Order.-This revision is directed against the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Kolar, reversing the judgment of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kolar Sub-Division, in the first revision before him and remanding the case under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to the Magistrate to stay proceedings in that case and refer the issue regarding tenancy claimed by one of the parties to the Land Tribunal, Kolar, for its decision. 2. The dispute related to S. No. 179 and the first member of the first party who is respondent 2 in the present petition, claimed to be a tenant, while the first member of the second party who is petitioner 1 claimed to be the owner of the land. It was stated on behalf of the first party that the first member of that party was a tenant from the last 20 years. While it was asserted to on behalf of the first member of the second party that the disputed land belonged to one Chinnamma and under successive sale deeds from her the land became ultimately vested in him as owner. There was a dispute, according to the police report, between the two parties regarding possession and the said dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. Accordingly, the learned Magistrate after initiating proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, issued the preliminary order on 21st February, 1975. After enabling the parties to file written statements of their respective claims, he ultimately passed the final order under that section in favour of the first member of the second party holding him to be the owner entitled to remain in possession. The usual order was made that the first party were not to disturb the possession of the second party and that the first member of the second party was to remain in possession till the question was decided by a competent civil Court. Being aggrieved of that order passed by the Magistrate in favour of the first member of the second party, the first party came in first revision before the Sessions Judge. 3. Being aggrieved of that order passed by the Magistrate in favour of the first member of the second party, the first party came in first revision before the Sessions Judge. 3. While the first revision was argued before the learned Sessions Judge, it was pointed out that the tenancy claimed by the first member of the first party was the subject-matter of the dispute in a proceeding before the Land Tribunal and that being the position, under section 133 (1) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 as amended by Act XXVII of 1976, the Criminal Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under section 145 or to initiate any proceeding in regard thereto. It may however be recalled that the learned Magistrate had also passed the order attaching the property and appointing a receiver. It was further contended before the learned Sessions Judge that the jurisdiction of the criminal Court was ousted in view of subsection (1) of section 133 and if at all any interim order by way of attachment or appointment of a receiver was needed, the same could be passed by the Land Tribunal. This plea prevailed before the learned Sessions Judge and he dismissed the revision on that short ground holding that the case be remanded to the learned Magistrate for staying the proceeding and for referring the issue regarding the tenancy to the Laud Tribunal for its decision as provided for in sub-section (1) (ii) of section 133. The second party has felt aggrieved of that decision and has preferred the present second revision. 4. The only point contended in this Court refers to the interpretation of section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, which may profitably be quoted as below: “133. Suits, proceedings, etc.. The second party has felt aggrieved of that decision and has preferred the present second revision. 4. The only point contended in this Court refers to the interpretation of section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, which may profitably be quoted as below: “133. Suits, proceedings, etc.. involving questions required to be decided by the Tribunal: (1) Notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force (i) no Civil or Criminal Court or officer or authority shall, in any suit, case or proceedings concerning a land, other than proceedings under Chapter IV of this Act, decide the question whether such land is or is not agricultural land and whether the person claiming to be in possession is or is not a tenant of the said land from prior to 1st March, 1974; (ii) such Court or officer or authority shall stay such suit or proceedings in so far as such question is concerned and refer the same to the Tribunal for decision; (iii) all interim orders issued or made by such Court, officer or authority, whether in the nature of temporary injunction or appointment of a Receiver or otherwise, concerning the land shall stand dissolved or vacated, as the case may be; (iv) The Tribunal shall decide the question referred to it under clause (1) and communicate its decision to such Court, officer or authority. The decision of the Tribunal shall be final; (2) nothing in sub-section (1) shall preclude the Civil or Criminal Court or the officer or authority from proceeding with the suit, case or proceedings in respect of any matter other than that referred to in that subsection.” In view of sub-section (2) mentioned above, it is manifest a proceeding in respect of any matter other than that referred to in sub-section (1) of that section is precluded and shall not be affected by any provision of that section. On the basis of sub-section (2) it was contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that a proceeding under section 145 is in respect of a matter other than that referred to in section 133 and as such the said proceeding is precluded from being affected by that section. On the basis of sub-section (2) it was contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that a proceeding under section 145 is in respect of a matter other than that referred to in section 133 and as such the said proceeding is precluded from being affected by that section. A reading of section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes it abundantly clear that the dispute mentioned therein is not in fact a dispute concerning any land but rather it is a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace that exists concerning any land. Therefore, the very basis for initiating a proceeding under section 