Judgment R.P.SINHA, J. 1. This appeal by the defedants who are commissioners of Dhanbad Municipality, is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the subordinate Judge, 1st court, Dhanbad, in Title suit No. 8 of 1964 on 25th June, 1966, decreeing the suit of the plaintiff with costs. 2. The case of the plaintiff, who is respondent here, was that he was appointed Tax collector under the Dhanbad Municipality on 30th July, 1930 on a salary in the scale of Rs. 25-1-40/- per month. Sub-sequently, he was promoted to the post ot Assistant Tax Daroga in the year 1947 in the time scale pay of Rs. 50-3-80/- besides dearness allowance at the rate of Rs. 30/- per month and house rent. In the year 1955 when he was drawing a total emolument of Rs. 114/11/- per month which included his salary and other allowances, he incurred the displeasure of Shri B. L.Gugutia, the then Chairman of the Municipality and he was suspended with effect from 20th May, 1955 on a false charge of misappropriation of municipal fund. A criminal proceeding was initiated against him in which chargesheet was submitted under S. 408, I. P. C. He was tried in the court of a Magistrate, Ist class, Dhanbad, and was acquitted by an order dated 20th Aug. 1957. After his acquittal, he applied to the Chairman on 27th Aug. 1957 requesting for permission to join his duty and for sanctioning payment of arrears of pay from 1st April, 1955. There was no reply to that and so he sent two reminders but, still no action was taken. The Chairman filed Criminal Revision No. 1049 of 1957 in this court against the order of acquittal. By order dated 10th June, 1958 the aforesaid criminal revision was dismissed by this court In spite of the order of acquittal having been upheld by this court the plaintiff was not allowed to resume his duties nor was he paid the arrears of salary. On 16th April, 1960 Shri B. L. Gugutia, Chairman, sent letter No. 130 to the plaintiff making various false and frivolous allegations against him. The plaintiff replied to that letter on 22nd April, 1960 denying the allegations and giving his explanation thereto. According to him, no further action was taken by the Municipality and the rules which govern. On 16th April, 1960 Shri B. L. Gugutia, Chairman, sent letter No. 130 to the plaintiff making various false and frivolous allegations against him. The plaintiff replied to that letter on 22nd April, 1960 denying the allegations and giving his explanation thereto. According to him, no further action was taken by the Municipality and the rules which govern. the municipal employees were not observed and all on a sudden, on 9th March, 1961 Mr B. L. Gugutia, as the Chairman, issued a notice to him dismissing him from service on the ground of detection of embezzlement. 3. According to the plaintiff, the order of dismissal was void, illegal and infringed the rules governing the municipal employees and that he was entitled to get a declaration that he was still an employee of the Municipality and entitled to get his pay and other privileges including arrears of pay and that his services had not been terminated by the Board of the Dhanbad Municipality. He accordingly, claimed a sum of Rs. 7957.81 paisa as his salary from 20th May, 1955 till Feb., 1961 out of which he admitted to have got Rs. 2828.50 paise from time to time and thus Rs. 5129.31 paise was due. He further claimed a sum of Rs. 3899.37 paise at the rate of Rs. 114/11/- from the month of March, 1961 to Dec, 1963 and his provident fund which, according to him, was approximately a sum of Rs. 2926/- besides the security of Rs. 150/- which was deposited by him and to which he was entitled to get a refund with interest. The plaintiff, in all, claimed Rs. 12,134.68 paise as given in schedule A of the plaint. According to the plaintiff, notice under S. 377 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act had been served on the defendants on 6th Jan., 1964 making a demand of the aforesaid sum but he was neither paid any amount nor he received any reply. 4. The defendants, who are appellants here in their written statement had stated that the suit was barred by limitation and also under the provisions of S. 377 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act as well as the Specific Relief Act. It was also stated that the suit was barred under the principles of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence as the plaintiff respondent had accepted payment of subsistence allowance during the period of his suspension. It was also stated that the suit was barred under the principles of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence as the plaintiff respondent had accepted payment of subsistence allowance during the period of his suspension. According to them, he had received the charge and had shown cause on 22nd April, 1960 and the show cause filed by the plaintiff and the charge were considered by the Commissioner in the meetings held on several dates. In those meetings the details of the charges were considered by the Board and the Board called for a further report from the Chairman in order to finally decide as to what step should be taken against the plaintiff respondent. According to them, the Chairman submitted a further report after considering the explanation and all other relevant papers and documents and that report was placed before the meeting of the Board of Commissioners on 30th Jan.,1961 and all relevant papers were considered by the Board and thereafter a resolution was adopted unanimously that the plaintiff respondent should be removed from service with effect from the date of detection of misappropriation namely, from 29th May, 1955. In short, the stand of the defendants appellants was that the respondent was rightly dismissed in accordance with the provisions of rules and after observing the procedure for dismissal and that he was not entitled to the reliefs he has claimed. 