Judgment :- 1. The writ petition is to quash the disciplinary proceedings taken against the petitioner resulting ultimately in Ext. P-1 order of the Government imposing a penalty of stoppage of increment for three years with cumulative effect. There were altogether five charges against the petitioner which will be found set out in Ext. P-1. Preliminary enquiries were conducted by X-Branch Vigilance Division into some of the allegations, which revealed a prima facie case of misconduct and irregularity. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated. Charges were framed, and were referred for enquiry and report to the Tribunal for Disciplinary proceedings. This was obviously on the basis that a major punishment was proposed to be inflicted and that it was necessary to sanction and follow the procedure prescribed by R.15 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960. The Tribunal found that none of the charges had been substantiated. The proceedings were submitted to the disciplinary authority, namely, the Government of Kerala. That authority disagreed with the Tribunal in respect of its findings on charges 2 and 3. We may briefly extract these charges: "2. The RTA meeting held on 13th October 1971 refused permit to bus KLZ.1087 on the ground that it is a 1955 model. But you without getting the order reviewed by the R.T.A. issued temporary permit to the same vehicle from 16th October 1971 to 16th November 1971 and again on 18th November 1971 to 30th November 1971. 3. The R.T.A. meeting held on 25th November 1971 decided to make an enquiry about the clandestine running of vehicle KLZ.1274 in Kozhikode City, and you were directed to make a report to the Regional Transport Authority. You without making any such enquiry, issued temporary permit to the vehicle KLZ. 1274 for running in Kozhikode." The substance of the reasoning of the Government was that the petitioner who was a Regional Transport Officer and the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority, was bound to carry out the decisions of the Regional Transport Authority and was not entitled to sit in judgment for a revision of its decision. The Government was accordingly of the view that the petitioner's action which was made the subject-matter of charges 2 and 3 constituted a violation of his statutory duties and obligations and therefore merited the disciplinary proceedings taken against him. The Government was accordingly of the view that the petitioner's action which was made the subject-matter of charges 2 and 3 constituted a violation of his statutory duties and obligations and therefore merited the disciplinary proceedings taken against him. Having come to the conclusion on charges 2 and 3 at variance with the report of the Tribunal for disciplinary proceedings, by the very same order (Ext. P-1), the Government directed that the petitioner's increments be withheld for a period of three years with cumulative effect. The question canvassed before us is whether this procedure followed by the Government and the order passed in Ext. P1 is in violation of the statutory provisions of the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules. R.1 i of these Rules provides the penalties that can be imposed on a Government servant. Nine penalties are provided, and it is clear from the scheme and the provisions or the Rules that penlaties (i) to (iv) are regarded as minor penalties and numbers (v) to (ix) are regarded as major penalties. The procedural rules keep in mind this distinction between the two sets of clauses. Sub-rule (1) of R.15 prohibits the imposition of any of the major penalties except after a full enquiry in the manner provided by the following sub-rules. The formal enquiry may be conducted either by the Government or by the appointing authority or by the disciplinary authority or the head of the Department or any officer in the department empowered by the appointing authority, or by a Special Officer or Tribunal appointed by the Government or a Tribunal generally appointed for making enquiries into the conduct of the Government servants. This is how the Tribunal for disciplinary proceedings came into the picture. Sub-rule 9 provides that at the conclusion of the enquiry the enquiring authority is to prepare a report recording its findings on each of the charges together with the reasons for the same. Under sub-rule 11 the disciplinary authority (in this case the Government) is to consider the record of the enquiry and record its findings on each charge; and where it considers necessary to depart from the findings of the enquiring authority, record its provisional findings on each charge with the reasons thereof. Then follow sub-rules 12 and 13 which are important. Under sub-rule 11 the disciplinary authority (in this case the Government) is to consider the record of the enquiry and record its findings on each charge; and where it considers necessary to depart from the findings of the enquiring authority, record its provisional findings on each charge with the reasons thereof. Then follow sub-rules 12 and 13 which are important. Sub-rule 12 prescribes the procedure, if the disciplinary authority decides, having regard to the findings on the charges, that any of the major penalties should be imposed; and sub-rule 13 sanctions the procedure if, on the findings, it decides that only any of the minor penalties are to be imposed. In the former case the disciplinary authority should furnish the Government servant a copy of the report of the enquiring authority, or the findings of the disciplinary authority together with the brief reasons for disagreement, it any, from the findings of the enquiring authority. It is also to give the person proceeded against notice stating the action proposed to be taken and requiring a representation to be made, if he wished, against the proposed action. The further provisions of the Rules need not be noticed. Sub-rule 13 may conveniently be extracted: "(13) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in items (i) to (iv) of R.11(1) should be imposed, it shall pass appropriate orders in the case: Provided that in every case in which it is necessary to consult the Commission the record of the enquiry shall be forwarded by the Disciplinary Authority to the Commission for its advice and such advice taken into consideration before passing the orders." We may also quote R.16 of