Judgment :- 1. And now we come to the end of the tragic tale. 2. Horror houses and torture chambers have figured in films and fiction. We would have assumed they had no contemporary relevance, but the gruesome story unfolded to us in this, the last chapter of this case, speaks of brutal and inhuman torture in a Police camp in the State organised by Senior State Police Officials. The Home Secretary to the Government and the Inspector General of Police of the State have now, in marked contrast to their earlier stand, affirmed before us, in no uncertain terms and with expression of regret, that Rajan, who was directed to be produced in court was in fact taken into police custody as found by us in this case. But Rajan, we are told, is no longer available for production. He is said to have succumbed to "operation torture". Rajan having thus escaped from a world of sadistic Policemen, never to return, as we are told, now, these proceedings must come to an end, for, in Habeas Corpus the role of the Court is only to compel the production of the living. 3. Despite the stand of the respondents on the earlier occasion we were satisfied that Rajan had been taken into custody by the police from the College hostel. We were convinced that the plea to the contrary was dishonest. We presumed that he was still in custody in the absence of evidence to explain what happened to him after he was taken by the police. Hence we issued the writ to produce Rajan. The normal consequence of non-compliance therewith would be punishment for contempt. Since our direction was based on an assumption which we were compelled to make in the unique circumstances of the case we gave an opportunity to the respondents to show cause for non-compliance. The cause now shown by the respondents 1, 2 and 4 is the demise on 2nd March 1976 of the boy Rajan directed to be produced before this Court. This information is said to be base I on materials gathered by specially appointed investigating officers. After having heard counsel and perused the material made available to us by the learned Advocate General we accept, for the purpose of these proceedings, the case stated before us by the Advocate General that Rajan is dead and hence cannot be produced. This information is said to be base I on materials gathered by specially appointed investigating officers. After having heard counsel and perused the material made available to us by the learned Advocate General we accept, for the purpose of these proceedings, the case stated before us by the Advocate General that Rajan is dead and hence cannot be produced. If production of Rajan is not possible by reason of the fact that he is not alive there would be no question of proceedings for disobedience of the order of this Court; whatever may be the circumstances resulting in the death, and whatever be the responsibility of any or all of the respondents direct or indirect, mediate or immediate, legal or moral for permitting a situation leading to such an event to develop. Hence we have to close the contempt proceedings. We do so. 4. Respondents in this case are persons holding responsible positions in public and official life. On the date of this petition the 4th respondent was the Chief Minister of this State, first respondent, the Home Secretary, second respondent, the Inspector General of Police and respondents 3 and 5 senior police officials. They were called upon to answer a very serious charge, namely that of illegal arrest of a student from the Hostel premises and his subsequent detention, with the further change that the father of the student was not even told, inspite of knocking at every door and turning from pillar to post, what happened to his son There is a specific allegation levelled against Sri. Karunakaran that while he was Home Minister the petitioner met him soon after the illegal arrest and complained to him. The position occupied by the respondents cast on them a duty to the public and an equally important duty to this Court to place the true facts and the entire facts before this Court. When once this Court was moved and we called upon the respondents to show cause we would have expected forthright, candid and honest statements from the respondents. We regret to say that we have not been benefited by their stand in our enquiry for truth. We bad to get at the truth despite them. When once this Court was moved and we called upon the respondents to show cause we would have expected forthright, candid and honest statements from the respondents. We regret to say that we have not been benefited by their stand in our enquiry for truth. We bad to get at the truth despite them. In these circumstances, we would have, in the normal course and even without any motion from any party considered the question whether we should, in the interests of justice initiate any action against any or all of the respondents, for suppressing the truth. We would have suo mote exercised our mind to determine whether there was a case for holding an enquiry into the offence of giving false evidence. Now that petitions are filed by the petitioner in this case against the respondents seeking action against them under S.340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, such examination is evidently called for on that account also. 5. S.193 of the Indian Penal Code provides for punishment of imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and also fine to any person intentionally giving false evidence in any stage of judicial proceedings or fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of any judicial proceedings. S.191 of the Indian Penal Code explains the concept of giving false evidence. If a person legally bound by an oath to state the truth makes any statement which is false and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true he is said to give false evidence. When a person files an affidavit in court he is bound by oath to state the truth; he would be giving false evidence if (1) the statement given by him in the affidavit is false, and (2) he knew or believed such statement to be false or he did not believe it to be true. Merely because a statement made by a person in an affidavit or in his sworn testimony is shown to be false such person cannot be said to have given false evidence. The statement which is false might have been made in good faith but perhaps even recklessly. Merely because a statement made by a person in an affidavit or in his sworn testimony is shown to be false such person cannot be said to have given false evidence. The statement which is false might have been made in good faith but perhaps even recklessly. To make it an offence under S.191 of the Indian Penal Code it is necessary to show that the deponent knew the statement to be false or he believed the statement to be false or he did not believe it to be true. A person may not positively know a statement to be false and he may not even believe it to be false. But if, nevertheless, be does not believe the statement to be true, then he commits the offence of giving false evidence. 