JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against an order of the Government of India dated January 10, 1975, prematurely retiring the petitioner from service. 2. The petitioner joined Indian Administrative Service in 1948. After completion of requisite period of probation, he was allotted to the U.P. Cadre of Indian Administrative Service. In 1953, he was appointed Deputy Secretary to the Government of Uttar Pradesh in Finance Department. In 1956, he was posted as Deputy Secretary, Home (Confidential) Department. He was then appointed District Magistrate and in that capacity, he worked at several districts Uttar Pradesh. In 1963, while he was posted as District Magistrate, Agra, he was appointed Manager (Administration)/Secretary in the State Trading Corporation of India, a public undertaking of the Government of India. On the bifurcation of the State Trading Corporation into two corporations, i.e., one State Trading Corporation and the other Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation, the petitioner was appointed Manager (Administration)/Secretary of Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation. In 1964, he was selected for promotion as Director of State Trading Corporation. He remained posted in the State Trading Corporation from March 18, 1964 to July 31, 1968. During that period, he was granted super time-scale (Rs. 2500-2750) and the scale of Rs. 2500-3000. 3. On the expiry of the period of his deputation, the petitioner was reverted to the State of Uttar Pradesh and was posted as consolidation Commissioner on December 9, 1958. In 1970, he was appointed Chairman of the U.P. State Textile Corporation. In February, 1974, he was appointed a Member, Board of Revenue at Allahabad ; while he was working on that post, the President of India in exercise of his powers under sub-rule (3) of Rule 16 of the All India Services (Death cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1956, in consultation with the Government of Uttar Pradesh issued the impugned order dated 10th January, 1975, prematurely retiring the petitioner from service on the expiry of three months from the service of the order on him. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed this writ petition challenging the validity of the aforesaid order of premature retirement. 4. Before we consider the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, it is necessary to refer to certain facts which have material bearing on the petitioner's case. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed this writ petition challenging the validity of the aforesaid order of premature retirement. 4. Before we consider the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, it is necessary to refer to certain facts which have material bearing on the petitioner's case. In 1968, certain complaints were received against the petitioner in respect of his dealings while he was posted as Director of the State Trading Corporation. Those complaints were in respect of certain charges of corruption. A preliminary inquiry was held into those complaints by the Central Bureau of Investigation and a case under section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(d) and (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act No. II of 1947) was registered with the police against the petitioner. During investigation of that case, the police conducted searches at the residence and the office of the petitioner at Lucknow and also at certain other places connected with the petitioner. it is not necessary to give the details of the premises which were searched. Suffice it to say that not only the petitioner's residence but also the premises of his relations and other persons who were alleged to have colluded with the petitioner in the alleged acts of corruption, were searched. After completion of investigation, the investigating agency on March 15, 1971, submitted a final report to the Special Judge, Delhi, before whom the case was pending inter alia saying, "No prosecution case has been made out and charge sheet is therefore not to be filed in the case." 5. After the aforesaid report was submitted in the criminal case registered against the petitioner, the Government of India decided to take departmental disciplinary proceedings against him. On 6th December, 1973, a memo of charges containing allegations of misconduct, misbehaviour and corruption, was issued to the petitioner, which was served on him on December 24, 1973. The petitioner was called upon to submit his explanation. Along with the memo of charges, the petitioner was served with another order of the Government of India dated December 6, 1973, communicating the Government's displeasure to the petitioner for certain lapses mentioned in the order. The petitioner represented to the Government of India against the order, but with no result. Ultimately, he filed a Writ Petition being Civil Misc. Writ No. 663 of 1975 in this Court challenging the award of the aforesaid minor punishment. The petitioner represented to the Government of India against the order, but with no result. Ultimately, he filed a Writ Petition being Civil Misc. Writ No. 663 of 1975 in this Court challenging the award of the aforesaid minor punishment. That petition has been admitted and .is pending in this Court. 