the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, which reads as follows: "Procedure for imposing minor penalties. (1) No order imposing any of the penalties specified in items (i) to (iv) of R.11 (1) shall be passed except after, (a) the Government servant is informed in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the allegations on which it is proposed to be taken and given opportunity to make any representation he may wish to make; (b) such representation, if any, is taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Authority; and (c) the Commission is consulted in cases where such consultation is necessary. (2) The record of proceedings in such cases shall include, (i) a copy of the intimation to the Government servant of the proposal to take action against him; (ii) a copy of the statement of allegations communicated to him; (iii) his representation, if any; (iv) the advice of the Commission, if any; and (v) the orders of the case together with the reasons therefor." 2. In the light of the above provisions of the rules and unaided by any authorities to which we shall presently turn, it appears to us that there is no ground for grievance on account of any violation of the provisions of the Statutory Rules. The disciplinary proceedings started with a proposal to impose any of the major penalties under sub-clauses (v) to (ix) of R.11. Therefore the procedure under R.15 was followed and the Tribunal for disciplinary proceedings sent in its enquiry report On receipt of the report and after consideration of the same it was ultimately decided to impose only one of the minor penalties under sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of R.11 and this was done by Ext. P-1 order. The procedure is in strict conformity with R.15 sub-rule (13) of the Rules. 3. But counsel for the petitioner relied upon R.16 and the amplification of the procedure sanctioned thereby as given in the Manual for Disciplinary Proceedings and on the decisions in Narayan Misra v. State of Orissa (1969) I.S.C.W.R 829, Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala and another 1 70 KLJ.1069 and Surendra Sen v. Director of Survey and Land Records and others 1975 KLT. 582. In 1969 I.S.C.W.R. 829 the position was that the enquiring officer acquitted the appellant before the Supreme Court of the first two of the three charges framed against him, but found him guilty of the third charge. He recommended that the appellant be reinstated in service. He also suggested that the period of suspension be treated as sufficient punishment The disciplinary authority, namely, the Conservator of Forests, called upon the appellant to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service, observing that the proposed punishment was light for the serious offences disclosed. The Conservator of Forests accepted not only the third charge but also the other two charges, in respect of which the enquiring officer had absolved the appellant. The Conservator of Forests accepted not only the third charge but also the other two charges, in respect of which the enquiring officer had absolved the appellant. The grievance was that the Conservator of Forests should not have taken note of the charges of which he had been absolved by the enquiring officer without giving the appellant notice of his intention to do so. It was observed by the Supreme Court: "6. Now if the Conservator of Forests intended taking the charges on which he was acquitted into account, it was necessary that the attention of the appellant ought to have been drawn to this fact and his explanation, if any, called for. This does not appear to have been done. In other words, the Conservator of Forests used against him the charges of which he was acquitted without warning him that he was going to use them. This is against all principles of fair play and natural justice If the Conservator of Forests wanted to use them, he should have appraised him of his own attitude and given him an adequate opportunity. Since that opportunity was not given, the order of the Conservator of Forests modified by the State Government cannot fie upheld. We accordingly set aside the order and remit the case to the Conservator of Forests for dealing with it in accordance with law. If the Conservator of Forests wants to take into account the other two charges, he shall give proper notice to the appellant intimating to him that those charges would also be considered and afford him an opportunity of explaining them." It will be noticed that there was no question of violation of any statutory provision or of any provision of the Rules which governed the requirements. But the matter was put essentially and broadly on considerations of fair play and natural justice. In this case, we are essentially in the region of the procedure sanctioned by the statutory rules, and as stated earlier, we are unable to find any contravention of the provisions of the statutory rules. We are therefore unable to countenance any argument that there has been any contravention either of the rules of natural justice or of the provisions of the Rules. 4. We are therefore unable to countenance any argument that there has been any contravention either of the rules of natural justice or of the provisions of the Rules. 4. In 1970 KLJ 1069 our learned brother Eradi, J. dealt with the case where the writ-petitioner was proceeded against under R.15 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. An enquiry into the charges was conducted by the Tribunal, at the end of which it submitted its report. On the report, the Government passed its final order differing from the conclusion of the Tribunal in respect of charges 1 (a) and (b) and holding the petitioner guilty of the former and also of a substantial part of the latter, and stating that the imposition of a penalty of censure was warranted. But as the petitioner had retired from service the proposed penalty could not be imposed and therefore it was recorded in the order communicated to the petitioner that a censure would have been awarded had he continued in service. It was this order that was sought to be quashed. The learned judge observed: 10 After a careful consideration of the arguments addressed on both sides I have come to the conclusion that the petitioner is entitled to succeed in his contention that he was entitled to be given a notice and an opportunity to make his representations before Government before any final order