6. S.195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 debars courts from taking cognizance of the commission of certain offences except on a complaint in writing by the court. An offence under S.191 of the Indian Penal Code committed in or in relation to any proceedings in court is one where no prosecution could be resorted to without a complaint from the court. The circumstances under which such a complaint is to be made are those provided under S.340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 7. The question therefore is whether this court is of the opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into the offence of giving false evidence punishable under S.193 of the Indian Penal Code. 8. By way of answer to the averment in the Original Petition that Rajan had been taken into custody by the police on 1st March, 1976, respondents made averments in their counter-affidavits totally denying the case of the petitioner in this regard. The Home Secretary refers to the report, Ext. XI, received by him from the Inspector General of Police and avers in his counter-affidavit: "The petitioner's son Rajan, to the best of ray information, had not been arrested and kept in custody". The Home Secretary refers to the report, Ext. XI, received by him from the Inspector General of Police and avers in his counter-affidavit: "The petitioner's son Rajan, to the best of ray information, had not been arrested and kept in custody". The second respondent, the Inspector General of Police in his counter-affidavit filed in this court on 4 4 1977 states that " Rajan has not been arrested by any police officer of the State and he has not been kept in custody by the police in the State." He refers to the report sent by him to that effect to the Government based upon enquiries caused by him to be made. The 4th respondent, the then Home Minister who was, on the date of this petition, the Chief Minister of the State, states "The allegation made in Para.2 of the additional affidavit that I told the petitioner on 10th March, 1976 that his son Rajan had been arrested from his college for involvement in some serious cases and he will do his level best to look into the matter and help the petitioner is absolutely incorrect. I have never told the petitioner that his son Rajan has been in police custody at any time." Respondents 3 and 5 who are police officers, the former the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Crime Branch, and the latter the District Superintendent of Police, Kozhikode also contend that Rajan had not been taken into police custody. The 3rd respondent states that "The allegation that the petitioner's son had been arrested on my directions and is being kept in custody by the Crime Branch of the State Police is untrue". Again be states: " the petitioner's son has not been arrested by any police officer in the Crime Branch of the State Police. According to the best of my information the said Rajan has not been arrested at all by the State Police." The 5th respondent states in his counter-affidavit filed on 4th March, 1977 that "I am sure that Sri. Rajan, the petitioner's son had not been arrested in connection with the investigation of Crime No. 19 of 1976 of Kayanna Police Station, as I myself was present at Kayanna Investigation camp from 28 21976 to 12 31976. The said Sri. Rajan, the petitioner's son had not been arrested in connection with the investigation of Crime No. 19 of 1976 of Kayanna Police Station, as I myself was present at Kayanna Investigation camp from 28 21976 to 12 31976. The said Sri. Rajan had not been brought to the investigation camp also by any police officer." Again earlier in the same affidavit he has stated: "The petitioner's son has not been in my custody or in the custody of any of the police officers of Kozhikode District." Consequent upon such denial by the respondents the issue whether Sri. Rajan was in police custody had to be determined by this court and on evidence taken in this court we found that Rajan had been taken by police officers from the Hostel of the Regional Engineering College at Calicut on 131976. It was also found by us that he was taken to the Kakkayam police camp for the purpose of investigation and he was tortured at the camp. The 3rd respondent, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Crime Branch in charge of the Crime Branch of the State was said to be in charge of the Kakkayam camp also. The presence of the District Superintendent of Police, Sri. Lakshmana, the 5th respondent, at Kakkayam investigation camp when Rajan was being put on torture was spoken to by pw. 9 and that evidence was accepted. In these circumstances this Court issued the writ to the respondents. Subsequent to this as a result of investigation of a case registered by the police of the State, respondents 1, 2 and 4 have submitted to this Court that Rajan was taken into police custody on 131976 as found by this court, that he was tortured, to which he succumbed on 2 31976 and that investigation has disclosed these facts. We have therefore no difficulty in finding that the statements of the respondents in their respective counter-affidavits dated 4th April 1977 that Rajan had not been arrested on 131976 are false. 9. We have therefore no difficulty in finding that the statements of the respondents in their respective counter-affidavits dated 4th April 1977 that Rajan had not been arrested on 131976 are false. 9. But there is another ingredient to be proved as against the respondents in case action against them under S.340 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to be initiated It must be shown that respondents knew that the statements made by them were false or believed them to be false or believed that such statements to be not true If we find so we could, in the circumstances of this case, without any hesitation, hold that the interests of justice call for proceedings for perjury against such of the respondents as have made such statements. That would be because the parties intended that this court should act upon such statements. They were made by men holding high and responsible positions in life. The issue concerned the life and liberty of a citizen of this country. Such statements were made by way of returns to a writ of Habeas Corpus in the highest court of the State. These are weighty considerations in deciding whether it would be in the interests of justice to proceed under S.340 of the Code in case we find that otherwise there is a case for action. Hence our attempt shall be to determine whether in the case of each one of the respondents there is reason to assume that such respondent knew that the statement made by him that Rajan was not arrested on 131976 was false or believed it to be false or did not believe it to be true. If we find a prima facie case for an enquiry into this question as against any of the respondents we would be justified in taking action against such respondents We will examine the case of each of the respondents with this background. 10. The Home Secretary, in his affidavit filed on 23rd May 1977 explained the circumstances under which he made the statement in the return filed by him in this court on 4-4-1977. He is said to have made the statement on the basis of the letter dated7-1-77 sent to the Government by the Inspector General of Police. 10. The Home Secretary, in his affidavit filed on 23rd May 1977 explained the circumstances under which he made the statement in the return filed by him in this court on 4-4-1977. He is said to have made the statement on the basis of the letter dated7-1-77 sent to the Government by the Inspector General of Police. That letter conveyed the result of an enquiry into the allegations made by the petitioner in his petition of 24th August 1976 complaining that whereabouts of Rajan arrested on 131976 were not known. Evidently the plea of the Home Secretary is that the complaints received by the Home Department of the Secretariat from the petitioner were treated as in the usual course. On the unsigned petition no action was taken. The petition dated 24 81976 was sent for enquiry and report in the routine fashion. It is urged that there is no case that the Home Secretary had any specific information other than what he could gather from the files. There is of course no evidence to show that he obtained any other information from any other source. His conduct was severely commented upon by the petitioner's counsel. It is said that in spite of several petitions sent to the Government there has been no response. The question whether he has been vigilant in performing the duties of his office would not be relevant in considering whether in averring that Rajan was not in custody he was making a statement which he knew to be false or believed to be false. We have already expressed our views about his conduct incur judgment in this case. But we find no case for any action against him under S.340(1) as be is not shown to have been possessed of any information other than what was disclosed to him from the files when he filed his statement on 4th April 1977. 