( 1 ) IN these writ petitions the petitioners have sought for a writ to quash ext. 'a' dismissing the petitioners from service and to quash Ext"b' confirming the order passed by respondent-2 at Ext. 'a' and rejecting the appeal filed before the appellate authority. ( 2 ) THESE petitioners were members of the police force. The petitioners in WP. 6674 of 1976 was working as Sub-Inspector of Police of Sriman- gala Police Station in Coorg Dist. The petitioners in WPs. 6675 and 6676 of 1976 were working as Head Constables and the petitioner in WP. 6677 of 1976 was working as a Police Constable of Srimangala Police Station. A departmental enquiry was held and the impugned orders at Exts. 'a' and 'b' were passed dismissing them from service. ( 3 ) THESE petitioners will be referred to as 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th petitioners hereinafter the allegations against them is that on the morning of 21st Aug 1974, the 1st petitioner along with petitioners 2 and 3 and other staff went to kutta village within the jurisdiction of Srimangala Police Station for detection of cases of transportation of rice in contravention of the Essential commodities Act and the orders framed thereunder At a place called Bettathadi the 1st petitioner seized in all according to the department 43 bags of rice and distributed 2 bags of rice among the lobourers towards labour charges, eight bags ol rice among the staff of the police station and accounted only for 33 bags in the property form under different mahazers and registered cases in Crime Nos. 225 to 229 of 1974 against the accused. On information furnished by certain police officials of the Special Branch the Superintendent of Police ordered preliminary enquiry by the Circle Inspector of Police. After the preliminary enquiry the 2nd Respt Deputy Inspector General of Police, Southern Range, Mysore, appointed the 1st respondent the Deputy Superintendent of Police as specially empowered authority to hold a disciplinary enquiry against these petitioners. The charges were framed against the petitioners and true copies thereof were served with a charge memo to them. The 1st respondent held a departmental enquiry against these petitioners by examining 13 witnesses for the department and 6 witnesses for the defence and marking certain documents. The charges were framed against the petitioners and true copies thereof were served with a charge memo to them. The 1st respondent held a departmental enquiry against these petitioners by examining 13 witnesses for the department and 6 witnesses for the defence and marking certain documents. ( 4 ) THE charge against the 1st petitioner reads thus :" PSI Sri L. B. Shirguppi of Srimangala PS (Now under suspension) exhibited gross misconduct in misusing the case property of ten bags of table rice seized in Srimangala PS Cr. No. 225-74 to 230-74 on 21-8-74 by sharing 8 bags of seized rice among the staff and giving 2 bags of table rice to coolies for labour charge without bringing it to the connected records of the Police Station and giving false report to the Superior Officers about the quantity of rice seized. " ( 5 ) THE charge against the 2nd and 3rd petitioners reads thus:"that HC. 18 P. A. Madappa, exhibited gross misconduct in misusing the case property of ten bags of table rice seized in srimangala P. S. Cr. No. 225-74 to 230-74 on 21-8-1974 by sharing 8 bags of rice among the staff and giving 2 bags of table rice to coolies for labour charge without bringing into connected records of the police station. ""that H. C. 96 A-P. Somanna of Srimangala P. S. exhibited gross misconduct in misusing the case property of ten bags of table rice seized in Srimangala P. S. Cr. No. 225-74 to 230-74 on 21-8-1974 by sharing 8 bags of seized rice among the staff and giving two bags of table rice to coolies for laboui charge without bringing into connected records of the Police Station. " ( 6 ) THE charge against the 4th petitioner reads thus. "that PC. 156 Onkarappa of Srimangala P. S. exhibited gross misconduct in misusing the case property of 10 bags of table rice seized in Srimangala P. S. Cr. No. 225-74 to 230-24 on 21. 8. 1974 by sharing 8 bags of rice among the staff without bringing into connected records of the PS. "upon consideration of the evidence on record the enquiry officer found that all the charges were proved against the petitioners. The disciplinary authorities agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and affirmed the findings and imposed the penalty of dismissal against all the petitioners. "upon consideration of the evidence on record the enquiry officer found that all the charges were proved against the petitioners. The disciplinary authorities agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and affirmed the findings and imposed the penalty of dismissal against all the petitioners. The appellate authority, the 3rd respondent, dismissed the appeals filed by the petitioners. In these writ petitions, the petitioners have challenged the entire proceedings from the inception. The contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners are : (1) There is denial of reasonable opportunity to defend at the stage of departmental enquiry; (a) that there is a refusal to permit legal practitioner or a retired police officer or a Police Officer in service to defend the petitioners (b) that there is refusal to supply material documents for their defence; (c) that there is bias on the part of the enquiry officer who acted both as a prosecutor and Judge in the course of the enquiry. Thereby there is violation of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. (2) There is no evidence to support the findings of enquiry