was passed by the Government imposing on him even the minor penalty of censure. It is true that under R.16 it is not obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to have any elaborate oral enquiry conducted before imposing a minor penalty. But, in the present case, the Government did not proceed against the petitioner under that rule. Under R.16 a notice ought to have been given to the petitioner in the first instance informing him of the allegations against him and also about the nature of the action proposed to be taken against him and asking him to show cause against such action. If that had been done the petitioner would have had a composite opportunity of showing cause not merely against the charges levelled against him, but also against the particular action proposed to be taken. If that had been done the petitioner would have had a composite opportunity of showing cause not merely against the charges levelled against him, but also against the particular action proposed to be taken. The Rules clearly contemplate that the disciplinary authority should make up its mind at the initial stage itself whether it would adopt the procedure for the imposition of a major penalty laid down in R.15 or whether in the circumstances of the case only the comparatively summary procedure for the imposition of a minor penalty contained in R.16 need be followed. It is not permissible for the disciplinary authority to shift over from one procedure to the other at the stage of passing the final order so as to deprive the Government Servant concerned of an effective opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him which is guaranteed to him even under R.16. I had occasion to deal with this question in my judgment in O. P. 26 0 of 1966 in considering the validity of an order passed against a Government Servant imposing on him a minor penalty after following the same procedure as has been adopted by the disciplinary authority in the present case. In that judgment the legal position was stated by me in the following terms: 'Quite apart from the statutory provisions contained in R.17, it is an elementary requirement of natural justice that before the petitioner who had successfully exonerated himself before two successive Boards of Enquiry, was declared guilty by the 2nd respondent differing from the conclusion of the Board of Enquiry, the petitioner should certainly have been given an opportunity to state his case and establish his innocence before the disciplinary authority (2nd respondent). To my mind the applicability of this principle is not in any manner affected by the circumstances that the 2nd, respondent chose to impose on the petitioner not any one of the major penalties but only a minor penalty of warning because the crucial fact remains that the petitioner had been branded guilty of a very grave misconduct, which undoubtedly does cast a stigma on his fair name and reputation besides constituting a perpetual black mark in his service record which will seriously affect his future prospects of departmental promotion, etc." The same view has been taken by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Kishan Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1965 (2) LLJ. 335. The following observations from that judgment may be usefully extracted: "Under the circumstances, though the disciplinary authority, when it gave notice, was considerate enough to ask the petitioner to let it know if he wanted a personal hearing and if he wanted any documentary or oral evidence to be produced in his defence, it suddenly adopted a different procedure and proceeded against him under R.17 instead of proceeding under R.16, without disclosing any reasons for the change and punished the petitioner without giving him any personal hearing or examining any evidence for or against him in his presence. It is true that for imposing minor penalties, it is open to the disciplinary authority to proceed under R.17, instead of R.16, but if the disciplinary authority proposes to proceed under R.17, that rule requires that the Government servant must be informed in writing of the proposed action to be taken against him and also of the allegations on which action is proposed to be taken. He should be given an opportunity to make a representation which he may wish to make. We find that no intimation was given to the petitioner what action the disciplinary authority proposed to take against him and whether it wanted to proceed under R.17. He should be given an opportunity to make a representation which he may wish to make. We find that no intimation was given to the petitioner what action the disciplinary authority proposed to take against him and whether it wanted to proceed under R.17. We do not mean to say that it is not permissible for the disciplinary authority to proceed under R.17 for imposing minor penalties, simply because it has proceeded initially under R.16 but it is certainly necessary that if it proposes to change the procedure from R.16 to R.17, a clear notice to that effect must be given to person concerned before proceeding under R.17 It "Judged in the light of the legal portion as explained in the aforesaid rulings it has to be held that the order, Ext. P6, whereunder the petitioner has been held to be guilty of the charges of misconduct and has been effectively censured so as to cast an indelible stigma on his fair name and reputation in relation to his official career without affording him any opportunity to make bis representations concerning the matter is illegal and void," Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the above reasoning and conclusion of the learned judge and stated that the same position was disclosed in this case and the same principle must be followed. The decision of the learned judge went up in appeal in W.A. No 255 of 1970. The Division Bench of this court observed: "6. We make it clear that we express no opinion about the scope and ambit of R.15 and 16 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and as to what procedure should be followed before inflicting a minor penalty after completion of an enquiry commenced under R.15. This question will have to be determined, if it arises again, in other appropriate proceedings," The judgment of the learned judge was modified; the exact manner and terms of modification, it is unnecessary to notice for the purposes of this case. It is enough to stress that the Division Bench left open the question regarding the scope and ambit of R.15 and 16 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. 