11. The stand of the Inspector General of Police in relation to the statement made by him in his counter-affidavit filed on 4th April 1977 has been vehemently criticised by the learned counsel for the petitioner; Sri. Ramakumar. 11. The stand of the Inspector General of Police in relation to the statement made by him in his counter-affidavit filed on 4th April 1977 has been vehemently criticised by the learned counsel for the petitioner; Sri. Ramakumar. The interesting feature in this case is that the case now set up by the Inspector General of Police laying the blame on the 3rd respondent for the misdeeds at the Kakkayam camp resulting in the murder of Rajan has naturally provoked the 3rd respondent to urge that whatever was done at Kakkayam camp was done under the instructions of the Inspector General of Police and the latter was aware of whatever was happening in the camp by the information conveyed to him from time to time through the wireless and also by the special branch police. The Inspector General in a very detailed supplementary affidavit filed by him on 8-6-1977 has attempted to explain the set up under which the Crime Branch was working in the State at the relevant time. He admits that for the investigation of Crime 19 of 1976 registered in connection with the attack on Kayanna Police Station an investigation camp was set up at Kakkayam. He denies that the 3rd respondent was camping at Kakkayam under his orders. According to him the jurisdiction of the Deputy Inspector Genera! of Police, Crime Branch, extends over the whole State and he need not take orders from him for moving anywhere in the State on duty. Very important is the averment that the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Crime Branch, deals direct with the Government in regard to the crimes investigated by him. It is further stated that Naxalite cases, including the detention or Naxalites under MISA were handled exclusively by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Crime Branch. He was said to be corresponding directly with the Government in respect of MISA detention of Naxalities without making copies thereof to the Inspector General of Police. The 3rd respondent had no obligation, it is said, to report to the Inspector General of Police the details of investigations handled by him. The second respondent would further say that he was not posted with the day to day progress of the investigation of Crime 19 of 1976. The 3rd respondent had no obligation, it is said, to report to the Inspector General of Police the details of investigations handled by him. The second respondent would further say that he was not posted with the day to day progress of the investigation of Crime 19 of 1976. But he would admit that officers and men of the police station within the jurisdiction of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Northern Range participated in the investigation of Crime 19 of 1976 at the Kakkayam camp It was said to be under direction from the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Northern Range for assisting the Crime Branch In the investigation of the crime. According to him for deployment of these officers and men his permission was not necessary. He avers that he had no knowledge of the happenings at the Kakkayam camp and he came to know of those only after this court pronounced judgment on 13 41977 and in particular by the evidence of such happenings collected in the course of investigation of Crime 304 of 1977 of Crime Branch, CID. The substances of his case appears to be that though he was the Inspector General of Police in matters relating to investigation of cases by the Crime Branch the 3rd respondent was independent and was subject only to orders from Government. 12. We should take it that the case urged by the second respondent is this matter is also the case of the Government, for, the learned Advocate General appears for respondents 1 and 2 besides the fourth respondent Sri. Karunakaran and there is no reason to assume conflict of interests as between them. We have also been referred to certain files to substantiate the case that the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Crime Branch, was dealing directly with the Home Department of the State and not through the Inspector General of Police. The Deputy Inspector General of Police was declared to be the Head of Office of the Crime Branch, CID. Unit for all purposes by Government order dated 511976. 13. Sri. Nayanar, counsel for the third respondent, mentioned at the hearing that on 2nd March 1976 the date on which Rajan is alleged to have been tortured to death, the Inspector General Police had issued D.O. letters to officers including the third respondent instructing them to inflict maximum causalities on extremists. 13. Sri. Nayanar, counsel for the third respondent, mentioned at the hearing that on 2nd March 1976 the date on which Rajan is alleged to have been tortured to death, the Inspector General Police had issued D.O. letters to officers including the third respondent instructing them to inflict maximum causalities on extremists. Evidently what is suggested is that the Inspector General of Police cannot disown responsibility and let down the 3rd respondent and other police officers when they have acted only in accordance with the instructions issued by him. The file placed in our hands by the Advocate General shows that the D. O. letter dated nil March 1976 does not concern any direction to investigating officers as to how to treat the witnesses in their custody or the persons whom they are interrogating. That D. O. letter was issued in the wake of the Kayanna Police Station attack as to how the police officers should conduct themselves thereafter to avoid repetition of such attacks and strict vigilance in police stations to assure that station attacks do not succeed was advised. It is in this context that the D. O. letter mentions that "It should be the endeavour of everyone to see that such an attempt not merely does not succeed but is repelled with maximum casualties to the enemy". It is sufficient to state that the direction did not concern any excess to be practised by investigating officers. 14. It seems to us to be quite strange that the Inspector General of Police should be able to disown the responsibility for an organised activity in his Department. But in the circumstances of this case there is no material on which we could find that the Inspector General of Police was directing the investigation of Crime 19 of 1976. Though counsel for the 3rd respondent very vehemently urged that wireless messages were being relayed to him from time to time concerning the investigation of the case and there arc other materials against the second respondent no specific reference is made to any such material so that we can call for the same for perusal. 