officer. The learned Government Pleader raised a preliminary objection that the writ petitions are not maintainable, since the petitioners have not avaded of other remedy for redressal of the grievance of the petitioner under S. 25 (2) of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963 (to be referred to as the 'act' ). Secondly, he urged that the impugned order does not call for interference, as it is supported by adequate reasons and that it is not a case of no evidence. Thirdly, he contended that reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioners to defend themselves by the 1st respondent. If the petitioneis have failed to. avail of it, it is not open to them to challenge the orders passed dismissing them from service. Firstly, it is necessary to deal with the preliminary objection raised by the learned Government Pleader with regard to the maintainability of the writ petitions. ( 7 ) THE learned Government Pleader in support of the preliminary objection relied upon the provisions of Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution of India (42nd Amendment ). Firstly, it is necessary to deal with the preliminary objection raised by the learned Government Pleader with regard to the maintainability of the writ petitions. ( 7 ) THE learned Government Pleader in support of the preliminary objection relied upon the provisions of Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution of India (42nd Amendment ). The relevant provision reads thus :"no petition for the redress of any injury referred to in sub- clause (b) or sub-clause (c) of claused) shall be entertained if any other remedy for such redress is provided for by or under any other law for the time being in force. " ( 8 ) THE learned Government Pleader further relied upon the provisions of sec. 25 (2) of the Act which invested the State Govt with powers of revision against the orders passed under S. 23 of the Act. It reads thus :"the Government may suo motu or otherwise after calling for the records of. the case, revise any order under S. 23 or sub-section (1) of this section passed by the Inspector General or any officer subordinate to him, and- (a) confirm, modify, set aside the order ; (b) impose any penalty or set aside, reduce, confirm or enhance the penalty imposed by the order; (c) remit the case to the authority which made the order or tc any other authority directing such further action or inquiry as it considers proper in the circumstances of the case ; or (d) pass such other orders as it deems fit; the proviso to the sub-section is unnecessary for the purpose of this case. Eel; ing upon these provis ons the learned Government Pleader argued that in view of the other remedy for redress, namely, revision where S. 25 (2) of the Act, the Writ Petitions are not maintainable under art. 226 (3) of the Constitution of India (42nd Amendment ). 'ihe contention on behalf of the petitioners is that the requirement under Art. 228 (3) of the Constitution of India, is not adequately met by the remedy or redressal as provided under S. 25 (2) of the Act. In support of the contention it is urged that "any other remedy for such redress" used in sub-article (3) of Art. 226 of the Constitution, should be a specific remedy and it must be an effective remedy as of right. In support of the contention it is urged that "any other remedy for such redress" used in sub-article (3) of Art. 226 of the Constitution, should be a specific remedy and it must be an effective remedy as of right. It is further urged that, if bias is alleged against the authorities concerned, even though threre is any other remedy for redressal, there will be violation of principle of natural justice and, therefore, no alternative remedy can come in the way of this Court exercising its discretionary powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. " ( 9 ) IN A. R. Sarin vs. B. C. Patil, AIR. 1951 Bom. 423. a Division Bench of the Bombay high Court has interpreted the meaning of the words "any other remedy" under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Chagla, C. J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court has observed thus : mr. Vakharia has contended that this petition is no maintainable in as much as a specific legal remedy was open to the petitioner and he should have availed himself of that remedy ratier than come to this Court on a petition for a writ of certiorari, and reliance is placed on Art. 227 of the Constitution which confers upon the high Court powers of superintendence not only over all Courts but also over all tribunal throughout the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. We have already taken the view that the superintendence of the High Court is not confined to administrative superintendence, it also includes judicial superintendence, and undoubtedly the High Court has power to correct any decision of a tribunal within its jurisdiction through its powers of superintendence. But in order that a petition for a writ of certiorari would not lie, the petitioner must have a specific legal remedy, and specific legal remedy in this context can only mean that he must have a right to approach a Court and he must have a right to a remedy if his case was just. Art. 227 only deals with the power of the High Court and not with the rights of litigant. A litigant may approach the High Court, but he has no right to do so, nor has he a right to a remedy because the High Court may refuse a remedy under Art. 227. Art. 227 only deals with the power of the High Court and not with the rights of litigant. A litigant may approach the High Court, but he has no right to do so, nor has he a right to a remedy because the High Court may refuse a