JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition has arisen in the following circumstances. The petitioners are a registered partnership firm 'engaged in the business of mining. They made an application for grant of mining lease for soap stone over an area of 887.46 acres in village Khawa Raoji, Tehsil Dausa, District Jaipur, on 4th January, 1971. On the same day, the non-petitioner Prakash Chand also submitted an application for mining lease for the same area. The State of Rajasthan granted the application of that non-petitioner Prakash Chand on 27th December, 1971 only for an area of 269.95 acres as the State Government was satisfied that the applicant Prakash Chand was a suitable party for the grant of the said concession. The application of the petitioners was rejected on the ground that priority has been given to Shri Prakash Chand and the area was not free for allotment. A revision was filed by the petitioners with the Government of India which quashed the order of the State Government and remanded the case for passing an older on the lines indicated by it as the order of the Sate Government did not indicate the process of reasoning, vide its order dated 26th November, 1971. Thereafter the Government of Rajasthan made an order on 20th September, 1975 that Prakash Chand's standing is on better footing & hence priority was fixed in his favour. The application of the petitioners was again rejected and on 23rd September, 1975, the respondent No. 3 was granted a lease for the non-conflicting area of about 239.95 acres. The petitioners again filed a revision and the Government of India, vide its order dated 19th June, 1976. while exercising its revisional powers under rule 55 (4) of the Mineral Concessions Rules, 1960 and all other enabling provisions in that behalf set aside the orders of the State Government dated 20th September, 1975 and 23rd September, 1975 and directed the State Government to issue fresh order granting lease to the petitioner and the non-petitioner on the lines indicated in the order. The Central Government did hold that the petitioners were prior applicants and had a prima facie right to the grant of the mining lease in respect of the entire area of 887.46 acres applied for by them. The Central Government did hold that the petitioners were prior applicants and had a prima facie right to the grant of the mining lease in respect of the entire area of 887.46 acres applied for by them. But since the area in question was quite large and the non-petitioner in must have invested a considerable capital and conducted minor operations, they, therefore, on ground of equity indicated that they would have no objection if the part of the area applied for by the petitioner is granted to the non-petitioner to a fresh lease. The allocation between the two parties was to be made on the lines detailed in the order the main part of which was that the application may be 60 per cent in favour of the petitioners and 40 per cent in favour of the non-petitioners. 2. The petitioners seek to challenge this last order of the Government of India on the ground that they held that the petitioners had a preferential right for obtaining a mining lease under section 11 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, and yet the area was directed to be divided between the two applicants. The petitioners were also not given an option to select the area allocated to them. The premises on which the order was made, were alleged to be wrong in respect of the area covered and of the investments made by the parties. The only mining operation in that area is pit No 6 which was worked by the petitioners and fell into their old lease area. The opposite party hid conducted no operations. It was prayed that the grant of 40 per cent area in favour of the non--petitioner be quashed. 3. The State Government in its reply has stated that the actual area that shall fall to the share of the petitioners has been worked out to be 86 per cent and that of the non-petitioner only 14 per cent. The learned counsel for the non-petitioner raised an objection that under a writ of certiorari part of the order cannot be quashed. Moreover, the powers of the Central Government under rule 55 (4) of the Mineral Concessions Rules, 1960, are discretionary in nature and therefore, a writ of certiorari cannot be issued against such orders. The learned counsel for the non-petitioner raised an objection that under a writ of certiorari part of the order cannot be quashed. Moreover, the powers of the Central Government under rule 55 (4) of the Mineral Concessions Rules, 1960, are discretionary in nature and therefore, a writ of certiorari cannot be issued against such orders. The learned counsel for the non-petitioner further submitted that in the light of 42nd amendment of the Constitution that writ petition cannot be allowed because suit was the proper remedy. 4. To these arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioners has replied that writ of certiorari can be granted to modify the order because the same is severable and as such it can be quashed as far as 40 per cent allocation is concerned. Power to make a discretionary order can be exercised in an arbitrary manner and moreover, the petitioner was even denied the option to select the area. A wait of certiorari does lie against arbitrary exercise of discretion. As to alternative remedy, it was submitted that unless there is a completed contract and a lease executed no suit can be filed. 5. I have considered over these matters and it appears to me that the claim of the petitioners is founded upon the preferential right conferred by section 11 of the Mines & Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 and a suit can lie to enforce such a right. It does not appear to be hatred under section 27 of the said Act, even if a suit be not a proper remedy, yet the breach of the section 11, which gives a preferential right to the petitioners has not resulted in any substantial injury to the petitioner within the meaning of the amened Art. 226 of the Constitution. Rule 26 of Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, empowers the State Government to grant a lease over the whole or part of the area applie for. One has to read section 11 and rule 26 together. If the Government has a power to grant lease for a part of an area, then the petitioners have been given 60 per cent of the area. It is no concern of their how the remaining 40 per cent of the area is allotted by the State Government. It cannot therefore, be said that they have suffered any sub-stantial injury thereby. It is no concern of their how the remaining 40 per cent of the area is allotted by the State Government. It cannot therefore, be said that they have suffered any sub-stantial injury thereby. The learned Addl Advocate General has also submitted and correctly that the impugned order is also covered by sub-section (4') of Section 11 which empowers the Central Government to approve the grant of lease even to a subsequent applicant for special reasons to be recorded by the State Government and it can also not be said that there has been any contravention of any provisions of the aforesaid Act and Rules so as to attract the provisions of clause (b) of Art. 226 of the Constitution. 6. I therefore, do not consider it a fit case in which a writ of certiorari be issued, the writ petition rather abates wind is therefore, dismissed but without any order as to costs.Writ dismissed. *******