Judgment HARI LAL AGRAWAL, J. 1. This application in revision by the members of the second party is directed against the final order passed against them by the Executive Magistrate, Bhabua, in a proceeding under S. 147 of the Cr. P. C, 1898 (hereinafter called the Code). 2. The disputes relate with respect to two Galis; one between Holdings Nos. 214 and 212, on the one side, and Holdings Nos. 217 and 217/1, on the other, and another between Holdings Nos. 217 and 217/1, on the one side, and Holding No. 218, on the other, as also mentioned in the proceeding in question. The proceeding was started on the basis of a police report dated 23-2-1970 on a petition filed by the first party on 14-2-1970 before the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Bhabua. 3. The case of the first party was that the two Galis were connected on the southern side with Bhabua-Chand metalled road and on the northern side with a Gali further north running east to west, and that the first party and other persons whose houses stood continguous to these Galis were using the same as passage for egress from and ingress to their houses for a long time. The members of the second party, who are recent purchasers of Holdings Nos. 217, 217/1 and 218, wanted to create obstruction to the aforesaid user and to raise constructions covering the Gallis in question by showing the Gallis as part and parcel of their purchase. The case of the second party, namely, the petitioners, was that they purchased the holdings mentioned above by two registered sale deeds dated 1-8-1969 and 19-12-1969 and that the alleged Gallis in question were imaginary somuch so that the first party never used the Galis in question and had a different passage for negotiating the road in question. 4. On the report of the Police, initially a proceeding under S. 144 of the Code was started on 5-3-1970 ,by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, but later on, by an order dated 4-5-1970, on a perusal of the show cause petitions filed by both the parties and examining the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Magistrate converted the proceeding into one under S. 147 of the Code and directed the parties to file their written statements. 5. 5. In support of their respective cases, both parties examined a large number of witnesses and produced various documents. On an appreciation of the materials produced before him, the learned Magistrate decided the proceeding partly in favour of the first party, that is, he accepted the case of the first party with respect to only one Gali that was by the side of Holdings Nos. 212 and 214 and meets the Bhabua Chand Road (P. W. D.) and rejected the case with respect to the second Gali. The second party has, accordingly, come to this court in revision. 6. Mr. R. S. Chatterji, who appeared in support of this application, raised the following contentions: (i) The inquiry in question itself having been started beyond period of three months from the date of the complaint of the first party, the whole proceeding was without jurisdiction; (ii) The Executive Magistrate has not recorded any finding that the right claimed by the first party had been exercised by him within three months next before the institution of the inquiry and, therefore, the order was without jurisdiction; and, (iii) The Executive Magistrate has misread the agreement for sale and other documents filed by the petitioners, 7. I will take up the first two contentions together as they are inter-connected. These contentions are based upon the proviso to sub-sec. (2) of S. 147 of the Code which prescribes a period of limitation for the aggrieved party to move the Criminal Courts for the redress of his grievance with respect to disputes concerning rights of user of land or water, etc. whether - such right be claimed as an easement or otherwise. (2) of S. 147 of the Code which prescribes a period of limitation for the aggrieved party to move the Criminal Courts for the redress of his grievance with respect to disputes concerning rights of user of land or water, etc. whether - such right be claimed as an easement or otherwise. The proviso reads as follows: "Provided that no such order shall be made where the right is exercisable at all times of the year, unless such right has been exercised within three months next before the institution of the inquiry, or where the right is exercisable only at particular seasons or on particular occasion, unless the right has been exercised during the last of such seasons or on the last of such occasions before such institution." It has been seen that the first party made his complaint before Sub-Divisional Magistrate by a petition on 14-2-1970 alleging that the members of the second party were intending to cause obstruction to his user of the Galis in question and that on this account there was apprehension of breach of the peace. The present proceeding, namely, the proceeding under S. 147 of the Code was drawn up by an order dated 4-5-1970, apparently within a period of three months from the date of filing of the petition by the first party. The order dated 4-5-1970 is a long-drawn order in which the learned Magistrate, on a perusal of the respective show causes filed by both the parties, came to the conclusion that the dispute could be resolved only by drawing a proceeding under S. 147 of the Code. Mr. Chatterji, however, contended that the inquiry in question could be deemed to be instituted on the date when the Magistrate entered upon the evidence, and not on the date when the Magistrate made the initial order drawing up the proceeding. Learned counsel, however, could not call to his aid any authority in support of his contention. Reading the provision and the scheme of S. 147 of the Code, it is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Chatterji. Learned counsel, however, could not call to his aid any authority in support of his contention. Reading the provision and the scheme of S. 147 of the Code, it is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Chatterji. In my opinion, if such an interpretation Is put to the provision of limitation contained in the proviso to S. 147 (2) of the Code, then it is bound to work great injustice and there would be no fixity in the period of limitation, for in that event, a more clever opponent may steal a march over Ms adversary, by delaying the hearing by seeking adjournment or avoiding service of process and thereby letting the three months period elapse. The period of limitation has been deliberately fixed under the proviso so that any person who wants to move a criminal court for any relief contemplated under the provision of S. 147 of the Code, must move with speed within the said period, and when he is late, he loses the said