remedy under Art. 227. Therefore the mere power of superintendence conferred upon the High Court does not disentitle a petitioner seeking a writ of certiorari from coming to this Court and asking for that writ. It cannot be said under the circumstances of the case that he had an alternative specific legal remedy open to him which he should have availed of before he asked for a prerogative writ. " ( 10 ) THIS Court while dealing with the question of alternative remedy in B. K. Narayan Singh vs. State of Mysore, 1964 Myslj. Supp. 321. has observed thus:" The Act of 1957 (Mines and Minerals (Regulations and development) Act (Central Act 67 of 1957) provides in S. 30 thereof that the Central Government may, of its own motion or on an application made within the prescribed time by an aggrieved party, revise any order made by a State Government or other authority in exercise of the power conferred on it by or under that Act, although under this section a party has a right to make an application to the central Govt, the powers of revision exercised by the Central Govt are clearly discretionary powers The remedy therefore cannot be said to be either adequate of efficacious so as to totally disentitle a person from approaching this Court u|art226 of the Constitution. The same view was taken by this Court in M. Basha vs. C. Sultan Beig (1958 mys. L. J. 558) with reference to S. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, which is in the same terms as S. 30 of the 1957 Act. " ( 11 ) I am in respectful agreement with the ratio of the above quoted decision. In a latest decision of the Supreme Court in Wealth Tax Commissioner ap vs. Officer Incharge (Court of Wards), AIR. 1977 SC. 113. the Supreme Couit dealing with the question of interpretation of statutes and meaning of words and expressions (not denned) have laid down the following rule of construction. In a latest decision of the Supreme Court in Wealth Tax Commissioner ap vs. Officer Incharge (Court of Wards), AIR. 1977 SC. 113. the Supreme Couit dealing with the question of interpretation of statutes and meaning of words and expressions (not denned) have laid down the following rule of construction. "we think that it is not correct to give as wide a meaning as possible to terms used in a statute simply because the statute does not define an expression. The correct rule is that we have to endeavour to find out the exact sense in which the words have been used in a particular context. We are entitled to look at the statute as a whole and give an interpretation in consonance with the purpose of the statute and what logically follows from the terms used. We are to avoid absurd results. " ( 12 ) THE rule of construction of the meaning of the words and expression used in the statutes which are not defined is made plain by the ruling of the Supreme Court in consonance with the purpose of the statute and it is not correct to give as wide a meaning as possible to the terms used in the statute. Therefore, we have to interpret the words "any other remedy for such redress" found in sub-article (3) of Art. 226 of the constitution not in its widest sense as contended by the Government Pleader, relying upon the meaning of the word 'remedy' found in Oxford Dictionary, iii Edn. at page 1699, as it would lead to absurd results. His further submission that remedy should not be understood in the context of right is clearly opposed to the ratio of the decision in A. R. Sarin vs. B. C. Patil (1 ). In my opinion the words "any other remedy for redress" laid down in sub-article (3) of Art. 226 of the Constitution, must be a specific legal remedy and that the aggrieved party must have a right to approach the Court if his case was just, as laid down in the decision of the Bombay High Court cited above. The learned Government Pleader further contended that the interpretation given to the words "any other remedy" by the Courts prior to 42nd Amendment should not be read with the Amended Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution of India. The learned Government Pleader further contended that the interpretation given to the words "any other remedy" by the Courts prior to 42nd Amendment should not be read with the Amended Art. 226 (3) of the Constitution of India. This contention ignores the fact that the unamended Art. 226 did not contain any such words. But the rule of any other remedy for redress was crystalised when dealing with the relief to be granted to litigants when they approached the High Court for exercise of its discretionary powers under Art. 226, as it stood unamended. Therefore, there is no force in the contention of the learned Government Pleader. Therefore, as laid down by this Court in basha vs. C. Sultan Beig, 1958 Myslj. 558. and in B. K. Narayan Singh vs. State of mysore (2), although under S. 25 (2) of the Act an aggrieved party may approach the State Government with an application seeking revision of any order passed under S. 23 of the Act, the powers of revision exercised by the State Government are discretionary powers and, therefore, the remedy cannot be said to be either effective or can be claimed by the aggrieved party as of right. ( 13 ) IN this connection, it is relevant to refer to the observations made by mr. S. R. Das, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in State of U. P. vs. M. D. Noor, 1958 SCJ. 242. which reads thus : "orders made on departmental 'trial' held by an officer in the department without any legal training and orders passed by his superior officers in the same department on appeal or in revision which, in the words of Harries, C. J. in Assistant Conrtoller of Customs v. Soorajmull Nayarmull ( (1952) 5p CWN 453, 467) were only in the nature of an appeal from Caesar to Caesar and which might not be regarded with any great confidence by persons brought before them, can hardly be equated with reasonable propriety with the orders passed by the Special Tribunal which had not merely tappings of a Court but was a Court of law presided over by a Judge with legal training and background and on appeal there from by the High Court. " therefore, in my view the revision provided under 8. 