S. N. SESHADRI v. LIC OF INDIA — 1977 DIGILAW 122 (KAR)

( 1 ) IN these writ petitions under Article 226 (1) (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India (42nd Amendment) the petitioners have sought for quashing the orders of their dismissal by issue of writs of certiorari and have claimed re instatement to the service and consequential benefits. As these writ petitions give rise to common questions of law and facts they axe heard together and disposed of by a common order. ( 2 ) THE three petitioners were working as Development Officers under the 1st respondent. A domestic enquiry was Initiated against them for proposing insurance for non existent proponents and for forgery of -signatures of proponents. The 4th respondent held inquiry and found them guilty and the 3rd respondent accepted the findings and imposed the punishment of dismissal. The petitioners filed appeals against the orders of dismissal before the 2nd respondent who dismissed the appeals. The memorial sent by them to the 1st respondent was also dismissed. Thereafter these petitioners filed writ petitions in W. P. Nos. 1332, 2191 and 1390 of 1967 before this Court. Those writ petitions were disposed of by this Court by a common judgment dated 8-6-1971 by a Division Bench observing that "there appears to be little doubt that the orders of the appellate authority prima facie reveal grave failure on his part to obey the provisions of the regulations" and this Court declined to interfere with the order of dismissal in view of the law as then enunciated by the supreme Court in Executive Committee of U. P. State Ware Housing corrm v. Chandrdkiran Thyagi AIR. 1970 SC. 1244. and Indian Airlines Corrm v. Sukhdev rai AIR. 1971 SC. 1328,. Thereafter memorials were filed before the 2nd resnondent as provided under the Staff Regulations, which ended in their rejection. In Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram the Supreme Court overruled the earlier decisions holdin that the staff regulations were statutory in nature and are amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court. Thereafter the petitioners filed these writ petitions before this Court challenging the order of dismissal. ( 3 ) BEFORE considering these writ petitions on merits, it is necessary to dispose of the preliminary obiections raised by the learned Advocate for the respondents. The preliminary objections are : no. Thereafter the petitioners filed these writ petitions before this Court challenging the order of dismissal. ( 3 ) BEFORE considering these writ petitions on merits, it is necessary to dispose of the preliminary obiections raised by the learned Advocate for the respondents. The preliminary objections are : no. 1 That the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed in limine on the ground of laches or delay in filing the writ petitions. No. 2 That the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the principles of res judicata. Mr. V. C. Brahmarayappa, learned Advocate for the respondents in support of the 1st preliminary point urged that the order of dismissal of the petitioners was made on 13-12-1966 and it was confirmed by the appellate authority on 15-7-1967 and these writ petitions filed on 1-3-1976 after ten years suffer from laches or delay. Further, he urged that even a remedy in a Civil Court for a declaration should have been within the period of three years and when the remedy of adjudication of civil rights is barred by limitation, the petitioners could not invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner have no valid ground against the bar of limitation and the writ petitions must fail on that score. ( 4 ) ON the second point of preliminary objection, the learned Advocate for the respondents urged that the petitioners had approached this Court in WPs. 1332, 2191 and 1390 of 1967 challenging the same impugned orders and those petitions came to be dismissed by this Court on 8-6-1971 and the said decisions are binding upon the petitioners. He urged that those decisions have not been set aside by any one of the modes recognised by law and the petitioners are bound by those decisions. He further urged that the decision of the Supreme Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram AIR. 1975 SC. 1331. does not in any way destroy the decision of this Court rendered in the above said writ petitions and it does not have the effect of creating a new right in favour of the petitioners and, therefore, he urged that these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed in Umine. 1975 SC. 1331. does not in any way destroy the decision of this Court rendered in the above said writ petitions and it does not have the effect of creating a new right in favour of the petitioners and, therefore, he urged that these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed in Umine. ( 5 ) THE learned Advocates for the petitioners contended that if there is a good case on merits the delay is no consideration for the maintainability of the writ petitions. It is further urged that there is no upper or lower limit of limitation to invoke the remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India (42 Amendment ). Therefore, whenever, there is delay tne Court need not necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. He pointed out that the former set of writ petitions were dismissed not on merits and in fact on merits the Court observed in those writ petitions that the impugned orders prima facie reveal great failure on the part of the respondents to obey the provisions of the regulations, and