6. With regard to the charges framed against the petitioner, he submitted a preliminary explanation on January 3, 1974. with a request that he may be given further opportunity to submit a detailed explanation to the charges. On 7nd April, 1974, in exercise of his powers under sub-rule (2) of rule 8 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules, the President appointed Sri A.P. Veeraghavan, Commissioner of Departmental Inquiries, Central Vigilance Commission, as the Inquiry Authority to hold inquiry into the charges framed against the petitioner. The petitioner raised objection against the appointment of the Inquiry Authority and requested that a Board of Inquiry be constituted against him. His request was, however, not accepted by the Government and the inquiry proceeded. Witnesses were examined in support of the charges and the petitioner contested the charges. During the pendency of the proceedings the impugned order of premature retirement was issued. Even after the issue of the impugned order the inquiry proceeded and the proceedings were completed on March 11, 1975, and thereafter the Inquiry Authority submitted its report to the Government of India which is pending consideration before it and no final orders have been passed. 7. Sri S.C. Khare, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that the petitioner was retired from service during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings against him and as such the impugned order amounts to punishment. Learned counsel for the respondents urged that the order of compulsory retirement was issued in public interest in accordance with the Service Rules. The pendency of the departmental proceedings against the petitioner did not change the character and nature of the impugned order and the order does not amount to punishment or removal or dismissal from service. Since the impugned order does not contain any word or expression casting stigma on the petitioner, it is not permissible to the Court to go behind the order or to investigate facts to ascertain the true nature of the order. A number of authorities were cited by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their contention. 8. Since the impugned order does not contain any word or expression casting stigma on the petitioner, it is not permissible to the Court to go behind the order or to investigate facts to ascertain the true nature of the order. A number of authorities were cited by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their contention. 8. The Central Government in exercise of powers conferred by subsection (1) of section 3 of the All India Services Act, 1951, framed the All India Service (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958, regulating the terms and conditions of service of the members of the Indian Administrative Service relating to retirement benefits, pension, gratuity etc. Rule 16(1) of the said rules lays down that the age of superannuation of a member of the service shall be 58 years and on attaining that age he shall be required to retire compulsorily from service. Clause (3) of the Rule which is relevant is in the following terms : "The Central Government, in consultation with the State Government, may require a member of the Service who has completed 30 years of qualifying service of who has attained the age of 50 years, to retire in the public interest provided that at least three months previous notice shall be given to the member concerned." 9. The above rule read with clause (1) of rule 16 provides that normally a member of the Service shall retire on his attaining the age of 58 years but clause (3) confers power on the Central Government to retire any member of the service prematurely on his completing 30 years qualifying service or on his attaining the age of 50 years if it considered it to be necessary in public interest. Rule 16(3) confers similar powers as conferred upon the appointing authority by rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules. The impugned order was issued by the Central Government under rule 16(3) and it contains a recital that the petitioner's premature retirement was in public interest. The order does not contain any word or expression which may cast stigma on the petitioner. Compulsory retirement simpliciter does not amount dismissal removal; or reduction in rank, under Article 311 of the Constitution or under the Service Rules. The order does not contain any word or expression which may cast stigma on the petitioner. Compulsory retirement simpliciter does not amount dismissal removal; or reduction in rank, under Article 311 of the Constitution or under the Service Rules. It is in fact termination of service in accordance with the terms and conditions of service which courts of law have consistently held not to be an order of punishment. See Shyam Lal v. State of U.P. AIR 1954 S.C. 369 , State of Bombay v. Saubhagchand N. Doshi AIR 1957 S.C. 892 , Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 S.C. 1305 , Union of India v. J. N. Sinha AIR 1971 S.C. 40 , State of U.P. v. Shyam Lal Sharma AIR 1971 S.C. 2151 and Tara Singh v. State of Rajasthan and others A I.R. 1975 S.C. 1487. The Supreme Court in these cases laid down affirmatively that the right of a servant to hold public employment is restricted by the Rules. If the rules make provision for compulsory retirement on attaining a certain age or on completion of qualifying period of service, the termination of service does not violate any of the rights of the Government servant as he does not lose the benefit which he may have earned in service. The order of compulsory retirement simpliciter does not attract Article 311 of the Constitution. 