( 1 ) THIS petition raises a short but important question namely whether an order made under S. 451 Crpc 1973, by a Criminal Court without notice to or hearing the party adversely affected can be reviewed, and it arises in the following circumstances: On the complaint of the 2nd respondent hanumantha Gowda a charge-sheet for the offences under Ss. 379 and 411, r/w 34 of the IPC was ultimately filed against the petitioners on 20-10-1976 in CC. 29711976 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Laxmeswar, inter alia, alleging that on 21-9-1976 the petitioners committed theft of 4 she-buffaloes belonging to the 2nd respondent Hanumantha gowda. It appears that the 4 she-buffaloes were seized and given to the custody of the police-patil during investigation. Then on 21-10-1976, the 2nd respondent's Advocate filed an application under S. 451 Crpc in the said Court for the custody of the 4 she-buffaloes. The learned Magistrate on the same day without notice to or hearing any of the petitioners made an order directing the 4 she-buffaloes to be given to the custody of the 2nd respondent till the conclusion of the trial en his execution a bond in a sum of Rs. 3000. It appears, till 25-10-1976, the 2nd respondent, did not execute a bond as ordered and on that day the 2nd petitioner too filed an application under S. 451 Crpc stating that the 4 she-buffaloes belonged to him and they were seized from his possession and they should be given to his custody. The learned Magistrate taking the view that in view of the order already made on 21-10-1976 under S. 451 Crpc in favour of the 2nd respondent the application filed by the 2nd petitioner under S. 451 Crpc is not tenable, dismissed the same by his order dt. 18-11-1976, and it is that order that is assailed in this petition. ( 2 ) IT is obvious from the above that the learned Magistrate appears to think that under S. 451 Crpc it was open to him to make an ex parte order such as the one made on 21-10-1976 and that order must be regarded as final pending conclusion of ithe inquiry or trial. But in my opinion, there is no warrant at all for such a view. But in my opinion, there is no warrant at all for such a view. There may be compelling circumstances to make an order under S. 451 Crpc without notice to or hearing the party adversely affected, but an order passed in that way can- only be an interim order subject to vacation or variation or confirmation after hearing the parties concerned. In this connection, I may refer to the following observations in Ramchetsing v. Deoji Kalyani (AIR 1942 Bom 42):" It may be that circumtances of urgency may necessitate the passing of ex parte order, but orders passed in that way can only be interim orders subject to vacation or variation or confirmation after hearing the parlies concerned. "in that case their Lordships were considering an order made under S. 516a, crpc (old) which Corresponds to S. 451 Crpc (new) and while repelling the contention advanced at the Bar that even an ex parte order must be regarded as a final order pending conclusion of the inquiry or trial, observed as above. The view I have taken also finds support in the decision in mohammad Yosuff v. Abdul Ahmad Shah ( (1972) 2 Crlj 1613 ). In that case, while considering the question whether an ex parte order made under S. 516a,crpc (old) is open to review, their Lordships said thus :" Once an order is made under this section the Court becomes functus offcio in the matter and cannot entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless and until the order has been set aside. In other words the Court has no power to review an order made under this section, for there is none given by he Code of Criminal Procedure nor can one be found in 'the absence of a direct statutory provision. On the other hand the principle of law inferable from S. 369 of the Crlpc is to the contrary, That section provides that the judgment of a Criminal court is final so far as that Court is concerned and cannot be reviewed or altered except where it is otherwise provided by the Code or any other law for 'the time being in force or for purpose of correcting clerical errors. The word 'judgment' may imply the decision in a trial terminating in the conviction or the acquittal of accused and as such the section may not in terms apply in respect of final orders like the one made under S. 516a Crpc which do net amount to judgments in trials, but the general principles on which the section is based would apply and such orders cannot be reviewed or altered by the Court which passed them. In that view the order passed by 'he trial Magistrate in the instant case unqualified as it was could not be reviewed or leconsidered by it. The position would be somewhat different if the order were qualified in the sense that it was subject to the objections of the party adversely affected hereby in which case the Court could perhaps legitimately reconsider the matter after hearing such party, for an order passed in that way can be considered to be an interim order subject to confirmation or modification after hearing the parties and not one made finally under the section. It may be that the circumstances of urgency necessitate the passing of an ex parts order under h. 516a Crpc but such an order should always be subjected to the objections of the party adversely affected thereby which, when considered a final order should be made by which the earlier provisional order may either be confirmed or else suitably varied. " (Underlining italics is mine ). It may however be asked that the provisions of S. 451 Crpc do not contemplate issue of notice to or hearing of the parties adversely affected. But, all the same, an order made without hearing the parties adversely affected does not cease to be an ex parte order. Though S. 451 Crpc does not expressly require a notice to be issued or a hearing to be given to the parties adversely affected, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in State bank of India