordingly, allowed. As a result thereof, the judgment and order of the learned single Judge are set aside. 10. As a result of the above discussions, this appeal must succeed and is, accordingly, allowed. As a result thereof, the judgment and order of the learned single Judge are set aside. In the circumstances of the case, however, I will leave the parties to near their own costs. 11. Before parting, however, an application filed by Lal Krishna Singh, the Headmaster of the school in question, who was earlier dismissed by the managing Committee, for addition of party to this appeal, should also be disposed of. It was this Headmaster who was ordered to be reinstated by the appellant No.1, which direction was not carried out by the respondent-Managing committee. Since all the possible contentions that could be advanced on his behalf have already been noticed, as advanced on behalf of the appellants, and in view of the fact that the appeal is being allowed, I do not think that it is necessary to make a formal order adding him as a party to this appeal. The application is, accordingly, rejected. Appeal allowed.