15. It is true that Sri. Eachara Varrier, the petitioner, had been moving heaven and earth to get some information about bis son and his petitions passed through the hands of respondents 1 and 2. 15. It is true that Sri. Eachara Varrier, the petitioner, had been moving heaven and earth to get some information about bis son and his petitions passed through the hands of respondents 1 and 2. It it said that more than 10,000 such petitions pass through the hands of the second respondent every year. This is mentioned evidently to indicate that personal verification of the tacts raised in these petitions may not be possible. We cannot fail to take note of the fact that the petitioner Sri. Eachara Varrier, has no case that he met the Inspector General of Police at any time or brought his case to the personal notice of the Inspector General of Police. Hence we cannot rule out the possibility, however slender it be, that the Inspector General of Police did not believe that he was making a false statement when he acted upon the report dated 7-1-1977. In the normal course the Inspector General of Police may not be taken seriously when he feigns ignorance to the happenings in a Police Camp set up to deal with an important and emergent situation. The Kakkayam Police Camp worked for about 12 days during which period officers of police other than those belonging to the Crime Branch were also attending the camp for the purpose of investigation. Mr. K. G. Adiyodi, then the Minister of Finance had visited the camp on 4th March, 1976, two days after Rajan is said to have died at the camp. This is a fact averred by the petitioner and not refuted and hence we naturally assume that it is true. The officers who camped at Kakkayam had to draw their bills for Travelling Allowance and Daily Allowance and these had to be counter-signed by the Inspector General of Police which he did. To say that his duties and responsibilities in regard to the officers were limited to signing their T. A. and D. A. bills seems to border on the ridiculous. But we are told by the learned Advocate General that this was the case. If that be so we have to sympathise with the plight of the Inspector General of Police who must be taken to have been functioning in such matters merely as a rubber stamp and as a post-office. 16. But we are told by the learned Advocate General that this was the case. If that be so we have to sympathise with the plight of the Inspector General of Police who must be taken to have been functioning in such matters merely as a rubber stamp and as a post-office. 16. Certain circumstances are highlighted by petitioner's counsel to indicate that the Inspector General was aware that he was making a false statement when he swore to his affidavit. The petitions sent by the petitioner passed through the hands of the second respondent on occasions when the Home Secretary forwarded them to him for obtaining reports thereon. The petition dated 24 81976 seems to be the earliest petition which so come into the hands of the Inspector General of Police. The father was wailing about want of information about his son in that petition. It is said that prompter and more effective action should have been attempted. There was in fact no serious enquiry at all and the report sent to the Inspector General of Police could have been taken seriously by him if he had cared to bestow his attention to it But all these may only be a reflection of the attitude of the 2nd respondent in dealing with a matter of life and death in which, as Inspector General of Police of the State he could have shown a greater sense of responsibility. On this we do not wish to add to what we have said in our judgment earlier. But we do not wish to find, on the basis of this conduct, that the second respondent was guilty of giving false evidence. We should therefore decline to institute any complaint against him under S.340(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 17. Now we come to the case of the 3rd and 5th respondents. We have to notice an objection by learned counsel Sri. Nayanar appearing for the 3rd respondent as well as Sri. T. V. Prabhakaran, appearing for the 5th respondent that we should not, at this stage, fake any action for prosecuting these respondents for perjury. 17. Now we come to the case of the 3rd and 5th respondents. We have to notice an objection by learned counsel Sri. Nayanar appearing for the 3rd respondent as well as Sri. T. V. Prabhakaran, appearing for the 5th respondent that we should not, at this stage, fake any action for prosecuting these respondents for perjury. Inspite of this court's finding and also the stand taken by respondents 1, 2 and 4 now that Rajan was taken into custody respondents 3 and 5 who are now facing a murder charge stick to their stand that Rajan was not taken into custody either by them or by any other police officers. This, their counsel urge, they are entitled to press in the murder charge against them and if they succeed in proving this case they are entitled to an acquittal. Therefore according to counsel the charge against them for perjury and trial on such charge may operate against them in the proper conduct of their defence in the case now registered against them for murder. We do not think that this is sufficient reason to desist from taking action under S.340 (1) of the Code in the light of what we have found in our judgment in the Original Petition. Action under S.340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure arises by reason of false evidence having been given in this court for the express and deliberate purpose of misleading this court into dismissing the Original Petition. If that is an offence under the Indian Penal Code, we do not think that the circumstance that respondents 3 and 5 are facing also a murder charge would be sufficient to dismisses the petition filed by the petitioner for taking action under S.340 (I) of the Code. The consequence of action being allowed to be taken under S.340 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure will be institution of complaints against respondents 3 and 5 before the Magistrate of the First Class having jurisdiction. If respondents 3 and 5 would be prejudiced by the trial of those cases before the disposal of the murder charge and if there is provision for staying the trial of such proceedings under such circumstances it would be open to respondents 3 and 5 to move for such relief before the appropriate forum. That would then be decided on its own merits. That would then be decided on its own merits. The proceedings under S.340 (1) cannot be dropped or deferred until the termination of the trial of the charge of murder which might take shape pursuant to the case taken against respondents 3 and 5 and others. 18. In the case of respondents 3 and 5 the finding of this court is sufficient to hold that action under S.340 (1) of the Code must follow, for, the decision of the court involves the finding that their case that Rajan was not arrested is false and that they did also know that it was false when they made such statements, The 3rd respondent was in charge of the Kakkayam camp and the 5th respondent was present at the time of torture of Rajan as found by this Court in the judgment. So they must have made such statement with the knowledge that such statement was false. Hence naturally we find that is expedient in the interests of justice that an enquiry into the offence under S.191 of the IPC. for giving false evidence be held against them This is so in the case of respondent 3 as well as 5. 