25 (2) of the Act, is in the nature of an appeal from Caesar to Caesar. " therefore, in my view the revision provided under 8. 25 (2) of the Act, is in the nature of an appeal from Caesar to Caesar. Hence, the preliminary objection raised by the learned Government Pleader cannot be accepted. I am therefore of the opinion, that the requirements of Art. 226 (3) of the constitution, is not adequately and effectively met by the revisionary powers provided under S. 25 (2) of the Act. It does not, therefore, disentitle the petitioners from approaching this Court for the issue of a writ of certiorari or any other writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution (42 Amendment ). ( 14 ) MR. B. V. ACHARYA, learned advocate for the petitioners in support of his first contention urged that the preliminary enquiry report of PW. 13 the Circle Inspector of Police, Virajpet, which was the basis for the departmental enquiry and several other documents which are material and relevant for the petitioners to defend themselves have not been supplied by the Enquiry Officer in spite of the reauest made by them as per Ext. 'd'. In Ext. 'd' the petitioners sought for the supply of the preliminary report of the Circle Inspector Viraipet, P. W. 13, which was the basis for the departmental enquiry. They also sought for the supply of despatch register indicating the despatch report of the Head Constable joyiappa on 28-8-1974 to the Sub-Inspector of Police, Special Branch and tappal extracts showing this despatch from the Sub Inspector, Special branch to the Supdt of Police, Mercara. They further sought for the note books of P. Ws. 1, 6 and 10 Dairy of P. W. 10, original TA. Bills of pw. 1, which were all referred to in the above charge Memo at Ext. 'c'. Further they made a request for supply of Exts. D22 and D23 reports of the Sub-Inspector DW. 6 regarding the non-availability of note book of pw. 6, which was later allowed to be produced at the time of cross-examination of DW. 6 and the same marked at Ext. P33 in spite of objections. In reply to the request made by the petitioners for supply of copies at ext. 'd', the Enquiry Officer passed a Memo as per Ext. 6, which was later allowed to be produced at the time of cross-examination of DW. 6 and the same marked at Ext. P33 in spite of objections. In reply to the request made by the petitioners for supply of copies at ext. 'd', the Enquiry Officer passed a Memo as per Ext. 'e', In this Memo the Enquiry Officer has passed orders fco the effect that the statements of of Joyappa, Head Constable, Kushalappa, Police Constable and thimmiah, Police Constable and also Belliyappa Police Constable were not recorded. He rejected the request regarding the despatch register, the tappal extract of the despatch register and report of the special Branch Head Constable to the Superintendent of Police, coorg by the Sub-Inspector, Special Branch, on the ground that they were not relevant. As regards the entry made by the police constable bopanna in the Kutta Out-Post the Enquiry Officer found fault with the petitioners that they failed to peruse those documents on an earlier occasion and that they were at liberrty to peruse them in his office. He rejected the request for supply of copy of the preliminary enquiry on the ground that it is a confidential record. Thus, it is clear that the Enquiry officer has refused to supply to petitioners the relevant material documents which were necessary for defending themselves in the departmental enquiry. The learned Govt Pleader is unable to give any good reason for such a refusal on the part of the Enquiry Officer. ( 15 ) IT is contended by Mr. Acharya for the petitioners that the documents supply of which was sought for by the petitioners at Ext. 'd' was intended to show the evidence given hy the departmental witnesses like the herd constable and constables is untruthful and on whose evidence the finding of the enquiry officer is based. The supply of preliminary enquiry report by PW. 13 would have helped the petitioners to demonstrato the improvement made by the official witnesses over and above what they have stated before PW-13, who held the preliminary enquiry, which was the basis of the entire departmental enquiry. The supply of preliminary enquiry report by PW. 13 would have helped the petitioners to demonstrato the improvement made by the official witnesses over and above what they have stated before PW-13, who held the preliminary enquiry, which was the basis of the entire departmental enquiry. The despatch register indicating the despatch of Special Branch report on 28-8-1974 and the report said to have been submitted hy the Head Constable of the special Branch, would have revealed the incriminating information he received before he submitted the report was exaggerated and false and was inconsistent with the evidence brought on record against them in the enquiry. Note books of PWs. 1, 6 and 10 and other witnesses, daily diaries of PW. 10, original T. A. Bills of PW. 1 which were all referred to in the charge Memo at Ext. 