this Court declined to interfere with the order of dimissal, in view of the declaration of law made by the Supreme Court in Executive Committee U. P. Ware Housing Corpn's case (l) and in Indian Airlines Corpn (2), in which the Supreme Court held that the staff regulations like those of LIC cannot be regarded as breach of any statutory obligation and, therefore, any breach of those regulations is not amenable to correction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In this view of the matter, the former set of writ petitions filed by the petitioners were dismissed and not upon consideration of the case upon merits. ( 6 ) THEREFORE the question whether the writ petitions filed long after the passing of the order of dismissal can be entertained depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The learned Advocate for the petitioners relied upon the decisions of the Orissa High Court in Damodar Sahu v. State AIR. 1955 Orissa 156. and mahadeb Dash v. Life Insurance Corpn of India AIR. 1975 Orissa 234. In the former case the Orissa High Court has held that if on merits the petitioner has a good case he should not be deprived of his remedy merely because of delay. 1955 Orissa 156. and mahadeb Dash v. Life Insurance Corpn of India AIR. 1975 Orissa 234. In the former case the Orissa High Court has held that if on merits the petitioner has a good case he should not be deprived of his remedy merely because of delay. In the latter case G. K. Misra, CJ while dealing with that case at para 15 of the judgment has observed thus : the present writ application was filed after some of these judgments were pronounced dissenting from the Bombay view. Though apparently the present writ application had been filed about 4 years after the order of dismissal was passed, really there was no such inordinate delay as the first writ application was filed soon after the memorial was rejected and the second writ application was filed after one year and a few days from the date of withdrawal of the first writ application as soon as the petitioner's Advocate came to know of some decisions upholding the maintainability of writ application. There is no particular period of limitation prescribed for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Whether there has been delay so as not to grant relief under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. At the time when the first writ application was withdrawn, the view current was adverse to the petitioner and accordingly the petitioner was permitted to withdraw the writ application. The then prevailing view has been overruled and the matter has been finally set at rest by the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme court. In the circumstances the real delay is delay of one year from the date of withdrawal of the first writ application till the filing of this writ application. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are not inclined to reject the writ applications on the ground of delay. " ( 7 ) IN the instant case, it is not disputed that immediately after the dismissal of the petitions, WPs. 1332, 2191 and 1390 of 1967 were filed. They came to be dismissed on 8-6-1971. At the time when the first set of writ petitions were dismissed the prevailing view was adverse to the petitioners. " ( 7 ) IN the instant case, it is not disputed that immediately after the dismissal of the petitions, WPs. 1332, 2191 and 1390 of 1967 were filed. They came to be dismissed on 8-6-1971. At the time when the first set of writ petitions were dismissed the prevailing view was adverse to the petitioners. It is only after the prevailing view was over-ruled by the Supreme court the petitioners filed these writ petitions. In this connection the learned Advocate for the respondents relied upon a decision of the supreme Court in Trilokchand Motichand v. H. B. Munshi, Commr, of sales Tax, Bombay AIR. 1970 SC. 898. wherein the Supreme Court has observed at para 12 of the judgment thus : "the question is: can the petitioner in this case take advantage, after a lapse of a number of years, of the decision of this Court? He moved the High Court but did not come up in appeal to this Court. His contention is that the ground on which his petition was dismissed was different and the ground on which the statute was struck down was not within his knowledge and therefore he did not know of it and pursue it in this Court. To that I answer that law will presume that he knew the exact ground of unconstitutionality. Everybody is presumed to know the law. It was his duty to have brought the matter before this Court for consideration. In any event, having set the machinery of law in motion he cannot abandon it to resume it after a number of years, because another person more adventurous than him in his turn got the statute declared unconstitutional, and got a favourable decision. If I were to hold otherwise, then the decision of the High Court in any case once adjudicated upon and acquiesced in may be questioned in a fresh litigation revived only with the argument that the correct position was not known to the petitioner at the time when he abandoned his own litigation. I agree with the opinion of my brethern Bachawat and Mitter, JJ, that there is no question here of a mistake of law entitling the petitioner to invoke analogy of the Article in the Limitation Act. I agree with the opinion of my brethern Bachawat and Mitter, JJ, that there is no question here of a mistake of law entitling the petitioner to invoke analogy of the Article in the Limitation Act. The grounds on which he moved