19. Now we come to the case for action against Sri.. Karunakaran, the 4th respondent In Para.28 of our judgment of 13th April 1977 we had referred to the manner in which the 4 h respondent had, in his counter-affidavit, met the case of the petitioner. We said thus: "The petitioner in this case avers in his affidavit of 30 31977 that be met Sri. Karunakaran, the then Home Minister on 10 31976, at the Manmohan Palace at Trivandrum and Sri. Karunakaran told him that his son Rajan had been arrested from the College for involvement in some serious case and he will do his level best to look into the matter and help the petitioner. He would also say that he later met Sri A K. Antony, K.P.C.C. President, and a former student of the Maharaja's College, on the 4th January, 1977 and on the 2nd February 1977 and Sri. Antony assured him that Rajan was alive and in custody and he will see the Home Minister in this regard. In the counter-affidavit filed by Sri Karunakaran reference is made to the averment of the petitioner. Antony assured him that Rajan was alive and in custody and he will see the Home Minister in this regard. In the counter-affidavit filed by Sri Karunakaran reference is made to the averment of the petitioner. What is stated in reply is this: "The allegation made in Para.2 of the additional affidavit that I told the petitioner on 10th March, 1976 that his son Rajan had been arrested from his college for involvement in some serious cases and he will do his level best to look into the matter and help the petitioner is absolutely incorrect. I have never told the petitioner that his son Rajan was in police custody at any time, and so far, I have no knowledge that the said Rajan has been in police custody at any time." We regret to say that this is not meeting the point raised by the petitioner, for, one would like a direct answer particularly in view of the seriousness of the averment as to whether the petitioner did meet Sri. K. Karunakaran on 10th March, 1976. If he did meet him it would have been necessarily for the purpose of complaining about the disappearance of his son and more than what the reply of Sri. Karunakaran was, the fact of meeting Sri. Karunakaran itself would be relevant. Sri. Karunakaran could also have then said what reply he gave to the petitioner. One would be tempted to read from the counter-affidavit that the case is that the petitioner had not met the then Home Minister. But at the hearing when we put this question specifically to Sri. T. C. N. Menon, it was submitted that Sri. Karunakaran was not denying the fact of the petitioner meeting him, but he was only denying the case that he admitted about the arrest of Sri. Rajan. Counsel would also say that he is also not admitting about the date, for, Sri. Karunakaran is not sure of it. One may not remember on what date any visitor met him. But we would have been happy to find the case in the counter-affidavit that though the petitioner met him sometime he did not mention to the petitioner that Rajan was in police custody but mentioned something also. Karunakaran is not sure of it. One may not remember on what date any visitor met him. But we would have been happy to find the case in the counter-affidavit that though the petitioner met him sometime he did not mention to the petitioner that Rajan was in police custody but mentioned something also. Though this was what was submitted by learned Additional Advocates General we are surprised to find later a different stand taken in the hearing note submitted by the Additional Advocate hearing. The hearing note did not come at our our instance. In fact we do not normally encourage the practice of filing hearing notes. When the case was being beard the hearing note was filed by the learned Additional Advocate General requesting us to look into the notes before disposing of the case. On going through the notes it is seen stated: "Another important aspect which may be dealt with here is the petitioner's allegation that he met the then Home Minister, Kerala on 10 31976 and then the Home Minister told him that the petitioner's son had been taken into police custody in connection with a serious criminal case. I would like to submit that this allegation is absolutely unfounded. Apart from the categorical denial of the then Home Minister in his counter-affidavit filed before this court, the entirety of the circumstances and the petitioner's conduct shows that this allegation cannot be true." We assume that in view of what was stated by the learned Additional Advocate General before this court he is not pursuing this stand taken in his notes. If it is admitted that the petitioner met Sri. Karunakaran on 10 31976 or some other day at about that time and then representation was made to Sri. Karunakaran if the answer was different from what is stated by the petitioner that should have been mentioned in the counter-affidavit. Whatever that be we cannot fail to give credence to the petitioner's case that he met Sri. Karunakaran to represent about his grievance and evidently that must have been either on 10 3 976 or somewhere about that time. It is more so when the petitioner has offered himself for cross examination on his affidavit and the learned Additional Advocate General said that he does not desire to cross-examine him". Karunakaran to represent about his grievance and evidently that must have been either on 10 3 976 or somewhere about that time. It is more so when the petitioner has offered himself for cross examination on his affidavit and the learned Additional Advocate General said that he does not desire to cross-examine him". In the petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court moved in this court there was a specific ground which referred to the finding of this court on the contention of Sri. Karunakaran and therefore we had to deal with it and this court observed "It is strange that ground L. which refers to this, while categorically denying that the Home Minister had stated that the petitioner's son has been arrested from his College is silent about the case that the petitioner met Sri. Karunakaran. In fact when we asked the learned Advocate General what exactly is the case in ground L as to this, the learned Advocate General submitted that he has nothing to state other than what is said in the counter affidavit of the 4th respondent." As we pointed out that it was because of absence of a direct answer in the counter-affidavit of the 4th respondent that we had to make the comments in the judgment and even when we put this specifically to the learned Advocate General on the occasion when the petition for leave was moved in this court he was not in a position to give any specific answer. It was thereafter that the 4th respondent filed a fresh affidavit on 23 51977 when the case was posted for further action. In that affidavit Sri. Karunakaran also averred the case that Rajan was taken into police custody and was tortured and further said that Rajan died as a result of torture. Referring to the averments made by the petitioner in his affidavit of 30th March 1977 and the 4th respondent's reply to the affidavit filed on 4 41977 which has been commented upon in this court's judgment the 4th respondent in his counter-affidavit of 23 51977, said thus: "Sri. Referring to the averments made by the petitioner in his affidavit of 30th March 1977 and the 4th respondent's reply to the affidavit filed on 4 41977 which has been commented upon in this court's judgment the 4th respondent in his counter-affidavit of 23 51977, said thus: "Sri. T. V. Eachara Warrier, the petitioner in the Original Petition had met me on or about 10th March 1976 and told me that he suspected that his son is involved in the criminal case registered in connection with the attack by some