forum. The date of institution of the inquiry is the date when the likelihood of breach of the peace is brought to the notice of the Magistrate by an aggrieved person or by a police report. The period of three months has to be computed from this date. Any other construction may lead to anomalous situations. In my opinion, the mode of computation of the period of limitation provided in the proviso is at par with the mode of computing the period of limitation in a civil proceeding. As in a civil suit, the period of limitation is computed from the date of presentation of the plaint, being the date of Institution of the suit, so in a proceeding under S. 147 of the Code, the I period of three months is to be computed when the apprehension of a breach of the peace is brought to the notice of a Magistrate, either by a petition or by a police report. Once this view is taken, then it has got to be held that the inquiry in question instituted on 4-5-1970 under S. 147 of the Code cannot be held to be without jurisdiction. The first contention of Mr. Chatterji therefore must be rejected. The second contention of Mr. Chatterji also has got no force. Once this view is taken, then it has got to be held that the inquiry in question instituted on 4-5-1970 under S. 147 of the Code cannot be held to be without jurisdiction. The first contention of Mr. Chatterji therefore must be rejected. The second contention of Mr. Chatterji also has got no force. Whereas it cannot be disputed that the settled view of this Court is that in the case where the right claimed is exercisable at all times of the year, an order under S. 147 of the Code will be without jurisdiction unless it is based upon a finding that the right claimed has been exercised within three months next before the institution of the inquiry. Mr. Chatterji is not right in contending that the impugned order is bad on account of the absence of this finding. It is, no doubt, true that the learned Executive Magistrate has not recorded an express finding in terms of the proviso, nonetheless the finding recorded by him does indicate that the first party was exercising the right of user of the Gali in question day to day. The first party examined seven witnesses and the essence of their evidence was that the Galis in question were being used by the first party and the other persons for a long time and that "at present also (the date of their deposition) they were utilising these two Galis as rasta". The first party who examined himself as A. W. 3 stated that at present also he was coming and going through these Galis and the learned Magistrate has recorded a finding on this evidence in these words: "...............People of the locality have been utilising the Galli as their rasta since long time and at present they are utilising the same..............." The above finding, in my view, not only establishes that the right has been exercised within three months next before the institution of the inquiry; it rather indicates that the right was exercised even right up to the date of the evidence of the witnesses. The second contention of Mr. Chatterji also therefore, has got no substance and must be rejected. 8. The third contention of Mr. The second contention of Mr. Chatterji also therefore, has got no substance and must be rejected. 8. The third contention of Mr. Chatterji that the learned Executive Magistrate has not properly appreciated the Mahadanama in favour of the petitioners and some other documents produced on their behalf, where the boundaries of the properties purchased by them have been described, in also devoid of any substance and does not merit much discussion inasmuch as this pertains to the appreciation of evidence. This Court in revisional jurisdiction is always reluctant to go into this question unless the findings of fact are shown to be in any way perverse or the like. 9. Before concluding, however, I may also refer to two further subsidiary contentions advanced by Mr. Chatterji, namely, (i) there was no finding that the apprehension of breach of the peace still existed on the date when the final order was passed, and (ii) there was no finding that the first party had acquired any right of easement with respect to the Gali in question. In my opinion, it is not necessary for a Magistrate in making an order under S. 147 of the Code that the apprehension of breach of the peace concerning rights of user must also exist at the time of making the order. It is sufficient that such an apprehension existed at the date of initiation of the proceeding. The existence of the likelihood of breach of the peace regarding any alleged right of user is a jurisdictional fact and if once a Magistrate is satisfied on this fact, either from the Police report or other materials, he is entitled to initiate the proceeding and pass a final order. The second contention that in the absence of a finding that the first party had acquired a right of easement over the Gali in question he was not entitled to the protective order in question, is also devoid of any substance. S. 147 of the Code is not confined to easement acquired by uninterrupted enjoyment for twenty years as provided by S. 25 of the Limitation Act. The section itself now contemplates the rights whether they "be claimed as an easement or otherwise". It is, therefore, plain that the word "easement" is not used in the restricted sense in which it is used under the Limitation Act. The section itself now contemplates the rights whether they "be claimed as an easement or otherwise". It is, therefore, plain that the word "easement" is not used in the restricted sense in which it is used under the Limitation Act. For the purpose of S. 147 of the Code, a person may not have strictly speaking a right of easement, but may have acquired the right of user by any other mode. This right has got to be a right distinguished from the use of the land as an owner, and not in any way unlawful. 10. Mr. Chatterji raised yet another contention, namely, that the proceeding in question having been initiated when the old Code was in force and that the same should have been concluded under the old Code itself, but inasmuch as the final order was passed by Shri G. P. Sharma, an Executive Magistrate - a Magistrate under the new Code - the impugned order was invalid. This contention however, was ultimately not pressed and it was admitted that Shri G. P. Sharma was vested with the powers of a First Class Magistrate under the old Code and, therefore, was otherwise competent to dispose of the proceedings. 11. All the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners by Mr. Chatterji having been found to be of no substance, this application must fail and is, accordingly, dismissed. SHAMBHU PRASAD SINGH, J. 12 I agree.