the Court might well have impressed this Court which might have also decided the question of the unconstitutionality of the act as was done in the subsequent litigation by another party. " ( 8 ) THE facts of the case involved in the above decision in my opinion do not bear upon the facts of the present case. In the decision cited above, it did not involve any earlier ruling of the Supreme Court, but it involved the question of Constitutionality of the Act. which was struck down by the Supreme Court. But in the instant case the previous ruling of the supreme Court was over-ruled in Sukhdev Singh's case (3 ). The decision of the Orissa High Court in Mahadeb Dash's case (5) is on the point in issue. I am in respectful agreement with it. Therefore, it cannot be said that the writ petitions are not maintainable on the ground of delay in view of the position that no period of limitation is prescribed for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Now turning to the question whether the principle of res judicata is attracted in respect of the second set of writ petitions, it may be stated at the outset that it does not, as the previous writ petitions were not decided on merits, but were dismissed in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Executive Committee U. P. Ware Housing Corporation's case (l) and in indian Airlines Corporation's case (2 ). But the contention of the learned advocate for the respondents, is that the parties to those writ petitions are bound by the decision of this court. He urged that for rectification of any defect in the order passed by this Court, there were only three modes of getting it rectified. They are, review, recall or appeal. When the petitioners have not taken recourse to any one of these modes, the decision of this Court is not demolished and it is binding on them. He urged that for rectification of any defect in the order passed by this Court, there were only three modes of getting it rectified. They are, review, recall or appeal. When the petitioners have not taken recourse to any one of these modes, the decision of this Court is not demolished and it is binding on them. ( 9 ) NEXTLY, he contended that in spite of the previous rulings of the supreme Court, it was open to these petitioners to approach the Supreme court by way of appeal and to get the previous rulings of the Supreme court over-ruled. When they have failed to do so, it is not open to them to contend that the decision of this Court in the previous writ petitions is not binding upon them. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon a decision of the supreme Court in Shedan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar AIR. 1966 SC. 1332 wherein the operation of the priniciples of res judicata in a subsequent suit is considered. Head Note (B) of the Report reads thus :"in order that a matter may be said to have been heard and finally decided, the decision in the former suit must have been on the merits. Where, for example, the former suit was dismissed by the trial Court for want of jurisdiction, or for default of plaintiff's appearance, or on the ground of non-joinder of parties or misjoinder of parties or multifariousness, or on the ground of technical mistake, or for failure on the part of the plaintiff to produce probate or letters of administration or succession certificate when the same is required by law to entitle the plaintiff to a decree, or for failure to furnish security for costs, or on the ground of improper valuation or for failure to pay additional Court fee on a plaint which was undervalued or for want of cause of action or on the ground that it is premature and the dismissal is confirmed in appeal (if any) the decision not being on the merits would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit". Nextly reliance is placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in arati Ray Choudhury v. Union of India AIR. 1974 SC. 532. Nextly reliance is placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in arati Ray Choudhury v. Union of India AIR. 1974 SC. 532. wherein the Supreme court has observed thus : as the petition filed in the High Court under Art. 226 was not dismissed on merits, the present petition cannot be barred by res judicata or by the application of any principle analogous to it. ( 11 ) THE learned Judges of the Supreme Court, while laying down the principle of law. have considered the decision in Trilokchand's case (6 ). In view of these decisions of the Supreme Court, it must be held that when petitions filed by the petitioners on an earlier occasion under art. 226 of the Constitution, were not dismissed on merits the order passed in those writ petitions would not operate as res judicata for maintainability of the present writ petitions for the same relief. Therefore the priliminary objections fail and are rejected. ( 12 ) ON merits the learned advocates for the petitioners raised the following contentions in support of the petitioners' case. Firstly, it is contended that the impugned dismissal orders are in violation of the statutory provisions contained in Staff Regulations of 1960 which are statutory in nature. Secondly, it is contended that in the domestic enquiry held against the petitioners articles of charges framed against the petitioners have not been proved. Thirdly, it is contended that the impugned orders are not speaking orders, as they are not supported by reasons. Fourthly, it is contended that there was no supply of enquiry report which amounted to denial of reasonable opportunity. ( 13 ) THE learned advocate