persons on the Kayanna Police Station on 29-2-1976 and that he wanted me to use my good offices to exclude his son from that case. I told him that this was a crime under investigation by the police and that it would not be proper for me as the Home Minister to interfere with the investigation by the police by issuing directions to them." 20. The petitioner felt that the 4th respondent had added insult to injury by averring that the petitioner had sought interference by the Home Minister and the Minister did not oblige. According to the petitioner while he had no complaint about any proceedings being taken against his son and he only wanted information about the whereabouts of his son, by making a statement insinuating that the petitioner tried to influence the 4th respondent the latter was persisting in his dishonest attitude. A further counter-affidavit was filed by the petitioner on 31-5-1977 stating this and along with that on the same day CMP. 7406 of 1977 was filed by the petitioner for taking action against the 4th respondent for perjury. Sri Karunakaran has thereupon filed a supplementary affidavit on 8-6-1977. In that he explains the rea on way at the earliest point of time he did not give a direct answer to the averment of the petitioner. The explanation is "It was unintentionally that I did not disclose in full the reply I gave to the petitioner when he met on or about 10-3-1976." Referring to the version of the petitioner as to what the 4th respondent spoke on that occasion the case in the supplementary affidavit of the 4th respondent is this: "The statements made by me in Para.8 of my affidavit dated 22 51977 are from my memory. What had transpired when the petitioner met me on or about 10 31976 is, to the best of my memory, as stated in Para.8 of that affidavit." But it does not stop there. This is immediately followed by the statement "The averments of the petitioner to the contra are not correct". When the 4th respondent states that he is speaking from his memory, if the suggestion is that he is liable to have made a mistake for that reason the further statement totally denying the averments of the petitioner cannot be honest. What strikes us is that the 4th respondent even at this moment is not prepared to state his case fully and squarely and present to the court his version of the case in plain and unambiguous terms. In spite of the several occasions Sri. Karunakaran had to explain his stand, so far as is relevant for the case, to enable us to make an objective assessment of the case against him. we feel we bad no assistance from his counter-affidavits. Even in the last of the affidavits filed by him on 8th June 1977 there is no categorical or unequivocal answer to the petitioner's case Whether Sri. Karunakaran obtained the information about the arrest of Rajan when Sri. Eachara Warrier met him on or about 10 3 1976, whether he naturally believed that case, what was his state of belief all along thereafter, and particularly when he received repeated complaints from Sri. Eachara Warrier thereafter, whether he had on any occasion discussed this with the 3rd respondent with whom he would have been in direct contact since the Inspector General of Police is said to have been by-passed, are all matters on which we would have expected some light to be thrown, if not an honest disclosure made. This he owed to the petitioner as also to this court even when he filed the return to the Habeas Corpus petition and at any rate at least in his latest affidavit. In bis affidavit filed on 23rd May 1977 he states "I had stated in the Legislative Assembly that Sri. Rajan had not been in police custody on the basis of the report of the Inspector General of Police dated 7177. Apart from this report I had no other source of information in the matter." (Underlining ours). In bis affidavit filed on 23rd May 1977 he states "I had stated in the Legislative Assembly that Sri. Rajan had not been in police custody on the basis of the report of the Inspector General of Police dated 7177. Apart from this report I had no other source of information in the matter." (Underlining ours). This is inconsistent with the case of information having been received by him as early as in March 1976 from Eachara Warrier. Again he had every other source available, He would have asked the 3rd respondent for the information. One fails to understand let alone appreciate, the statement that the Home Minister of the State had no source of information. The next sentence in the same affidavit makes stranger reading. It is said "I had no means whatever to doubt the correctness of the facts stated in the report of the Inspector General of Police." If the 4th respondent had been told about the arrest by the petitioner soon after such arrest in March 1976 and there was no reason for the Home Minister to doubt the veracity of such information we are surprised that the Minister should have been gullible enough to be taken in by a haphazard report about which we have expressed our views earlier in our judgment. 21. Reference is made in the counter-affidavit of the 4th respondent to the instructions given by him to the learned Additional Advocate General that he was prepared to seek the appointment of a commission to find out the truth about Rajan's arrest when this Original Petition was filed in this court. There is no case that this idea of appointment of Commission arose prior to the filing of the petition for Habeas Corpus. Actually the proposal to appoint a commission was mentioned in court by the learned Additional Advocate General after the entire evidence was closed and when the case was being heard. Assuming that instructions had been given to the learned Additional Advocate General to submit that the Government was prepared to conduct an enquiry into the matter by appointing an Honourable Judge of this Court for that purpose as stated in the affidavit filed by the 4th respondent on 23 41977 that attitude will be of no assistance to Sri. Karunakaran. Assuming that instructions had been given to the learned Additional Advocate General to submit that the Government was prepared to conduct an enquiry into the matter by appointing an Honourable Judge of this Court for that purpose as stated in the affidavit filed by the 4th respondent on 23 41977 that attitude will be of no assistance to Sri. Karunakaran. What is stated in this regard in the affidavit is this: "After the writ was filed, I thought that the matter should be further probed into and so I had instructed the Additional Advocate General even before the evidence was recorded to represent that the Government is prepared to conduct an enquiry in the matter by an honourable judge of this Honourable Court." On fails to reconcile this with the return filed by the 4th respondent on 4th April 1977 denying the arrest of Rajan. If Sri. Karunakaran felt that the the matter should be further probed into and that by a high level Commission even before evidence was taken in the case as is now stated it naturally follows that Sri. Karunakaran was not certain when he filed the return on 4th April 1977 that Rajan had not been arrested. He could not then have categorically stated "I have no knowledge that the said Rajan has been in police custody at any time." Information is the source of knowledge and when the veracity of such information is doubted the question of belief arises. The 4th respondent had information on or about 10th March 1976 about Rajan's arrest as observed earlier. Hence to say that he had no knowledge at any time may not be true. 22. The case of truth is served best by plain speaking,1 hat, we are afraid, has been a casualty in this case. When the