'c' would have enabled the petitioners to show that they were not speaking the truth in the departmental enquiry. The original t. A. Bills of PW. 1, who has given evidence about the taking of eight bags of rice from the police station would have falsified his statement that he was present in the police station on the relevant day and hour. Exts. D22 and D23 established the non-availability of the note book of PW. 6 till the last stage of the enquiry and the note book is also a fabricated document to involve the petitioners in the departmental enquiry. ( 16 ) IN support of his contention Mr. Acharya, placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in State of M. P. v Chintaman Sadashiv waishampayan, AIR. 1961 SC. 1023. Gajendragadkar, J (as he then was) enunciated the law on the point thus :" It cannot be denied that when an order of dismissal passed against a public servant is challenged by him by a petition filed in the high Court under Art. 228, it is for the High Court to consider whether the constitutional requirements of Article 311 (2) have been satisfied or not. In such a case it would be idle to contend that the infirrnit. es on which the public officer relies flow from the exercise of discretion vested in the enquiry officer The enquiry officer may have acted bona fide, but that does not mean that the discretionary orders passed by him are final and conclusive. In such a case it would be idle to contend that the infirrnit. es on which the public officer relies flow from the exercise of discretion vested in the enquiry officer The enquiry officer may have acted bona fide, but that does not mean that the discretionary orders passed by him are final and conclusive. Whenever it is urged before the High Court that as a result of such orders the public officer has been deprived of a reasonable opportunity, it would be open to the high Court to examine the matter and decide whether the requirements of Art. 311 (2) have been satisfied or not. In such matters it is difficult and inexpedient to lay down any general rules whether or not the officer in question has had a reasonable opportunity, which must always depend on the facts of each case. The only general statement that can be safely made in this connection is that the departmental enquiries should observe rules of natural justice and that if they are fairly and properly conducted the decisions reached by the enquiry officers on the merits are not open to be challenged on the ground that the procedure followed was not exactly in accordance with that which is observed in Courts of law. As Venkatarama Iyer, J has observed in Union of India v. T. R. Varma ( 1958 SCR 499 at p. 507= air 1957 SC 882 at p. 885) "stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive it may be observed, that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-exmining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them". It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the right to cross-examine the witnesses who give evidence against him is a very valuable right, and if it appears that effective exercise of this right has been prevented by the enquiry officer by not giving to the officer relevant documents to which he is entitled, that inevitably would be that the enquiry had not been held in accordance with rules of natural justice. That is the view taken by the High Court, and in the present appeal which has been brought to this Court under Art. 136, we see no justification for interfering with it. " ( 17 ) THE ratio of this decision bears on the facts of this case. As already pointed out the Enquiry Officer has refused to supply the material documents stated in Ext. 'd' on the ground that they were either not relevant or that they are confidential records. Ext. P33 is the note book maintained by P. W. 6 Police constable, in which he appeared to have noted about 41 persons carrying on rice bags and seizure of those bags on 21-8-1974. D. W. 6 the Sub Inspector of Police has admitted that he sent reports as per Ext. D-22 and D-23 informing the non-availability of the note book. But it was got admitted by the enquiry officer as Ext. P-33 when the sub Inspector of police was cross-examined before him. Objection was taken on behalf of the petitioners. It was over-ruled on the ground that the note book was summoned at the instance of the delinquent and that the relevant entry has been marked. The non-availability of Ex. P. 33 during the entire course of the departmental enquiry and its marking- through D. W. 6 at the time of his cross-examination betrays the truthfulness of the evidence given by PW. 6 the police constable, who had gone to the raid and who stated that two bags of rice were distributed to the labourers at the spot on seizure. Failure to supply copies of the S. B. report and despatch report further falsifies the departmental case that no such report was made on 28-8-1974. P. W. 1 Achaiah, head constable has stated about eight bags of rice being taken to nearby place from the police station. He admitted in the course of cross-examination that he had been to Virajpet and has taken T. A. on 21-8-1974. If his original ta. Bill had been summoned, it would have disproved his very presence in the police station on the relevant day and time and would have established that what he stated before the preliminary enquiry officer and also before the enquiry officer was a fabricated version. If his original ta. Bill had been summoned, it would have disproved his very presence in the police station on the relevant day and time and would have established that what he stated before the preliminary enquiry officer and also before the enquiry officer was a fabricated version. Thus as laid down by the Supreme Court, the valuable right to cross-examine the departmental witnesses on behalf of the petitioners was prevented by the enquiry officer by not supplying the petitioners relevant documents to which they were entitled. ( 18 ) THIS Court in Bindurao Jivaji Kulkarn v. State of Mysore, (1967) 2 Myslj. 