v. Rajendra Kumar (AIR. 1969 SC. 401), there is in the eye of law a necessary implication that the parties adversely affected should be heard before the Court makes an order for the return "of the seized property, and while dealing with this subject the Supreme Court said thus :" It is true that the. 1969 SC. 401), there is in the eye of law a necessary implication that the parties adversely affected should be heard before the Court makes an order for the return "of the seized property, and while dealing with this subject the Supreme Court said thus :" It is true that the. statute does not expressly require a notice to be issued or a hearing to be given to the parties adversely affected. But though the statute is silent and does not expressly require issue of any notice there is in the eye of law a necessary implication that the parties adversely affected should be heard before the Court mak. es an order for return of the seized property. The principle is clearly stated in the leading case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Borad of Works ( (1863) 14 CB NS 180 ). In that case sec. 76 of the Metropolis Local Amendment Act, 1855 authorised the district Board to demolish the building if it had been constructed by the owner without giving notice to the Board of his intention to build. The statute laid down no procedure for the exercise of the power of demolition, and therefore, the Board demolished the house in exercise of the above power without issuing a notice to the owner of the house. It was held by the Court of common pleas that the Board was liable in damages for not having given notice of their order before they proceeded to execute it. Erle C. I held that the power was subject to a' qualification repeatedly recognised that no man is to be deprieved of his property without his having an opportunity, of being heard and that this had been applied to ' many exercises of power which in common understanding would not be at all a more judicial proceeding than would be the act of the Dist Beard in ordering a house to be pulled down'. Wills, J said that the rule was ' of universal application and founded upon the plainest principles of justice' and Byles, J said that ' though there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature '. The same principle has been reaffirmed in the recent case Ridge v. Baldwin ( (1963) 2 WLR 935 ). The same principle has been reaffirmed in the recent case Ridge v. Baldwin ( (1963) 2 WLR 935 ). In that case, Sec. 191 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1881, provided that a watch committee may at any time suspend or dismiss any borough constable whom they think negligent in the discharge of his duty or otherwise unfit for the same. The appellant who was the chief constable of a borough police force was dismissed by the watch committee on the ground that he was negligent in the discharge of his duties as chief constable. He brought an action against the members of the watch committee by stipulating that his dismissal was illegal and ultra vires the powers. It was held by the House of Lords that the decision of the watch committee was ultra vires because they dismissed the appellant on the ground of neglect of duty and as such they were bound to observe the principles of natural justice by informing him of the charges made against him and giving him an opportunity of being heard. The same principle was applied by this Court in Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U. P. , Allahabad v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta ( AIR 1962 SC 1110 ). It was held in ithat case that an examination committee of the Board of Secondary Education in Uttar Pradesh was acting quasi-judicially when exercising its power under Rule 1 of Chapter VI of the Regulations dealing with cases of examinees using unfair means in examination halls and the principles of natural justice which require that the examinee must be heard will apply to the proceedings before the committee. Though there was nothing express one way ot the other in the Act or the Regulations casting a duty on the committee to act judicially, where no opportunity whatever was given to the examinees to give an explanation and present their case before the committee the Resolutipn of the committee cancelling their results and depriving them from appearing at the next examination was defective. Applying the principle to the present case, it is manifest that the High Court was bound to give"notice to the appellant before reversing the order of the Sessions Judge directing the disposal of the property under S. 517 of the Crpc. As no such notice was given to the appellant the order of the High Court dt. Applying the principle to the present case, it is manifest that the High Court was bound to give"notice to the appellant before reversing the order of the Sessions Judge directing the disposal of the property under S. 517 of the Crpc. As no such notice was given to the appellant the order of the High Court dt. 5th April 1963 is vitiated in law. (Underlining italics is mine ). The above enunciation makes it abundantly clear that though Sec. 451, crpc does not expressly require a notice to be issued or a hearing to be given to the parties adversely affected, the parties adversely affected must be heard. in the present case, the 2nd petitioner, it is obvious, was not heard at all before the order was made on 21-10-1976. The said order being an ex parte order, for the reasons stated above, can be reviewed by the court which made it, of course, after hearing the party or parties adversely affected by the said ex parte order. The view taken to the contrary by the learned Magistrate, therefore, cannot be sustained. ( 3 ) IN the result, this petition is allewed, the impugned order of the learned Magistrate dt. 18-11-1976 is set aside, and he is directed to take the application cf the 2nd petitioner on file and dispose of the same in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. --- *** ---