case came up before us for hearing prior to our judgment of 13th April, 1977, learned Additional Advocate General mentioned to us more than once that he did not believe the entire police version of the case to be true. Atleast when the matter came to this court the Home Minister who, by that time, had become the Chief Minister could have caused further investigation to be made in the matter so that instead of setting up a case now admitted to be false truth might have been attempted to be brought out to assist this court. Atleast when the matter came to this court the Home Minister who, by that time, had become the Chief Minister could have caused further investigation to be made in the matter so that instead of setting up a case now admitted to be false truth might have been attempted to be brought out to assist this court. The stand now taken in the supplementary affidavit filed on 8th June 1977 is one jetting down the Additional Advocate General. It is stated in the supplementary affidavit thus: "The statement stated to have been made by the Additional Advocate General that he is not believing the entire story of the police officers regarding the arrest of Sri. Rajan, it is submitted, was not under instructions from me." We do not want to go into this question as it may not be necessary and in view of the present stand we do not want to rely upon any observation by the Additional Advocate General when he argued the case before us on the previous occasion. 23. The two features which distinguish the case against the 4th respondent from that against respondents 1 and 2 are that in the case of the former there is the fact that he was contacted personally by the petitioner soon after the arrest of Rajan and secondly there is absence of explanation as to the circumstances appearing against the 4th respondent in the wake of evidence that the petitioner had conveyed to him information about the arrest of Rajan as early as in March 1976. 24. Summing up: Sri. Karunakaran had knowledge about the arrest of Rajan as early as on March 10, 1976 or thereabouts. He does not speak to any circumstance which made him doubt the correctness of this information, at any rate until 7th January, 1977. He is silent about his state of belief till that day. Several representations from the petitioner came to the Home Department and the 4th respondent could not say that he was unaware that the petitioner was pursuing his case. Ext. P3 would belie such a statement. Sri. Jayaram Padickal the 3rd respondent, was dealing directly with the Home Department by-passing the Inspector General of Police. The 4th respondent is silent as to whether he made any enquiries with the 3rd respondent at any time. Merely on the report of 711977 Sri. Ext. P3 would belie such a statement. Sri. Jayaram Padickal the 3rd respondent, was dealing directly with the Home Department by-passing the Inspector General of Police. The 4th respondent is silent as to whether he made any enquiries with the 3rd respondent at any time. Merely on the report of 711977 Sri. Karunakaran could not have come to a positive belief that Rajan was not arrested if all along he was believing otherwise. At any rate, in the light of the case of the father all along that the son was arrested, normally, one would have expected him to direct that the matter be looked into further. Sri. Karunakaran now says that even before the evidence in the Original Petition was adduced he had instructed the learned Additional Advocate General to submit that the Government was proposing to appoint a Commission. No such submission was made to court before evidence was closed. That apart, that would mean that Sri. Karunakaran was not certain when he filed his statement on 4 41977 that his stand was true. Nevertheless he asserted that Rajan was not in police custody at any time. We are not relying on purely controversial material to which reference is made by the petitioner and to which we will refer presently. On the broad circumstances of this case and on the material now available we find there is a case for inquiry as against the 4th respondent which inquiry is to be pursuant to an order by us under S.340(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The materials referred to us by the petitioner's counsel on which we are not particularly relying now, but which may perhaps be relevant in an inquiry are the following. 25. There is an averment by the petitioner in the Original Petition that the 4th respondent bad, during the election campaign addressed several public meetings at which he is said to have spoken that the petitioner's son Rajan was involved as an accused in a murder case and that was why he was kept in custody. Sri. Karunakaran denied this case of the petitioner. In support of the petitioner's case two witnesses were examined before this court in the earlier stage of these proceedings. Sri. Karunakaran denied this case of the petitioner. In support of the petitioner's case two witnesses were examined before this court in the earlier stage of these proceedings. They spoke to the fact that Sri Karunakaran had, in his election meeting, referred to the arrest of Rajan, If we believed that statement that would have amounted to holding straightaway that Sri. Karuna-kanan was aware of the fact of the arrest. There was no counter evidence of this since Sri. Karunakaran did not offer himself for cross examination. Nevertheless we did not express our view one way or the other on the evidence of these witnesses. What we said in this context was as follows: "At the 'samapana rally' of the election campaign he is said to have admitted the detention of Sri. Rajan, and explained it to be because he was a member of a banned organisation. PW.10 and PW.11 are two persons who are said to have heard the speech. Their cross-examination indicates that the answer to their evidence is that they are interested persons as they belong to the politically opposite camp. That by itself may not be sufficient to discredit their evidence. But we are not basing our decision on the evidence of these witnesses for another reason. If we believe the case that Sri. Karunakaran, the then Home Minister, admitted the detention of Sri. Rajan, that by itself would be sufficient to allow the petition. We would base our conclusion on the evidence of the witnesses in this case who speak first hand rather than what is said to be admitted especially when that is refuted. So is the case with Ext. P3 letter to which we will advert in due course." Again there was controversy as to the construction of Ext. P3 letter admittedly written to Sri. Viswanatha Menon M. P. That is discussed in Para.30 of the judgment of this court. What is stated in that context is "The reply Ext. P3 is signed by him personally. If in March, 1976 or thereabout the petitioner had met the Home Minister in connection with the controversy and the issue had not been closed for months, the Home Minister would have been, in the normal course, able to say that no action was called for as Rajan was not in custody. Ext. P3 is signed by him personally. If in March, 1976 or thereabout the petitioner had met the Home Minister in connection with the controversy and the issue had not been closed for months, the Home Minister would have been, in the normal course, able to say that no action was called for as Rajan was not in custody. Ext. P3 is at least evidence of the fact that even as late is in December. 