10. The question however arises as to whether an order of compulsory retirement issued during the pendency of departmental proceedings against a Government servant would amount to punishment. There is no direct authority of the Supreme Court on this question but the matter was considered at length by a Division Bench of this Court in State of U. P. v. Parshottam Swarup Johari 1976 (2) A.L.R, 316. Since the principle laid down by the Division Bench apply squarely to the facts of the instant case, it is necessary to note the facts of Parshottam Swarup Johar Vs case in some detail. Purshottam Swarup Johari was holding a Civil post in the State of Uttar Pradesh, Certain charges of misconduct were framed and a Disciplinary Departmental Enquiry was held against him. Purshottam Swarup Johari was holding a Civil post in the State of Uttar Pradesh, Certain charges of misconduct were framed and a Disciplinary Departmental Enquiry was held against him. During the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings Johari was retired compulsorily under Note I to Article 465 of the Civil Service Regulations which also conferred similar powers to retire a Government servant prematurely in public interest as those conferred on the Central Government under clause 16(3) of the All India Service (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958. The order of compulsory retirement was challenged by means of a writ petition which was allowed by one of us (K.N. Singh, J.) on the ground that since a full fledged departmental enquiry was proceeding against Johari at the time when the order of compulsory retirement was passed, the order amounted to one of removal from service which could be passed only after giving him reasonable opportunity as 'contemplated by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The State of Uttar Pradesh took the matter in special appeal and contended before a Division Bench that where the order of compulsory retirement on the face of it did not contain any expression casting stigma on the Government servant concerned and if the order of compulsory retirement did not deprive the Government servant of any accrued benefits, the Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of retirement because the order of retirement issued in public interest does not amount to punishment and it is not permissible for the courts to go behind the order of compulsory retire men to ascertain whether the order of retirement was passed by way of punishment or not. The Supreme Court cases noted above were pressed into service to support the contention raised on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Supreme Court cases noted above were pressed into service to support the contention raised on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Division Bench considered the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the above noted cases as well as in the case of Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India AIR 1964 S.C. 449 and State of Punjab v. Sukhraj Bahadur AIR 1968 S.C, 1089 and thereafter it observed thus : "When Government initiates disciplinary proceedings against a Government servant on the basis of charges of misconduct or inefficiency, it is obvious that Government does so with the intention of punishing him, If in such proceedings an Enquiry Officer has been appointed, a charge-sheet has been submitted, explanation has been called for and considered and thereafter an order of compulsory retirement is passed, it can legitimately be inferred that the misconduct or inefficiency is the foundation or basis of the order and that the order has been passed by way of punishment. In these circumstances, the order of compulsory retirement will amount to an order of dismissal or removal from service and will attract the provisions of Article 311 (2)." 11. The Bench further repelled the contention that the Court cannot examine facts and circumstances to ascertain the true character of the order of compulsory retirement. The Bench held that other circumstances which can lead to the conclusion that order has been passed by way of punishment can be examined by the Court. The Court can see whether the order is passed on the ground of misconduct on the part of the Government servant. This can be done only by going behind the order. The principle that the form of the order is not conclusive or decisive but it is really the substance of the order which would determine its true nature and character is well settled. This can be determined by going behind the order and examining the circumstances which may have preceded or followed the issue of the oider. See S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra AIR 1964 S.C. 1680 , State of Punjab v. Sukhraj Bahadur AIR 1968 S.C. 1089 , Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1974 S.C. 2192 , State of Bihar v. Shiv Shukshuk Misra AIR 1971 S.C. 1011 . 12. See S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra AIR 1964 S.C. 1680 , State of Punjab v. Sukhraj Bahadur AIR 1968 S.C. 1089 , Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1974 S.C. 2192 , State of Bihar v. Shiv Shukshuk Misra AIR 1971 S.C. 1011 . 12. Learned counsel for the Union of India referred to the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi 1976 (4) SCC 52 and urged that since the order did not cast any stigma nor did it visit the Government servant with evil consequences the Court is not entitled to go behind the order to determine its nature. It is true that in Ram Chandra Trived Vs case the Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and observed that the High Court erred in probing in the Departmental correspondence that passed between the superior officers of the Government servant overlooking the rule that when there were no express words in the impugned order itself casting a stigma on the Government servant the High Court could not delve into Secretariate files to discover whether some kind of stigma could be inferred on such research. In order to appreciate the true import of the aforesaid observations it would be necessary to keep in mind that it is settled law in regard to precedents that a judgment has to be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expressions of the whole law, but governed or qualified by the particular facts of the case in which expressions are to be found ; See Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 1940 P.C. 230 . Also see Fateh Kumar v. Durbijai Singh AIR 1952 All. 942 (F.B.); Jwala Mohan v. State AIR 1963 All. 161 (F.B.) and S.V. Kondaskar v. V.M. Deshpande AIR 1972 S.C. 878 (885). 1971 A. W. R. 378 (F. B.). 13. The facts involved in Ram Chandra Trivedi's case ( supra ) have, therefore, to be seen in order to appreciate the aforesaid observations made in that case. Trivedi was a temporary Government servant. His services were terminated by an order of termination simpliciter. 