632. has laid down the law as follows :"denial of copies of documents relied on by the prosecution in the charge memo and which would be necessary to cross-examine effectively the witnesses who were examined in the case amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity to defend. . . . "no material should be relied on in a departmental enquiry against the delinquent without giving him an opportunity of explaining it. " ( 19 ) THEREFORE, in my opinion that in the departmental enquiry against the petitioners there is denial of reasonable opportunity to defend. Now turning to the question of refusing to permit a legal practitioner or a retired police officer and also refusal to afford adequate opportunity to be defended by a serving police officer, it may be stated that the request of the petitioners for engaging the legal practitioner to defend them made at Ext. 'd' dated 20-11-74 was rejected as per the Memo Ext. 'e' dated 17-12-1974 by the enquiry officer. This request was further renewed by the petitioners as per Ext. 'f'. But the same was also refused. The 1st petitioner again as per Ext. 'g' made a request to permit him to engage Shri P. M. D'souza a retired Deputy Superintendent of Police, mangalore, to defend him. The enquiry officer did not permit him to engage the services of the retired officer. Then again he made a request as per Ext. 'j' to permit him to engage Shri V. O. Padmanabha, Circle inspector of Police Sakaleshpur to defend the petitioners. The enquiry officer did not permit him to engage the services of the retired officer. Then again he made a request as per Ext. 'j' to permit him to engage Shri V. O. Padmanabha, Circle inspector of Police Sakaleshpur to defend the petitioners. The enquiry officer rejected this request on the ground that it would delay the disposal of the departmental enquiry, but asked the petitioners to take the services of the serving police officers in Coorg District, which the petitioners did not avail on the ground that they were all under the immediate control of the enquiry officer who was the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Coorg. The refusal to grant the request of the petitioners is contrary to Rule 456 of the Karnataka Police Manual, 1965 Vo. I (to be called the Police Manual) which lays down the procedure to be followed when an accused police officer makes a request for assistance of a police officer to defend. It says :"if the Police Officer whose assistance is requested for is not a subordinate of the Inquiring Authority, the request should be forwarded through proper channel to the Superintendent of the district where such Police Officer is serving. The Superintendent, after ascertaining the willingness or otherwise of the Police Officer whose assistance is requested for, pass such oders as he considers fit and send copies to the inquiring authority and the accused police officer through the Inquiring Authority. " ( 20 ) THIS rule was not observed by the enquiry officer when the petitionera requested him tp permit them to engage the Circle Inspector of Police from Hassan District. It is wholly illegal. The learned Government pleader contended that one Dasappa, Sub inspector of Police of the Vigilance Department appeared for the petitioners continuously from 30-4-1975 to 2-5-1975 and cross-examined ten prosecution witnesses and therefore, there was reasonable opportunity given to the petitioners to defend themselves in the departmental enquiry. Records disclose that the petitioners got him to defend them by chance. Even the request made by Dasappa to adjourn the enquiry to 20-5-1975 as he had to attend to some other official duties was rejected and the enquiry was adjourned to 7-5-1975 and again on 7-5-1975 the enquiry was adjourned as the prosecution witnesses were not present and the enquiry was posted to 11-5-1975. Even the request made by Dasappa to adjourn the enquiry to 20-5-1975 as he had to attend to some other official duties was rejected and the enquiry was adjourned to 7-5-1975 and again on 7-5-1975 the enquiry was adjourned as the prosecution witnesses were not present and the enquiry was posted to 11-5-1975. The application of the petitioners on 11-5-1975 for adjournment was refused by the enquiry officer as per Ext. 'k'. On that day P. W. 13 was examined and the request of the petitioners to adjourn the cross-examination till 25-5-1975 was also refused. ( 21 ) IN C. L. Subramaniam v. The Collector of Customs, AIR 1972 SC. 2178 . the Supreme court, while interpreting Rule 15 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules of 1967 framed under Art. 309 of the constitution, which is more or less similar to Rule 456 of the Police manual has observed thus :" It is needless to say that Rule 15 is a mandatory rule. That rule regulates the guarantee given to Govenment servants under Art. 311. Government servants by and large have no legal training. At any rate, it is nobody's case that the appellant had legal training. Moreover when a man is charged with the breach of a rule entailing serious consequences, he is not likely to be in a position to present his case as best as it should be. The accusation against the appellant threatened his very livelihood. Any adverse verdict against him was bound to be disastrous to him, as it has proved to be. In such a situation he cannot be expected to act calmly and with deliberation. That is why Rule 15 (5) has provided for representation of a Government servant charged with dereliction of duty or with contravention of the rule by another Government servant