1976 the State or its officers had no case that Rajan had not been taken into custody, though the Home Minister himself had been contacted soon after 1-3-1976. Whether by Ext. P3 the Home Minister intimated that the matter of release was under consideration is a question on which there is keen controversy. For the Home Minister it is said that this was not what was meant Though plainly read this is what appears from the words {]kvXpXImcyw in Ext. P3 letter we do not want to rule out the possibility that what was meant was only that the petition was under consideration, If at all we err in this we would like to err so as to accept the explanation of the author of the letter." In view of what we have said about Ext. P3 it may not be fair to base any case against the 4th respondent on Ext. P3 letter. But evidence as to whether 4th respondent did admit at his election meeting that Rajan was arrested is a matter still at large and may be relevant in determining whether the 4th respondent was giving false evidence. Reference is made in the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner on 10th June 1977 to certain informal discussions among the Cabinet Ministers. This is what is stated in para 8 of the affidavit: "In this context I respectfully submit that the revelation by some of the Honourable Ministers of the previous cabinet in which the 4th respondent was the Home Minister, that there was an'informal' discussion among them is important. It is not clear why out of the about ten thousand cases only my son's case was a subject-matter of discussion among the members of the cabinet " This again is a matter on which we do not wish to reply here. It is not clear why out of the about ten thousand cases only my son's case was a subject-matter of discussion among the members of the cabinet " This again is a matter on which we do not wish to reply here. If there is any evidence to show that Rajan's case came up before the cabinet or was discussed between the members of the cabinet and the Chief Minister and other Ministers were aware of it that again is a matter that may be relevant in the inquiry and that calls for no comment from us at the moment. There is an averment in the same affidavit of the petitioner of a statement by the Minister for Food and Agriculture, Sri. E. John Jacob at Alleppey. He is said to have stated that Rajan died in the process of questioning by the police, which was on'instructions from higher authorities'. It is not indicated how this statement would be of any use, for, Sri. John Jacob was not a Minister in office at the relevant time. Though several persons were taken to the investigation camp at Kakkayam including students of the Regional Engineering College it is said that one alone among them was released and that was Sri. John K. Paul, son of a partner of Popular Automobiles and this is said to be further indicative that the Home minister denies such release having been made under instructions from him and there is no material to show at the moment that any such release was under orders from him. 26. In the circumstances indicated we think that there is a prima facie case of "giving false evidence" as against the 4th respondent. That calls for an inquiry by the Magistrate of First Class having jurisdiction over the area. We reiterate here that to constitute the offence of 'giving false evidence' it is not necessary that the person who gives such evidence knows it to be false. If he makes such statement without believing it to be true that amounts to giving false evidence. In the circumstances of the case we find, prima facie, that when Sri. Karunakaran made the statement in his affidavit of 4 41977 he could not have believed it to be true. 27. If he makes such statement without believing it to be true that amounts to giving false evidence. In the circumstances of the case we find, prima facie, that when Sri. Karunakaran made the statement in his affidavit of 4 41977 he could not have believed it to be true. 27. It is true that we should order prosecution for perjury only if we feel that ii is expedient in the interests of justice to do so. Our attention has been drawn by learned Advocate General to the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Chajoo Ram v. Radhew Shyam, AIR. 1971 SC. 1367 and Santekh Singh v Izher Hussain, AIR. 1973 SC. 2190. In the first of these cases the Supreme Court said "The prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by courts only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. No doubt giving of false evidence and filing false affidavits is an evil which must be, effectively curbed with a strong hand but to start prosecution for perjury too readily and too frequently without due care and caution and on inconclusive and doubtful material defeats its very purpose. Prosecution should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interests of justice to punish the delinquent and not merely because there is some inaccuracy in the statement which may be innocent or immaterial There must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and the Court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge." Here we are not concerned with any inaccurate or wrong particulars given in any statement which is of no consequence. If the statements which are considered as false are inconsequential or immaterial the time of the Criminal Court need not be wasted by being asked to inquire into the case. But where the false statement is made deliberately the court would be doing injustice in closing its eyes to the situation. That would be deliberate when the object and purpose of making the statement is to lead the court to render a decision different from that which the court would have rendered if the statement was truly made. That of course is the situation here Hence we see no scope for application of the decision to this case In Santekh Singh v. Izhar Hussain, AIR. That of course is the situation here Hence we see no scope for application of the decision to this case In Santekh Singh v. Izhar Hussain, AIR. 1973 SC. 2190, the court observed: "Every incorrect or false statement does not make incumbent on the court to order prosecution. The court has to exercise judicial discretion in the light of all the relevant circumstances when it determines the question of expediency. The court orders prosecution in the larger interest of the administration of justice and not to gratify feelings of personal revenge or vindictiveness or to serve the ends of a private party. Too frequent prosecutions for such offences tend to defeat its very object. It is only in glaring cases of deliberate falsehood where conviction is highly likely that the court should direct prosecution." Here again the question was whether the falsehood was deliberate. We had already commented on that expression. In the result, on the question of taking action under S.340 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure we hold that such action is not called for in regard to respondents I and 2, but such action by way of prosecution for perjury would be called for in respect of respondents 3,4 and 5. That would be in regard to the falsity of statements made by them and referred to in Para.3 of this order. Complaints will accordingly be filed before the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam for giving false evidence which is an offence under S.191 of the Indian Penal Code punishable under S.193 of the IPC. The Registrar of the High Court is appointed to sign such complaints. Such complaints shall be sent to the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam for further action. Respondents 3 and 5 may, if they are so advised, seek appropriate remedies for holding in abeyance action pursuant to such complaint and if they are entitled to any relief on that account that will not be affected by reason of this order. Disposed of as above.