1971 A. W. R. 378 (F. B.). 13. The facts involved in Ram Chandra Trivedi's case ( supra ) have, therefore, to be seen in order to appreciate the aforesaid observations made in that case. Trivedi was a temporary Government servant. His services were terminated by an order of termination simpliciter. He filed a suit challenging the validity of the order on the ground that the order was passed by way of punishment which attracted Article 311 of the Constitution and since no opportunity was given to him the order was rendered void. The trial Court dismissed the suit on the finding that the order was not passed as a measure of punishment. This finding was affirmed by the first appellate court but on second appeal a learned Single Judge of the High Court set aside the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below and decreed Trivedi's suit. The High Court reversed the findings of fact after examining the official correspondence in the file and recorded a finding that a close scrutiny of the file indicated that the order was passed by way of punishment. It was in these circumstances that the Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and recorded a note of disapproval of the procedure of delving through the Government file to ascertain the true nature of the order. The point involved in the instant case was not considered in that case. It would, however, be significant to note that in Trivedi's case the Supreme Court again reiterated the principle that the form of the order is not conclusive of its true nature. The entirety of the circumstances preceding or attendant must be examined by the Court and the over-riding test will always be whether the misconduct is mere motive or the very foundation of the order. In the circumstances we do not find any substance in the respondents' contention. 14. Indeed an almost similar view as taken in Parshottam Swarup Johare's case was taken by a Full Bench of this Court in Ram Saran Lal v. State of U.P., 1971 A.W.R. 378 (F.B.) Ram Saran Lal, the petitioner in that case, was appointed as a Sub-Inspector of Police in a temporary capacity in February, 1964. 14. Indeed an almost similar view as taken in Parshottam Swarup Johare's case was taken by a Full Bench of this Court in Ram Saran Lal v. State of U.P., 1971 A.W.R. 378 (F.B.) Ram Saran Lal, the petitioner in that case, was appointed as a Sub-Inspector of Police in a temporary capacity in February, 1964. On September 16, 1969, he was served with a charge-sheet under section 7 of the Police Act regarding undue delay in the submission of case diaries, and on September 29, 1969, further charges were framed against him by means of a supplementary letter. A regular inquiry was stated on the basis of these charges and a number of witnesses were examined by the inquiry Officer. On March 11, 1970, the prosecution evidence was closed and the petitioner was asked to file a list of defence witnesses ; and on March 24, 1970, he was informed that one of the prosecution witnesses, whose cross-examination had been deferred, would be available for cross-examination on April 2, 1970. The witness, however, did not turn up on the date fixed. In place of taking any further steps to record any more evidence in that inquiry the petitioner was served with a show cause notice on April 6, 1970, asking him to show cause why he should not be discharged from service on the basis of certain adverse entries in his character roll as well as on account of the delayed submission of case diaries etc. covered by the earlier charge-sheets. He submitted a detailed explanation in reply on April 26, 1970, and included therein a list of the defence witnesses whom he wished to examine. This was followed by the issue of a notice dated May 12, 1970, informing him that his services were being terminated as they were no longer required. The order of termination of the petitioner's services contained no express words or expression casting stigma on him. The said order was challenged on the ground that it was an order of punishment The question which fell for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court was whether the termination order, though ostensibly innocuous was in fact an order of punishment because the said order had been issued after the charges had earlier been levelled against the Government servant and inquiry was held therein. It is note worthy that the order of termination was preceded by a regular enquiry but the provisions of Article 311(2) were not complied with and no reasonable opportunity of defence as contemplated by that Article was afforded to the Government servant concerned. The Full Bench held that the form of the order was not conclusive of its true nature and it was a cloak or camouflage for the order was founded on misconduct. Relying on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Sukhari Bahadur's case the Full Bench held that the order of termination was in fact an order of punishment and attracted Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. In Purshottam Swarup Johan's case, it was also held : "There appears no reason on why the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in respect of orders of termination of services of temporary employees should not apply to the cases of compulsory retirement." 