B. J. DIVAN, N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a tenants revision application under sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act challenging the decree passed against him in the regular civil suit no. 313 of 1971 of the court of the Civil Judge (J. D.) Jetpur and confirmed in the appeal no. 17 of 1973 decided by the Assistant Judge of Rajkot District at Gondal. The tenant was ordered to be evicted from the rented premises namely a shop under sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rent Act on the ground that despite the service of a notice ex. 18 dated 7-10-1971 served on him on 8-10-71 calling upon him to pay the arrears of rent from 1-11-1970 to 30-9-1971 he had failed to pay the same within one month of the receipt of the notice of demand. ( 2 ) THIS revision application has been referred to the Division Bench by the learned Single Judge of this court because it involved a question regarding the meaning of the term month occurring in sec. 12 (2) of the Rent act. Under the said provision no suit for possession could be instituted by a landlord against a tenant prior to the expire of one month next after the notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent has been served upon the tenant. Relying upon the judgment of another learned Single Judge of this court in the Civil Revision Application no. 712 of 1976 decided on 3 the petitioner tenant before this court had contended that the term month referred to in sec. 12 (2) would be a calendar month and as the suit in question had come to be filed on 22-11-71 before the expire of the next calendar month namely November 1971 suit was premature and therefore liable to be dismissed. On behalf of the tenant one another contention also was raised to the effect that the landlords case fell under sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Bombay Rent Act in so far as there was an invariable liability of the tenant to pay education cess by virtue of sec. 19 of the Gujarat Education Cess Act 1962 which cess is payable only annually and not monthly. In other words contention was that part of the rent being not payable by month one of the four requisites of sec. 19 of the Gujarat Education Cess Act 1962 which cess is payable only annually and not monthly. In other words contention was that part of the rent being not payable by month one of the four requisites of sec. 12 (3) (a) was lacking and consequently the case fell under the alternative situation provided for by sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Bombay Rent Act. ( 3 ) THE view canvassed on behalf of the petitioner by Mr. Suresh M. Shah the learned Advocate to put in the words of the learned Single Judge who decided the Civil Revision Application no. 712 of 1972 decided on 3 is as incorporated below from the judgment of the learned Single Judge himself:the expression one month used in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 12 read with sub-sec. (1) of sec. 12 in my opinion means a calendar month commencing from the first day of the month following the service of notice of demand upon the tenant. It does not mean an ordinary or usual month from the date of service of notice. WE are called upon to examine and decide this question namely what is meant by the term month occurring in sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act. ( 4 ) IN common parlance the term month is hardly understood as a calendar month according to the Gregorian calendar but it by and large means space of time from a day in one month to the corresponding day in the next. This is the meaning of the term month given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary 1964 Edition. The term month has been explained also in the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904 The term month as defined in sec. 2 (30) of the Bombay General Clauses Act means a month reckoned according to the British Calendar. The term reckoned is equivalent of the term calculated or counted. If the legislature wanted the month to mean only a compact unit of a calendar month the normal definition would have been as a British Calendar month or a calendar month. The elaborate explanation given in the definition of the term month and particularly the reference to calculation clearly and pointedly suggest that what is intended to be referred to by the term is a space of time between the two dates of the two contiguous months. The elaborate explanation given in the definition of the term month and particularly the reference to calculation clearly and pointedly suggest that what is intended to be referred to by the term is a space of time between the two dates of the two contiguous months. ( 5 ) THE matter however does not rest on the meaning of the term month as understood generally. The terminology of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 12 of the Bombay Rent Act clinches the question. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 12 is quoted below:12 No suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against a tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882the phrase until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing is served clearly indicates that the month is to be counted from the date of service of the notice on the tenant. The adjective next occurring therein is the superlative form of the term nigh which is equi- valent or synonym of the term near. The term next therefore means nearest closest most contiguous. When a month is to be counted immediately after the date of the service of notice it means that no days are to be left out in between for counting of the month. As for example let us take the facts of the case on hand. The notice ex. 18 was served on 8-10-77 on the tenant. What sub-sec. (2) of sec 12 requires is that the landlord must wait before instituting a suit against a tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due till the expiry of one month to be reckoned immediately after the notice in writing of the demand has been served upon the tenant. Another connotation of the word next would mean immediately The phrase next after is equivalent to immediately after and the term next does not allow any scope for the intervention of any days in between. Another connotation of the word next would mean immediately The phrase next after is equivalent to immediately after and the term next does not allow any scope for the intervention of any days in between. ( 6 ) NO doubt there is the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this court referred to above supporting the submission made on behalf of the petitioner-tenant but we find that the learned Single Judge has not put forward any reasons in support of that view of his which with profound respect we say is not correct. The learned Single Judge has assumed - we say so with respect because there is no elaboration at all that a month as occurring in sec. 12 (2) of the Rent Act means a calendar month commencing from the first day of the month following the service of the notice of demand upon the tenant. Even the learned Single Judge in his judgment