Short Note : 1. It is an admitted position in this case that the appellant was nominated by the deceased Dashrathsingh to receive the amount in case of his death. The only question on which the entitlement of the appellant has been called in question is that such nomination is not in accordance with the rules of the Fund. We have, therefore, to see the rules of the Fund. Rule 5 deals with the nomination and is relevant provision which we have to consider in this case. It may be stated here that the General Provident Fund (Central Services) Rules, 1960 have been framed in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 and Clause (5) of Article 148 of the Constitution. They are statutory rules and these rules would govern the validity of the nomination in the case. I have already pointed out that section 5 gives the right to the nominee to receive the amount where the nomination was duly made in accordance with the rules of the Fund. Under rule 5, a subscriber, at the time of joining the Fund, makes a nomination conferring on one or more persons the right to receive the amount that may stand to his credit in the Fund, in the event of his death, before that amount has become payable or having become payable has not been paid. The second proviso to the rule enjoins on the subscriber to make the nomination only in favour of a member or members of his family when he had a family. As to who would be the members of the family is clarified by the definition Clause 2 (c) and 'Family' has been defined. 2. It is clear that if the appellant, Smt. Lilabai is not the legally married wife, her nomination when other family members were living, would not be effective as against such members and, therefore, the question arises whether Smt. Lilabai was the legally married wife of Dashrathsingh or not. Held : I would first take up the question of presumption in such cases and would advert to Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumar, AIR 1952 Supreme Court 231, whether their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that it was well settled that continuous cohabitation for a number of years may raise a presumption of marriage. Held : I would first take up the question of presumption in such cases and would advert to Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumar, AIR 1952 Supreme Court 231, whether their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that it was well settled that continuous cohabitation for a number of years may raise a presumption of marriage. The presumption which may be drawn from long cohabitation is rebuttable, and if there are circumstances which weaken or destroy that presumption, the Court cannot ignore them. It would, therefore, be necessary to see whether the presumption that would arise in favour of Lilabai from long and continuous cohabitation would be weakened or destroyed by any such circumstance as has been fully proved in the case. The only circumstance on which reliance is placed is that in face of the established fact that Dukhwantibai was married to Dashrathsingh a presumption of second marriage was not permissible. The first appellate Court has lost sight of the fact that the alleged marriage with Lilabai is said to have taken place some 25 years before. It is admitted by the plaintiff's witnesses and even by the plaintiff herself that Lilabai was living with Dashrathsingh for the last 19-20 years and unless it was established that there was any impediment to Dashrathsingh marrying for second time, a presumption could validly be raised from such long association living together as husband and wife openly and to the knowledge of all concerned. The mere fact that Dukhwantibai was also a married wife would not create such an impediment as at that time there was no such law prohibiting a second marriage. It appears to me clear that cohabitation as husband and wife for 20 years would clearly give rise to a presumption in favour of the marriage of Lilabai with Dashrathsingh. 3. We may then turn to the evidence in the case. The evidence of sister of Lilabai was rejected on the ground that she was unable to remember the facts about her own marriage and, therefore, it was unthinkable that she would be able to state the details of marriage of her sister. This undoubtedly is a wrong approach. It is difficult for a Hindu bride to remember the details of her marriage. Most of the time she is just doing what her relatives are asking her to do without her knowing as to what was happening round her. This undoubtedly is a wrong approach. It is difficult for a Hindu bride to remember the details of her marriage. Most of the time she is just doing what her relatives are asking her to do without her knowing as to what was happening round her. It is difficult for the bride to know as to who was the priest and who attended her marriage and the various other details. But it can well be expected that the persons responsible for marrying her knew such details and thus the evidence of Lilabai's sister giving the various details of the marriage has wrongly been brushed aside. Suddhobai (D.W.2) then deposed to a very important circumstance that their parents died when they were very young. It was thus necessary for her to marry her younger sister and that is why she had learned Lilabai at the first opportunity. It is also natural that she may not know the address of her brother who had never cared to think about them or had not taken upon him the responsibility of marrying his sister. In my opinion, the evidence of Lilabai and Suddhobai have wrongly been discarded on the question of actual marriage with Dashrathsingh. I am aware that in a second appeal, it will not be permissible for me to disturb the finding of fact arrived at by the Court below. This, however would be possible if the appellate Court discarded material evidence on wrong premises shutting its eyes to the well established characteristics of human conduct as borne out by experience. The first appellate Court had not viewed the evidence in the proper perspective and not applied the law laid down by the Supreme Court correctly. I would, therefore, hold that the evidence in the case warrants the conclusion that Lilabai was married to Dashrathsingh and that it would be justified in drawing the presumption of marriage with Dashrathsingh because of long cohabitation with Lilabai. I would, therefore, restore the finding of the trial Court and hold that Lilabai was married to Dashrathsingh. In that case, the nomination in her favour would be valid and she alone would be entitled to the amount of the provident fund. Appeal allowed. AIR 1952 SC 231 , relied on.