15. It is thus clear that the principles applicable for judging the nature and character of an order of termination of a temporary Government servant are applicable to judge the true character of the order of compulsory retirement. In both the cases considerations are almost the same. A temporary Government servant has no right to hold the post and his services are liable to be terminated in accordance with the rules. Similarly, an officer on the completion of the period of qualifying service or on attaining a particular age as fixed in the rules is liable to be compulsorily retired in pursuance of. the service rules and he was no right to hold the post thereafter. In our opinion, the form of the order of compulsory retirement is not decisive or conclusive or concluve, it is open to the court to determine the substance and true nature of the order. In view of the above discussion we are in respectful agreement with the principles laid down by the Division Bench in Purshottam Swarup Johari's case. 16. In the instant case, admittedly full fledged departmental proceedings were pending against the petitioner. Charges framed against the petitioner contained serious allegations of misconduct and corruption which, if proved, would normally lead to his dismissal or removal from service. The petitioner had denied the charges. 16. In the instant case, admittedly full fledged departmental proceedings were pending against the petitioner. Charges framed against the petitioner contained serious allegations of misconduct and corruption which, if proved, would normally lead to his dismissal or removal from service. The petitioner had denied the charges. An Enquiry Officer was appointed and the proceedings were on the verge of conclusion when the impugned order was issued retiring the petitioner compulsorily from service. There can be no doubt that the Central Government had initiated the enquiry to punish the petitioner. In the circumstances, it is legitimate to hold that the order was passed by way of punishment and it amounted to dismissal or removal from service. 17. Learned counsel for the Union of India urged that while considering the case against the petitioner for compulsory requirement is public interest the Central Government did not take into account the material which was the subject-matter of departmental proceedings. On a careful scrutiny of the counter-affidavit filed by A.K. Gupta, Under-Secretary to the Government of India, and the affidavit of Radhika Raman filed on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh, we do not find any reason to accept this contention. In Paragraph 66 of the affidavit of A.K. Gupta, it is asserted iaat the petitioner was retired in public interest on an over all assessment of his record of service. In paragraph 68 it is further asserted by him that the action to retire the petitioner was not influenced by the departmental proceedings pending against him and the decision to retire the petitioner was taken by the Central Government after taking into consideration the recommendations of the Review Committee and the State Government, and after duly examining the record of service of the petitioner. It is further asserted that there was sufficient material to unable the Central Government to form opinion that the retirement of the petitioner was in public interest. There is however no averment in either of the two counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the Central Government and the State Government that the facts and circumstances which were the subject-matter of the charges against the petitioner were not taken into account in forming the requisite opinion to retire the petitioner in public interest. As already noticed the Central Government at first attempted to prosecute the petitioner in a court of law. As already noticed the Central Government at first attempted to prosecute the petitioner in a court of law. After the criminal prosecution failed on account of lack of evidence, the Central Government launched departmental proceedings against the petitioner. In these circumstances, it is difficult to comprehend that the facts and charges which formed the basis of the departmental proceedings were not present on the service record of the petitioner. Since the enquiry into those charges was pending at the time of the issue of the impugned order and that order was passed on an over all assessment of the petitioner's record of service, it is inherent that the allegations made against the petitioner, must have been taken into account. In the absence of any express averment to the contrary, we are of the opinion that in the background of the circumstances of this case, the impugned order is based on the allegations of misconduct against the petitioner, and since Article 311 (2) of the Constitution was not complied with the impugned order is rendered void and liable to be quashed. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the impugned order was passed arbitrarily by the Central Government as there was no material against the petitioner in his service record on the basis of which the Central Government could bona fide form the opinion that the petitioner's compulsory retirement was in public interest. He referred to the averments contained in the petition that during his entiae service career the petitioner had not earned any adverse entry except the communication of the displeasure of the Central Government on 6th December, 1973 which was already subject matter of a writ petition in this Court. He further urged that the respondents have failed to place any material on the basis of which the requisite opinion to retire the petitioner in public interest could legitimately be formed, and therefore the impugned order must be held to be arbitrary in nature. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on Union of India v. J.N. Sinha, AIR 1971 S.C. 40 and State of U.P. v. S.M. Banerji 1974 A.L.J. 238. In our opinion, since the petitioner is entitled to relief on the basic of the first submission made by his counsel, it is not necessary to record any finding on this question. 19. In our opinion, since the petitioner is entitled to relief on the basic of the first submission made by his counsel, it is not necessary to record any finding on this question. 19. In the result, we allow the petition and quash the order of the Central Government dated January 10, 1975. The petitioner is entitled to his costs.