for the respondents sought to support the impugned dismissal orders on the ground, firstly, that the enquiry officer has given adequate reasons in finding them guilty of the charges framed against them and that all the charges have been satisfactorily estaolished by the evidence on record. Secondly, he contended that there was no denial of opportunity by non-supply of enquiry report. The charges against the petitioner in W. P. No. 1945 of 1976, are : (1) that the petitioner introduced proposals of non existent proposers and deliberately misled and cheated the first respondent corporation. (2) that the proposal regarding one Ganapathi does not tally with the proponent's signature. The charges against the petitioner in W. P. No. 1945 of 1976, are : (1) that the petitioner introduced proposals of non existent proposers and deliberately misled and cheated the first respondent corporation. (2) that the proposal regarding one Ganapathi does not tally with the proponent's signature. On the first charge the finding of the enquiry officer is that the petitioner (S. N. Seshadri) should have exercised a little more caution and to this extent found him guilty and he was absolved of the 2nd charge. It may be pertinent to note that nowhere in the first charge there is any allegation about non-exercise of caution on the part of the petitioner (Seshadri ). The gravamen of the charge is that he introduced proposals of non-existent proposers and deliberately misled and cheated the first respondent Corporation and thus committed fraud on the Corporation. This has not been established against him. The enquiry officer found him guilty of non-exercise of caution, which was not the charge against him and he was not given any opportunity to defend. Therefore, it is a clear case that the petitioner Seshadri, was punished on a charge being unheard. Thus the finding of the enquiry officer is vitiated. ( 14 ) IN the case of the petitioner in WP. No. 7270/1976 the charge against him (S. Rama Rao) is similar to the charges against Sri Seshadri in w. P. No. 1945/1976. The enquiry officer has given a finding that the petitioner Sri. Rama Rao, should have exercised more caution at the time when he obtained proposal through Sri Sripad Rao and to this extent he is guilty of the charge levelled against him. On the second charge of the alleged forgery of proposal papers, the enquiry officer's finding is that sri Rama Rao, witnessed the proposal without satisfying himself of the genuineness or otherwise of the signature of the proponent relying on his friend and colleague Sripad Rao and that was an incorrect attitude of the responsible development officer and to this extent he was found guilty. It is significant, to note that in Writ Petition No. 7270 of 1976 regarding the 2nd charge the complainant has not been examined by the enquiry officer in support of that charge. Hence, the finding cannot be sustained. The findings of the enquiry officer on these two charges are not the gravament of the allegations levelled against him. It is significant, to note that in Writ Petition No. 7270 of 1976 regarding the 2nd charge the complainant has not been examined by the enquiry officer in support of that charge. Hence, the finding cannot be sustained. The findings of the enquiry officer on these two charges are not the gravament of the allegations levelled against him. Want of exercise of caution while obtaining proposals and also about the attitude of Rama rao. as a responsible Devept Officer are not directly put to him in the course of the articles of changes nor, at any subsequent state this charge was brought to his notice and he was given an opportinity to state his plea on these charges. These two findings of the enquiry officer against rama Rao. also suffer from the same infirmities as in the case of mr. Sesbadri. Therefore, the findings are vitiated. ( 15 ) IN W. P. No. 4608/1976 the charges against the petitioner (Sripad Rao) are that bp introduced a proposer and furnished false particulars and tberebv deliberately misled the Corporation 1st respondent into wrong assumption of the risk by suppression of mateial facts and the 2nd charge against him is that he introduced the proposals of non-existent proposers and thereby deliberately misled and cheated the 1st respondentcorporation. On both these charges the enquiry officer has found that petitioner (Sripad Rao) guilty of the charges levelled against him The contention on behalf of the petitioner Sripad Rao, is that the Development Officer is concerned only with perusing records when he thought fit and it is not the obligatory duty of the Development Officer to go and personally inspect every proposer except in cases of doubt. Further, the contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner is that the enquiry officer has failed to get the records of the cancellation letters signed in connection with the proposal which would have completely disproved the allegations against him and the enquiry officer with a mala fide intention neither summoned the witnesses nor documents for investigation and cross- examination. Thus there is non-supply of documents by the enquiry officer to defend which is a serious error of law which vitiated the findings against him. Thus there is non-supply of documents by the enquiry officer to defend which is a serious error of law which vitiated the findings against him. ( 16 ) NOW the question for determination is whether the impugned orders passed against the petitioners by respondents 3 and 2 are violative of the statutory provisions contained in the Staff