or in appropriate cases by a legal practitioner. For the reasons mentioned above, we think that there had been a contravention of Rule 15 (5 ). We are also of the opinion that the appellant had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Hence the impugned order is liable to be struck down and it is hereby struck down. The facts of this case are not such as to justify any fresh enquiry against the appellant. We are also of the opinion that the appellant had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Hence the impugned order is liable to be struck down and it is hereby struck down. The facts of this case are not such as to justify any fresh enquiry against the appellant. Hence we direct that no fresh enquiry shall be held against the appellant and he be restored to the position to which he would have been entitled to but for the impugned order. " ( 22 ) THE ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court cited above, bears on the facts of the instant case. The 1st petitioner was a probationary Sub- inspector and was posted to the independent charge of the police station a month or so earlier to the Alleged occurrence. Neither he, nor other petitioners had any legal training. They were not in a position to defend their case before the enquiry officer upon the charges framed against them which entailed serious consequences. The enquiry officer's refusal to permit the petitioners to engage the services of the police officers serving in other districts and his insisting upon them to engage police officers in the Coorg District and further failure to grant adjournment to get the services of Dasappa the Sub Inspector of Police for cross-examining all witnesses has resulted in the denial of reasonable opportunity to defend themselves. This Court in Bindurao Jivaji Kulkarni v. State of Mysore has held that failure to permit the reasonable request of the Govt Servant that he be permitted to make use of the services of another Govt servant to defend him in the enquiry amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity to defend, while dealing with the Mysore Civil Services (Classification, control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. Therefore, there is denial of opportunity to the petitioners by refusal to permit a retired police officer to defend or allowing a serving police officer to defend them. ( 23 ) MR. B. V. ACHARYA, nextly contended that there was bias on the part of the enquiry officer throughout the enquiry. He enumerated the acts of commission and omission on the part of the enquiry officer and also his failure to give adequate opportunity to the petitioners in certain matters which indicate bias on his part. ( 23 ) MR. B. V. ACHARYA, nextly contended that there was bias on the part of the enquiry officer throughout the enquiry. He enumerated the acts of commission and omission on the part of the enquiry officer and also his failure to give adequate opportunity to the petitioners in certain matters which indicate bias on his part. He pointed out that refusal on the part of the enquiry officer to make available the relevant documents for the defence of the petitioners, not permitting the assistance of a legal practitioner or a retired police officer to defend them, his refusal to grant even a short adjournment to suit the convenience of a police friend namely dasappa to cross-examine the departmental witnesses and posting the enquiry to remote places like Ponnampet, which is 30 miles away from the head-quarters to record the defence evidence and holding the enquiry in the evening and till midnight had prejudiced the case of the petitioners and the enquiry officer has not held a fair and impartial enquiry. He further urged that though Rule 6 (5) of the Karnataka Police (Disciplinary Proceeding) Rules of 1965 provided for appointment of a presenting officer, no such presenting officer was appointed. The enquiry officer himself acted both as ' prosecutor' and ' Judge' by leading evidence of all the prosecution witnesses, treating PWs. 2 and 8 as hostile and cross- examining them and suggesting that they were giving false evidence and himself cross-examining all the witnesses in defence in contravention of rule 6 of the Rules, which permitted such cross examination only by the presenting officer. The learned Govt Pleader is unable to give any reasonable explanation for such a conduct on the part of the enquiry officer. His conduct betrays bias against the petitioners. The 1st respondent throughout the enquiry has acted in a high-handed manner and seldom acted as an impartial umpire. ( 24 ) MR. B. V. ACHARYA, learned Counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in S. Parthasarathi v. State of A. P. , AIR. 1973 SC. 2701. His conduct betrays bias against the petitioners. The 1st respondent throughout the enquiry has acted in a high-handed manner and seldom acted as an impartial umpire. ( 24 ) MR. B. V. ACHARYA, learned Counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in S. Parthasarathi v. State of A. P. , AIR. 1973 SC. 2701. wherein the Supreme Court has enunciated the law thus : " The question then is: whether a real likelihood of bias existed is to be determined on the probabilities to be inferred from the circumstances by Court objectively, or, upon the basis of the impressions that might reasonably be left on the minds of the party aggrieved or the public at large. The test of "real likelihood" and "reasonable suspicion" are really inconsistent with each other. We think that the reviewing authority must make a determination on the basis of the whole evidence before it, whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer that there is real likelihood