5. In the trial court as many as ten issues were framed on the pleadings of the parties. The learned subordinate Judge, on consideration of the evidence, both oral and documentary, decided all the issues in favour of the respondent and on the findings recorded by him, he decreed the suit with costs. 6. Mr. S. K. Mazumdar, learned counsel for the appellants has urged two points in support of the appeal namely, (i)that the order of dismissal was in accordance with law was proper and he had been given opportunity of defending himself; and, (ii) that the claim for arrears of salary was barred by limitation. This appeal has, therefore, to be decided mainly on the two points urged on behalf of the appellants. 7. According to the respondent, the Chairman of the Dhanbad Municipality had sent him a notice (exhibit 3/d) dated 16th April, 1960 wherein false and frivolous allegations were made and he had on 22nd April, 1960 sent his reply (exhibit 3/e) denying those false allegations. 7. According to the respondent, the Chairman of the Dhanbad Municipality had sent him a notice (exhibit 3/d) dated 16th April, 1960 wherein false and frivolous allegations were made and he had on 22nd April, 1960 sent his reply (exhibit 3/e) denying those false allegations. Thereafter, according to him, no further action was taken by the Municipality and the rules guiding the Municipal employees were not observed. 8. There cannot be any doubt that if the respondent was dismissed without following the rules guiding the municipal employees, his dismissal was illegal, improper and against the procedure laid down thereunder. From the judgment of the trial court it appears that the dismissal of the respondent was examined keeping in view relevant model rules framed under S. 42 of the Municipal Act and it was found that the rules were not complied with in this case. Relevant rules with regard to such cases are model rules 3 and 9 framed in accordance with S. 12 of the Municipal Act. Under said R. 8 "no officer or servant of the Commissioners shall ordinarily be dismissed from the pay and service of the Municipal Commissioners except on the grounds of fraud continued and wilful negligence of duty and offences involving moral turpitude. Rule 9 reads as follows : "9. Under said R. 8 "no officer or servant of the Commissioners shall ordinarily be dismissed from the pay and service of the Municipal Commissioners except on the grounds of fraud continued and wilful negligence of duty and offences involving moral turpitude. Rule 9 reads as follows : "9. No order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or pay shall be passed on an officer or servant of the Commissioners, unless he : (i) has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action: (ii) has been served with a copy of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action, reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges, together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and of any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on the case : (iii) has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself and to state whether be desires to be heard in person: (iv) has been afforded an adequate opportunity to adduce such evidence as may be considered to be reasonable; (v) has been allowed to be present during any enquiry that may be made at his request or at the discretion of the authority concerned and has been permitted to cross-examine such witnesses as may be produced against him; and (vi) has been afforded a reasonable time to show cause against the imposition of a punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or scale if the enquiring officer has arrived at a provisional conclusion that such a punishment should be imposed." In the present case the trial court has held that R. 9 (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) have not been complied with as the respondent was not served with the allegations on which charges were based or any other circumstance which it was proposed to take into consideration in passing the orders in the case nor was any enquiry made as to whether he desired to be heard in person. The trial court further held that the plaintiff was not given any opportunity to adduce evidence nor was he given any notice to enable him to be present during the enquiry said to have been conducted by the Chairman of the Municipality nor was he given an opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment. The trial court further held that the plaintiff was not given any opportunity to adduce evidence nor was he given any notice to enable him to be present during the enquiry said to have been conducted by the Chairman of the Municipality nor was he given an opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment. Learned counsel for the appellant was unable to show from the records of the case that the provisions of R. 9 aforesaid were complied with in this case. There is also no evidence on the record to show that the respondent was asked to be present at the time when the Board of Commissioners had considered the matter of his dismissal. Hence, the trial Court in my opinion, has rightly come to the conclusion that there was violation of rule of natural justice as the provisions of R. 9 were not at all complied with. Even the only witness who was examined on behalf of the appellant has admitted that he was not present at the time of the proceedings against the respondent and so his evidence is of no help. There is complete paucity of evidence on behalf of the appellant to show that the provisions of R. 9 aforesaid had been complied with in this case and the order of dismissal was passed in accordance with the procedure laid down thereunder. The court below has, therefore, rightly held that there was violation of rule of natural justice and the order of dismissal was illegal, invalid and void and that the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration to that effect. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the claim for arrears of salary was barred by limitation and that the court below has wrongly decreed the suit of the respondent in respect of the same. 10. The trial court has considered the question of limitation under issue No. 3. It has held that the claim was not barred by limitation because the suit was filed within three years of the date of dismissal. It has relied upon a decision in the case of Sudhir Ranjan Haldar V/s. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1961 Cal 626 ) and has held that the arrears of salary for the period before the dismissal became payable only after the wrongful dismissal is said to have been made on 9th March,1961. It has relied upon a decision in the case of Sudhir Ranjan Haldar V/s. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1961 Cal 626 ) and has held that the arrears of salary for the period before the dismissal became payable only after the wrongful dismissal is said to have been made on 9th March,1961. As the suit was filed by the respondent on 7th March, 1964, it was not held to be barred by limitation. Mr. Mazumdar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, however, urged that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe V/s. State of Mysore ( AIR 1962 SC 8 ) the respondent is entitled to a decree for arrears of salary only for a period of three years from the date of the institution of the suit. He has referred to another decision in the case of Anand Swarup Singh V/s. State of Punjab ( AIR 1972 SC 2638 ) : (1973 Lab IC 8) where the case of Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe (supra) was followed and it was held as follows: (at p. 2638 of AIR). "Now coming to the question whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim arrears of 6 years pension, but question appears to be concluded by the decision of this court in Shri Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe v. State of Mysore, 1962 (1) SCR 886 : ( AIR 1962 SC 8 ) wherein this court held that in the case of a claim for arrears of salary the period of limitation will be that laid down in Art. 102 of the Limitation Act, 1908. It has not been shown that the ratio of that decision is inapplicable to the present case." Reference was also made to a decision in the case of the State of Andhra Pradesh V/s. Mohammad Khutubuddin Khan (AIR 1964 Andh Pra 491) wherein too reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe (Supra) Lastly, Mr. Mazumdar referred to a decision of our own High Court in the case of Ramanugrah Jha V/s. State of Bihar ( AIR 1966 Pat 97 ) in support of his contention that the respondent was entitled to only three years salary from the date of the institution of the suit and not in respect of the arrear beyond that period. Mazumdar referred to a decision of our own High Court in the case of Ramanugrah Jha V/s. State of Bihar ( AIR 1966 Pat 97 ) in support of his contention that the respondent was entitled to only three years salary from the date of the institution of the suit and not in respect of the arrear beyond that period. 11 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent had, however, submitted that the decisions referred to above by Mr. Mazumdar have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case and he has relied on a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Madhya Pradesh V/s. State of Maharashtra (1977) 2 SC C 288) : (1977 Lab IC 697) which, according to him, is a direct decision on the point. In that case the plaintiff had filed a suit on 6th January, 1949 and by judgment dated 31st August, 1953 the District Judge held that the suspension order and the order of dismissal were illegal and declared the plaintiff to be deemed to continue in service. He was thereafter reinstated in service on 12th December,1953. In 1954 he was again suspended and on 2nd February, 1956 removed from service. Then a suit was filed on 6th October. 1956 against Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra challenging the suspension and order of removal and the plaintiff claimed that he should be deemed to have continued in service and claimed recovery of arrears of salary. It was held, firstly, that since the plaintiff was under suspension from 16th September, 1943 till 12th December, 1953 when he was reinstated and was again suspended from 19th January, 1954 till 23rd February, 1956 when he was dismissed, his suit, in October, 1956, was within a period of three years from the date of his reinstatement; and secondly, during the period of suspension he was not entitled to salary. Therefore, the plaintiffs cause of action for salary for the period of suspension did not accrue until he was reinstated on 12th December, 1953. It was also held that there could be no question of salary accruing or accruing due so long the order of suspension and dismissal stood. The plaintiffs salary accrued only when he was reinstated as a result of the decree setting aside the orders of suspension and of dismissal. 12. It was also held that there could be no question of salary accruing or accruing due so long the order of suspension and dismissal stood. The plaintiffs salary accrued only when he was reinstated as a result of the decree setting aside the orders of suspension and of dismissal. 12. Relying on the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Madhya Pradesh (Supra) learned counsel for the respondent has, in my opinion, rightly urged that the suit of the plaintiff for arrears of salary was not barred by limitation as he had filed the suit within three years from the date his right to get his arrear salary accrued because during the period of suspension the same would not and could not have accrued. The Court below, therefore, has rightly decided that the suit of the plaintiff-respondent was not barred by limitation. In my opinion, therefore, learned counsel for the appellant has failed on both the points urged by him. 13. In the result the appeal fails and is, accordingly dismissed with costs. UDAY SINHA, J. 14 I agree.