Regulations of 1960. In Sukhdev Singh v. Bhavatram the Supreme Court has laid down that rules and regulations framed by the Statutory Corporation have the force of law and their employees have statutory status and are entitled to declaration of being in employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of statutory provisions. ( 17 ) IN the light of the enunciation of the law by the Supreme Court, let me examine whether any statutory rule has been violated in the domestic enquiry against the petitioners. The contravention alleged against the petitioners in the domestic enquiry is : that after the perusal of the enquiry report made by the 4th respondent the 3rd respondent decided to dismiss the petitioners from service and he sent a show cause notice and called upon the petitioners to give reply to the show cause notice . In WP. 1945/76 and WP. 7270/76 the enquiry report did not accompany the show cause notice, but it was supplied on request and on payment of fees only after the dismissal orders were passed. In WP. 4608/76 the petitioner had to obtain the enquiry report before making his representation on the show cause notice. The procedure followed by the 3rd respondent in issuing show cause notice without the supply of the copy of the enquiry officer's report is a grave failure on his part to obey the provisions of the Regulations. Thus in all the three orders of dismissal there is grave failure on the part of the 3rd respondent to obey the provisions of the Regulations resulting in denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioners to make their representation in regard to the findings as also on the proposed punishment. Hence there is contravention of Reguation 39 (2) of the Statutory Regulation 1960 (to be hereinafter called the Statutory Regulations ). Hence there is contravention of Reguation 39 (2) of the Statutory Regulation 1960 (to be hereinafter called the Statutory Regulations ). If the petitioners had been supplied with the enquriy reports, they would have been in a position to explain the errors in the findings given by the enquiry officer and they would have explained that the findings are not based upon evidence. Thus there is contravention of the provisions of Regulation 39 (2) of the statutory regulations. The test of reasonable opportunity has been laid down by the Supreme Court in U. P. Govt v. Sabir Hussain AIR. 1975 SC. 2045,. It reads thus : the broad test of "reasonable opportunity" is whether in the given case the show cause notice issued to the delinquent servant contained or was accompanied by so much information as was necessary to enable him to clear himself of the guilt, if possible, even at that stage or, in the alternative to show that the penalty imposed was much too harsh and disproportionate to the nature of the charge established against him. ( 18 ) IN the instant case the impugned order of removal proceeded on an acceptance of the report of enquiry proceedings and comments of of the enquiry officer. No copy of the report, findings and "comments" of the Enquiring Officer, was supplied to the delinquent servant. No copy of the enquiry report and allied documents was given to him even when he applied for the same in order to file an appeal to the higher authorities against the order of removal. Held : that the High Court was right in holding that the delinquent servant was not given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him and that the nonsupply of the copies of the material documents had caused serious prejudice to him in making a proper representation. There was a disobedience of the mandate of S. 240 (3) of the Govt of India Act, 1935 and the impugned order stood vitiated on that score alone. " the ratio of the decision bears on the facts of these cases. Thus, there is disobedience of the mandate of the Regulation 39 (2) of the Statutory regulations, 1960. Therefore, the enquiry is ab initio void as held by the Supreme Court. " the ratio of the decision bears on the facts of these cases. Thus, there is disobedience of the mandate of the Regulation 39 (2) of the Statutory regulations, 1960. Therefore, the enquiry is ab initio void as held by the Supreme Court. ( 19 ) THE orders of dismissal passed by the 3rd respondent and affirmed by the 2nd respondent are not speaking orders as they do not disclose any reasons whatsoever to accept the findings of the 4th respondent, the enquiry officer and they are cryptic orders. Further, there is utter lack of application of the mind of the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority upon the evidence on record. ( 20 ) THE contention of the learned advocates for the respondents is that the 3rd and the 2nd Respts have accepted the reasoning of the enquiry officer and, therefore, the reasons given by the Enquiry Officer should be read as the reasons given by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority. It is difficult to accept this argument when the petitioners were facing grave charges against them and the penalty was so severe, orders passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority should disclose that they have considered the evidence on record independently of what the enquiry officer has done, while accepting the findings of the enquiry officer. The orders passed by them are not speaking orders and they cannot be sustained. In Mahabir Prasad v. State of U. P AIR. 1970 SC. 1302 at Head Note (B) the Supreme court has held :"opportunity to a party interested in the dispute to present his case on question of law as well as fact, ascertainment of facts