of bias. The Court must look at the impression which other people have. This follows from the principle that justice must not only be done but seem to be done. If right minded. persons would think that there is real likelihood of bias on the part of an inquiring officer, he must not conduct the enquiry; nevertheless, there must be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture would not be enough. There must exist circumstances from which reasonable men would think it probable or likely that the inquiring officer will be prejudiced against the deliquent. The Court will not inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced, that is sufficient to quash the decision. We should not, however, be understood to deny that the Court might with greater propriety apply the "reasonable suspicion'' test in criminal or in proceedings analogous to criminal proceedings. ( 25 ) AS there was real likelihood of bias in the sense explained above, we think that the inquiry and the orders based on the inquiry were bad. The decision of this Court in the State of U. P. v. Md. ( 25 ) AS there was real likelihood of bias in the sense explained above, we think that the inquiry and the orders based on the inquiry were bad. The decision of this Court in the State of U. P. v. Md. Nooh ( 1958 SCR 595 =air 1953 SC 86) makes it clear that if an inquiring officer adopts a procedure which is contrary to the rules of natural justice the ultimate decision based on his report of inquiry is liable to be quashed. We see no reason for not applying the same principle here as we find that the inquiring officer was biased. " ( 26 ) AS already stated above, no presenting officer was appointed by the enquiry officer as required under Rule 6 (5) of the Disciplinary proceeding Rules of 1965. By implication this rule prohibits the inquiring officer to cross-examine the witnesses since that power is given to the presenting officer. In the instant case the enquiring officer throughout cross-examined the departmental witnesses and defence witnesses himself. The astounding aspect of the case is that he has suggested to the defence witnesses that they have given falsehood. Thus the enquiring officer has acted in a one-sided manner and has prejudged the defence evidence even before he wrote the minutes of the disciplinary enquiry. The omissions and commisssions pointed out by the learned Advocate for the petitioners clearly establish bias on the part of the enquiry officer in the departmental enquiry against the petitioners. From what has been stated above, any reasonable man would think it probable or likely that the enquiring officer was prejudiced against the petitioners and that is sufficient to quash his decision. ( 27 ) THERE is another circumstance which requires to be dealt with. As already stated the approach of the enquiry officer was one sided. He has discarded the evidence of the tractor driver who removed 33 bags of rice from the place of seizure to the police station, on the sole ground that he is interested in the petitioners. His evidence was the best evidence, but the same was rejected by the enquiring officer on unreasonable grounds. the enquiring officer's report suffers for want of critical examination of the evidence in both appreciation and assessment of the evidence on record. No doubt the enquiring officer has prepared a laborious report of number of typed pages. His evidence was the best evidence, but the same was rejected by the enquiring officer on unreasonable grounds. the enquiring officer's report suffers for want of critical examination of the evidence in both appreciation and assessment of the evidence on record. No doubt the enquiring officer has prepared a laborious report of number of typed pages. But he has wholly missed to find out the truth of the charges framed against the petitioners. The case against the petitioners is that they distributed among themselves eight bags of rice seized from the smugglers. There is absolutely no evidence to show that the 1st petitioner had taken any share of the rice. In these circumstances, I am constrained to say that the department has made a mountain of a molehill. It is improbable to conceive that the 1st petitioner who had completed his probationary period as Sub-Inspector and posted to an independent charge of a police station would stoop to commit acts alleged against him having a bright future in the police department. Possibility of some interested police officers entangling him in an inquiry of this kind cannot be ruled out. The evidence on record discloses that the statements of the petitioners were recorded by PW. 13 at the stage of preliminary enquiry under threat and duress as contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioners. ( 28 ) WHEN the Enquiring Officer's findings are wholly vitiated for violating principles of natural justice and denial of reasonable opportunity to defend, the subsequent confirmation of those findings by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority cannot be sustained. Therefore, the entire enquiry from its inception is liable to be quashed. Accordingly, it is quashed. The facts and circumstances of the case are not such that any fresh enquiry against the petitioners is necessary. Hence, it is directed that no fresh enquiry shall be held against the petitioners and they shall be restored to the position which they were holding at the time of dismissal, but for the impugned order and they shall be given all monetary and other benefits to which they are entitled. Therefore, issue a writ of mandamus to the respondents as prayed for in the writ petitions. In the result, all the writ petitions are allowed. No costs. --- *** --- .