145 is prima facie a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace and it is. only that dispute with which the Magistrate is. concerned. The section provides a summary remedy to remove that dispute so that the breach of the peace is not caused. What the Magistrate does is that he makes enquiry in a summary manner and finds out, as to which of the parties was in possession on a relevant date. Having arrived at that finding, the Magistrate gives an executive protection to that party and asks the other party not to disturb his possession. The decision of the Magistrate is always; subject to the decision of a Tribunal or a Court competent to decide any question of title in respect of the land that may be raised before it. Therefore, it it would not be correct to say that the proceeding before the Magistrate was “a proceeding concerning a land” as contemplated in sub-section (1) (i) of section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. Rather the proceeding was relating to a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace concerning a land and it was not a dispute concerning a land simpliciter, in the sense that any right claimed by one party over land and denied by other party was under dispute and was open to a decision by the Court. In fact the criminal Court is not concerned as to the person having title to possession. For the purpose of section 145, such a person may be a tenant or a proprietor or even without any tile but nevertheless entitled to possession. In fact the criminal Court is not concerned as to the person having title to possession. For the purpose of section 145, such a person may be a tenant or a proprietor or even without any tile but nevertheless entitled to possession. As long as the physical possession, of a person is found to exist on a relevant date, the criminal Court protects that possession so that a breach of the peace is not committed. As I have stated before, the question of title of whatever description is left for decision by a Tribunal or a Court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, in my opinion there could be no conflict between the jurisdiction exercised by the Land Tribunal under section 133 of the Land Reforms Act and the jurisdiction exercised by the Magistrate under section 145 of the Code. The two jurisdictions are of entirely different nature and one docs not overlap the other nor cause any hindrance in exercise of one jurisdiction over the other. 5. In sub-section (1) (i) of section 133 what the Land Tribunal decides is (a) whether such land is or is not agricultural land; and (b) whether the person claiming to be in possession is or is not a tenant of the said land from prior to lst March, 1974. In a proceeding under section 145 of the Code the date 1st March, 1974 has absolutely no significance. It is not to be decided in these proceedings, as to whether the person claiming to be in possession is or is not a tenant of the said land. Rather the criminal Court is called upon to decide as to whether the person claiming possession was in fact in possession on a particular date and as such he can seek protection of the executive Magistrate to retain that possession until he is dispossessed after a decision upon title by a competent Court is taken against him. Therefore, whatever the Land Tribunal is called upon to decide which is obviously the title of the person claiming right of tenancy, is not the subject-matter of the proceeding before the Magistrate. In this view of the matter it cannot be stated that the proceding before the Magistrate is in any manner similar to the proceeding before the Land Tribunal. Rather it is a proceeding in respect of a matter other than that referred to the Tribunal. In this view of the matter it cannot be stated that the proceding before the Magistrate is in any manner similar to the proceeding before the Land Tribunal. Rather it is a proceeding in respect of a matter other than that referred to the Tribunal. That being so, section 133 of the Land Reforms Act will not be a bar to the proceeding before the Magistrate under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 6. The other interpretation of section 133 advanced by the learned Counsel for the respondents if accepted will lead to startling results. It cannot be held that by starting a proceeding before the Land Tribunal where there is a dispute as to the tenancy, the jurisdiction of the executive Magistrate is taken away to adopt means to prevent a breach of the peace concerning that land. Section 145 of the Code, is provided to meet that contingency. If the initiation of proceeding of any description before the Tribunal goes to make section 145 defunct or even goes to retard the proceeding initiated under that section in any manner, the consequence may be of very serious nature. I am therefore confident, that section 133 of the Land Reforms Act has left totally untouched the proceeding concerning breach of the peace enumerated in section 145 of the Code, and for that matter even enumerated in sections 107, 108, 109 or 110 of the Code. The argument cannot be advanced in support of section 133 because there could even be a case of a serious substantive offence committed by a person, in which a question of tenancy might be raised and it could be stated that the proceeding with respect to that substantive offence in the criminal Court should wait for the decision of the question of title by the Land Tribunal. 7. Therefore, the order of the learned Sessions Judge inasmuch as he held that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to proceed under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as some proceeding was pending in respect of the land before the Land Tribunal was erroneous. As such, the petition is allowed and the order of the learned Sessions Judge is set aside. He has to consider the revision before him on merit. 8. As such, the petition is allowed and the order of the learned Sessions Judge is set aside. He has to consider the revision before him on merit. 8. The learned Counsel for the respondents contended that on merits in the case, the proceeding under section 145 of the Code could not be initiated or at any rate the decision should have been in favour of the first member of the first party. Any question regarding merit is left open at this stage. It is for the learned Sessions Judge to decide if the proceeding under section, 145 of the Code, could at all be initiated and if so which of the parties is entitled to remain in possession.