from materials before the Tribunal after disclosing the materials to the party against whom it is intended to use, judgment upon a finding of the facts in controversy and application of the law to the facts found, are attributes of even a quasi-judicial determination. Recording of reasons in support of a decision by a quasi-judicial authority is obligatory as it ensures that the decision is reached "according to law and is not a result of caprice, whim or fancy or reached on ground of policy or expediency. The necessity to record reasons is greater if the order is subject to appeal". ( 21 ) FURTHER, the Supreme Court in Chowgule and Co v. Union of India AIR. The necessity to record reasons is greater if the order is subject to appeal". ( 21 ) FURTHER, the Supreme Court in Chowgule and Co v. Union of India AIR. 1971 SC. 2021. has held that, even in revision applications, it is incumbent on the Central Government to indicate the grounds on which revision application is disposed of unless the State Government had already in its order of rejection given the grounds and Central Government referred to them in its capacity as revising authority. Therefore, the impugned orders passed against the petitioners by the 3rd and the 2nd respondents suffer from grave irregularities and illegalities and failure to obey Regulation 39 (2) of the Statutory Regulations, 1960 as contended by the learned advocates for the petitioners. ( 22 ) WHEN these petitioners have challenged the impugned orders in the first set of writ petitions, viz, W. P. Nos. 1332, 1390 and 2191 of 1967, a division Bench of this Court while disposing of these writ petitions observed thus: in certain disiplinary enquiries held against them by the Zonal manager, they were found guilty of one or other of the charges framed against them, and the penalty of dismissalwas imposed upon them. Upon appeal to the Managing Director, the appeals were dismissed by short orders, suggesting and supporting the case of the petitioners that the Appellate Authority had not applied his mind fully to the facts and circumstances of the case, as he was bound to, in the light of Regulation 46 (2) of the Staff Regulations of the Life insurance Corporation which are modelled on similar rules contained in the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules governing Government servants. ( 23 ) WHATEVER may be the position regarding the regularity of the original enquiry and infirmities, if any, in the report of the enquiry Officer, as to which we express no opinion, there appears little doubt that the orders of the Appellate Authority prima jade reveal grave failure on his part to obey the provisions of the regulation mentioned above and that the petitioners may legitimately feel aggrieved thereby. ( 24 ) I am in respectful agreement with the opinion expressed by the Division bench in those writ petitions. Therefore. ( 24 ) I am in respectful agreement with the opinion expressed by the Division bench in those writ petitions. Therefore. I am opinion that the enquiry conducted by the 4th respondent and the dismissal order passed by the 3rd respondent as affirmed by the 2nd respondent are in obedience to the provisions of Statutory Regulations of 1960 and the punishment of dismissal imposed on them is too severe and, therefore, the impugned orders cannot be sustained. ( 25 ) THERE is yet another aspect in these cases which deserves serious notice at the hands of this Court. After the dismissal of previous set of writ petitions, the petitioners made representations and brought to the notice of the 3rd and the 2nd respondents the observations made by this court while disposing of those writ petitions and requested them to re-consider their cases. It is unfortunate that the 3rd and the 2nd respondents have not heeded to the observations made by this Court regarding their grave failure to obey the provisions of the Regulations and rectify their mistakes. On the other hand they dismissed their representations on the ground that this Court has not said anything about the 4th respondent's i. e. , Enquiry Officer's report. The manner in which the representations are dealt with, which involved grave consequences to them borders on arbitrariness which should not have happened in a high institution like life Insurance Corporation. ( 26 ) THEREFORE, I am of opinion that the proceedings from the inception are liable to be quashed. Accordingly in all the three writ petitions they are quashed. The facts and circumstances of these cases are such that no fresh enquiry against the petitioners is necessary. Hence, it is directed that no fresh enquiry shall be held against them and they should be restored to their position which they were holding at the time of dismissal, but for the impugned order, and they shall be given all monetary benefits to which they are entitled. ( 27 ) AS regards the administrative difficulties raised by the Advocate for the respondents there is no case made out in the matter. But the petitioner's advocate submitted that the petitioners are not claiming any retrospective promotions and, therefore, no difficulty will be caused to the 1st respondent Corporation. Therefore, issue a writ of mandamus to the respondents, in terms stated above. But the petitioner's advocate submitted that the petitioners are not claiming any retrospective promotions and, therefore, no difficulty will be caused to the 1st respondent Corporation. Therefore, issue a writ of mandamus to the respondents, in terms stated above. In the result, these writ petitions are allowed. No costs. --- *** --- .