5. In Surendra Sen v. Director of S. and L. Records 1975 KLT. It is enough to stress that the Division Bench left open the question regarding the scope and ambit of R.15 and 16 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. 5. In Surendra Sen v. Director of S. and L. Records 1975 KLT. 582 our learned brother Khalid, J. stated: "When once the disciplinary authority informs the delinquent of its intention to impose a major punishment, it is necessary to follow the procedure laid down for such an enquiry. If. after the final enquiry, the disciplinary authority feels that in the circumstances of the case a major punishment is not necessary, the disciplinary authority is perfectly at liberty to alter the original proposal of imposing a major penalty into a minor one. In this case, the petitioner was told of the proposal to impose a major punishment He is entitled to a personal hearing. The final decision after the enquiry cannot govern the procedure that has to be followed. 6 The decision reported in Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala and another 1970 KLJ.1069 was brought to my notice. In that case Eradi, J. has observed as follows: "It is not permissible for the disciplinary authority to shift over from one procedure to the other at the stage of passing the final order so as to deprive the Government servant concerned of an effective opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him which is guaranteed to him even under R.16". The principle laid down in that case is also pressed into service in this case. The peculiar facts in that case have to be borne in mind. There, the Tribunal, the disciplinary authority, found that the delinquent was not guilty of the charges" After further discussion and after noticing the judgment in W.A No. 255 of 19 0 the learned judge stated: 7. I feel no doubt, that in a case initiated under R.15, a minor punishment can be awarded instead of a major punishment as originally proposed if the procedure laid down in R.15 is adhered to. But action initiated under R.16, cannot ultimately end in the imposition of a major punishment. I feel no doubt, that in a case initiated under R.15, a minor punishment can be awarded instead of a major punishment as originally proposed if the procedure laid down in R.15 is adhered to. But action initiated under R.16, cannot ultimately end in the imposition of a major punishment. But whether a disciplinary authority can, after initiating action under rule IS, change its mind subsequently, and follow the procedure under R.16 midway, and award a minor punishment, is not free from doubt Since in this case, the procedure laid down in R.15, as construed by the Division Bench of this Court referred to above, has not been scrupulously adhered to, in so far as the petitioner was not given a personal hearing, the petitioner is entitled to succeed in this writ petition." We are in agreement with this reasoning and conclusion of the learned judge. 6. The learned Government Pleader brought to our notice the decision of the Supreme Court in Shadi Lal v. State of Punjab AIR. 1973 SC. 1124 which, it appears to us, to be quite appropriate, and to the point. It was there observed by the Supreme Court, after referring to the provisions of the relevant rules, under which the disciplinary proceedings were conducted, that there was no violation of the rules of natural justice or of the provisions of the Rules concerned. One of the cases noticed by the Court in Para.9 was Roop Lal v. State of Punjab (1971) Service L.R. 40 (Punj.) of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. It was there pointed out that if the procedure under R.7 of the Rules was followed, and instead of a major punishment a minor one was inflicted, no flaw in procedure was committed; but if no enquiry was held as envisaged by R.7, and a minor punishment was proposed to be inflicted under R.8 then the procedure prescribed under R.8 had to be followed There is thus an authoritative exposition by the Supreme Court of the principles governing the scope and applicability of the Rules. Following the same, we think, in the instant case the procedure in R.15 was followed, and only a minor penalty was inflicted in strict conformity with the provisions of sub-rule (13) of R.15. We cannot accept the contention that there has been any violation of the statutory rule or of the principles of natural justice. 7. Following the same, we think, in the instant case the procedure in R.15 was followed, and only a minor penalty was inflicted in strict conformity with the provisions of sub-rule (13) of R.15. We cannot accept the contention that there has been any violation of the statutory rule or of the principles of natural justice. 7. We may notice that our learned brother Eradi, J. had himself relied on the above decision of the Supreme Court, in an unreported judgment in O P. No. 730 of 1972. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court, the learned judge there observed: "In the light of the observations contained in the decision of the Supreme Court already referred to above there is also no merit in the petitioner's contention that there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice in imposing the punishment without giving the petitioner an opportunity to show cause against the specific punishment after the oral enquiry was concluded. When the statutory rule has prescribed a particular procedure as the one to be followed in the matter of taking a particular action, there is no scope for the application of any general principles of natural justice. As has been pointed out in many a decision of the Supreme Court, the rules of natural justice cannot be strait jacketed into a rigid formula applicable to all cases and to all circumstances. What rule of natural justice should govern a case will depend upon its individual facts and circumstances, and if the case is one covered by a particular statutory provision prescribing a special procedure, the observance of that procedure would be deemed to satisfy all the requirements of law thereby excluding the applicability of the general principles of natural justice." (para 6) In the light of the above principles, we see no ground for interference. We dismiss this writ petition with no order as to costs.