S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) MR. V. B. Patel who appears on behalf of the petitioner has raised before me the following four contentions: (I) The petitioner had become a permanent teacher after 3rd May 1970 when the petitioners probation period came to an end and when the academic year expired. (ii) Assistant Principal of the school who made the order terminating the petitioners services had no authority to do so. (iii) Paragraph 65. 3 of the Grant in Aid Code was not complied with. (iv) Unless a departmental enquiry is held against the petitioner reliance upon misconduct alleged to have arisen out of the petitioner having appeared at the LL. B. examination could not have been taken into account. ( 2 ) I have gone through the judgment of the Tribunal. It appears to me that the Tribunal has laboured under the impression that it has no jurisdiction to grant any relief to the petitioner because Grant in Aid Code conferred no rights upon the members of the teaching staff and that they were merely administrative instructions to govern relationship between the secondary schools on one hand and the Government on the other hand. In that behalf reliance has been placed by the Tribunal on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ku. Regina v. St. Aloysius Higher Elementary School. A. I. R 1971 S. C. 1920. It has been laid down in that decision that Grant in Aid Code confers no enforceable rights upon the members of the staff. It appears to me that with the enactment of sub- sec. (2) of sec. 40 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act. 1972 the position has changed and what could not be done by a Court of Law earlier can now be done by the Tribunal. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 40 provides as under:all suits and proceedings between the manager of a registered private secondary school and any person in service of such School as a head master a teacher or a member of non-teaching staff relating to disputes connected with the conditions of service of such person which are pending in any civil court on the appointed day shall be transferred to and continued before the Tribunal. PROVISO to sub-sec. (2) of sec. 40 is not material for the purpose of the present case. PROVISO to sub-sec. (2) of sec. 40 is not material for the purpose of the present case. Before the Gujarat Secondary Education Act 1972 came in to force all disputes which arose between the management of the school on the one hand and a teacher a head master or a member of the nonteaching staff on the other hand were governed either by the contract between the parties or by the Grant in Aid Code. There was nothing else which was attracted to such disputes. Therefore if a dispute between the management of a school and a teacher had been pending in a civil Court toe Civil Court would have decided it either in terms of the contract between the parties or under the Grant in Aid Code if it was permissible for the Civil Court to do so. Such disputes have been transferred by subsec. (2) of sec. 40 from the Civil Court to the Tribunal. Obviously therefore what the Civil Court could decide in the suit must be decided by he Tribunal on transfer to it of a suit or proceeding under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 40. The Tribunal has therefore the jurisdiction to decide disputes between the management of a school and a teacher which arose before the Act came into force irrespective of whether they were governed by the contract of service between the patties or by the Grant in Aid Code. The view which I am taking receives support from an unreported decision of Mr. Justice P. D. Desai Special Civil Application No. 1391 of 1975 decided by him on 6/10th August 1976. He has in terms held in that decision that a dispute arising out of the termination of services of a teacher is a dispute which relates to the conditions of service and under sub-sec. (2) of sec 38 the Tribunal alone has Jurisdiction to decide such a dispute as from the appointed day. He has also observed in that decision that in that case it rightly transferred the dispute to the Tribunal for its decision under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 40. In this context it is necessary to have a quick glance at sub-sec. (1) of sec. He has also observed in that decision that in that case it rightly transferred the dispute to the Tribunal for its decision under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 40. In this context it is necessary to have a quick glance at sub-sec. (1) of sec. 40 which provides as follows; No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled decided or dealt with by the Tribunal. WHILE sub-sec. (1) bars the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain are dispute after the Act has come into force sub-sec. (2) following the same principle provides for transfer of such suits to the Tribunal. There; fore scheme of sub-secs. (1) and (2) of sec. 40 is to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil court not only to entertain disputes which arise after the Act has come into force but even pending disputes. In Satsangi Shishu vihar Kelavani Trust and Ors. v. P. N. Patel and Ors; 18 G. L. R 615 the scheme of secs. 36 38 and 39 of the Act has been analysed by this Court. The principle laid down by a bench of this Court in that decision lends support to the view which I am taking. The Tribunal was therefore in error in observing that the dispute which has been raised by the petitioner could not be entertained on merits because Grant in Aid Code conferred no enforceable rights upon secondary teachers employed by private managements. ( 3 ) MR. C. K. Patel who appears on behalf of respondent No. 1 has contended before me that in the instant case the jurisdiction which the Tribunal can exercise is the jurisdiction of a civil court and no more. In that context again he has brought into play the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Reginas case (supra ). In my view after having exhausted the remedies provided under the Grant in Aid Code of moving a hierarchy of educational authorities if a teacher whose services have been terminated approaches a civil court what he really prays for is that refusal on the part of the educational authorities to interfere with the order of termination made by the management was bad. It is therefore open to him to challenge the decision of the educational authorities as well as to seek reinstatement. It is therefore open to him to challenge the decision of the educational authorities as well as to seek reinstatement. The civil court exercising the plenary jurisdiction could entertain both these prayers. Therefore if the civil court had the jurisdiction to examine the legality of the order made by the educational authorities the Secondary Education Tribunal to whom the suit was transferred necessarily had that jurisdiction. In my opinion it is not correct to say that the civil court did not have such a jurisdiction and that therefore the Secondary Education Tribunal had no such jurisdiction. The educational authorities could have examined the contentions which have been raised by Mr. Patel and could have interfered if they had substance in them. They could have been raised before the civil court. Therefore they could be raised before the Secondary Education Tribunal also. [the rest of the judgment is not material for reports. ] .