accepts the position that ordinary or usual would mean a month calculated from a specified date. There is nothing in the context or in the text of sec. 12 (2) of the Rent Act which would suggest ruch an unusual connotation. As observed by us above both the general tenor of the term as well as the clear meaning that could be derived from the interpretation of the term occurring in sec. 12 (2) clearly point to only one conclusion namely that the month referred to there is a span of a time between two dates of two contiguous months and not a calendar month. We therefore find ourselves unable to agree with the view of the learned Single Judge. ( 7 ) THIS brings us to the second question regarding the case falling under sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Bombay Rent Act. It was very vehemently contended by Mr. Shah for the petitioner-tenant that under sec. 19 (1) of the Gujarat Education Cess Act 1962 it is ultimately the liability of the tenant to be accountable for the amount of education cess which admittedly is payable annually. Reliance in this connection was placed upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this court. It is the case of Dayalal Gangaram v. Bhigani Bhupatrai Chunilal and Anr. 18 G. L. R. 349. Reliance in this connection was placed upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this court. It is the case of Dayalal Gangaram v. Bhigani Bhupatrai Chunilal and Anr. 18 G. L. R. 349. In that case the following observations have been made :-THE settled legal position is to treat the rent in the context of such rent control measure not only as a merely realisable contractual rent but in the more comprehensive sense so that all such permitted increases and the standard rent which is made lawfully recoverable under such control measure form part of the term rent and that is the context in which sec. 12 (2) (a) has used the term rent in the first condition required to be fulfilled. It has been further observed as follows :even in the absence of a contract between the landlord and tenant as regards payment of education cess the education cess would form part of the rent payable by the tenant to the landlord so as to enable the court to decide under sec. 12 (3) (a) that the said rent was not payable by the month and therefore in the facts of the present case sec. 12 (3) (a) would not be attracted and the case would fall into any other case under sec. 12 (3) (b ). HOWEVER it is very clear from the text of sec. 19 (2) second proviso that the landlord would not be entitled to recover education cess in respect of any tenament the tax on which by the terms of tenancy such owner had agreed to pay for its occupier. In other words there may be cases in which there may be a contract to the contrary making the landlord himself liable for the education cess without his being able to recover the same from the occupier of the premises. ( 8 ) MR. Shah the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner-tenant however urged that this being an exceptional situation it was required to be both pleaded and proved by the landlord because in his submission the initial onus to plead and prove the four requisites of sec. 12 (3) (a) lay on the landlord and it was for the landlord to eliminate the presumptive statutory liability of the tenant to pay education cess by specific pleading and by specific proof if the pleading was controverted. We however do not agree. 12 (3) (a) lay on the landlord and it was for the landlord to eliminate the presumptive statutory liability of the tenant to pay education cess by specific pleading and by specific proof if the pleading was controverted. We however do not agree. What is essential in such cases is that the landlords who goes to a court of law with a prayer only for rent claiming it to be payable every month impliedly makes a statement that the only liability of the tenant is to pay the rent as demanded by the landlord. The fact that he does not demand any education cess in his notice preceding the suit and in his plaint would be prima facie evidence of the lack of tenants liability to pay the education cess to pay his landlord who is entitled to recover it only when he happens to pay the same to the local authority. If such an implied assertion of the landlord arising out of the non-mention of such a claim is controverted by the tenant it is for him to raise the question so as to give a proper opportunity to the landlord to meet that case. ( 9 ) RELYING upon the background of this case Mr. Shah however urged that these very landlords had served the tenant with the notice ex. 22 on 10-7-70 demanding arrears of rent and in that notice a specific demand for education cess was put forward. It is the common case that that notice ex. 22 was not required to be carried to its logical culmination because the dispute was then settled. The present suit is based on the notice ex. 18 dated 7-10-71 in which the only demand made is of the rent as such due from 1-11 70 to 30-9-71. There is no mention of the education cess. Mr. Shah however urged that from the notice ex. 22 an admission of the landlords should he deduced to the effect that there was no such contract exonerating the tenant from the liability to pay the landlord the amount of education cess as and when paid by the landlord. We do not know and Mr. Shah was fair enough to concede before-us that there was nothing on record to show why the notice ex. 22 did not come to be pursued any further. We do not know and Mr. Shah was fair enough to concede before-us that there was nothing on record to show why the notice ex. 22 did not come to be pursued any further. We therefore in the facts of this case are not in a position to hold that from ex. 22 the liability of the tenant to pay the education cess was as a matter of fact really there. This sort of deduction from a casual demand in the earlier notice ex. 25 cannot necessarily be made. If the tenant wanted to deny the plaintiffs implied pleadings to the effect that the rent was payable by month he should have put up this special defence specifically and in that case some evidence could have been led by the plaintiffs to meet that defence. To us it appears clear that at the revisional stage such a contention could not be allowed to be advanced for the first time. It is a common case that this plea is raised for the first time before the High Court. If entertained it would necessitate further examination of some facts in the light of what may be alleged by the plaintiffs as a part of their pleadings liable to be amended or elaborated. The other side cannot be allowed to be taken by surprise in the manner in which an attempt has been made by the tenant here before us. We therefore have not permitted Mr. Shah to raise this question on certain assumptions because in our view this contention is necessarily and inextricably involved with some questions of facts which could have been pleaded by the other side. ( 10 ) IN above view of the matter we find little merit in this revision application which is hereby rejected with no order as to costs. Rule is accordingly discharged. .